Government at a Glance 2025

Government at a Glance 2025

This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.

The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

Please cite this publication as:
OECD (2025), *Government at a Glance 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0efd0bcd-en.

ISBN 978-92-64-36321-2 (print)
ISBN 978-92-64-59508-8 (PDF)
ISBN 978-92-64-31390-3 (HTML)

Government at a Glance
ISSN 2221-4380 (print)
ISSN 2221-4399 (online)

Photo credits: Cover © Babaroga/Shutterstock.com.

Corrigenda to OECD publications may be found at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/support/corrigenda.html.

Foreword

Governments across the globe are navigating a period of profound transformation and challenge. Aging populations, the twin transitions to digital and green economies, low levels of trust in public institutions, stagnating productivity, and constrained fiscal space are testing the resilience and effectiveness of public institutions like never before. In response, many governments have strengthened their approaches to public governance—through, for example, greater digitalisation, streamlined budgeting, and regulatory simplification. The imperative now is to not only sustain these efforts but to deepen them.

Deepening these efforts requires governments to build trust in public institutions while fostering a renewed sense of shared prosperity. This calls for a deliberate focus on restoring individuals' sense of dignity in their interaction with governments, enhancing individual and collective sense of security and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of government to boost productivity. This edition of *Government at a Glance* includes a spotlight on the long-term governance of the green transition- a challenge that lies at the intersection of all three areas. As explored in greater depth in Chapter 1, how governments lead this transition will shape public trust and prosperity for generations to come.

With a growing emphasis on governance outcomes, this ninth edition of *Government at a Glance* presents the latest evidence on public governance tools and resources that can help public administrations in OECD and accession candidate countries address complex, long-term challenges — while allowing progress to be monitored over time. It draws extensively on the analytical and statistical work of the Public Governance Committee, as well as that of the Regulatory Policy and Senior Budget Officials Committees and their subsidiary bodies.

Looking ahead, 2027 will mark two decades of *Government at a Glance*. The publication has grown in ambition, recognising that an evidence-based approach is essential to support policymaking, enhance accountability and enable governments to adapt to complexity and change. Future editions will continue to deepen and expand the evidence base on public governance- its design, implementation, and tangible impacts on economy and society. This work will include assessing how governance practices align with relevant OECD recommendations, as well as advance the measurement of government efficiency and effectiveness.

This report was approved by the Public Governance Committee on 30 April 2025, and prepared for publication by the OECD Secretariat.

Acknowledgements

Government at a Glance 2025 is the work of the OECD Directorate for Public Governance, under the overall leadership of Elsa Pilichowski, Director. The publication was prepared by the OECD Governance Indicators and Performance Division, under the direction of Monica Brezzi, Head of the Division and co-ordinated by Santiago González. *Government at a Glance 2025* was drafted by Brett Carson, Conor Das-Doyle, Santiago González, Alexis Kyander and Alessandro Lupi. Anais Gaffud provided research assistance.

Major contributions were received from Gillian Dorner, Omer Faruk Metin (chapter 2); Andrew Blazey, Ludovico Campagnolo, Mike Cressey, Anne Keller, Jean Francois Leruste and Carissa Munro, (Chapter 3) Elise Desplanques, Anne Keller, Ernesto Soria Morales, Silvia Picalarga, Álfrún Tryggvadottir (Chapter 5); Jack Beeching, Ludovico Campagnolo, Deniz Devrim, Jean Francois Leruste, Nina Lengliger, Carissa Munro Ollin Perez Reynault and Benedict Stefani (Chapter 6); Cecilia Emilsson, Felipe González-Zapata, Albert Rapha, Vania Sari and Ricardo Zapata (Chapter 7); Paul Davidson, Ramisa Huq, Valeria Prieto, Tobias Querbach, Alexander Roberts, Simay Tekin, Yola Thuerer, Vincent Van Langen (Chapter 8); Indre Bambalaite, Andrew Blazey, Eddie Casey, Titouan Chassagne, Anne Keller, Delphine Moretti, Scherie Nicol and Álfrún Tryggvadottir (Chapter 9); Tenzin Dekyi and Santiago González (Chapter 10); Andras Hlacs, Kenza Kachani and Giulia Morando (Chapter 11); Ludovico Campagnolo,Jean Francois Leruste and Carissa Munro (Chapter 12) Stephanie Cooper, Nicole Drew, Daniel Gerson, Pinar Guven, Alessandro Lupi, Dónal Mulligan and Nina Thomassen (Chapter 13); Ayeesha Abbasi, Daniel Gerson, Alessandro Lupi and Nina Thomassen (Chapter 14) .

The Focus chapter (Chapter 1); received contributions from many of the above on the specific subject matters noted, and also Robert Addison, Alana Baker, Pauline Bertrand, Erika Bozzay, Matthieu Cahen, Ludovico Campagnolo, Mike Cressey, Tenzin Dekyi, Gillian Dorner, Mia Drazilova, Sara Fyson, David Jonason, Jean Francois Leruste, Giulia Morando, Carissa Munro,Elina Smetanina, Taylor Tang, Timothy Tennant, Piret Tonurist,Camila Vamalle and Chiara Varazzani. *Government at a Glance 2025* was edited by Sally Hinchcliffe and benefitted from editorial assistance from Andrea Uhrhammer. It was prepared for publication by Meral Gedik.

Valuable comments to chapter 1 were received from Enrico Botta, Daniel Nachtigall and Kilian Raiser of the OECD Environment Directorate and Raj Anasuya of the OECD Centre for Tax Policy. Valuable comments to Chapter 4 were received from Gaetan Lafortune and Chris James of the OECD Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs; Corinne Heckmann and Miyako Ikeda of the OECD Directorate of Education and Skills.

The delegates to the OECD Public Governance Committee and the Government at a Glance Steering Group provided guidance to the publication and substantial comments to the drafts. Many of the indicators included in Government at a Glance reflect the measurement of OECD principles and recommendations developed with the Public Governance Committee (PGC), the Committee of Regulatory Policy (RPC) and the Committee of Senior Budget Officials (SBO). These indicators are collected through OECD surveys to government officials developed in co-operation with the PGC, the RPC, the SBO, the Public Employment and Management Working Party (PEM), the Working Party of Senior Public Integrity Officers (SPIO), the Working Party of Senior Digital Government Officials (E-Leaders), the Network of Senior Infrastructure and PPP Officials (SIP) and the Working Party of Leading Practitioners on Public Procurement.

Table of contents

Executive summary

Governments today operate in a high-stakes environment marked by profound demographic, environmental and digital shifts compounded by relatively low levels of trust. Economic issues are at the forefront of citizens' minds, yet governments must respond in the face of a challenging fiscal landscape: in 2023, average fiscal deficits in OECD countries reached 4.6% of GDP, a sharp rise from 2.9% in the years preceding the COVID-19 pandemic.

Navigating these issues will require governments to focus on three fronts: enhancing individuals' sense of dignity in their interaction with governments, restoring individual and collective sense of security in the face of rapid societal and economic changes, and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of government to boost productivity, while restoring public finances. At the intersection of these three fronts lies the long-term governance of the green transition.

Enhancing individuals' sense of dignity through meaningful citizen engagement, strengthened accountability and more human-centred public services

- Governments need to focus on enhancing citizens' trust that institutions and officials act in the public's interest, are accountable, and give people a voice in decision-making. Only about 30% of OECD populations in 2023 believed their governments would resist corporate influence, and 38% were confident their parliament could hold the government to account or that public services would respond to user needs. Only 30% feel that their political system lets them have a say.
- OECD countries are increasingly redesigning their delivery of public services to put users at the centre, with 20 out of 28 surveyed countries taking a life-event approach to service design, although only 13 have fully integrated them for at least one life event. These approaches mean people can find all the administrative services they need for a specific event, such as having a baby, in one place.
- Rules can be more effective when those affected are involved in their development. Among OECD countries, the average quality of stakeholder engagement in primary lawmaking improved slightly, rising from 2.0 in 2014 to 2.3 in 2024 on a scale of 0 to 4. In addition to traditional mechanisms, governments can also employ deliberative democratic practices—such as citizens' assemblies, juries, and public dialogues—to address complex or long-term policy challenges. Between 1979 and 2023, the OECD recorded 716 such processes, with 20% (148) occurring between 2021 and 2023.
- Standards on public transparency and conflicts of interest strengthen accountability, but only if put into practice. OECD countries' regulatory frameworks on transparency of public information meet 66% of the recommended criteria, while their implementation meets 64%. The implementation gap is wider for conflicts of interest: OECD countries have 77% of the regulatory safeguards in place on average but only 42% are implemented in practice.

Restoring individual and collective sense of security in the face of rapid societal and economic changes

- Economic issues dominate most people's concerns in OECD countries: 59% identified inflation as one of the three most important concerns, 33% poverty and social inequality, and 22% unemployment and jobs.
- Slightly more than one-third of people (37%) believe that the government can adequately balance the needs of different generations, while 41% disagree. Education and training opportunities help younger people benefit from economic growth; however, in 2023, 12.6% of youth were not in employment, education, or training (NEET)—a decrease from 2012, when the rate stood at 16%.
- Improving the effectiveness and accessibility of the justice system is key to preventing fraud and ensuring contracts will be enforceable. On average, the quality of civil justice across OECD countries scores 0.68 on a 0-1 scale, barely unchanged since 2014, when it was 0.67.

Optimising all available tools to boost government efficiency and productivity in the economy

- In 2023, almost all OECD countries (34 out of 35 surveyed) had conducted or were conducting spending reviews, aiming to restore their public finances. Political leadership is crucial to such reviews; in 15 of these countries, the cabinet was involved in setting their objectives and scope, while in 17 the cabinet had the final say on adopting their recommendations.
- Data, digital tools and AI all offer the prospect of efficiency gains. On average, OECD countries score 0.61 on the Digital Government Index (on a 0-1 scale) but could improve their digital policy frameworks, whole-of-government approaches and use of data as a strategic asset. On average, only 47% of OECD governments' high-value datasets are available as open data, falling to just 37% of education datasets and 42% of health and social welfare ones.
- With public procurement amounting to 12.7% of GDP, optimising procurement systems could significantly boost efficiency. Already, 21 out of 35OECD surveyed countries use innovative technologies to streamline procurement workflows, automate repetitive tasks and reduce costs. Active monitoring is also crucial to efficiency gains; over two-thirds of OECD countries use efficiency indicators in their procurement systems to track and improve effectiveness.

Managing the green transition lies at the intersection of all of these

- The green transition requires long-term commitment. This is reflected in 23 out of 37 OECD countries enshrining emissions targets into law and 5 more proposing to do so. As of 2023, nearly half of countries (18 of 37) have also established dedicated independent advisory bodies to guide and monitor progress. However, detailed data on their roles and powers remain scarce, indicating the need for clearer frameworks.
- Green public procurement (GPP) frameworks have been adopted by 35 out of 38 OECD countries, but only 11 countries are developing methodologies to measure their environmental impact, such as CO_2 emissions saved.
- A large majority of OECD countries with available data (27 out of 36) assess the environmental impact of major primary laws but just 7 conduct *ex post* reviews of alignment with national or international sustainability goals.
- There is also an implementation gap in green infrastructure: 21 out of 32 surveyed countries have set climate resilience outcomes for infrastructure, but only 9 evaluate alternative solutions based on these outcomes during the appraisal process.

Chapter 1. Governing for the green transition

Government at a Glance 2025 looks at how governments are addressing the climate crisis and working to limit the impacts of climate change. It analyses the governance arrangements that public institutions can adopt to ensure that government actions to mitigate or adapt to climate change are as effective as possible. It does so by presenting the latest available OECD evidence on the extent and quality of public governance arrangements in place.

Climate change caused by emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) poses an immediate and escalating threat to our societies. Global temperatures are already increasing due to emissions caused by human activity. Global surface temperatures were 1.09°C higher in 2011–2020 than in 1850-1900 and have increased faster since 1970 than in any other 50-year period over at least the last 2000 years (IPCC, 2023[1]). Food and water security have decreased in some regions and occurrences of food-, water- and vector-borne diseases have increased, as have extreme heat events (ibid.). The frequency of climate- and weather-related disasters, such as droughts, storms, cyclones, hurricanes, and typhoons, nearly quadrupled from the 1970s to the 2010s. Hydrological disasters such as floods have become 6 times more frequent (FAO, 2021[2]).

Progress is being made in efforts to mitigate climate change and reduce emissions. While emissions remain at a record high, their growth is now being substantially reduced by the deployment of green technology, including in energy production (IEA, 2023[3]). CO2 emissions per capita from energy have been falling in OECD countries since 2005 (OECD, 2023[4]). Many mitigation options are now both technically viable and increasingly cost-effective, including solar and wind energy, urban green infrastructure, energy efficiency, demand-side management, improved forest and crop/grassland management, and reduced food waste (IPCC, 2023[1]). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that adopting sustainable consumption practices and technologies could reduce emissions by up to 70% by 2050 (Creutzig et al., 2023[5]).

Despite this progress, the risk of objectively falling short of climate goals remains high. Emissions are unlikely to fall enough to limit global warming to the target of 1.5C (UNEP, 2023[6]). In the near term (2021–2040), global warming will continue to increase, mainly due to increased cumulative GHGs emissions. Moreover, the effects of climate change may not proceed linearly with the level of warming (IPCC, 2023[1]). Many irreversible "tipping points", such as the loss of ice sheets, glaciers or coral reefs, may be crossed with a higher probability and at much lower levels of warming than previously assumed (OECD, 2022[7]). The path of emissions reductions matters substantially: reducing emissions as soon and as fast as possible gives a better likelihood of reducing irreversible damages.

To bridge the remaining large gaps as soon as possible, governments can increase their leverage to shape global climate outcomes through more effective regulation, taxation as well as spending, and also by leading by example in the way administrations function. A wide array of policy measures, regulatory tools, and public finance instruments are critically important for the collective effort needed to significantly curb emissions. Their role has gained increased attention across the OECD and governments have made progress in integrating climate action into their institutional, regulatory and financial frameworks. The adoption of policies to reduce emissions, and the stringency of these policies, increased steadily across the OECD between 2000-2020 (Nachtigall et al., 2022[8]). Most OECD countries have adopted net zero emissions strategies and more than half have initiated efforts to green their public administrations. As explored below, climate objectives are increasingly embedded at the highest levels of governance. According to the latest available data, 14 of 27 centres of government in OECD member and partner countries co-ordinate climate policy and 13 of 27 monitor climate and environmental policies. Green public finance tools are also gaining traction, with 24 of 36 OECD countries (66%) having introduced at least one green budgeting tool, such as green budget tagging. A significant majority, 35 of 38 OECD and (92%) have introduced Green Public Procurement frameworks.

Nevertheless, evidence suggests that OECD countries are lagging behind in the design of effective governance tools for policy actions in this field (OECD, forthcoming). While most OECD countries have net-zero strategies, only 23 countries and the EU have granted them legal status, limiting their enforceability. In turn, according to the first Global Stocktake, policies implemented by the end of 2020 were insufficient to meet countries Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), indicating an implementation gap as well (OECD, 2024[9]).

These systemic implementation gaps weigh on citizen's trust in public institutions to navigate complex policy issues. Across the OECD, around 44% of people report having low or no trust in their national government, and many are skeptical about the manner in which their governments deal with large and complex policy issues (OECD, 2024[10]). Around 70% of people across OECD countries indicate that addressing climate change should be a priority for their government, but only an average of 42% are confident their country will reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the next 10 years (Figure 1.1). As explored below, this confidence gap, in addition to having consequences for trust in government, can have real impacts on the effectiveness of climate change policy: if people and businesses have concerns about the credibility, effectiveness or fairness of climate change policy, it is less likely that public institutions will be able to implement in a sustained manner over the long term.

Figure 1.1. An average of four in ten are confident their country will reduce greenhouse gas emissions



Note: The figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question "On a scale of 0 to 10, how confident are you that [COUNTRY] will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next ten years?" The "confident" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; "neutral" is equal to a response of 5; "not confident" is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and "Don't know" was a separate answer choice. "OECD" presents the unweighted average of responses across countries.
Source: (OECD, 2024[10]).

StatLink https://stat.link/l1kjnc

Figure 1.2. Governing for the Green Transition Framework



Source: OECD Illustration.

Governments will be critical in determining how successful our societies will be in achieving permanent reductions in emissions and building resilience to the impacts of climate change over the coming decades, and will need to be more effective with the governance tools that enable their policies. Responding to this need, the OECD has developed the "**Governing for the Green Transition**" framework (Figure 1.2). This framework structures the public governance practices and processes necessary to design and implement climate change policy effectively over the long-term. They are grouped under mutually reinforcing three pillars: **Commitment – Capabilities – Consensus. Commitment** involves structuring public institutions to ensure they are credibly committed to long-term implementation of climate policies. This is important for ensuring that climate change policy is sustained across electoral cycles and is not derailed by other pressing, but more transitory, issues. The second pillar, **Capabilities** involves building the skills, practices and processes within public institutions to ensure to design and implement climate change policies, using a mix of policy tools effectively. The third pillar, **Consensus,** involves building broad and lasting public support for climate change policy. This is necessary to ensure businesses and individuals act to reduce emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change. It is especially important where climate change policy may involve managing trade-offs or welfare costs across different groups, and positive perceptions of effectiveness and fairness are needed to maintain support.

This chapter presents the OECD's evidence on the effectiveness in current governance practices for each of these pillars, with Box 1.1 providing an overview. There are significant implementation gaps in several of the areas for which detailed data is available. These include many core capabilities: regulation, budgeting and infrastructure governance. In several others, there are knowledge gaps, with no detailed information yet available to systematically assess effectiveness. These include independent oversight of climate policy, public sector skills, citizen engagement, and greening public administration. With limited time remaining to address emissions reduction, it is important that these gaps are addressed urgently by OECD members.

Box 1.1. Overview of evidence on Governing for the Green Transition framework

The table below provides an overview of the OECD's evidence and state of knowledge about the governance practices under each pillar of the **Governing for the Green Transition** framework. **Early Stage** indicates that standards for relevant public governance practices are not fully developed, and/or that evidence on the implementation these practices is not sufficient to compare effectively across OECD countries. **Developing** indicates that public governance practices have been developed and OECD has collected evidence on their implementation, but there aremain significant opportunities for expanding and strengthening. **Mature** indicates that public governance practices have been developed, OECD has collected evidence on their implementation, and many countries are implementing effectively. While this broad analysis offers an overview of collective progress, the specific application and outcomes may vary from country to country. Nonetheless, it provides a useful reference point for understanding the general state of green governance and identifying areas that could benefit from further attention and refinement.

	Early stage	Developing	Mature
		Commitment	
Long term strategy		✓	
Whole of government co-ordination	✓		
Monitoring and measuring outcomes			✓
Independent oversight	✓		
Policy innovation and foresight	✓		
		Capabilities	
Green regulation		✓	
Green budgeting		✓	
Green taxes & market-based incentives		✓	
Green infrastructure		✓	
Green procurement		✓	
Green public sector skills	✓		
		Consensus	
Public participation and engagement	✓		
Behavioural change	✓		
Greening public administration	✓		
Managing influence and lobbying		✓	
Access to justice	✓		

Source: Authors.

Commitment

The first pillar of Governing for the Green transition is **Commitment**: ensuring that governments are credibly committed to implement long-term policies to reduce emissions and minimise the degree of climate change. Ensuring credible commitment is a central issue which public institutions must address in their governance approach to climate change mitigation. The policy mix required to reduce emissions includes investments, taxes and regulatory compliance, often with upfront costs for people and businesses. This can create an intertemporal trade-off, with climate policies imposing costs for current taxpayers, while benefits accrue over the long-term, primarily to populations in the future. Moreover, governments face many other pressing and immediate issues, which are of direct salience for voters during the current electoral cycle. These compete for priority and resources.

This can create an issue of time inconsistency and credibility in climate change policy. Elected leaders have incentives to focus on shorter-term issues that provide visible outcomes to their electorate. Policies to reduce emissions are at continuous risk of being undermined by pressures to "roll-over" the costs of mitigation to future policymakers (Brunner, Flachsland and Marschinski, 2012[11]). Uncertainty over climate change policy has direct effects for mitigation efforts by actors outside government. For example, private investment in decarbonisation technology can be significantly negatively affected by uncertainty about future carbon prices (Blyth et al., 2007[12]; Fuchs, Ströbel and Terstegge, 2024[13]).

To address this, public institutions must construct a governance framework for climate change policy which incorporates "commitment mechanisms". These can be thought of as institutional arrangements that make it a difficult and time-consuming process to change policy rules in all but emergency situations (Kydland and Prescott, 1977[14]). This section examines how governments can set an effective long-term framework for climate change mitigation policy, incorporating appropriate legal and institutional commitment mechanisms. Issues covered are: 1) Setting long-term strategy and goals, with legal and political backing; 2) Using policy co-ordination and coherence mechanisms to ensure joined up policy across institutions responsible for different aspects of climate change; 3) Establishing independent climate advisory boards to provide independent oversight of climate change policy; 4) Monitoring progress on emissions reduction effectively, to support evidence-based adjustments to policy over time; and 5) Implementing innovative governance approaches, such as mission governance and strategic foresight, to improve policy effectiveness as conditions change.

Long-term Strategy

A first step in credibly committing public institutions to long-term action on climate change is establishing clear long-term policy frameworks and setting overarching goals and interim targets that align with these, (OECD, 2023[4]). Climate-change strategies can support credible commitment by providing a long-term ambition, framework and targets. They may also outline potential trade-offs, the milestones necessary to achieve policy objectives and how the government will prioritise resources and support climate strategies over the long term. Twenty of 24 countries for which data is available (83%) have adopted net zero emissions strategies as of 2022 (Figure 1.3). Globally, these commitments now represent 88% of global GHG emissions (OECD, 2024[15]).

Net zero targets have been widely adopted in legislation in OECD countries over the past decade. As of 2022, 23 of 37 OECD countries for which data is available (62%) had placed Net Zero targets into legislation and a further 5 of 37 (13%) had placed them in proposed legislation (Figure 1.4). From a commitment perspective, this approach can help to provide long-term assurance that emissions reduction policy will be sustained. Placing Net Zero emissions targets into legislation creates institutional barriers to help prevent backsliding, and also legally commits public institutions to implement them. Moreover, the targets being adopted by OECD countries are generally comprehensive, 31 of 37 countries (84%) have adopted economy wide targets, and a further 31 of 37 have adopted targets covering a wide range of greenhouse gases (i.e. CO2, methane, and others).

To further support commitment, some countries have endorsed long-term climate change strategy by the cabinet or council of ministers. The Net Zero Strategy: Build Back Greener in the United Kingdom, for example, spells out policies to achieve a decarbonised economy by 2050. The strategy is overseen by the Prime Minister, with the Cabinet Committee on Climate Change. The strategy's assumptions are regularly updated based on policy performance and technological developments (Kaur et al., 2023[16]). Climate change strategies can also be the basis for co-operation agreements across sectors or between levels of government. An example of co-operative agreements among authorities is Luxembourg's Climate Pact, an agreement through which local governments commit to climate-related measures, helping to co-ordinate between national and sub-national governments (OECD, 2021[17]).

Figure 1.3. Many OECD countries have Net Zero Emissions strategies



Note: Data is for 24 OECD countries implementing green budgeting in 2022. OECD countries which are not implementing green budgeting not included.
Source: OECD Survey on Green Budgeting Practices, 2022.

StatLink https://stat.link/g80mt3

Figure 1.4. Most OECD countries have placed Net Zero Emissions targets in legislation



Note: No data available for USA.
Source: OECD Climate Actions and Policy Measurement Framework (OECD, n.d.[18]), accessed via OECD Data Explorer.

StatLink https://stat.link/hl4k60

Whole of Government Co-ordination

Climate change is a cross-cutting issue, requiring co-ordinated action by different government actors in many areas of policy, such as energy, transportation, agriculture and trade. A "whole-of-government" approach to policy making is required for policy to be credible. Governments can achieve this by situating co-ordination of climate change policy within the Centre of Government (CoG). The CoG consists of the Prime Minister's and/or President's offices, and other bodies and institutions supporting cross-government government priorities (OECD, 2023[4]). The CoG can help to set strategic priorities across government and embed climate change policy within prioritisation and planning exercises. For example, France's Direction Interministerielle de la Transformation Publique (DITP) supports strategic prioritisation on the green transition with whole-of-government plans and annual targets.

OECD's data on institutional structures in CoGs suggests that there may be weaknesses in taking a "whole-of-government" approach to climate change policy. As of 2023, 44% of OECD countries (12 out of 27) reported that climate action is one of the top priorities for their CoG (OECD, 2023[19]). While this was more than any other policy area, it was not a top priority for many CoGs. Only 14 out of 27 CoGs (51%) were responsible for steering and co-ordinating climate and environmental policies (Figure 1.5). A further 14 out of 27 monitored the implementation of the national climate strategy, and 13 of 27 (48%) monitored a selection of climate or environmental projects. These findings suggest there is scope for CoGs to take a more active role in climate change policy in many countries.

Figure 1.5. CoG role in climate & environmental policy



Note: n=27; Respondents were asked "What is the centre of government's role with regards to climate and environmental policy?".
Source: OECD Survey on the Centre of Government (OECD, 2023[19]).

StatLink https://stat.link/8hvmoj

Multiple institutional arrangements can be used by the CoG to leverage its convening powers. These can include super ministries, a dedicated ministry of environment and/or a co-ordination unit at the centre of government. Some may offer more authority to orient agencies' financial and technical resources for more effective policy development and planning. They are not mutually exclusive and are often layered to balance their advantages and drawbacks. In each arrangement, the CoG can support and steer policy development without necessarily driving it through a specialised unit in the centre.

CoGs have various tools to engineer collaboration across government on climate change policy (Figure 1.6). The most frequent is to use sectoral targets integrated in a cross-government strategy or sectoral strategies reviewed for alignment with climate and environmental objectives (OECD, 2023[19]). Aligning commitments at both sectoral and national levels can be challenging, and countries have adopted different approaches. For example, Scotland is addressing this through a National Planning Framework established by the CoG, while France's national low-carbon strategy involves co-ordination across stakeholders by the CoG.

Figure 1.6. Many OECD countries lack mechanisms for whole-of-government co-ordination for policy coherence

Mechanisms for whole-of-government co-ordination for policy coherence for sustainable development



Note: See also Figure 5.1 in Chapter 5.
Source: (OECD, 2023[20]).

StatLink https://stat.link/ui25jz

As a cross-cutting issue, governments also require mechanisms to promote policy coherence between environmental and other policy objectives. This may involve developing mutually supportive policies or managing trade-offs. Most OECD countries for which data is available (15 of 24, 63%) have governance arrangements in place to support communication between ministries and departments and promote cross-sectoral co-ordination (Figure 1.6). Practices include inter-ministerial working groups and networks, focal points, councils and interdepartmental commissions. However, many countries may need to develop a more structured approach to ensuring coherence of climate change policy with other national priorities. Most notably, only 3 of 24 countries (13%) have established mandates for mitigating or managing divergences between priorities in different sectors. Only 10 of 24 OECD countries (42%) undertake capacity building for policy coherence.

A key factor limiting improvements towards policy coherence is the absence of institutional mechanisms for detecting and resolving policy conflicts and assessing the impacts of policies. Currently, only 4 out of 24 OECD countries (17%) report using impact assessment tools to assess the transboundary impacts of policies (OECD (2023[20]), see also Figure 5.3 in Chapter 5). This low number is partly due to insufficient data and evidence-based information for assessing these impacts. Only 6 of 24 OECD (25%), report including the impacts of policies in the information provided to Ministers or Parliament. These are important barriers to building credible and effective climate and emissions reduction policy, as consideration of long-term and transboundary impacts is critical. Further information on policy co-ordination is given in Chapter 5.

Monitoring & Measuring Outcomes

Setting national GHG emissions targets, and monitoring emissions of GHGs, is an important commitment mechanism to support the long-term effectiveness of climate policies. Long-term targets, and short-term actions to achieve them, are key anchors for expectations, and for judging the effectiveness of current policy action. As of 2023, all OECD members and accession candidates for which data are available had adopted some form of GHG emissions targets. All had signed up to nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and 33 of 37 OECD countries (86%), and 6 of 7 accession candidates (71%) had set some form of Net Zero targets. However, stringency of Net Zero targets can vary, depending on the year in which countries aim to achieve net zero emissions, the range of sectors their goal targets, and the strength of the institutional arrangements for achieving Net Zero. Taking these factors into account, the average stringency of GHG emissions reduction targets across the OECD in 2023 was estimated at 7.5, measured on a scale of 0-10 (Figure 1.7). However, while 31 of 37 countries have target stringency of at least 7.5, a small number of countries lag significantly behind OECD peers in setting targets. Moreover, collectively, the Net Zero targets which have been set by OECD countries continue to fall short of reaching the emissions reductions which are necessary under the Paris Agreement.

Reporting on GHG emissions levels is necessary for ensuring long-term oversight and effectiveness of emissions reductions policies. All OECD members and accession partners for which data are available reported GHG emissions in 2023. However, the quality, completeness and transparency of reporting varies substantively. Overall, on a scale of 0-10, the average stringency of GHG emissions reporting across the OECD in 2023 was estimated at 7.0 (Figure 1.7). Most OECD countries varied between scores of 6 and 10. Finland, Austria, Spain and Switzerland notably all scored 10, meeting all criteria which the OECD used to examine the stringency of emissions reporting. However, a number of OECD countries had significant gaps in tracking their GHG emissions, with scores below 3.5. This hinders the ability of governments to commit to long-term climate action, by limiting their ability to monitor the effectiveness of policy. It is highly important that public institutions maintain effective monitoring emissions levels and use this to improve future policy.

Figure 1.7. Most countries have set GHG emissions reductions targets & reporting mechanisms, 2023



Note: All data for Emissions reporting is estimated based on recent year for which data is available. Data not available for USA and Brazil. Score for Emissions Reporting aggregates several measures: whether GHG emissions accounting following the System of Environmental Economic Accounting; Countries' submissions of GHG Inventories based on UNFCCC Annual Inventory Review Reports; harmonised score of the transparency and completeness of Biennial reports or Biennial Update Reports adopting the methodology of (Weikmans and Gupta, 2021[21]); and Submissions of 5 key documents under the UNFCCC enhance transparency on emissions data and countries' climate action. Please see metadata for OECD Climate actions and policies measurement framework for more details.
Source: OECD Climate Actions and Policy Measurement Framework (OECD, n.d.[18]), section "GHG emissions data and reporting", accessed via OECD Data Explorer.

StatLink https://stat.link/dpx1hw

Independent Oversight

Establishing independent authorities to provide oversight and review of climate policy can help to ensure long-term commitment and credibility (Brunner, Flachsland and Marschinski, 2012[11]). Independent Climate Advisory Bodies (ICABs) are independent councils delegated by governments to assess a country's climate performance and/or advise on its climate policies. As of 2023, 19 of 37 OECD countries (51%) had established ICABs (Figure 1.8). Of these, 17 were established in law, potentially providing stronger assurance on their existence and functions over the long-term. This was a large increase since 2013, when only 5 of 37 OECD countries (13%) had ICABS in place, of which 4 were established in law. This trend reflects growing recognition of the role of independent and science-based oversight in reinforcing commitment to emission reduction targets. ICABs roles in climate governance can include independent reviews of the assumptions, models and emissions trajectories underlying government emission reduction policies, advising on targets, and in some cases, producing independent analysis or emissions trajectories assessments of progress, and impact assessments (Averchenkova and Lazaro, 2020[22]).

Nonetheless, only half of OECD countries had established an ICAB as of 2023. In addition, no detailed data comparing the roles and powers of ICABs is currently available. This is a significant gap in assessing how effective the governance of climate policy is across OECD countries and limits the ability to establish best practices for the operation of ICABs. There is currently no standardised framework for establishing such bodies, and there are significant differences in their legal mandates, authority and scope of work across countries. For example, the UK's Climate Change Council can make proposals for the carbon budget (Box 1.2), while France's Council for Climate (HCC) cannot, and can only react to the carbon budget decided by the government. There is space to further advance in sharing experiences and generating comparative evidence on the effective design and role of ICABs.

Box 1.2. The United Kingdom's Climate Change Committee

One of the most prominent success stories of ICABs is the United Kingdom's Climate Change Committee (CCC) created under the Climate Change Act of 2008, the world's first strategic climate framework legislation. The CCC, fully embedded in the UK's policymaking, provides independent advice on emission targets and progress monitoring. Notably, this nonpartisan expert panel elaborates the UK's legally binding carbon budgets, setting five-year caps on greenhouse gas emissions. These budgets have driven key mitigation policies including the phase-out of coal-fired power plants, the expansion of renewable energy and stricter energy efficiency standards. The CCC also publishes annual reports assessing government policies, monitoring key indicators and providing recommendations to address potential gaps. To ensure accountability, the government must respond to these findings in a report to Parliament by October 15 of each year (Gransaull, Rhodes and Fairbrother, 2023[23]). The CCC has long emphasized the importance of embedding climate action in government action, encouraging cross-government policies. The independence, evidence-based approach and statutory nature of the CCC shield it from political cycles, ensuring policy continuity across political administrations. The CCC was the first of its kind and paved the way to the creation of similar bodies in other OECD countries.

Figure 1.8. Only half of OECD countries have an Independent Climate Advisory Body



Note: Data is for 2023. Data not available for USA.
Source: OECD Climate Actions and Policy Measurement Framework (OECD, n.d.[18]), accessed via OECD Data Explorer.

StatLink https://stat.link/5ragm8

Policy Innovation & Foresight

Climate change mitigation is complicated by interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders, and is unlikely to be addressed solely through the linear approach of a single strategy (Lazarus, 2009[24]; Rittel and Webber, 1973[25]). While maintaining long-term commitment, policymakers and public servants will also need to innovate and adapt policy implementation as political, social and technological conditions change over time. For example, approximately 35% of the CO2 emission reductions needed to achieve net-zero emissions by 2070 rely on technologies currently at the prototype or demonstration phase, and 40% on technologies that have not yet been commercially deployed in mass-market applications (IEA, 2025[26]). Policymakers may benefit by utilising a "mission governance" perspective on climate change policy, that is a far-reaching vision with transformative aspirations, seeking to set specific, ambitious, long-term, time-bound, and cross-sectoral objectives to address wicked problems (OECD, 2025[27]).

Strategic foresight can also support a country's long-term climate strategy by helping governments identify the long-term, complex challenges that lie ahead. This can be done by exploring potential futures through techniques such as horizon scanning, megatrends analysis, modelling, scenario planning, visioning and back casting. In the context of climate change, strategic forecasts can be used to identify future climate impacts or anticipate and plan for future developments that may impact a country's ability to deliver on its climate goals (OECD, 2023[4]). The application of foresight and future scenarios by the centre remains limited, with only 35% of surveyed OECD centres utilising these tools (OECD, 2023[19]).

Capabilities

The second pillar of Governing for the Green transition is Capabilities. These are the skills and competences which public institutions need to master in order to competently implement long-term policies to reduce emissions. Climate change is a cross-sectoral issue, requiring changes in areas including energy production, transport, infrastructure, agriculture, land and resource use, and individual choices to lower the amount emissions. Government must utilise a range of policy instruments to drive emissions reduction across these different areas. These include regulatory instruments (such as technology or performance standards), economic instruments (such as carbon taxes and green subsidies), and public investment and consumption instruments (like public procurement and investment) (OECD, 2024[28]). Governments must be able to utilise the full range of instruments capably and effectively, across regulation, budgeting, procurement and infrastructure management. They also require appropriate skills among public servants. This section reviews the extent to which governments in OECD countries can utilise these instruments effectively to mitigate climate change.

Green Regulation

Regulation can promote climate change mitigation and adaptation and encourage green innovation. To achieve these outcomes, public institutions should use tools and approaches designed to improve the quality of regulations, particularly for high-emission sectors. Regulatory impact assessment can help to identify likely climate impacts, feasible alternatives, and trade-offs of different policy options. Currently, 35 OECD members require an impact assessment as part of regulatory design. Of these, 28 countries (80%) systematically assess environmental impacts for all or major regulations. This has increased slightly from 25 a decade ago. However, while a majority of OECD countries systematically assess impacts of new laws and regulations on the environment, only half (14 of 28) extend these reviews to cover specific issues such as greenhouse gas emissions (OECD, 2024[29]). More systematic and granular assessments environmental impact assessments are needed.

Regular ex post review is also essential for ensuring that existing regulations support national and international climate policy goals and improving regulations to respond to evolving challenges and opportunities. Ex post evaluation remains an underdeveloped practice among OECD countries, in particular the evaluation of environmental impacts. Only 3 out of 38 OECD countries (8%) require ex post evaluations to assess whether existing regulations align with environmental sustainability goals for all or for major primary laws (Figure 1.9, see also Figure 8.19 in Chapter 8). Furthermore, while 25 OECD countries conduct principles-based reviews (i.e. the use of a principle, such as administrative burdens or effect of regulation on competition, as an initial filter to identify which regulations warrant review or potential reform), 7 out of 38 OECD countries (18%) have undertaken a principle-based review to assess the impacts of existing regulations on environmental sustainability in recent years (see Online Figure J.5.5, see also (OECD, 2025[30])). It is important that governments increase efforts to ensure that regulations stay fit-for-purpose amidst changes in the climate and advances in technology. This means reviewing regulations regularly and adjusted continuously, creating a feedback loop.

Empowered and enabled economic regulators can also make a significant contribution to the green transition and decarbonisation of network sectors. Economic regulators are permanent bodies which operate at "arms-length" or independently of central government, partly in order to ensure that long-term decisions on sectors can be adequately considered alongside near-term considerations. In many countries, economic regulators are responsible for overseeing firms in network sectors which are critical to emissions reduction, such as energy and transport. However, at present, the OECD assesses that many regulators do not have the necessary tools and governance arrangements in place to contribute effectively to implementing emissions reduction policy (OECD, 2024[31]).

Figure 1.9. *Ex post* evaluation of impacts of regulations on environmental sustainability is underdeveloped



Note: shows data for the question "Are ex post evaluations required to assess consistency with national or international environmental sustainability goals?" Data are based on 38 OECD Members. See also Figure 8.19 in Chapter 8.
Source: (OECD, 2024[29]).

StatLink https://stat.link/yft0hd

Figure 1.10. Few regulators have objectives on environmental sustainability defined in legislation

Share of regulators with objectives relating to environmental sustainability in legislation



Note: Data displayed is for all 36 OECD countries which completed the 2023 Governance of Sector Regulators (GSR) survey, representing 158 sector-country combinations (127 unique institutions). See also Figure 8.12 in Chapter 8.
Source: (OECD, 2024[31]).

StatLink https://stat.link/5zvmkc

Figure 1.11. Many regulators in energy, water and air transport have legal powers on environmental sustainability

Share of regulators with the legal power to consider environmental sustainability in regulatory decision making



Note: Data displayed is for all 36 OECD countries which completed the 2023 Governance of Sector Regulators (GSR) survey, representing 158 sector-country combinations (127 unique institutions). See also Figure 8.13 in Chapter 8.
Source: (OECD, 2024[31]).

StatLink https://stat.link/yctrb9

Economic regulators do not always have an appropriate mandate, with clear objectives and relevant powers, to support carbon mitigation efforts. There is also no standard approach to defining the role of economic regulators in the green transition. Currently, only 41% of economic regulators have explicit objectives defined in legislation relating to environmental sustainability (Figure 1.10, see also Figure 8.12 in Chapter 8). Even where objectives have been set, regulators do not always have a clear mandate and are not always supported by relevant legal powers to pursue these objectives. Currently, across all sectors, only 58% of economic regulators have legal powers to consider environmental sustainability in decision making (Figure 1.11, see also Figure 8.13 in Chapter 8). This rises to 86% in the energy sector but stands at only 30% in rail transport and 29% in e-communications. Amongst regulators with relevant powers, GHG reduction and decarbonisation are the areas most considered within their decisions, with two thirds of economic regulators considering these issues (see Figure 8.14 in Chapter 8, also (OECD[31]) 2024).

A broadened remit to cover climate change mitigation issues will require regulators to balance multiple objectives and may increase the complexity of their tasks. It is important that economic regulators become part of a more co-operative and co-ordinated approach across government. This is an area with significant room for improvement, as 60% of regulators lack formal co-ordination mechanisms for environmental sustainability issues (see Online Figure J.5.2 in Chapter 8). Guidance is needed to establish approaches for manging competing priorities, through co-ordination. Defined quantitative targets can also support regulators in providing surety on their goals and help co-ordinate action. This can also be improved substantively across the OECD. At present, only 56% of regulators have quantitative targets defined for their sector, and only 31% overall use such targets in their decision making (see Online Figure J.5.3 in Chapter 8).

Regulators also require access to sector data, and capacity to use this data, to support action on climate change and ensure decision-makers are appropriately informed. Regulators must be empowered to collect and manage relevant data for their sector, in order to be able to consider climate change issues in decision making. Currently, only 44% of regulators have powers to collect data on the environmental sustainability of their objectives (see Figure 8.15 in Chapter 8). For those regulators with the power to collect data, close to one third do not systematically do so, sometimes due to powers being too narrowly defined (OECD, 2024[31]). One of the reasons for limited data collection may be that 80% of regulators are not required to assess the impact of decision making on environmental sustainability (see Figure 8.16 in Chapter 8).

Supporting climate change mitigation will also require new skills and tools to support regulatory delivery, and an appropriate organisational culture. Currently, close to half of regulators (50%) have not hired, nor plan to hire staff with expertise in environmental sustainability, nor do they plan to make use of external professionals (see Figure 8.17 in Chapter 8). More information on regulation and green responsibilities of regulators is covered in Chapter 8 “Regulation”.

Green taxes & market-based mechanisms

Governments can use market-based instruments, such as taxes on the emission of GHGs to lower emissions and encourage greening of economic activity activities. By putting a price on GHG emissions, governments can both mobilise public revenues and steer the economy towards lower emissions. Market based instruments encompass both explicit mechanisms, such as carbon taxes and emissions trading systems (ETS), and implicit instruments, such as fuel excise taxes (OECD, 2016[32]). Most OECD countries apply either a carbon tax or an ETS to each of four energy-intensive sectors: transport, buildings, electricity production and industry (Figure 1.12). However, the stringency of these mechanisms varies, both in terms of the price applied, and the range of GHGs which are included. Moreover, a large share of emissions are not covered by carbon taxes or ETSs. In 2023, 58% of GHG emissions were not subject to a carbon price in 72 countries accounting for 80% of global emissions (OECD, 2024[33]).

Carbon taxes offer advantages in providing certainty on emissions prices, ease of administration and revenue mobilisation (OECD, 2024[33]). ETS schemes offer greater flexibility and design adaptability. Both carbon taxes and ETS may face political resistance due to concerns over their fairness. As such, the governance framework for carbon pricing should ideally address distributional impacts. One route is to recycle carbon tax revenues by using it to finance climate and energy projects. For example, Japan issues "green transition bonds" financed by carbon tax revenues to finance industrial decarbonisation (Cárdenas Monar, 2024[34]). Reinvesting carbon tax revenues to close the climate finance gap can significantly improve their public support and help improve trust in the government's capacity to manage these funds effectively (Carattini, Carvalho and Fankhauser, 2018[35]).

Public acceptance is also driven by progressiveness of the tax. Governments can recycle tax revenues to provide targeted transfers to low-income households or subsidies for low-carbon alternatives that these households would be likely to use, such as public transport (Carattini, Carvalho and Fankhauser, 2018[35]). For example, Austria provides a EUR 110 annual cash transfer to all residents, funded by the carbon tax. Reductions in other taxes to offset revenue gained from the carbon tax, or cut on taxes on low-emission sectors, can also foster public support. In addition, public communication to provide clear, simple and transparent information on the tax mechanism is important. Public support for carbon taxes is stronger when their functioning and distributional outcomes are explained (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2022[36]).

The governance of carbon taxes needs to address carbon leakage. Carbon leakage occurs when foreign emissions increase because of the introduction or intensification of domestic climate policies (OECD/Climate Club, 2024[37]). Growing attention has been drawn to Border Carbon Adjustments, which are mechanisms to put a price on the import of goods associated with GHG emissions abroad. For example, the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), scheduled for a definitive entry into force in 2026, will put a price on the carbon embedded in the imports into the EU of certain goods, such as cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen produced in non-EU countries (European Commission, 2025[38]).

Figure 1.12. Most OECD countries have emissions trading schemes or carbon taxes, 2023

Policy Stringency Scores, from 0 (minimum) to 10 (maximum)

	ETS				Carbon Tax			
Country	Industry	Electricity	Transport	Buildings	Industry	Electricity	Transport	Buildings
AUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AUT	9	9	8	8	0	0	0	0
BEL	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0
CAN	9.5	9.5	8.5	8.5	4	6	8	8
CHE	10	10	0	0	0	0	10	10
CHL	0	0	0	0	4	6	0	0
COL	0	0	0	0	5	7	3	3
CRI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CZE	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0
DEU	9	9	8	8	0	0	0	0
DNK	9	9	0	0	0	0	7	6
ESP	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0
EST	9	9	0	0	0	2	0	0
FIN	9	9	0	0	0	0	10	8
FRA	9	9	0	0	0	0	8	8
GBR	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0
GRC	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0
HUN	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0
IRL	9	9	0	0	10	0	8	8
ISL	9	9	0	0	0	0	8	7
ISR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ITA	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0
JPN	3.5	0	0	3.5	2	2	2	2
KOR	7	7	9	8.5	0	0	0	0
LTU	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0
LUX	9	9	0	0	0	0	8	7
LVA	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0
MEX	3	3	0	0	2	4	2	2
NLD	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0
NOR	9	9	0	0	0	0	10	10
NZL	9.5	9.5	10	10	0	0	0	0
POL	9	9	0	0	0	0	1	1
PRT	9	9	0	0	0	10	7	6
SVK	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0
SVN	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0
SWE	9	9	0	0	0	0	10	10
TUR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0



Note: Stringency scores reflect a combination of the level of the emissions prices applied and the range of emissions which are covered. For more information see metadata for OECD Climate Actions and Policy Measurement Framework data. No data for USA.
Source: OECD Climate Actions and Policy Measurement Framework accessed via OECD Data Explorer.

StatLink https://stat.link/lsevcg

Green Budgeting

Public expenditure represents on average about 43.3% of GDP in OECD countries. Ensuring that public expenditure is aligned with climate goals and strategies is an important capability for public institutions in addressing climate change. The budget is the instrument for prioritising public expenditure and making sure that public spending is aligned with government's objectives and commitments. The budget process plays a critical role in ensuring efficient public spending on climate change and in evaluating government's actions.

OECD countries have made significant progress in introducing green budgeting. As of 2022, 24 out of 36 countries OECD countries (66%) had introduced at least one green budgeting instrument, compared to 14 countries in 2020 (OECD, 2024[15]). OECD countries have also strengthened institutional arrangements for green budgeting, and broadened the methods and tools used. However, there remains substantial room for improvement in implementing green budgeting practices. Assessed on a scale from 0 (not implementing) to 1 (high level of green budgeting practices), the average score across the OECD for quality of green budgeting was assessed at 0.49 for 2022 (Figure 1.13). Issues affecting the quality of green budgeting include insufficient resources to develop green budgeting approaches; a lack of relevant knowledge or expertise on how to integrate climate and environmental considerations into the budget process; and limited data on the impact of climate change and environmental sustainability for reporting requirements within budget processes (OECD, 2024[15]).

Figure 1.13. Green budgeting is now widespread, but there is room for improvement

OECD Green budgeting index 2022



Note: Index ranges from 0 (not implementing) to 1 (high level of green budgeting practices). Data for Costa Rica and Slovenia are not available.
Source: (OECD, 2024[15]).

StatLink https://stat.link/5iw49b

The aspect of green budgeting in which OECD countries perform most poorly on average is Accountability and Transparency. Only 40% of surveyed OECD countries have implemented oversight mechanisms for green objectives or reporting by an independent body such as an independent fiscal institution, climate advisory body or council, or auditor general. 30% of surveyed OECD countries had oversight mechanisms to monitor compliance with green reporting requirements, 20% for monitoring green investment and spending targets, 10% for costing the fiscal impact of green initiatives, and 10% for costing the wider impacts of green initiatives (OECD, 2024[15]). As methods and tools for green budgeting become both more complex, and more integrated into budgeting, it is important that independent fiscal institutions increase their technical capabilities to provide oversight of their usage (Cameron, Lelong and von Trapp, 2022[39]). More information on budgeting practices in OECD countries, including the roles and effectiveness of independent fiscal institutions, is given in Chapter 9 on "Budgeting".

OECD countries also have significant room to improve in the Methods and Tools used for green budgeting. Tools such as Environmental Impact Assessment, used in 75% of countries, and green budget tagging, used in 55% of countries, are now widespread (OECD, 2024[15]). However, it is important that governments move beyond green budgeting tagging, which simply marks expenditures as being positive, negative or neutral for the environment (OECD, 2024[40]), and towards directly assessing and measuring the impact of budget proposals on emissions. This is especially important because climate impacts are often a secondary purpose of other expenditure, or an unintended effect of other expenditures. For example, subsidies supporting poorer households to pay for fuel or heating also have a negative impact on emissions, by increasing fossil fuel use. Several OECD countries have started to review tax expenditures and subsidies that are harmful to the environment.

The most advanced countries are now taking action to estimate the cost of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and Net Zero Emissions goals, and to ensure that their climate change strategies and actions plans are correctly reflected in the medium-term budget frameworks and annual budgets. Several have begun assessing the impact of budget proposals on emissions and using models to assess and compare different policy options, estimating their budgetary cost, social equity impacts and emissions reduction impacts. For example, Korea aims to analyse the impact of national budgets on emissions reduction, reflect the findings on budget preparation, and evaluate whether budgets have been properly executed and objectives reached. Denmark assesses the effects of different proposals for green tax reform on non-energy-related emissions from agriculture and forestry. Other next generation green budgeting tools include investing in modeling to understand the multi-dimensional links between climate change, climate policies, public finances and budgets, tax revenues, and costing climate change commitments (OECD, 2024[40]).

Green Infrastructure

Meeting the Paris Agreement in a way that supports the Sustainable Development Goals requires an estimated EUR 6.7 trillion of infrastructure investment per year until 2030 (Bhattacharya et al., 2024[41]). The international community is currently falling short of meeting this goal (OECD, 2022[42]), making it critically important that countries direct funding towards investments that will most effectively and efficiently reduce emissions and catalyse investment from the private sector. There is significant room for improvement in green infrastructure practices across OECD member countries. OECD data on member countries refers to the implementation of appropriate methods and practices to develop green infrastructure gives an average score across the OECD in 2023 was 0.52, on a scale from 0 to 1 (Figure 1.14).

A first step for lifting the contribution of green infrastructure to the climate transition is to ensure that countries are utilising planning and policy settings to signal their intention to invest in green infrastructure and to specify the conditions that need to be met to deliver and operate infrastructure that meets green standards. Having a clear strategic intent is important given the long-lead times required to deliver major physical assets and the many decades they can be in operation. Because decisions about infrastructure can significantly impact people, long-term planning gives stakeholders and citizens sufficient certainty needed to make decisions within their lives. In addition, most major infrastructure investments around the world involve participation from the private sector, who depend on having a steady, predictable and reliable pipeline of projects to give them the confidence to invest in the necessary people, plant and equipment (OECD, 2023[43]). For this reason, it is promising to note that all 33 OECD countries with data available have a national strategy or policy document that aims to improve resilience of infrastructure, setting out the government's strategic intent for resilient infrastructure investment. However, only 13 out of 32 (41%) have set requirements for infrastructure resilience (OECD, forthcoming[44]). In addition, within the transport sector, generally one of the highest emitting sectors, 72% of OECD countries (21 out of 29) have mechanisms to ensure that transport infrastructure strategies and plans contribute to nationally determined contributions (NDCs), net-zero strategies, long-term low emission development strategies (LT-LEDS) or other overarching climate change strategy on mitigation (OECD, 2023[45]).

Figure 1.14. Governments can improve on delivering environmentally sustainable infrastructure

OECD Infrastructure Governance Indicators (IGI) 2023, Part V: Deliver environmentally sustainable and climate-resilient infrastructure



Note: Data for Australia, Germany, Greece, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway and Türkiye are not available. Data for Belgium are based on responses from Flanders only. Belgium (Flanders) does not have complete data for this indicator. Only the sub-pillars with complete data are included (scores for Belgium, Flanders, are not included in the OECD average).
Source: (OECD, 2023[46]).

StatLink https://stat.link/0dnelc

As part of the climate transition, it is important that countries pay due consideration to climate-related costs and benefits of different options over the total life of the investment, alongside the economic, social and other environmental impacts (OECD, 2020[47]). Incorporating climate-related costs and benefits into project selection, such as carbon emissions and climate-risk protection measures, provides a clear understanding of the total impacts of investments on climate goals. This is particularly important given large-scale investments like infrastructure have great potential to either reduce or lock-in emissions or low levels of resilience (Meckling et al., 2022[48]). Traditional tools and mechanisms to appraise and prioritise infrastructure projects, such as cost-benefit analysis, can be ill-equipped to factor in environmental and climate aspects. This is due to the difficulty of estimating the environmental costs and benefits of infrastructure and translating them into monetary values. Moreover, cause-effect relationships are not straightforward and there is lot of uncertainty about the consequences and effects of changing climate conditions and extreme weather events (OECD, 2023[49]). Box 1.3 shows examples of how some countries have successfully quantified these considerations.

Box 1.3. Incorporating climate considerations into green infrastructure planning

Quantifying the price of greenhouse gas emissions in Ireland

Like a growing number of countries, Ireland has quantified the emissions impact of an investment proposal by prescribing a schedule of values based on the estimated marginal cost society will incur to reach specific climate targets. These values are integrated with Ireland's standard project appraisal methodology, cost-benefit analysis (CBA). This helps the Government to have an overview of the expected climate impacts of an investment proposal before agreeing to financing the project. In cases where emissions are not considered relevant, significant, or practicable for inclusion, public bodies should describe how this conclusion was reached.

Measuring the benefits of resilience in New Zealand

New Zealand is prone to climate-related risks, such as storms, flooding and coastal erosion. To help identify transport projects with greater resilience, New Zealand monetises the benefits of resilience by quantifying the financial impact of reinstating transport assets before and after an investment in resilient transport infrastructure. Incorporating the long-term cost savings of having more resilient transport infrastructure into the investment decision helps strengthen the case for investing in climate-resilience. This approach also factors in a wider range of costs and impacts, including: user costs (diversion, waiting times; other direct costs (loss of life, injury, repair and reinstatement) and; indirect impacts (wider economic benefits).

Source: (Percoco et al., 2023[50]; New Zealand Transport Agency, 2020[51]).

OECD member countries could also do more to implement methods that identify and prioritise green infrastructure. For instance, only 69% of OECD countries for which data is available (20 out of 29) provide infrastructure guidelines for climate change adaptation and 66% (19 countries) for climate change mitigation (OECD, 2023[46]). In the transport sector, only 63% (17 of 27) of OECD countries surveyed require a climate impact assessment to estimate potential emissions and only 44% (12 of 27) systematically use results to select or prioritise transport projects (OECD, 2023[46]). In addition, only 35% (9 out of 26) in transport systematically use climate resilience criteria in project selection and prioritisation (OECD, 2023[46]). Less than half of OECD countries (12 out of 26, 46%) require climate change adaptation measures to be integrated into the design of transport infrastructure projects (OECD, 2023[46]). Finally, less than half (14 out of 31, 45%) evaluate the costs and benefits of disaster resilience in infrastructure projects, and only 32% (10 countries) use these results in project selection.

Green Public Procurement

Governments are major purchasers of goods and services, with public procurement representing 13% of GDP on average across the OECD (OECD, 2023[46]). Procurement processes can directly lower carbon emissions by systematically opting for greener goods and services. By prioritising climate friendly products and services, governments can also stimulate the market for green technologies and signal the importance of investing in green technologies to the private sector. For instance, governments can mandate the inclusion of green criteria in public contracts and provide suppliers with the assurance to invest in green technologies by clearly communicating their medium to long-term green investment plans (Addison et al., 2024[52]).

Figure 1.15. Most OECD countries have green public procurement (GPP) frameworks in place

GPP frameworks in place, and time of most recent update, 2022



Note: Figure presents three different questions: (1) "Is there an active national policy or strategic framework on GPP?", (2) "In what year was the national policy or strategic framework on GPP last been revised?" and (3) "Is the national policy or strategic GPP framework (or public procurement more broadly) mentioned in national commitments on climate action such as strategies to reach net zero or nationally determined contributions (NDCs)?". Mexico and Hungary are excluded as they indicated they did not have an active GPP framework at the time of the survey (end 2022). Hungary adopted a GPP strategy (2022-2027) in December 2022, after the closure of the data cycle for this questionnaire. Canada updated its national strategy on public procurement in 2024, after the closure of the survey.
Source: (OECD, 2022[53]).

StatLink https://stat.link/ard5st

32 of 34 OECD countries for which data is available (94%) have adopted green public procurement (GPP) policies or frameworks (Figure 1.15). These either establish the mandatory use of green requirements in public tenders, or incremental targets, such as the percentage of goods and services subject to green strategies. For example, Italy has developed "minimum environmental criteria" for 18 product categories that are mandatory for all contracting authorities across government and for all public tenders, regardless of the contract's value (OECD, 2024[54]).

However, effective implementation of GPP policies will require stronger engagement with markets, better procurement planning, and wider signalling of upcoming green investment opportunities to suppliers. Currently, 50% of OECD and accession countries do not signal future GPP opportunities in their procurement plans (OECD, 2022[53]). This gap in communication and preparation can hinder private sector readiness to meet green procurement demands. There is a clear need for enhanced guidance and the creation of multi-stakeholder platforms that can improve supplier engagement and ensure successful GPP implementation (OECD, 2024[54]). In addition, implementing systems for monitoring and reporting the environmental impact of procurement activities helps track progress and ensure accountability. Regular reports can highlight achievements and areas for improvement, driving continuous enhancement of green procurement practices (OECD, 2024[54]). Still, in 2024, only 3 out of 29 OECD countries (9%) that have KPIs for the public procurement system report measuring its impact on the environment (OECD, forthcoming[55]).

Training programmes and resources to build the skills and knowledge for green procurement is also necessary, as it often entails more complex procurement techniques, such as environmental criteria or life-cycle costing (OECD, 2022[56]). An important area of capability-building relates to the procurement of green technologies, such as renewable energy sources. For example, the European federation of citizen energy co-operatives REScoop.eu is a network that represents 2 250 European energy communities and 1.5 million citizens that participate in renewable energy or energy efficiency projects. REScoop.eu has developed procurement guidance for municipalities collaborating with energy communities that reviews the main steps of the procurement process and offers concrete examples of renewable energy procurements and concessions (Rescoop.eu, 2023[57]).

Green Public Sector Skills

The capacity of the public sector workforce to design, lead, and implement green policies is integral to the ability of public institutions to mitigate climate change and adapt to its impacts. Many public servants work in roles that directly affect climate initiatives, while others can also use green skills and awareness to contribute to mainstreaming green initiatives. Relevant skills include climate-related policy design knowledge, data analysis, strategic foresight and planning, and scientific and technical knowledge. Many countries are up-skilling public employees on green issues (OECD, 2025[58]). Public sector leadership skills are also vital. It is important that managers are equipped to understand the issues, and lead initiatives and teams through the green transition, navigating scientific complexity and long-term impacts. This challenge will also require diplomacy and political aptitude for building and maintaining relationships with stakeholders and developing broad buy-in.

OECD does not currently have systematic data on the extent to which green skills are being embedded in the public sector. This is an important area for further development by OECD members to help assess their ability to implement climate change policies and identify good practice. Countries that have begun training and upskilling for the green transition are finding a need for a multi-faceted approach and considerable planning to understand their skills needs and roll out training plans. For example, Canada is developing a catalogue of training products and services, and mechanisms for capacity-sharing in professional development. This work is aimed at endowing the public service broadly with the green skills required across government decision making and processes.

Consensus

The final pillar of Governing for the Green transition is Consensus. This pillar examines how to build a governance framework for climate change policy that enables broad social acceptance of government's goals and implementation choices. Reducing emissions is a "whole of society" transition, requiring changes in technology and consumption patterns from businesses and individuals as well as government. The policies to bring about these large-scale changes will require broad public support in order to be sustained and bring about results. The most important drivers of public support for climate policies are the perceived effectiveness of the policies in reducing emissions, and their perceived fairness, in terms of impacts on one's own household and on lower-income households (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2022[36]; Bergquist et al., 2022[59]). Trust in public institutions implementing a policy is also highly important.

The first key aspect of building consensus relates to fairness of process, that is, ensuring that all climate change policies are demonstrated as being made in the public interest. Governments currently face a credibility gap in this area. Many people living in OECD countries voice scepticism about their government's ability to tackle complex policy issues with trade-offs across different groups in society and generations (OECD, 2024[10]). Many also have concerns that their public institutions do not always act in the public interest when developing policy. For example, fewer than one in three people in OECD countries find it likely that the government would refuse a corporation's demand if it went against the public interest (OECD, 2024[10]). In democratic countries there is a positive association between higher level of perceived corruption and weaker citizen advocacy for climate action, possibly explained by political resignation - the belief that nothing may change regardless of efforts (Rafaty, 2018[60]). Among the most effective levers for improving trust in the fairness of climate change policy is to implement citizen-government interface processes that help ensure the public have a voice in policymaking, and for public institutions to communicate the evidence used to arrive at decisions (OECD, 2024[10]).

A further key aspect of building consensus relates to the economic impacts of climate change policies across different groups in society. In some cases, policies to implement the green transition may have transitory costs or impacts. For example, carbon taxes can lead to increases in energy costs, which are felt more heavily by lower income households, where spending on energy for heating and transport takes up a bigger proportion of total income (OECD, 2024[61]). Employment in industries producing traditional energy sources, such as coal and oil extraction, may shrink as jobs move towards green industries (ibid.). These transitional costs may have a variety of differential impacts by region, gender, age and other characteristics. The governance framework for the green transition must carefully consider and manage how any impacts can be distributed fairly (and may supplement climate policy with labour or welfare policy where needed to help prevent negative impacts).

In addition, countries will be in a better position to steer societies through the green transition if people improve confidence in governments capacity to handle the green transition and for developing consensus for action (OECD, 2024[10]; OECD, 2024[62]). Climate action relies on the willingness of people to embrace change, such as through behavioural changes such as using lower-emission forms of transportation or accepting new, low emissions infrastructure in their communities. Early and effective public engagement can help address people's concerns and ensure that new, low-emissions infrastructure is delivered at the necessary pace and scale, with less resistance and fewer delays. However, a common barrier for developing new low emissions infrastructure can be that the benefits accrue to citizens located elsewhere or to future generations, but that the costs and risks are predominately borne by present generations living in close proximity to the infrastructure. For this reason, some countries are exploring how green infrastructure can be delivered fairly, taking into account the needs of citizens (Addison et al., 2024[52]; OECD, 2025[63]) (see Box 1.4).

The consensus pillar examines and identifies governance mechanisms which can help governments to work towards broad social acceptance of the modalities and policy choices used to implement emissions reduction and climate change mitigation policy. It covers: 1) Public engagement, to increase the public's voice in the policymaking process, and to ensure complexities and trade-offs are identified and resolved; 2) Managing influencing and lobbying practices, to ensure that all groups have the opportunity to input, but that policy decisions are not made to benefit any special interest groups; 3) Access to Justice, to support conflict resolution and ensure public and private institutions can be held to account on their responsibilities for reducing emissions; 4) Behavioural change work, to help society to voluntarily adopt greener practices, and finally 5) Greening public administration, or how public institutions can lead the way and build credibility by reducing their own waste and emissions.

Box 1.4. Addressing the inequities of climate action

Presenting financial benefits to affected parties (United Kingdom)

The United Kingdom has recognised that while new renewable electricity developments may help reduce emissions for the benefit of future generations at-large, certain local communities may have to live with the noise, visual and construction impacts of new renewable developments in the present day. This can lead local people today to object to new low emissions infrastructure, resulting in time delays and additional costs as developers consider amending their plans to appease local concerns.

For this reason, the United Kingdom's National Infrastructure Commission has recommended that the Government develop a framework of direct benefits for local communities and individuals hosting nationally significant infrastructure which delivers few local benefits, which could include socialising costs through utility bills or public expenditure to locally impacted communities.

Giving citizens a financial stake in local renewable energy development (European Union)

The European Commission has developed ''energy communities'', which enable local communities to join forces and act as a single entity to access all suitable energy markets and compete with market actors to invest in clean energy for the local community. This can contribute to increasing public acceptance of renewable energy projects and make it easier to attract private investments in the clean energy transition. Energy communities can drive the energy transition locally and directly benefit from better energy efficiency, lower bills, reduced energy poverty and more local green job opportunities. The European Commission provides support to energy communities through various initiatives such as:

- The Energy Communities Facility, with the aim to assist at least 140 energy communities across Europe in developing and implementing viable business plans.
- the Energy Communities Repository, which supported energy communities in 2022-2024 via technical assistance, knowledge repository, developing financial concepts and other training. The Rural Energy Community Advisory Hub assisted citizens, rural actors and local authorities in setting up energy communities. The Interreg Programme under the European Cohesion Policy, supports the establishment and co-operation of cross-border energy communities across the EU.

Source: (National Infrastructure Commission, 2023[64]; European Commission, n.d.[65]).

Public Participation & Engagement

Public participation processes have the potential to build greater public ownership, support and effective engagement with climate change policy, and also encourage citizens to take direct action by altering their own behaviours (OECD, 2025[66]). There are benefits and opportunities of involving citizens at each stage of the policy cycle, from priority setting to monitoring and evaluation. To enable effective public participation in climate change policy, it is important that governments enable access to information and open data; institute public consultations and deliberative mechanisms; and undertake public communication throughout the policy cycle (OECD, 2024[62]). OECD has collected some evidence on this, but systematic standards for relevant public governance practices are not currently in place.

Access to information on climate change policy and outcomes enables the public to make informed decisions on climate change, monitor public action, and hold government accountable. As of 2025, 37 of the 38 OECD countries have adopted Access to Information laws (OECD, 2022[67]). However, challenges remain to ensure access to environmental information. Some countries have taken steps to strengthen their legislation, such as Chile which included a clear definition of environmental information in its framework environmental law (OECD, 2025[66]). Ensuring that the legal framework addresses the issue of environmental information held by private entities is particularly relevant to monitoring emissions (Etemire, 2012[68]).

Figure 1.16. Availability of open data on environmental issues varies substantially



Note: The categories of high value datasets are determined by the OECD and primarily based on the G8 Open Data Charter. Data is considered available if they are machine-readable, free of charge, and provided with an open license. Data is not available for Hungary and the United States.
Source: OECD illustration, utilising selected data from the 2023 OURdata Index, see (OECD, 2023[69]).

StatLink https://stat.link/iehtl8

Access to open data on environmental issues varies substantially across the OECD. Relevant datasets include those on land ownership and use, natural risk zones, agriculture, forestry, meteorological data, air pollution, and transportation (OECD, 2023[69]). Scored on a scale from 0-100, the average availability of the most relevant datasets is 56 (Figure 1.16). Meteorological data is typically the least available. Many OECD countries could improve substantially in releasing high-value datasets on environmental issues as open data to the public (i.e. machine-readable, free, and available under an open license). More information on open data is presented in Chapter 7 "Digital Government and Innovation".

Governments are developing various ways to engage the public and stakeholders in the development of climate and emissions reduction policies. France, Portugal and Spain have implemented "green" participatory budgeting at municipal level (OECD, 2025[66]). Deliberative mini-publics (DMBs), involving randomly selected citizens in learning and deliberations with experts, have taken place with the French Citizens' Convention on Climate and the UK's Climate Assembly (Willis, Curato and Smith, 2022[70]). Costa Rica, Ireland and Peru have established permanent consultative bodies on climate issues. Other countries are using "civic tech" to broaden public consultation, and aggregate large numbers of contributions. While complete data on public and stakeholder consultation processes is lacking internationally, evidence suggests that climate policy issues are increasingly addressed in deliberative processes, such as citizen assemblies: 60 out of 148 deliberative processes recorded in OECD countries between 2021 and 2023 focused on environmental issues (41%) (Figure 1.17, see also Figure 6.6 in Chapter 6).

Ensuring effective public engagement requires attention to groups which may be more impacted by climate change or climate policy. Notably, women are disproportionately impacted by climate-related disasters and displacement (UNEP, 2023[71]), but have been historically underrepresented in climate policy processes such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (OECD, 2021[72]). Gender considerations are frequently overlooked in environmental policy, with only 57% of OECD countries incorporating gender practices into their environmental policies (ibid). Policy processes must also adequately represent the views of young people, who will experience more of the effects of future climate change, and those living in areas more greatly exposed to negative impacts. More information on gender and youth representation is given in Chapter 13 "Public Employment and Representation". The interests of indigenous populations must also be represented in policy processes, ensuring their continued access to resources and the protection of their cultural and traditional practices. Finally, environmental policies should also reflect the perspectives of migrants, refugees and displaced populations who often face higher vulnerability to environmental degradation and climate-related disasters.

Figure 1.17. Environment is the most common issue in deliberative processes

Number of times a policy issue was addressed through a deliberative process, 2021-23



Note: Data for OECD countries is based on 22 OECD countries and the European Union for which data was available between January 2021 and September 2023.

Source: OECD Deliberative Democracy Database, 2023. See also Figure 6.6 in Chapter 6.

StatLink https://stat.link/uicda5

Behavioural Change

Behavioural science helps policymakers design clearer, more accessible policies that align with public values, fostering trust and co-operation between citizens and governments. By identifying the factors that drive or hinder sustainable behaviour, governments can design solutions that encourage voluntary change by businesses and individuals. Insights into decision-making patterns and cognitive biases enable policies to better reflect human behaviours, increasing the likelihood of achieving desired outcomes (OECD, 2024[73]) This approach bridges the gap between the intent of climate strategies and their real-world effectiveness by tailoring participation and communication strategies to citizens' needs and leveraging social norms to mobilise public engagement (OECD, 2024[74]; OECD, 2025[75]). In addition, strengthening public communication is an important tool for governments to explain government choices, build public support for action, and encourage behavioural change (OECD, 2021[76]; OECD, 2023[77]).

One example of this approach is Canada's Program of Applied Research on Climate Action (PARCA). PARCA examines how Canadians perceive and act on climate issues. These insights inform the development and testing of behaviourally informed solutions, enhancing both the implementation and effectiveness of climate policies. It addresses real-world challenges such as misinformation and the adoption of emerging technologies like heat pumps, translating ambitious climate goals into meaningful, actionable outcomes (Impact Canada, 2024[78]). Through PARCA, the Government of Canada is building a data-driven understanding of the drivers of acceptability of environmental policies and programmes and design reforms and related communications in a way that addresses those drivers.

Greening Public Administration

Greening public administration, which involves reducing waste and emissions from the public sector, contributes directly to achieving climate goals, and allows governments to demonstrate leadership promoting a broader green shift across society, and to build consensus with business and the public on emissions reduction policies. A number of OECD countries have acknowledged the importance of greening their public administrations, by integrating greening elements into their government-wide greening strategies, public administration reform plans or national climate and/or sustainability policies (Box 1.5). For example, Canada is committed to making its government operations net-zero by 2050 and enhancing its climate resilience by 2035. Some OECD countries have also set specific emission reduction targets for their public sector. France, for example, aims to achieve a 22% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2027, a 25% reduction in the energy consumption of state buildings and conserve 3.3 million cubic metres of water. Despite significant ambition in this area, more detailed data is required to accurately compare activities to green public administration across countries.

Box 1.5. Greening Public Administration

Promoting greening within the existing public building stock

To decarbonise and promote greening within existing public buildings, OECD governments are seeking ways to improve energy efficiency, phase out fossil fuels, promote renewable energy sources, reduce resource consumption, upgrade heating systems and other. Germany promotes energy conservation in public buildings by optimising heating systems, reducing in-person activities during winter holidays, recommending needs-based light control and encouraging energy-efficient behaviour among public servants (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, n.d.[79]). Switzerland invites public service providers and institutional investors to commit to individual efficiency and renewable energy goals by both 2026 and 2030 (Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications, 2021[80]). Finland aims to improve energy efficiency of its public property by 1% each year (Ministry of Finance, n.d.[81]). New Zealand as an immediate priority is considering phasing out coal-fired boilers in the public sector, aiming to remove the largest and most active ones by the end of 2025 (Ministry for the Environment, 2023[82]).

Improving resilience of public services in Canada

Through its Greening Government Strategy, the Government of Canada pledged to strengthen climate resilience of its critical activities and services, thus minimising disruptions and managing financial risks related to climate change impacts (Government of Canada, 2024[83]). All departments in Canada are mandated to conduct regular climate risks assessments (at least every 5 years) and minimise identified risks. Canada further aims to equip public servants with the necessary guidance, tools and training to enhance their own climate resilience. Canada views a climate-resilient workforce a beneficial outcome of its greening government activities, as it will bolster business continuity of public administration in the face of large-scale disruptions.

France's Green Tech Initiative

In 2020, France established the Green Tech initiative, which seeks to reduce the environmental footprint of digital technologies when delivering public sector operations and services. The initiative looks to achieve eco-responsible public services through 20 actions to adapt government operations to the environmental needs of the future, as well as specific provisions on the environmental consequences of digital technologies in the public sector. The initiative includes a strategic roadmap with specific goals and activities around: Developing awareness of the digital environmental footprint in the public sector, including measurement frameworks and data collection; Reducing the environmental footprint of digital technology in the public sector, for example through responsible digital procurement, and eco-design of digital services; and increased awareness, support, training in responsible digital actions and uses; and using digital technology to help achieve ecological and solidarity goals, promoting electrical and electronic equipment waste management and circular economy.

Source: (OECD, forthcoming[84]).

Managing Influence & Lobbying

Building public consensus on climate change policy requires that governments demonstrate that policy is made fairly, with the public interest at the forefront, and not to the benefit of any special groups or interests. Delivering emissions reduction and sustainability targets requires government to work with a broad range of external actors. Integrity frameworks must manage this engagement effectively, to reduce any risk that policy is captured by narrow interests and is less able to meet governments' climate goals. With regard to climate change, oil and gas companies spend far more on influence activities than environmental advocacy groups and clean energy firms (Resimic, 2022[85]; Slowicek, 2022[86]; McCarthy, 2019[87]), increasing the risk of the overrepresentation of narrow interests. Misleading lobbying and campaigns can raise doubt, influence public opinion and reduce regulatory pressure to curb carbon emissions (Conway and Oreskes, 2010[88]; Supran and Oreskes, 2017[89]; Influence Map, 2022[90]) .

OECD data indicates a range of shortcomings in OECD countries' integrity frameworks (OECD, 2024[91]), which create risks of less effective climate policy. Of 33 OECD countries, only 17 (52%) have defined lobbying in legislation, and only 13 (39%) have defined and proportionate sanctions in place for breaches of standards for transparency and integrity in lobbying (ibid.). Furthermore, while 17 out of 33 OECD countries (52%) have a lobbying register in place, most do not provide sufficient transparency to help interested parties meaningfully understand who is influencing what policies and how. For instance, only 8 countries' registers contain information about the legislation or regulation targeted by lobbying. Governments can strengthen lobbying and influence disclosure requirements to include information on the objective of lobbying activities, its beneficiaries, the actors and decisions targeted, and the practices used. They can also require industry associations to make policy makers aware if they represent minority views among their members and encourage companies to ensure consistency between their influence activity and their publicly stated goals. Governments may include objectives for mitigating corruption risks in the green transition in their national anti-corruption strategies to safeguard green policymaking and public investments.

Public institutions can also work to avoid any conflicts of interest in external input to climate initiatives from advisory bodies and expert groups. Private sector and non-government representatives in these groups often have direct access to policymaking without being subject to rules on engagement with outside organisations. This can increase conflict of interest and revolving door risks. Members of these groups may, consciously or not, favour the interests of their company or industry, increasing the risk that policy is not made in the public interest (Conway and Hermann, 2021[92]; OECD, 2022[93]). To ensure these groups support effective policy while mitigating risks of undue influence, countries need to implement rules that promote transparency, integrity and inclusiveness in advisory and expert groups, such as procedural rules, standards of conduct and rules on conflict of interest (OECD, 2024[94]). Broader mechanisms for managing conflicts of interest can also help to mitigate these risks. However, OECD countries have adopted 77% of OECD criteria for regulations on conflicts of interest, but have only implemented 42% of OECD criteria on conflict-of-interest management on average (Figure 1.18).

Climate change policy can also be influenced by revolving doors. However, 23 of 33 OECD countries (70%) do not track whether former ministers move into sectors which they previously regulated, and 24 of 33 (73%) do not track this information for former senior civil servants (Figure 1.19). It is important that governments review integrity frameworks and related strategies to mitigate these threats. More information on public integrity issues is provided in Chapter 12 "Integrity".

Figure 1.18. Strength of regulations on conflict of interest and their implementation varies



Note: Data not provided or collected: Belgium, Colombia, Germany, Hungary and New Zealand for regulation and practice, and Slovenia for practice.

Source: OECD (2024[91]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 9 May 2025), https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/indicators.

StatLink https://stat.link/katl8c

Figure 1.19. Countries tracking office holders' movement into sectors they formerly regulated



Note: Inner circle is based on whether post-employment integrity for ministers is tracked. The outer circle is based on whether post-employment integrity for top-officials is tracked. Countries marked with an asterisk (*) have mandatory cooling-off periods for public officials.
Source: OECD (2024[91]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 9 May 2025), https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/indicators.

StatLink https://stat.link/6g3umn

Access to Justice

Justice systems can reinforce public support for climate policies by ensuring that citizens can hold public institutions and private entities accountable for their environmental commitments. This is essential for the credibility of these policies and to prevent them from being undermined by non-compliance. This is an emerging area, and systematic evidence on the effectiveness of implementation remains at an early stage. However, some positive trends are emerging.

The number of environmental courts and tribunals (ECTs) has risen from 350 in 2009 to 2 115 across at least 44 countries in 2021 (UNEP, 2021[95]). The number of climate change litigation cases has also expanded in recent years, with more than 2 600 cases recorded globally. In 2023, at least 230 climate litigation cases were filed globally, a 20% increase from 2022. There was a 70% success rate in cases targeting misleading corporate claims (Higham and Setzer, 2024[96]). As efforts to combat and manage climate change intensify, it is important that public institutions continue to invest in environmental courts and tribunals, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, and administrative justice procedures to ensure the swift and fair handling of climate-related cases. Countries such as Belgium, Australia, and Sweden have led efforts in establishing specialised courts or chambers (OECD, 2024[97]), while New Zealand has incorporated ADR frameworks to enhance efficiency and accessibility (Government of New Zealand, 2024[98]).

The justice system also plays a role in improving climate policies over time, through monitoring and refining regulatory frameworks. Accessible and responsive mechanisms, such as complaints mechanisms, administrative justice procedures, and ombudspersons, enable individuals and communities to raise concerns about unintended impacts of climate policies, without having to resort to conventional legal avenues (ENOC, 2022[99]). They also help to ensure the green transition is carried out fairly, by providing people and businesses with avenues to raise concerns, seek redress, and resolve disputes related to the impact of environmental policies and regulations (OECD, 2024[100]; ENOC, 2022[101]). This can help to prevent the escalation of conflicts that might arise from the perceived or actual impacts of green initiatives, such as land use changes, pollution controls, or regulatory shifts. They can also help to build trust between stakeholders by providing a neutral ground where grievances are addressed, fostering a sense of inclusion and fairness in the green transition (UNEP, 2019[102]).

It is important that justice institutions be accessible, inclusive, and responsive to all those affected by climate change, including specific groups such as indigenous communities, women, and youth. Indigenous peoples in particular require legal avenues to protect land rights and support sustainable resource management. Strengthening these communities' access to justice can build broader social consensus and engagement in climate policies. In some cases, non-profit organisations are filling this role, by providing financial and institutional support to help affected communities to engage in legal processes, such as Environmental Dispute Resolution Fund in Canada (EDRF, 2024[103]). Governments may consider how to better support access to justice for groups most affected by climate change.

Note on related OECD work

The chapter builds on past work under the OECD Reinforcing Democracy Initiative (RDI), including the OECD Action Plan on Governing Green, which identified three key areas to advance the governing green agenda: steering and building consensus, using the right tools, and leading by example (OECD, 2022[104]; OECD, 2022[105]). The "Governing for the Green transition" policy framework presents an updated and simplified version. This chapter also complements the OECD's NetZero+ project, which gathers and synthesizes the climate-related work of over 20 OECD thematic committees to provide analysis and recommendations for driving a rapid transition to net-zero emissions (OECD, 2024[106]). This chapter is closely supported by the forthcoming OECD NetZero+ paper "Governing Green Transition: Public Governance Arrangements for the Green Transition", which also presents the "Governing for the Green transition" framework, and provides further guidance for practitioners and public servants working on green governance issues (OECD, 2025[63]).

References

Addison, R. et al. (2024), "Towards the green transition: Stimulating investment and accelerating permits for low emissions infrastructure", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 68, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/fc97f64e-en. [52]

Averchenkova, A. and L. Lazaro (2020), *The design of an independent expert advisory mechanism under the European Climate Law: What are the options?*, https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/GRI_The-design-of-an-expert-advisory-mechanism-under-the-European-Climate-Law_What-are-the-options.pdf. [22]

Bergquist, M. et al. (2022), "Meta-analyses of fifteen determinants of public opinion about climate change taxes and laws", *Nature Climate Change*, Vol. 12/3, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-022-01297-6. [59]

Bhattacharya, A. et al. (2024), *Raising Ambition and Accelerating Delivery of Climate Finance*, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment; London School of Economics and Political Science, https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Raising-ambition-and-accelerating-delivery-of-climate-finance_Third-IHLEG-report.pdf. [41]

Blyth, W. et al. (2007), "Investment risks under uncertain climate change policy", *Energy Policy*, Vol. 35/11, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2007.05.030. [12]

Brunner, S., C. Flachsland and R. Marschinski (2012), *Credible commitment in carbon policy*, https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2011.582327. [11]

Cameron, S., M. Lelong and L. von Trapp (2022), "More than words: Potential roles for independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) in green budgeting", *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, https://doi.org/10.1787/6fcb2fb4-en. [39]

Carattini, S., M. Carvalho and S. Fankhauser (2018), "Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes", *WIREs Climate Change*, Vol. 9/5, https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.531. [35]

Cárdenas Monar, D. (2024), *Maximising benefits of carbon pricing through carbon revenue use: A review of international experiences*, Institute for Climate Economics, https://www.i4ce.org/en/publication/maximising-benefits-carbon-pricing-through-carbon-revenue-use-review-international-experiences-climate/. [34]

Conway, D. and B. Hermann (2021), *Dealing with corruption in adopting and implementing carbon taxes*, U4, https://www.u4.no/publications/dealing-with-corruption-in-adopting-and-implementing-carbon-tax.pdf. [92]

Conway, E. and N. Oreskes (2010), *Merchants of Doubt*, Bloomsbury, London. [88]

Creutzig, F. et al. (2023), "Demand, Services and Social Aspects of Mitigation", in *Climate Change 2022 - Mitigation of Climate Change*, Cambridge University Press, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926.007. [5]

Dechezleprêtre, A. et al. (2022), "Fighting climate change: International attitudes toward climate policies", *OECD Economics Department Working Papers*, No. 1714, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3406f29a-en. [36]

EDRF (2024), *EDRF Legal Aid Fund*, https://www.wcel.org/program/edrf-legal-aid-fund. [103]

ENOC (2022), *Children's Rights & Climate Justice*, https://enoc.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022-Synthesis-Report-Climate-Justice.pdf. [99]

ENOC (2022), *Synthesis Report Children's Rights & Climate Justice*, https://enoc.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022-Synthesis-Report-Climate-Justice.pdf. [101]

Etemire, U. (2012), "Public Access to Environmental Information Held by Private Companies", *Environmental Law Review*, Vol. 14/1, pp. 7-25, https://doi.org/10.1350/enlr.2012.14.1.142. [68]

European Commission (2025), *Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism*, https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en (accessed on 9 April 2025). [38]

European Commission (n.d.), *Energy communities*, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/markets-and-consumers/energy-consumers-and-prosumers/energy-communities_en (accessed on 15 October 2024). [65]

FAO (2021), *The impact of disasters and crises on agriculture and food security: 2021*, FAO, https://doi.org/10.4060/cb3673en. [2]

Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (2021), *On course for the climate: The initiative briefly explained*, https://www.vorbild-energie-klima.admin.ch/dam/vbe/en/dokumente/auf-kurs-fuers-klima-die-initiative-kurz-erklaert.pdf.download.pdf/2021.10_Broschuere_Vorbild_Energie_Klima.pdf. [80]

Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (n.d.), *Roadmap for a climate and greenhouse gas neutral federal administration*, https://www.sustainability.gov/pdfs/germany-nzgi-roadmap.pdf. [79]

Fuchs, M., J. Ströbel and J. Terstegge (2024), "Carbon VIX: Carbon Price Uncertainty and Decarbonization Investments", Vol. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 19349/CEPR Press, https://cepr.org/publications/dp19349. [13]

Government of Canada (2024), *Greening Government Strategy: A Government of Canada Directive*, https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/innovation/greening-government/strategy.html. [83]

Government of New Zealand (2024), *Aotearoa best practice dispute resolution framework*, https://www.mbie.govt.nz/cross-government-functions/government-centre-for-dispute-resolution/guidance-on-dispute-resolution/aotearoa-best-practice-dispute-resolution-framework. [98]

Gransaull, G., E. Rhodes and M. Fairbrother (2023), "Institutions for effective climate policymaking: Lessons from the case of the United Kingdom", *Energy Policy*, Vol. 175, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2023.113484. [23]

Higham, C. and J. Setzer (2024), *Global Trends in Climate Change Litigation: 2024 Snapshot*, London: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science. [96]

IEA (2025), *Innovation needs in the Sustainable Development Scenario*, International Energy Agency, https://www.iea.org/reports/clean-energy-innovation/innovation-needs-in-the-sustainable-development-scenario. [26]

IEA (2023), *CO2 Emissions in 2023*, International Energy Agency, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/33e2badc-b839-4c18-84ce-f6387b3c008f/CO2Emissionsin2023.pdf. [3]

Impact Canada (2024), *The Program of Applied Research on Climate Action in Canada*, https://impact.canada.ca/en/behavioural-science/parca. [78]

Influence Map (2022), *Big Oil's Real Agenda on Climate Change 2022*, https://influencemap.org/report/Big-Oil-s-Agenda-on-Climate-Change-2022-19585 (accessed on 1 October 2023). [90]

IPCC (2023), *Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report (Summary for Policymakers)*, IPCC, Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, https://doi.org/10.59327/IPCC/AR6-9789291691647.001. [1]

Kaur, M. et al. (2023), "Steering responses to climate change from the centre of government: A stocktaking", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 65, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b95c8396-en. [16]

Kydland, F. and E. Prescott (1977), "Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans", *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 85/3, https://doi.org/10.1086/260580. [14]

Lazarus, R. (2009), "Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future", *Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works* 159, https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/159. [24]

McCarthy, N. (2019), "Oil And Gas Giants Spend Millions Lobbying To Block Climate Change Policies", *Forbes*, https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2019/03/25/oil-and-gas-giants-spend-millions-lobbying-to-block-climate-change-policies-infographic/?sh=7ac2858e7c4f (accessed on 10 October 2023). [87]

Meckling, J. et al. (2022), *Busting the myths around public investment in clean energy*, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-022-01081-y. [48]

Ministry for the Environment (2023), "About the Carbon Neutral Government Programme", https://environment.govt.nz/what-government-is-doing/areas-of-work/climate-change/carbon-neutral-government-programme/about-carbon-neutral-government-programme/. [82]

Ministry of Finance (n.d.), *Net-Zero Government Initiative (NZGI) Finland*, https://www.sustainability.gov/pdfs/finland-nzgi-roadmap.pdf. [81]

Nachtigall, D. et al. (2022), "The climate actions and policies measurement framework: A structured and harmonised climate policy database to monitor countries' mitigation action", *OECD Environment Working Papers*, No. 203, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2caa60ce-en. [8]

National Infrastructure Commission (2023), *Delivering net zero, climate resilience and growth*, https://nic.org.uk/app/uploads/NIC-Planning-Study-Final-Report.pdf. [64]

New Zealand Transport Agency (2020), *Better Measurement of the Direct and Indirect Costs and Benefits of Resilience*, https://www.nzta.govt.nz/assets/resources/research/reports/670/670-Better-measurement-of-the-direct-a. [51]

OECD (2025), *Empowered Citizens, Informed Consumers and Skilled Workers: Designing Education and Skills Policies for a Sustainable Future*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/311cdbeb-en. [58]

OECD (2025), "Governing for the green transition", *OECD Net Zero+ Policy Papers*, No. 13, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5b0aa7d0-en. [63]

OECD (2025), *Harnessing Mission Governance to Achieve National Climate Targets*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/781146eb-en. [27]

OECD (2025), "Mind shift, green lift: Six behavioural science trends for environmental policy", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 69, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/162c5a27-en. [75]

OECD (2025), *OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/56b60e39-en. [30]

OECD (2025), *Open Government for the Green Transition: Panorama of Good Practices Towards Meaningful Citizen Participation*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/bfa02935-en. [66]

OECD (2024), *Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/968587cd-en. [91]

OECD (2024), "Beyond green tagging: How can public budgeting support climate goals?", *OECD Papers on Budgeting*, No. 2024/06, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b154d49b-en. [40]

OECD (2024), *Designing climate policy for people and planet: the role of the government-citizen interface*. [62]

OECD (2024), *Environmental Justice: Context, Challenges and National Approaches*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/57616eb4-en. [100]

OECD (2024), *Exploring New Frontiers of Citizen Participation in the Policy Cycle - Discussion Paper*. [74]

OECD (2024), *Green Budgeting in OECD Countries 2024*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9aea61f0-en. [15]

OECD (2024), *Harnessing Public Procurement for the Green Transition: Good Practices in OECD Countries*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e551f448-en. [54]

OECD (2024), *Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) Survey*. [29]

OECD (2024), *LOGIC: Good Practice Principles for Mainstreaming Behavioural Public Policy*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/6cb52de2-en. [73]

OECD (2024), *NetZero+*, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/net-zero-building-climate-and-economic-resilience.html. [106]

OECD (2024), *OECD Employment Outlook 2024: The Net-Zero Transition and the Labour Market*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac8b3538-en. [61]

OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en. [10]

OECD (2024), *Pricing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2024: Gearing Up to Bring Emissions Down*, OECD Series on Carbon Pricing and Energy Taxation, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b44c74e6-en. [33]

OECD (2024), "Recommendation of the Council on Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying and Influence", *OECD Legak Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0379 (accessed on 16 May 2025). [94]

OECD (2024), *The Climate Action Monitor 2024*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/787786f6-en. [9]

OECD (2024), "The IFCMA's Climate Policy Database: Policy instruments typology and data structure", *Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches Papers*, No. 5, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/68529f35-en. [28]

OECD (2024), *The OECD Reinforcing Democracy Initiative: Monitoring Report – Assessing Progress and Charting the Way Forward*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9543bcfb-en. [97]

OECD (2024), *The Role of Economic Regulators in the Green Transition: Driving Sustainable Change in Network Sectors*, The Governance of Regulators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7d4704c9-en. [31]

OECD (2023), *2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en. [69]

OECD (2023), *Governance of Infrastructure (Phase 2)*, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?lc=en&fs[0]=Topic%2C1%7CGovernment%23GOV%23%7CGeneral%20government%23GOV_GG%23&pg=20&fc=Topic&bp=true&snb=22&df[ds]=dsDisseminateFinalDMZ&df[id]=DSD_QDD_GOV_INFRA_PH_2%40DF_GOV_INFRA_PH_2&df[ag]=OECD.GOV.GIP&df[vs]=1.0&p. [45]

OECD (2023), *Government at a Glance 2023*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3d5c5d31-en. [46]

OECD (2023), *Net Zero+: Climate and Economic Resilience in a Changing World*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/da477dda-en. [4]

OECD (2023), *OECD Survey on Strategic Decision-making at the Centre of Government*. [19]

OECD (2023), *Public Communication Scan of the United Kingdom: Using Public Communication to Strengthen Democracy and Public Trust*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/bc4a57b3-en. [77]

OECD (2023), *Public Investment in Bulgaria: Planning and Delivering Infrastructure*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b73ef3b4-en. [43]

OECD (2023), *Questionnaire to Adherents for assessing the implementation, dissemination and continued relevance of the OECD Recommendation on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development.* [20]

OECD (2023), "Strengthening environmental considerations in public investment in Ireland: Assessment and recommendations", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 35, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/83b97aca-en. [49]

OECD (2022), *Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy: Preparing the Ground for Government Action*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/76972a4a-en. [104]

OECD (2022), *Climate Tipping Points: Insights for Effective Policy Action*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/abc5a69e-en. [7]

OECD (2022), "Governing Green: Gearing up government to deliver on climate and other environmental challenges", in *Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy: Preparing the Ground for Government Action*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/45cc57a7-en. [93]

OECD (2022), *Life-Cycle Costing in Public Procurement in Hungary: Stocktaking of Good Practices*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8d90f627-en. [56]

OECD (2022), "OECD Action Plan on Governing Green", *Declaration on Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy*. [105]

OECD (2022), *OECD Survey on Green Public Procurement*. [53]

OECD (2022), *Opening remarks at the OECD Infrastructure Infrastructure Forum 2022: "Green Infrastructure"*, Secretary-General to the OECD, https://www.oecd-events.org/ipp-week-2022/session/ca7af62e-7eed-ec11-b47a-a04a5e7cf9da. [42]

OECD (2022), *The Protection and Promotion of Civic Space: Strengthening Alignment with International Standards and Guidance*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d234e975-en. [67]

OECD (2021), *A Climate Pact to Strengthen the Role of Luxembourg's Municipalities*, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2021/09/ipac-policies-in-practice_1a65968e/a-climate-pact-to-strengthen-the-role-of-luxembourg-s-municipalities_baaafdee/b485676c-en.pdf. [17]

OECD (2021), *Gender and the Environment: Building Evidence and Policies to Achieve the SDGs*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3d32ca39-en. [72]

OECD (2021), *OECD Report on Public Communication: The Global Context and the Way Forward*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/22f8031c-en. [76]

OECD (2020), "Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Infrastructure", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0460. [47]

OECD (2016), *Effective Carbon Rates: Pricing CO2 through Taxes and Emissions Trading Systems*, OECD Series on Carbon Pricing and Energy Taxation, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264260115-en. [32]

OECD (forthcoming), *Greening Public Administration in OECD countries: Driving the Green Transition within and from the Public Sector*. [84]

OECD (n.d.), *OECD Climate Actions and Policy Measurement Framework*, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/ (accessed on 18 February 2025). [18]

OECD (forthcoming), *Report on the Implementation of the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement*. [55]

OECD (forthcoming), *Report on the implementation of the OECD Recommendation on the Governance of Infrastructure*. [44]

OECD/Climate Club (2024), *Summary report of the Strategic Dialogues on causes and relevance of spillovers from mitigation policies*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/30236662-en. [37]

Percoco, M. et al. (2023), "Integrating climate change in infrastructure project appraisal: A proposed methodology for Ireland", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 61, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/00ce58be-en. [50]

Rafaty, R. (2018), "Perceptions of corruption, political distrust, and the weakening of climate policy", *Global Environmental Politics*, Vol. 18/3, https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00471. [60]

Rescoop.eu (2023), "Procurement Guide for Community Energy", https://www.rescoop.eu/toolbox/procurement-guide-for-community-energy. [57]

Resimic, M. (2022), *Grand corruption and climate change policies: Overview of grand corruption evidence in energy transition, biodiversity loss and climate finance*, U4, https://www.u4.no/publications/grand-corruption-and-climate-change-policies.pdf (accessed on 25 September 2023). [85]

Rittel, H. and M. Webber (1973), "Dilemmas in a general theory of planning", *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 4/2, pp. 155-169, https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01405730. [25]

Slowicek, J. (2022), "Oil and gas heavily outspends clean energy, environmental groups on California lobbying", *Energy News Network*, https://energynews.us/2022/03/17/oil-and-gas-heavily-outspends-clean-energy-environmental-groups-on-california-lobbying%EF%BF%BC/ (accessed on 10 October 2023). [86]

Supran, G. and N. Oreskes (2017), "Assessing ExxonMobil's climate change communications (1977–2014)", *Environmental Research Letters*, Vol. 12/8, https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa815f. [89]

UNEP (2023), *Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record – Temperatures hit new highs, yet world fails to cut emissions (again)*, United Nations Environment Programme, https://doi.org/10.59117/20.500.11822/43922. [6]

UNEP (2023), *Global Climate Litigation Report: 2023 Status Review*, United Nations Environment Programme, https://www.unep.org/resources/report/global-climate-litigation-report-2023-status-review. [71]

UNEP (2021), *Environmental Courts and Tribunals – 2021: A Guide for Policy Makers*, United Nations Environment Programme, https://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/40309;jsessionid=DC80BA2189871C9E8F85CEDEABD05288. [95]

UNEP (2019), *Environmental Rule of Law: First Global Report*, United Nations Environment Programme, https://www.unep.org/resources/assessment/environmental-rule-law-first-global-report. [102]

Weikmans, R. and A. Gupta (2021), "Assessing state compliance with multilateral climate transparency requirements: 'Transparency Adherence Indices' and their research and policy implications", *Climate Policy*, Vol. 21/5, pp. 635-651, https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2021.1895705. [21]

Willis, R., N. Curato and G. Smith (2022), *Deliberative democracy and the climate crisis*, https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.759. [70]

Chapter 2. Trust, security and dignity

2.1. Levels of trust in public institutions

In democratic societies, changes in trust in public institutions can reflect a shifting gap between citizens' expectations and what institutions deliver. While there is no one silver bullet to building trust, improvements in trust levels along with healthy levels of public scrutiny facilitate the implementation of government policies, foster social cohesion and unite people around shared goals (Brezzi et al., 2021). Strengthening trust in public institutions through good public governance remains a top priority for many OECD governments.

Across the OECD surveyed countries, about four in ten people (39%) show high or moderately high trust in their national government, while 44% report low or no trust. However, levels vary considerably across countries. In Luxembourg (56%), Mexico (54%) and Switzerland (62%), the majority report high or moderately high trust in their national government, while in one-third of surveyed countries, the share is less than 35%. Law and order institutions tend to be more trusted than political ones. More than half the population in OECD surveyed countries have a high or moderately high trust in the courts and judicial system (54%). Trust in both the civil service and local government stands at 45%, and is just 37% for the national parliament (Figure 2.1).

In the 18 countries with data available for both years, the share of people with high or moderately high trust in their national government declined from 43% in 2021 to 41% in 2023. Conversely, there has been a 3-percentage point increase in the share of people with low or no trust (from 40% to 43%). However, these averages mask significant changes in trust levels within individual countries (Figure 2.2).

Different groups have different perceptions and interactions with public institutions. Across OECD surveyed countries, trust in national government tends to be significantly lower among people with financial concerns (35% compared to 52% without concerns), lower education attainment (33% against 46% for the highly educated), or who would describe themselves as belonging to a group that is discriminated against (30% compared to 43% those not in such groups). Across the OECD surveyed countries, 36% of women and 43% of men expressed high or moderately high trust in the government (Figure 2.3).

The factor with the greatest impact on trust seems to be individuals' sense of political agency. Of those who feel they have a voice in government decisions, 69% report high or moderately high trust in the national government. In stark contrast, this is just 22% among individuals who feel they lack a voice. Similarly, on average across countries, the trust gap between those with a high confidence in their own ability to participate in politics and those without is 25 percentage points (Figure 2.3).

Methodology and definitions

Trust is defined as a person's belief that another person or institution will act consistently with their expectation of positive behaviour (OECD, 2017). The OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions (OECD, 2024) provides the original data to explore people's experience with, and expectations of, public governance. The 2023 wave of the survey collected data from nearly 60 000 respondents across 30 OECD countries, up from 22 countries in 2021. Most countries were surveyed in October-November 2023. The 11-point response scale is aggregated as follows: 0-4 = Low or no trust/unlikely; 5 = Neutral; 6-10 = High or moderately high trust/likely. An advisory group of public officials, national statistical office representatives and international experts contributed to the development, oversight and implementation of the survey. For an in-depth look at the survey method and implementation, please refer to the detailed background paper at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/support-materials/2024/07/oecd-survey-on-drivers-of-trust-in-public-institutions-2024-results_eeb36452/2023%20Trust%20Survey%20-%20Technical%20annex.pdf.

Further reading

OECD (2025 forthcoming), *Update of the Guideline on Trust Measurement,* OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

Brezzi, M., et al. (2021), "An updated OECD framework on drivers of trust in public institutions to meet current and future challenges", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 48, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b6c5478c-en.

Figure notes

Figure 2.1. Refers to the question "On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust [national government / national civil service / national parliament / local government /courts and judicial system]?". "OECD" is the unweighted average.

Figure 2.2. Shows the responses from two survey waves to the question, "On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the national government?". "OECD" is the unweighted average across countries for which data were available in both years. Although Mexico and New Zealand participated in both waves, the 2021 survey did not ask about trust in national government in those countries.

Figure 2.3. Refers to the questions "How much would you say the political system in your country allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?" and "How confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics?"

Figure 2.1. High and moderately high trust in public institutions, 2023

Share of population with high or moderately high trust in the selected public institutions



Source: OECD Trust Survey 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/8n5po4

Figure 2.2. Trust in national government, 2021 and 2023

Share of population with different levels of trust in their national government



Source: OECD Trust Survey 2021 and 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/1wjczi

Figure 2.3. Trust in national government by subgroup, 2023

Share of population with high or moderately high trust in national government by subgroup, OECD average



Source: OECD Trust Survey 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/7nyha1

2.2. Drivers of trust in public institutions

Trust in government and public institutions is driven by many interacting factors. The OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions distinguishes different categories of factors that influence levels of trust. First, public governance drivers assess the degree to which people expect institutions to be reliable and responsive in formulating and implementing policies and services and to uphold the values of fairness, integrity and openness. Second, trust levels relate to the perceived capacity of government to address complex and/or global challenges. Finally, various individual and group-based cultural and socio-economic factors and political preferences influence trust (OECD, 2024). The relationships of these multiple factors with trust levels need to be explored simultaneously. Figure 2.4 summarises the areas that could yield the greatest improvement in trust in different institutions. When it comes to trust in the national government, people's perceptions about competence and values-based decision making on complex policy issues seem more important than their day-to-day interactions with government. The extent to which people believe that the government can adequately balance the needs of different generations has the greatest potential effect on trust in national governments.

Many citizens remain sceptical about the government's ability to handle such longer-term issues, however. Only 37% of people believe that governments balance the needs of different generations (Figure 2.5). Results vary among countries, but only in Mexico and Switzerland do more than half of the adult population feel confident that the government adequately balances the interest of current and future generations. Addressing these complex, long-term issues is critical for building trust in the national government (OECD, 2024).

Improving day to-day interactions has more potential to improve trust in local government and the civil service than in the national government. Actions to strengthen people's sense of having a voice in local matters would have the greatest impact on trust in local government. Similarly, improved trust in the civil service is most strongly associated with improved perceptions of legitimate data use, fair treatment and public satisfaction with administrative services (Figure 2.4).

Public confidence in how personal data are managed has the potential to improve trust in government, particularly in the civil service. On average, a majority of people across surveyed OECD countries (52%) are confident that their data are only used for legitimate reasons, while 28% are not. However, the shares vary across countries. There are only six countries where more than 60% of the population has confidence in how the public administration handles their data (Figure 2.6).

Methodology and definitions

The 2023 wave of the OECD Trust Survey is a nationally representative population survey collecting data from around 60 000 respondents in 30 OECD countries to explore the drivers of public trust. Most countries were surveyed in October-November 2023. For an in-depth look at the survey method and implementation, please refer to the detailed background paper at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/support-materials/2024/07/oecd-survey-on-drivers-of-trust-in-public-institutions-2024-results_eeb36452/2023%20Trust%20Survey%20-%20Technical%20annex.pdf.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

Brezzi, M., et al. (2021), "An updated OECD framework on drivers of trust in public institutions to meet current and future challenges", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 48, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b6c5478c-en.

Figure notes

Figure 2.4. Shows the combined information from the regression analysis of trust in the respective institutions on the public governance drivers and control variables and the distance of the average perception of the respective driver to an 80% threshold. The figure shows the variables which have a statistically significant relationship with trust in the respective institution in a model that includes measures of the perception of different public governance dimensions. The analyses also control for individual characteristics, including whether they voted or would have voted for one of the current parties in power, self-reported levels of interpersonal trust and country fixed effects that control for the unobserved country-specific factors and allowing to assess only within country variations. All variables depicted are statistically significant at the 1% significance level. Drivers that are more positively associated with trust in a respective institution and where only small share of people currently have a positive perception can potentially have a greater impact, as there is more room for improvement and the improvement is likely to be associated with increased levels of trust.

Figure 2.5. High or moderately high trust in the national government and confidence that the national government adequately balances the interests of current and future generations correspond to responses of 6-10 on a 0-10 scale.

Figure 2.6. High or moderately high trust in the civil service and confidence that government agencies will only use their data for legitimate purposes correspond to responses of 6-10 on a 0-10 scale.

Figure 2.4. Drivers of trust in public institutions, 2023

Public governance drivers with a statistically significant association with trust in national and local government, and the civil service



Source: OECD Trust Survey 2023.

Figure 2.5. Trust in national government and confidence that it balances interests of different generations, 2023

Share of people with high or moderately high trust in national government (y-axis) and share of people who find it likely that governments adequately balance the interests of future and current generations (x-axis)



Source: OECD Trust Survey 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/539s76

Figure 2.6. Trust in the civil service and confidence in its use of personal data, 2023

Share of people with high or moderately high trust in the national civil service (y-axis) and share of people who find it likely that a public agency would use their personal data for legitimate purposes only (x-axis)



Source: OECD Trust Survey 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/bwp7e3

2.3. Security

Governments are operating in a context where multiple overlapping crises, whether exceptional or expected, have become the norm. Challenges like climate change, technological disruption and social inequalities require complex, long-term solutions. In many instances, governments in OECD surveyed countries have responded at speed and scale to economic, public health and security shocks, and seem to have limited their impact on trust levels. In part, this may be due to recent advances that OECD surveyed countries have made in assessing, preventing and responding to crises or disasters which have large socio-economic impacts.

At the macro level, economic, environmental, public health and security trends are likely to affect trust levels through their impact on how stable and secure individuals feel. Data from the OECD Trust Survey show a mixed picture on this measure. On average, 53% of people across surveyed OECD countries are confident that their government would be prepared to protect people's lives in the event of a large-scale emergency while 31% are not (Figure 2.7). This sentiment may have been reinforced by the response to the COVID-19 pandemic and its socio-economic aftermath.

Crisis management and preparedness require public institutions to make decisions amidst uncertainty. The complexity is compounded when addressing societal challenges that require complex trade-offs or involve a high degree of uncertainty. People's main concerns at the end of 2023 were about the economy (see also Chapter 3 on Prosperity). On average, 59% of people in the countries surveyed identify inflation as one of the three most important issues facing their country (Figure 2.8), making it by far the most frequently cited concern. Poverty and social inequality are cited as top concerns by 33% on average, and unemployment and jobs by 22%. A second important area of concern in many countries is violence or crime. An average of 30% of people across participating countries name these as among the top three issues facing their country, and 11% are concerned about defence and foreign affairs, including war and terrorism.

When asked about their confidence that national governments can help business and people use new technologies like artificial intelligence, responsibly and regulate them appropriately, around four in ten people (41%) find it likely. Similarly, 42% of the population feel confident that their country will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Figure 2.9). While this figure is not remarkably high, it is higher than might be expected considering current predictions indicating that greenhouse gas emissions will not fall enough to limit global warming to 1.5C (UNEP, 2023). This discrepancy may be explained by people expecting only that overall emissions can be reduced, rather than that international agreements or carbon neutrality are met.

Methodology and definitions

The 2023 wave of the OECD Trust Survey is a nationally representative population survey collecting data from around 60 000 respondents in 30 OECD countries to explore the drivers of public trust. Most countries were surveyed in October-November 2023. For an in-depth look at the survey method and implementation, please refer to the detailed background paper at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/support-materials/2024/07/oecd-survey-on-drivers-of-trust-in-public-institutions-2024-results_eeb36452/2023%20Trust%20Survey%20-%20Technical%20annex.pdf.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

OECD (2023), *Report on the Implementation of the OECD Recommendation on the Governance of Critical Risks*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

UNEP (2023), *Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record – Temperatures Hit New Highs, Yet World Fails to Cut Emissions (Again)*, United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi. https://doi.org/10.59117/20.500.11822/43922.

Figure notes

Figure 2.7. Shows the within-country distributions of responses to the question "If there was a large-scale emergency, how likely do you think it is that government institutions would be ready to protect people's lives?". Likely corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a 0-10 scale, neutral to 5 and unlikely to 0-4; "Don't know" was a separate answer choice. "OECD" is the unweighted average of responses across countries.

Figure 2.8. Shows the unweighted OECD average of responses to the question "What do you think are the three most important issues facing [COUNTRY]?". Immigration was not a response option in Mexico and Norway. The number of countries where the issue is among the top five concerns is the count of countries where the issue has one of the five highest proportions of mentions among respondents.

Figure 2.9. Refers to the questions "If new technologies (for example artificial intelligence or digital applications) became available, how likely do you think it is that the federal/central/national government will regulate them appropriately and help businesses and citizens use them responsibly?" and "On a scale of 0 to 10, how confident are you that your country will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next ten years?". Likely/confident corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a 0-10 scale.

Figure 2.7. Confidence in government preparedness to protect lives in a large-scale emergency, 2023

Share of population reporting different levels of confidence in the emergency preparedness of institutions



Source: OECD Trust Survey 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/o20pqe

Figure 2.8. Key policy issues facing OECD countries, 2023

Share of population who view selected policy issues as among the three most important facing their country



Source: OECD Trust Survey, 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/kmj9ue

Figure 2.9. Confidence in governments' ability to tackle greenhouse gas emissions and new technologies, 2023

Share of population reporting confidence that their country will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next ten years and that government will regulate new technologies appropriately



Source: OECD Trust Survey 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/zeqj07

2.4. Dignity

When dealing with the public, democratic governments can, and should, foster a sense of dignity among their population. There is no one silver bullet to building trust. However, the OECD Trust Survey provides clear evidence that governments need to demonstrate that they respect citizens and have their interests and voices at heart when tackling complex policy issues, using the best available evidence, upholding the public interest and enhancing accountability.

People's sense that they have a say in what the government does sheds light on how responsive and accountable political institutions and leaders are to public needs and concerns. According to the survey results, only 30% of people on average believe that the political system in their country allows people like them to have a say in what government does, while 53% believe that it does not (Figure 2.10). People who feel they have a say in what the government does are, on average, more than three times as likely to say that they trust the government than those who don't (see Section on "Levels of trust in public institutions"). This highlights the significance of political agency and participation in fostering trust, suggesting a need for policies that promote political inclusivity and engagement (OECD, 2024).

A sense of dignity is also enhanced by the belief that public institutions work for the general interest and not just for a few. However, there is a general perception that policy decisions are repeatedly skewed away from the public interest, in favour of special interests and the interests of the "powerful". This undermines democratic values and exacerbates a sense of inequality and exclusion from the democratic political system. On average across countries, 43% of respondents say it is likely that their national government would accept the demands of a corporation promoting a policy beneficial to their industry but harmful to society as a whole (Figure 2.11).

People's beliefs that public institutions are not upholding the common interest could be exacerbated by a perceived lack of government transparency. Only 41% of respondents across OECD surveyed countries believe that governments rely on the best available evidence, research and statistics to guide decisions (Figure 2.12). Strengthening the use of and communication around the evidence underlying policy decisions – and clarifying their impact on citizens' lives – could improve public perceptions and significantly increase institutional trustworthiness (OECD, 2024). Finally, strengthening the oversight function of parliament, along with other inherent checks and balances in the political system in general, is likely to be a key ingredient helping to maintain support for representative democracy and further strengthen a sense of dignity. On average, only 38% of respondents are confident that their national parliament is holding their government to account. Among OECD countries, only in Switzerland and Denmark does this share rise to more than half the population (Figure 2.12).

Methodology and definitions

The 2023 wave of the OECD Trust Survey is a nationally representative population survey collecting data from around 60 000 respondents in 30 OECD countries to explore the drivers of public trust. Most countries were surveyed in October-November 2023. For an in-depth look at the survey method and implementation, please refer to the detailed background paper at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/support-materials/2024/07/oecd-survey-on-drivers-of-trust-in-public-institutions-2024-results_eeb36452/2023%20Trust%20Survey%20-%20Technical%20annex.pdf.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

OECD (2022), *Building Trust to Reinforce Democracy: Main Findings from the 2021 OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions*, Building Trust in Public Institutions, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b407f99c-en.

Brezzi, M., et al. (2021), "An updated OECD framework on drivers of trust in public institutions to meet current and future challenges", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 48, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b6c5478c-en.

Figure notes

Likely/completely corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a 0-10 scale, neutral to 5 and unlikely/not at all to 0-4; "Don't know" was a separate answer choice.

Figure 2.10. Refers to the question: ''How much would you say the political system in [COUNTRY] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?''.

Figure 2.11. Refers to the question: "If a corporation promoted a policy that benefited its industry but could be harmful to society as a whole, how likely do you think it is that the national government would refuse the corporation's demand?".

Figure 2.12. Refers to the questions "How likely do you think it is that the national parliament would effectively hold the national government accountable for their policies and behaviour, for instance by questioning a minister or reviewing the budget?" and "If the national government takes a decision, how likely do you think it is that it will draw on the best available evidence, research and statistical data?".

Figure 2.10. Perceptions of having a say in what the government does, 2023

Share of the population reporting different levels of perceived likelihood that the political system allows them to have a say in what the government does



Source: OECD Trust Survey 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/u6sq78

Figure 2.11. Confidence that government would refuse a corporation's demand that is not in the public interest, 2023

Share of population reporting different levels of likelihood that the government would refuse the demand



Source: OECD Trust Survey 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/zj3d6m

Figure 2.12. Confidence that the national parliament holds the government accountable and that government decisions are based on best available evidence, 2023

Share of population who find it likely



Source: OECD Trust Survey 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/d4p9u8

Chapter 3. Prosperity

3.1. Prosperity and household finances

Helping households and individuals achieve prosperity and financial security is a key outcome for governments. Many aspects of public governance contribute to this, whether by supporting economic growth, enabling different groups to share the benefits of growth or, in some cases, by redistributing income to support those with lower income levels. Greater levels of prosperity may also support other beneficial outcomes such as greater trust in public institutions (OECD, 2024a).

In 2023, a time when inflation remained high, more than two thirds of people (71%) in OECD countries were concerned about their household finances and worried about their economic well-being over the next couple of years (Figure 3.1). A majority of people reported concerns about their household finances in 27 of the 30 countries for which data are available, with women more worried than men in all 30 countries. On average across the OECD, 68% of men and 75% of women report such concerns.

Moreover, people's concerns about their prosperity and household finances have increased in recent years. The share of people concerned about their ability to pay all expenses and make ends meet rose from 67% in 2020 to 75% in 2022 (Online Figure J.1.1). This coincides with a period of sharply rising prices, with inflation across the OECD rising from an average of 1% in the second quarter of 2020 to a peak of 10.1% in the same period of 2022 (OECD, 2024b). Concerns increased in 22 of 25 countries with data available. A majority of people report concerns about covering household expenses in every country other than Denmark (49%).

Many people also have concerns about their ability to access public welfare or benefits. Only 52% of people in OECD countries are confident that they would be treated fairly if they applied for government benefits or services (Figure 3.2). People are most confident in Finland (77%) and Ireland (74%). Those with lower levels of education are less confident that they will be fairly treated (45%) than those with medium (50%) or high levels of education (60%). Women (50%) are less confident than men (55%) (Online Figure J.1.2).

There are high levels of support for policies to improve prosperity and economic security (Figure 3.3). A large majority of those surveyed across the OECD felt that their countries should prioritise providing equal opportunities for all (82%) and creating conditions for business to thrive (81%). Large majorities also supported prioritising help to adapt to automation (77%), which may lead to job losses in some sectors and regions, as well as reducing public debt (75%) and greenhouse gas emissions (69%), which may affect growth and living standards over the long term.

Methodology and definitions

The 2023 wave of the OECD Trust Survey is a nationally representative population survey collecting data from around 60 000 respondents in 30 OECD countries to explore the drivers of public trust. Most countries were surveyed in October-November 2023. For an in-depth look at the survey method and implementation, please refer to the detailed methodological background paper at https://oe.cd/trust.

Further reading

OECD (2024a), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

OECD (2024b), *OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2024 Issue 2*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d8814e8b-en.

OECD (2023), *Main Findings from the 2022 OECD Risks that Matter Survey*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/70aea928-en.

Figure notes

Figure 3.1. Refers to the question "In general, thinking about the next year or two, how concerned are you about your household's finances and overall economic well-being?". Figure shows the share of respondents answering "concerned" or "very concerned".

Figure 3.2. Refer to the question "If you or a member of your household applied for government benefit or service, how likely do you think it is that your application would be treated fairly?" Likely corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a 0-10 scale. Low education corresponds to lower secondary attainment, medium to upper secondary or post-secondary attainment, and high education to tertiary attainment.

Figure 3.3. Shows the unweighted OECD average of responses to the question "How important do you think it is that each of the following goals are prioritised in your country?" Important corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a 0-10 scale.

Figure J.1.1 (Concerns about not being able to pay expenses or make ends meet, 2020 and 2022) and Figure J.1.2 (Trust in administrative fairness by gender, 2023) are available online in Annex J.

Figure 3.1. Concerns about household finances, by gender, 2023

Share of respondents who are concerned or very concerned



Source: OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions*, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

StatLink https://stat.link/kjo4ib

Figure 3.2. Trust in administrative fairness by educational level, 2023

Share of respondents who believe it is likely that they would be treated fairly if they applied for a public service or benefit



Source: OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions*, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

StatLink https://stat.link/dtec7p

Figure 3.3. Key policy priorities for OECD countries, 2023

Share of respondents who think the goal is an important priority for their country



Source: OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions*, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

StatLink https://stat.link/b8fklc

3.2. Institutions and growth

Governments play a critical role in creating prosperity by supporting economic growth. This requires a business environment enabling enterprises to invest, innovate and grow. Public institutions therefore need to enable fair market access and competition; avoid undue regulatory burdens; and ensure that rules, regulations and contracts are fairly and reliably enforced within a stable macroeconomic environment.

Corruption deepens inequalities and weakens growth. It hampers investment, competition and entrepreneurship, and affects key determinants of productivity growth, including innovation and use of new technologies, the market environment, and public and private investment decisions (OECD, 2024). Lobbying is a natural part of the democratic process but needs to be managed to ensure fairness. On average, OECD countries fulfil only 42% of OECD criteria on the strength of laws, regulations and mandates related to lobbying, and only 36% on their implementation in practice (Figure 3.4). Lack of transparency over lobbying could benefit incumbents and well-funded corporations, but just over half of OECD countries with data available have defined lobbying activities and lobbyists, and a similar share have a publicly available lobbying register (OECD, 2024).

Fair enforcement of regulations is also important, with no enterprise or interest group able to gain unfair advantage by delaying or avoiding enforcement. The average score across the OECD for the quality of regulatory enforcement is 0.72 on a scale of 0 to 1 (Figure 3.5). This has changed little since 2014 (0.70). However, 21 of 29 countries with data available (72%) have improved, with only 8 worsening. The greatest improvements were in Germany (+0.10) and Czechia (+0.09), which both reduced delays in enforcement.

Growth requires businesses and customers to have confidence that they will not be defrauded and that contracts can be enforced. This in turn requires fair, impartial, affordable and accessible civil justice. The average score across the OECD for the quality of civil justice is 0.68 on a 0-1 scale, a figure that has changed little since 2014 (0.67) (Figure 3.6). Just over half of the OECD countries with data available improved over this period (16 out of 30, 53%), while the rest worsened. The greatest improvements were in Estonia (+0.08), which reduced delays in access to justice, and Slovenia (+0.09), which improved enforcement of civil judgements.

Fiscal objectives and rules help guide economic policy and support a stable macroeconomic environment. Setting clear fiscal targets can help limit public spending, achieve fiscal goals and promote prudent fiscal management. In 2023, the most common objective was for a balanced budget, adopted by 34 of 36 OECD countries (94%), with 5 countries having a quasi-permanent fiscal rule in their constitution and 24 enshrining it in law. This was followed by limits on public debt and public spending, both applied in 30 OECD countries (83%), and limits on revenue in 15 (42%) (Online Table J.1.1).

Methodology and definitions

Data on lobbying and influence were collected through a questionnaire based on the OECD Public Integrity Indicators on Accountability of Public Policy Making, measuring the implementation of the OECD recommendation on Public Integrity. Responses were collected from 33 OECD countries and 6 accession countries (Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, Indonesia, Peru and Romania). Respondents were senior officials responsible for integrity policies in central government.

The World Justice Project collects nationally representative samples and local expert interviews in each country. Country scores are normalised to a range between 0 (weakest adherence) and 1 (strongest adherence). Component scores are aggregated using simple averages.

Data on fiscal rules and objectives refer only to central government practices as of end-February 2023. Responses were collected from 36 OECD countries and represent the country's own assessment of current practices and procedures. Fiscal rules are numerical parameters set by the government to permanently constrain budgetary aggregates, usually in legislation. A fiscal objective is a target that is not legally binding but mandated through a political decision or established custom and practice.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/968587cd-en.

OECD (2021), *Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en.

OECD (2023), *OECD Spending Better Framework*, OECD, Paris, updated 1 December 2023, GOV/SBO(2022)6/REV1.

WJP (2024), The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2024, World Justice Project, Washington, DC, https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPIndex2024.pdf.

Figure notes

OECD presents the unweighted average of countries with data available.

Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5, Figure 3.6. OECD score is unweighted average of countries for which data is available.

Figure 3.4. Data for Belgium, Colombia, Germany, Hungary, and New Zealand are not available.

Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6. Data for Iceland, Israel and Switzerland are not available. The list of regulations and practice criteria are available on the OECD Public Integrity Indicators website.

Table J.1.1 (Legal basis for fiscal objectives and rules in place at national level, 2023) is available online in Annex J.

Figure 3.4. Quality of oversight of influence and lobbying, 2023



Source: OECD (2025), Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 9 May 2025), https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/.

StatLink https://stat.link/wvemnx

Figure 3.5. Quality of regulatory enforcement, 2014 and 2024



Source: WJP (2024), *The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2024*, https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPIndex2024.pdf.

StatLink https://stat.link/b0zond

Figure 3.6. Quality of civil justice, 2014 and 2024



Source: WJP (2024), *The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2024*, https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPIndex2024.pdf.

StatLink https://stat.link/4cho19

3.3. Cost effectiveness

Governments should work to ensure that public resources are spent as effectively as possible. There is no specific level of public expenditure which is most conducive to growth and prosperity: public spending on different sectors may rise or fall over time as national priorities and needs change. However, it is important for governments to try to maximise the cost effectiveness of the resources they do allocate, aiming to achieve the best possible results, in terms of quality and benefits for society, for the given level of resources. Across the different areas of government activity, education and healthcare are the sectors where public spending effectiveness can be most readily compared, as these have the best developed internationally standardised measures of results.

On average across the OECD, health expenditure accounts for 19% of overall public spending, or 9% of GDP (see Chapter 15 on "Public spending"). Health expenditure effectiveness is assessed by comparing a country's life expectancy at birth to its total current health expenditure per capita. This comprises both public and private health spending; the latter may be higher in countries without comprehensive public health schemes. Although life expectancy is affected by factors beyond healthcare activities and spending (such as lifestyle, behaviour and environment), there is a positive relation between health spending and life expectancy at birth (Figure 3.7). Nevertheless, countries such as Costa Rica, Israel, Spain and Switzerland have higher life expectancies than other countries with similar levels of healthcare spending. Japan achieves the highest life expectancy of any OECD country (84 years) with per capita healthcare expenditure that is similar to the OECD average. Meanwhile, countries such as Latvia, Lithuania and Mexico have lower life expectancies than other countries with similar per capita healthcare spending.

On average across the OECD, education expenditure accounts for 11% of overall public spending, or 5% of GDP (see Chapter 15 on "Public spending"). Results in this sector are measured using data from the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). This uses comparable tests to evaluate the performance of 15-year-old students in a wide range of countries on reading, mathematics and science. Average cumulative expenditure on education across the OECD is around USD 125 700 PPP per student across primary and lower secondary education. Overall, there is a positive relationship between expenditure and PISA results. However some countries, including Japan, Korea and Latvia, achieve higher mathematics scores than those with similar cumulative levels of education expenditure per student (OECD 2024). Similarly, countries including Ireland, Korea, Japan and New Zealand achieve higher reading scores than other countries with similar expenditure per student (Figure 3.9).

Countries which are not achieving the same results as others spending similar amounts may benefit from exploring ways to improve their spending effectiveness. This may involve reforms to policy, improvements to the public institutions implementing government policy, or improving delivery, such as through upgrading skills or digitalisation. Alternately, it might involve shifting some public resources to address wider social issues which are affecting results (e.g. funding anti-smoking campaigns). By focusing on improving spending effectiveness, governments can free up resources for other public purposes, and/or release resources back to businesses and the public. It will also be important for governments to work to build comparable evidence in other sectors allowing better cross-national benchmarking of spending effectiveness.

Methodology and definitions

Health spending measures the final consumption of healthcare goods and services (i.e. current health expenditure) including personal and collective healthcare but excluding spending on investments. Life expectancy measures how long, on average, a newborn can expect to live, if current death rates do not change. It focuses on measuring the length of life and not the health-related quality of life of people alive. Reading performance in PISA measures the capacity of 15-year-old students to understand, use and reflect on written texts. Mathematical performance measures their mathematical literacy.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *Education at a Glance 2024: OECD Indicators*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c00cad36-en.

OECD (2023), *Health at a Glance 2023: OECD Indicators*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7a7afb35-en.

Figure notes

Figure 3.7, Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9. Expenditure in US dollars per person, Purchasing power parity (PPP) converted, current prices. PPPs are the rates of currency conversion that equalise the purchasing power of different countries by eliminating differences in price levels.

Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9. Cumulative spending between ages 6 and 15

Figure 3.7. Expenditure data are provisional for Australia, Canada, Israel and Japan and estimated for Mexico and New Zealand. Life expectancies are provisional for Chile and Norway and estimated for Japan and the United Kingdom. Life expectancies for Canada and the United States are for 2021. See also OECD Health Statistics (database).

Figure 3.9. Shows cumulative expenditure per student over the theoretical duration of studies (primary and upper secondary). Expenditure data for Colombia, Costa Rica, Greece, Switzerland and Türkiye are not available. PISA scores are not available for Luxembourg.

Figure 3.7. Life expectancy at birth and total current expenditure on health per capita, 2022



Source: OECD Health Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/wm84dy

Figure 3.8. Performance in PISA (mathematics) 2022 at age 15 and cumulative expenditure per student, 2021



Source: OECD (2024), *Education at a Glance 2024: OECD Indicators*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c00cad36-en.

StatLink https://stat.link/c95i1q

Figure 3.9. Performance in PISA (reading) 2022 at age 15 and cumulative expenditure per student, 2021



Source: OECD (2024), *Education at a Glance 2024: OECD Indicators*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c00cad36-en.

StatLink https://stat.link/39il0k

3.4. Shared prosperity and youth inclusion

Governments play a role in supporting shared prosperity by helping to ensure all groups in society benefit from economic growth. The adverse shocks of recent years have created challenges for economic inclusion and opportunities for young people, who tend to have lower incomes, lower savings and less secure employment than their older peers. Balancing interests across generations is essential for creating long-term shared prosperity and can help foster economic growth, build institutional trust, and promote social and environmental sustainability.

Only 37% of people in OECD countries believe that their government adequately balances the interests of current and future generations, a share which is similar across all age groups (Figure 3.10). Mexico (63%) and Switzerland (52%) are the only OECD countries where a majority are confident that their government achieves this balance. In 12 out of 30 countries with data available, young people (18-29 year-olds) are less confident in their government's performance on this measure than the average for their country. In 17 of 30 countries, people aged 50+ are more sceptical. Governments could improve confidence by embedding intergenerational perspectives into their actions to ensure inclusive policy outcomes for all age groups (OECD, 2020).

Access to education and training opportunities are important for enabling younger people to benefit from economic growth. The share of 15-29 year-olds not in employment, education or training (NEET) fell from 16.0% of young people in 2012 to 13.1% in 2019 and 12.6% in 2023 (Figure 3.11). However, NEET rates increased in 15 out of 36 OECD countries, with 9 seeing increases of over 1 percentage point. The lowest NEET rates in 2023 were in the Netherlands (5.4%) and Iceland (6.7%). The largest reductions since 2019 have been in Greece (-6.9 percentage points) and Italy (-5.8 p.p.). Spain managed to reduce its NEET rate by 8.7 p.p. since 2012. Governments can help to reduce NEET rates through measures such as improving the responsiveness of education services and improving access to training.

Across the OECD, 60% of young people are concerned about being able to find or maintain adequate housing (OECD, 2023). Between 2015 and 2023, house prices grew faster than income levels in 27 out of 33 OECD countries (82%) with data available (Figure 3.12). From a base of 100 in 2015 (the reference year), the index of the ratio of house prices to incomes rose to 116 in 2023. This makes homeownership increasingly difficult for many, particularly younger people, who need greater resources than before to purchase their first home. The greatest increases over this period were in Portugal (154), Canada (138) and Luxembourg (130). Overall, the index was also higher in 2023 than in 2007, when it averaged 113 across the OECD. However, in 17 of 32 countries with data available, the ratio was lower in 2023 than in 2007.

Methodology and definitions

The 2023 wave of the OECD Trust Survey is a nationally representative population survey collecting data from around 60 000 respondents in 30 OECD countries to explore the drivers of public trust. Most countries were surveyed in October-November 2023. For an in-depth look at the survey method and implementation, please refer to the detailed methodological background paper at https://oe.cd/trust.

NEET rates are the share of 15-29 year-olds not in employment, formal education or training. Education includes attending part- or full-time formal education but excludes non-formal education or short educational activities. Employment covers all those who have been paid for at least one hour in the reference week of the survey or were temporarily absent from such work.

House price to income ratio is the nominal house price index divided by the nominal disposable income per head. It is only available as an index. The base year (100) is 2015. The nominal house price index covers sales of newly built and existing dwellings.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *OECD Youth Policy Toolkit*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/74b6f8f3-en.

OECD (2023), *Main Findings from the 2022 OECD Risks that Matter Survey*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/70aea928-en.

OECD (2020), *Governance for Youth, Trust and Intergenerational Justice: Fit for all Generations?*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c3e5cb8a-en.

Figure notes

Figure 3.10. Refers to the question "On a scale of 0 to 10, how confident are you that the national government adequately balances the interests of current and future generations?" Confident corresponds to responses of 6-10.

Figure 3.11. Data for Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Israel, Mexico and the United States are for 2022 rather than 2023. Data for Türkiye are for 2013 rather than 2012. Average for 2012 does not include Korea or Japan.

Figure 3.12. Data for Colombia are for 2022 rather than 2023. Data for Costa Rica, Mexico and Türkiye are not available.

Figure 3.10. Confidence that government adequately balances the interests of current and future generations, by age, 2023

Share of respondents who are confident



Source: OECD Trust Survey, 2023, http://oe.cd/trust.

StatLink https://stat.link/8sz74j

Figure 3.11. Percentage of young adults not in employment, education or training, 2012, 2019 and 2023



Source: https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/youth-employment-and-social-policies.html.

StatLink https://stat.link/owvgme

Figure 3.12. Affordability of house prices, 2000, 2007, 2015 and 2023

Index of the ratio of house prices to nominal household disposable income per capita, 2015=100



Source: OECD Affordable Housing Database, https://oe.cd/ahd.

StatLink https://stat.link/mxniwo

3.5. Poverty and inequality

Governments can help ensure economic opportunity and security for households through policies that help ensure people have social and economic opportunities in areas such as education and employment. Where households continue to experience adverse economic outcomes, governments can support them directly by redistributing income towards low-income households. Direct measures to reduce poverty and inequality include progressive taxes, benefits and cash transfers. Governments may also use indirect measures, such as subsidies or price controls.

Government redistribution of income reduces relative poverty in every OECD country for which data are available (Figure 3.13). On average across the OECD, 27% of people are in relative poverty before taxes and transfers such as child, housing or unemployment benefits. This falls to 11% after taxes and transfers have been taken into account. The greatest reductions in relative poverty through redistribution are in France (-28 percentage points) and Finland (-27 p.p.). Overall, relative poverty rates after taxes and transfers have altered little across the OECD over the past decade, falling from 12% in 2012 to 11% in 2021. However, 13 countries have seen rates fall by more than 1 p.p. over that period. The largest falls were in Mexico (-3.9 p.p.) and Türkiye (-3.7 p.p.).

The effectiveness of government actions in mitigating disparities in relative income can also be examined using the Gini coefficient. This measures income inequality, from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). Government redistribution reduces inequality in every OECD country for which data are available (Figure 3.14). The average level of inequality across the OECD in 2021 was 0.46 before taxes and transfers, and 0.32 after, with taxes and transfers resulting in the greatest reductions in inequality in Czechia and Finland (both -0.24 points). However, there has been little overall change in inequality after taxes and transfers in the past decade, averaging 0.32 in both 2012 and 2021 (OECD, 2024). The largest reductions in inequality over that period were in Korea and Mexico (both -0.06 points).

Methodology and definitions

Market income is total household income from market sources. Disposable income is total income from market sources plus current government transfers, and minus direct taxes on income, wealth taxes and social security contributions. The relative poverty rate is the share of people with an income below the poverty line (50% of the current median equivalised income of the entire population of the country). Inequality is measured using Gini coefficient, comparing a cumulative proportion of the population against the cumulative proportion of income received.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

Kuypers, S., F. Figari and G. Verbist (2021), "Redistribution from a joint income-wealth perspective: Results from 16 European OECD countries", *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers*, No. 257, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/22103c5e-en.

Figure notes

Figure 3.13. The latest data refer to 2021 except for Costa Rica (2023); Brazil, Chile, Finland and the United States (2022); Australia, Germany, New Zealand and Switzerland (2020); Denmark (2019); and Iceland (2017). Earlier data refer to 2012 except for Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Luxembourg, Sweden and the United States (2015); Brazil and Bulgaria (2016); and Belgium and Japan (2018). No data for France are available for before 2020. Data for Mexico are after taxes but before transfers.

Figure 3.14. The latest data refer to 2021 except Costa Rica (2023); Brazil, Chile, Czechia, Finland, Mexico, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United States (2022); Australia, and Switzerland (2020); Denmark (2019); and Iceland (2017). Earlier data refer to 2012 except Belgium and Japan (2018); Brazil (2016); Luxembourg (2015); Chile, Estonia, Sweden and the United States (2013).

Figure 3.13. Relative poverty rates before and after taxes and transfers, 2021 and 2012

Percentage of total population earning less than 50% of median income



Source: OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD), https://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm.

StatLink https://stat.link/a56yk9

Figure 3.14. Household income inequality before and after taxes and transfers, 2021 and 2012

Household income inequality of the total population



Source: OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD), https://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm.

StatLink https://stat.link/uokn0h

Chapter 4. Public services

4.1. Satisfaction, accessibility, responsiveness and quality of healthcare services

Across 30 OECD countries, 52% of users were satisfied with their healthcare system in 2023 but this average hides very wide variation across countries (Figure 4.1). Satisfaction rates fell by 10 percentage points in OECD countries between 2021 and 2023. Only three countries saw satisfaction levels rise over the period: Colombia saw a significant rise from 28% to 42%, Australia saw slight rise from 61% to 64%, and Belgium's high satisfaction levels increased slightly from 79% to 81%. Such country variations present opportunities to explore underlying factors and address areas for improvement.

Out-of-pocket (OOP) healthcare spending refers to payments made by households for healthcare goods and services. High OOP expenditures may be a barrier to accessing health services. Rates vary across OECD countries, reflecting different financing structures and financial protection for households. Between 2020 and 2023, OOP spending in the OECD remained constant at 19% of total healthcare spending, with Luxembourg and France having the lowest rates, at less than 10%. The largest falls in OOP expenditure rates over that period were in Latvia (-4 p.p.) and Mexico (-3 p.p.) although they still remained comparatively high (Figure 4.2).

The indicator person-centred care is based on a scale including eight questions to measure the extent to which a person's health needs are managed holistically, ensuring their preferences and needs are central to the care received. The index shows the average score on this scale for people living with chronic conditions in each country. This score is based on a scale ranging from 0 to 24. Two cutoffs are shown: a value of 12, equivalent to a respondent scoring on average 50% or more across the eight questions; and a higher cutoff of 16, equivalent to scoring on average 66.6%. In all countries, people living with chronic conditions scored on average above the cutoff value of 12. In most countries (13 of 19), this average scale score was also above the higher cutoff of 16 (equivalent to a positive response on average across the eight questions). Scores were highest in Switzerland, the United States and Australia. (Figure 4.3)

Methodology and definitions

The 2023 wave of the OECD Trust Survey is a nationally representative population survey collecting data from around 60 000 respondents in 30 OECD countries to explore the drivers of public trust. Most countries were surveyed in October-November 2023. For an in-depth look at the survey method and implementation, please refer to the detailed methodological background paper at https://oe.cd/trust.

OOP payments are those made directly by a patient where neither public nor private insurance cover the full cost of the goods or service. They include cost-sharing and other expenditure paid directly by private households, and should also ideally include estimations of informal payments to health providers. For countries that do not report spending on dental care, this is typically reported under outpatient care which can affect the coverage rate

Median waiting time for cataract surgery refers to the time elapsed from the date patients were added to the waiting list for the procedure (following specialist assessment) to the date they were admitted for treatment.

The case-fatality rate for ischaemic stroke measures the share of people aged 45 and over who die within 30 days of admission to the hospital.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

OECD (2023), *Health at a Glance 2023: OECD Indicators*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7a7afb35-en.

Figure notes

Figure 4.1. "OECD" presents the unweighted average across countries. Refers to the question "On a scale of 0 to 10, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the healthcare system in [country] as a whole?" Satisfied corresponds to responses of 6-10.

Figure 4.2. The latest data refer to 2023 except for Australia, Belgium, Switzerland, Costa Rica, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Croatia, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Romania, Slovak Republic, Türkiye, United States (2022). Argentina and Indonesia (2021); Brazil (2019; and New Zealand (2018). Earlier data refer to 2020 except for Australia, Belgium, Switzerland, Costa Rica, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Croatia, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Romania, Slovak Republic, Türkiye, United States (2019); Argentina, Indonesia (2018); Brazil (2016); and New Zealand (2015).

Figure 4.3. Refers to results of the P3CEQ Questionnaire. Response to eight questions measuring if care is person-centred. Scale ranges from 0 to 24. Two cutoffs are shown: 12, representing the midpoint of the scale range, and 16, equivalent to a positive response on average across questions asked. *Data for Italy refer to patients enrolled in outpatient settings for specialist visits in selected regions. **United States sample only includes people aged 65 years or older.

Figure 4.1. Citizen satisfaction with healthcare services, 2021 and 2023

Share of respondents satisfied with healthcare system



StatLink https://stat.link/zhkfr9

Source: OECD Trust Survey, 2023, http://oe.cd/trust.

Figure 4.2. Out-of-pocket health expenditure as a share of total healthcare spending, 2020 and 2023



Source: WHO Global Health Expenditure Database.

StatLink https://stat.link/mtuszh

Figure 4.3. Person-centred care – people with chronic conditions



Source: OECD PaRIS 2024 Database.

StatLink https://stat.link/myjxnu

4.2. Satisfaction, accessibility, responsiveness and quality of education

Among the countries that participated in the OECD Trust Survey in 2021 and 2023, the share of the population who were satisfied with the education system fell by 4 percentage points, from 61% to 57%. However, satisfaction increased in 7 of the 20 countries with data available for both years. The largest rises were in Colombia (from 36% to 56%), Canada (from 60% to 68%) and Australia (from 63% to 70%). Denmark maintained high satisfaction levels of over 74% in both years, signalling consistent public approval of its education system (Figure 4.4).

There is significant evidence for the positive benefits to childhood development and well-being of early education and care (OECD, 2022). Enrolment rates in early childhood education are a measure of accessibility, reflecting the availability and inclusiveness of public education systems. On average, enrolment rates in OECD countries stand at 75% for 3-year-olds and 89% for 4-year-olds. France, where school attendance is mandatory from age 3, and the United Kingdom have achieved universal enrolment for both ages. Several other countries have enrolment rates above 95% in both age categories (Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Korea, Norway and Spain). However, notable disparities persist. Türkiye, for instance, reports enrolment rates of just 11% for 3-year-olds and 33% for 4-year-olds, while for Switzerland the rates are only 2% for 3-year-olds and 49% for 4-year-olds (Figure 4.5).

Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) maths scores are one indicator of the quality of education systems, reflecting how effectively they equip students with critical analytical and problem-solving skills. In 2022, students across the OECD scored an average of 472 points in the PISA maths test. The highest average scores were in Japan (536 points), Korea (527 points) and Estonia (510 points) (Figure 4.6).

Another measure of the quality of an education system is its ability to educate students equitably, regardless of their background. On average across the OECD, 15.5% of the variance in PISA mathematics scores is attributed to students' socio-economic status. This highlights the need for policies that address the impact of socio-economic status on student achievement to ensure that all students can reach their potential (OECD, 2023a). Socio-economic background has the smallest influence on educational results in Iceland (9.3% of the variance), Norway (9.6%) and Canada (10.2%), demonstrating these countries' highly equitable education systems (Figure 4.6).

Methodology and definitions

The 2023 wave of the OECD Trust Survey is a nationally representative population survey collecting data from around 60 000 respondents in 30 OECD countries to explore the drivers of public trust. Most countries were surveyed in October-November 2023. For an in-depth look at the survey method and implementation, please refer to the detailed methodological background paper at https://oe.cd/trust.

The OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) evaluates how well 15-year-old students nearing the end of compulsory schooling can apply their knowledge and skills to real-life challenges. The PISA reporting approach uses proficiency levels to summarise and compare student performance in mathematics. Results are scaled, with a mean of 500 and standard deviation of 100. Socio-economic status is derived from three proxy components: highest parental occupational status, highest parental education in years and home possessions. For more information see https://doi.org/10.1787/01820d6d-en.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

OECD (2023a), *PISA 2022 Results (Volume I): The State of Learning and Equity in Education*, PISA, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/53f23881-en.

OECD (2023b), *PISA 2022 Results (Volume II): Learning During – and From – Disruption*, PISA, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a97db61c-en.

OECD (2022), "Quality assurance and improvement in the early education and care sector", *OECD Education Policy Perspectives*, No. 55, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/774688bf-en.

Figure notes

"OECD" presents the unweighted average across countries.

Figure 4.4. "OECD" presents the unweighted average across countries. Refers to the question "On a scale of 0 to 10, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the education system in [country] as a whole?" Satisfied corresponds to responses of 6-10. Responses include only those who were enrolled in an educational institution in the past two years or had a family member enrolled.

Figure 4.5. Data for Canada are not available

Figure 4.6. Data for Luxembourg are not available. Percentage of variance explained by socio-economic background is not available for Costa Rica.

Figure 4.4. Citizen satisfaction with education services, 2021 and 2023

Share of respondents satisfied with education system



Source: OECD Trust Survey 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/5t8lri

Figure 4.5. Enrolment rate at age 3 and 4 in early childhood and pre-primary education, 2022



Source: OECD (2024), *Education at a Glance 2024*.

StatLink https://stat.link/0pej7o

Figure 4.6. Mean score in mathematics and percentage of variance explained by socio-economic background, 2022



Source: OECD (2023), *PISA 2022 Results (Volume I): The State of Learning and Equity in Education*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/53f23881-en.

StatLink https://stat.link/l43h5t

4.3. Trust, accessibility, responsiveness, and quality of justice services

Although the public tend to interact with their country's judicial system less frequently than with their health or education systems, trust in the judiciary serves as a valuable indicator of public perceptions about its independence, quality and effectiveness. High levels of trust in the judicial system are also a sign of functioning checks and balances, which are essential for healthy democratic systems (OECD, 2021). Across OECD countries with data available, 54% of people have high or moderately high trust in the judicial system on average, a share which has declined by 3 percentage points between 2021 and 2023. Out of the 21 countries with data available for both 2021 and 2023, 10 saw a rise in trust levels. The largest increases were in Colombia (+14 p.p., from 19% in 2021 to 33% in 2023) and France (+8 p.p. from 42% in 2021 to 50% in 2023). Denmark and Norway maintained trust levels of over 75% in both years, demonstrating strong and stable confidence in their judicial institutions (Figure 4.7).

Access to justice refers to the capacity of individuals, businesses and communities to effectively, fairly and promptly resolve legal issues and address their justice-related needs. In 2024, OECD countries achieved an average score of 0.61 on a scale of 0 to 1 in the accessibility and affordability of civil justice, as measured by the World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index. This represents a one point fall compared to the 2021 result. The top performers in this dimension are Sweden (0.80), Denmark (0.79) and Lithuania (0.78), with Lithuania also having achieved the greatest improvement since 2021 (+0.08). Two other countries making notable advances on this measure were Hungary (+0.07) and New Zealand (+0.05) since 2021 (Figure 4.8).

An independent justice system is critical not only for the fair resolution of legal disputes but also for maintaining public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of judicial processes. In 2024, the average score among OECD countries for freedom from improper government influence in judicial processes reached 0.73 points out of a on a scale of 0 to 1. This indicates a general perception of robust judicial independence, although there were significant variations across countries. The countries with the highest scores in 2024 were Norway (0.94), Ireland (0.92), Denmark (0.92) and Germany (0.91). Slovenia and Poland have recorded the most improvement since 2021, with their scores increasing by 0.07 points and 0.06 points respectively (Figure 4.9).

Methodology and definitions

The 2023 wave of the OECD Trust Survey is a nationally representative population survey collecting data from around 60 000 respondents in 30 OECD countries to explore the drivers of public trust. Most countries were surveyed in October-November 2023. For an in-depth look at the survey method and implementation, please refer to the detailed methodological background paper at https://oe.cd/trust.

The WJP Rule of Law Index is based on a general population survey of 1 000 respondents in each country and a survey of experts who frequently interact with their national state institutions. Each dimension is scored from 0 to 1; a higher score means better performance. For more information, see https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data. Accessibility and affordability are gauged by asking about people's awareness of available remedies and affordability of legal advice and representation. Freedom from improper influence is estimated by asking about factors such as how likely a litigant is to win a case against the state and whether it would respect such a decision.

Further reading

World Justice Project (2024), *WJP Rule of Law Index 2024*, World Justice Project.

OECD (2021), *OECD Framework and Good Practice Principles for People-Centred Justice*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/cdc3bde7-en.

Figure notes

Figure 4.7. Refers to the question "On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the courts and judicial system?" High or moderately high trust correspond to responses of 6-10. "OECD" is the unweighted average.

Figure 4.8. Refers to factor 7.1 People can access and afford civil justice of the World Justice Project index.

Figure 4.9. Refers to factor 7.4 Civil justice is free of improper government influence of the World Justice Project index.

Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9. Countries are ranked in descending order of the index values for 2024. Data for Iceland, Israel and Switzerland are not available.

Figure 4.7. Citizen trust in the justice system, 2021 and 2023

Share of respondents with high or moderately high trust in judicial system



Source: OECD Trust Survey 2023, http://oe.cd/trust.

StatLink https://stat.link/76xk1y

Figure 4.8. Access and affordability of civil justice, 2021 and 2024



Source: WJP Rule of Law Index 2024, https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/.

StatLink https://stat.link/en1asz

Figure 4.9. Freedom of civil justice from improper government influence, 2021 and 2024



Source: WJP Rule of Law Index 2024, https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/.

StatLink https://stat.link/rfzp1q

4.4. Satisfaction with public administrative services

Public services function as critical points of contact between citizens and their governments, influencing trust in public institutions (OECD, 2024a). High-quality public administrative services are essential for achieving governments' socio-economic objectives, including economic growth, citizen well-being and upholding the rule of law. To effectively deliver these outcomes and respond to citizens' needs and expectations, administrative services must be designed and delivered in a responsive, reliable, inclusive, equitable and agile fashion. Transforming administrative services to be more human-centred is an ongoing priority for governments, requiring them to consider user convenience and expectations ahead of internal processes, existing policies or legacy systems (OECD, 2024b).

In 2023, on average across OECD countries, two-thirds (66%) of people who have used administrative services in the previous year were satisfied with the quality of the services they received (Figure 4.10). It is noteworthy that in 28 of the 30 participating countries, a majority of users are satisfied, a share that rises to over 80% in Estonia, Finland, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. Variations across individual countries indicate opportunities for governments to identify local challenges and implement targeted improvements to service delivery.

User satisfaction with particular aspects of an administrative service significantly influences their overall satisfaction rates. The factor which made the most difference to satisfaction rates was the speed of obtaining a service. Across OECD countries, 64% of people were satisfied with this aspect of public administrative services, correlating with a 13 percentage point increase in overall satisfaction. The ease of obtaining a service was also important, associated with a 10 p.p. increase in overall satisfaction, and with approximately 69% of users satisfied on this front. The ability to access the service as desired and the ease of using digital services, both with satisfaction rates of around 67%, correlated with an 8 p.p. increase in overall satisfaction apiece. Higher satisfaction rates (approximately 73%) were observed for clarity of language and information provided, and employee courtesy, each associated with a 6 p.p. increase in overall satisfaction. These insights suggest clear pointers for governments aiming to enhance users' experiences, suggesting they particularly prioritise improving the timeliness of and ease of access to their administrative services (Figure 4.11).

Methodology and definitions

The 2023 wave of the OECD Trust Survey is a nationally representative population survey collecting data from around 60 000 respondents in 30 OECD countries to explore the drivers of public trust. Most countries were surveyed in October-November 2023. For an in-depth look at the survey method and implementation, please refer to the detailed methodological background paper at https://oe.cd/trust.

Further reading

OECD (2024a), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

OECD (2024b), "Recommendation of the Council on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0503.

Figure notes

Figure 4.10. Refers to the question "On a scale of 0 to 10, how satisfied are you with the quality of administrative services in [country] (for example applying for an ID, registering a birth or applying for benefits)?" Responses only include users of government administrative services.

Figure 4.11. Presents the OECD unweighted average of the share who indicated satisfaction with the respective aspect when answering the question: "Thinking about the most recent administrative service that you personally made use of, how satisfied were you with each of the following? Please give your answer on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means you are not at all satisfied, and 10 means you are completely satisfied". The percentage point change in satisfaction with administrative services, on the left y-axis represented by bars, corresponds to the average marginal effect of being satisfied as compared to not being satisfied with any of the eight service aspects, when all the other service aspects, as well as age, gender and education levels, are kept constant. The average marginal effects are statistically significant at $p<0.01$.

Figure 4.10. Citizens satisfaction with administrative services, 2023



Source: OECD Trust Survey 2023, http://oe.cd/trust.

StatLink https://stat.link/432560

Figure 4.11. Increase in likelihood of being satisfied with administrative services following an increase in satisfaction with any of the service aspects, 2023



Source: OECD Trust Survey 2023, http://oe.cd/trust.

StatLink https://stat.link/uxcitm

4.5. Strategies and institutional organisation for public administrative services delivery

Delivering reliable, responsive, inclusive, accessible and fair public services is one of the most important functions of government, and plays a key role in building trust (OECD, 2024a). Delivering services effectively requires strategic vision, and clear institutional arrangements and co-ordination across levels of government. Implementing whole-of-government and comprehensive strategies for public services design and delivery is a key principle of the OECD Recommendation on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services (OECD, 2024b).

Countries vary in how they organise the delivery of administrative services, reflecting diverse traditions, institutional set-ups and the roles of different levels of government. Those typically delivered solely by the central/federal government include visas (27 out of 30 OECD countries, 90%), filing income taxes (25 out of 30, 83%), old-age pensions (24 out of 30, 80%), and citizenship applications (23 out of 30, 77%). Birth, marriage and death certificates are more commonly managed at local level (in 11 out of 30 countries, 37%). Other services are more evenly split. For example, 17 out of 29 countries (59%) manage ID cards solely at the central level, while 12 do so at multiple or subnational levels (41%); 18 out of 29 countries (62%) manage health insurance registration solely at the central level, and 20 out of 30 countries (67%) manage passport issuance solely at the central level (Figure 4.12).

Government-wide strategies for public services are comprehensive, co-ordinated plans adopted by the central government detailing how to improve public administrative services. Currently, 14 out of 27 OECD countries for which data is available (52%) have standalone government-wide strategies for service improvement, 9 countries (33%) include them within broader strategies (usually the digital government strategy), and 4 (15%) have yet to establish a service improvement strategy (Figure 4.13). Almost all of the strategies include objectives on delivering more human-centred services (22 out of 23, 96%), and 20 out of 23 (87%) also include implementation timelines. Other common aspects of strategies for public services include alignment with other strategies (19 out of 23, 83%) and process simplification (18 out of 23, 78%). Fewer countries have strategies addressing aspects such as monitoring and evaluation (14 out of 23, 61%), capacity analysis (13 out of 23, 57%), and costs and funding sources (7 out of 23, 30%) (Online Figure J.2.1).

Ensuring the protection of service users' rights is fundamental to delivering human-centred administrative services. The OECD recommendation emphasises safeguarding procedural guarantees and providing effective administrative and judicial review mechanisms. Most surveyed countries have a strong legal basis for protecting users' rights, with 28 out of 30 OECD countries (93%) granting users the right to appeal administrative decisions and access to personal data, and 27 out of 30 (90%) granting users the right to be informed of the rationale behind a decision affecting them, and timely process of service applications (Online Figure J.2.2).

Methodology and definitions

The Serving Citizens Survey gathers information from senior government officials responsible for public administrative services. In GAAG 2025, data is presented for 30 OECD countries and 4 OECD accession and partner countries. The survey, implemented for the first time in 2024, aims to measure institutional, legislative and organisational arrangements, practices and reforms that influence the delivery of human-centred public administrative services and will allow progress to be monitored and the impact of different choices assessed over time. Responses were collected between November 2024 and March 2025.

The survey is structured around four key components: *strategic vision*, *core foundations*, *seamless and accessible services*, and *measurement, engagement and improvement*.

Further reading

OECD (2024a), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

OECD (2024b), "Recommendation of the Council on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0503

Figure notes

Figure 4.12. Refers to the question: "Which level(s) of government are responsible for delivering the following commonly used public administrative services?". National ID and health insurance registration do not apply in NZL. Unemployment insurance does not apply in CRI.

Figure 4.13. Refers to the question: "Is a government-wide strategy for improving public administrative services currently being implemented?". Data pending validation for BEL, ISR, TUR.

Figure J.2.1 (Aspects included in government-wide strategy for improving public administrative services, 2024) and Figure J.2.2 (Rights of public services users, 2024) are available online in Annex J.

Figure 4.12. Level of government providing different public administrative services, 2024



Source: OECD (2024) Serving Citizens Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/thf3jz

Figure 4.13. Existence of a government-wide strategy for improving public administrative services, 2024



Source: OECD (2024) Serving Citizens Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/lrg29s

4.6. Roles and responsibilities for public administrative services design and delivery

Clearly defining roles, responsibilities and competencies is fundamental to delivering human-centred administrative services. The OECD Recommendation on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services, calls for clear political accountability and administrative leadership over service design and delivery to ensure strategic oversight, co-ordination and effective implementation. The design and delivery of human-centred services also requires the relevant skills and competencies to be systematically identified and developed. The strategic use of digital public infrastructure and common digital building blocks (e.g. digital identity, data-sharing systems, digital notifications and post) are also essential for integrated and seamless public services (see Section 7.2 on "Digital Public Infrastructure" in Chapter 7).

Most countries have designated a government agency to lead the improvement of administrative services (26 out of 30 countries, 87%). These are most often public administration ministries or their equivalent (12 out of 30 OECD countries, 40%). In several countries, responsibilities are shared across bodies. In Japan, responsibility is shared by the centre of government, the interior and public administration ministries, and the digital government agency. Similarly, Israel assigns responsibilities to the centre of government, its finance ministry and digital government agency. In Korea responsibilities are shared by the centre of government and the interior ministry (Figure 4.14).

Most countries have appointed bodies to oversee the improvement of services within the central/federal government (20 out of 30 OECD countries, 67%). These bodies are responsible for a wide variety of tasks, most commonly enabling co-ordination across government entities and monitoring strategy implementation (13 out of 20 countries indicated their body is responsible for this, 65%, in both cases). Many are also responsible for simplifying multi-agency services (11 out of 20, 55%) and monitoring service projects (8 out of 20, 40%). Publishing performance data (6 out of 20, 30%) and setting service targets (5 out of 20, 25%), are less common. The bodies in Austria and Estonia cover all of the responsibilities assessed, and Canada's body also has a comprehensive mandate (Figure 4.15).

Identifying and addressing skill gaps among public servants is critical to ensuring effective service delivery. Most countries systematically assess skills gaps (17 out of 29 OECD countries, 59%), more frequently at the agency level (11 out of 29 countries, 38%), than government wide (6 out of 29 countries, 21%). Providing training is essential to addressing gaps and 24 out of 30 countries (80%) provide some form of human-centred service training. In most cases, the training is voluntary (20 out of 30 countries, 67%), with only 4 countries (13%) making it mandatory (Figure 4.16).

Methodology and definitions

The Serving Citizens Survey gathers information from senior government officials responsible for public administrative services. In GAAG 2025, data is presented for 30 OECD countries and 4 OECD accession and partner countries. The survey, implemented for the first time in 2024, aims to measure institutional, legislative and organisational arrangements, practices and reforms that influence the delivery of human-centred public administrative services and will allow progress to be monitored and the impact of different choices assessed over time. Responses were collected between November 2024 and March 2025. The survey is structured around four key components: *strategic vision, core foundations, seamless and accessible services, and measurement engagement and improvement*.

Further reading

OECD (2024), "Recommendation of the Council on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0503

OECD (2022), "OECD Good Practice Principles for Public Service Design and Delivery in the Digital Age", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 23, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2ade500b-en.

OECD (2024), "Digital public infrastructure for digital governments", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 68, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ff525dc8-en.

Figure notes

Figure 4.14. Refers to the questions: "Has a central/federal government Ministry/Agency/Department been designated to lead the improvement of public administrative services?" and "If Yes, please select the entity leading the improvement of public administrative services. Select all that apply."

Figure 4.15. Refers to the question: "What are the main responsibilities of the coordination body/committee? Select all that apply." Data pending validation for ISR and TUR.

Figure 4.16. Refers the questions: "Does your central/federal government identify skill gaps for service design and delivery?" and "Is training on human-centred design available to civil servants? Select all that apply". Data pending validation for PRT on identifying skills gaps.

Figure 4.14. Agency leading on improvement of services, 2024



Source: OECD (2024) Serving Citizens Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/lsx51u

Figure 4.15. Tasks carried out by the co-ordination body, 2024



Source: OECD (2024) Serving Citizens Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/opdk62

Figure 4.16. Support for staff development in service design and delivery, 2024



Source: OECD (2024) Serving Citizens Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/q4fpx2

4.7. Seamless and accessible public administrative services

Delivering seamless and accessible public administrative services requires adopting a human-centred approach that prioritises user needs, streamlines interactions and proactively addresses potential barriers. Services designed and delivered this way promote equity, simplify administrative processes and leverage digital tools and innovation to ensure positive user experiences. Service standards enable public sector organisations to adopt a consistent approach to service design across sectors and institutions, providing users with a seamless experience whether they access services online or offline, and irrespective of their point of entry. OECD countries are increasingly adopting service standards for the whole government to establish a common approach to designing and delivering government services. Of the 33 OECD countries surveyed, 28 (85%) have implemented a public service standard (Figure 4.17).

OECD countries can also use human-centred service design and user research methods to involve users in the design of government services. More than half of countries (19 out of 33, 58%) test usability with users or providers before launching a service while 15 out of 33 (45%) use focus groups to identify user needs and test public services, and 13 (40%) employ design thinking sessions. Only five countries use A/B testing (15%), and only two each first-click testing and tree testing (6%) (Online Figure J.2.3). Assessing the effectiveness of these methods will help ensure services are designed to meet user needs and also remain efficient, accessible and improve over time.

The life event approach helps to align services with citizens' needs by organising them around key events in peoples' lives, such as the birth of a child, retirement or losing a job. A majority of OECD countries have taken a life event approach to some public administrative services in some form (20 out of 28 countries, 71%) and another 5 countries (18%) are planning to (Figure 4.18).

There are two main models for the life event approach. In the information grouping model, governments collate information and links relevant to a given life event in a single place, directing users to the relevant websites or portals for each service, which often still operate independently. More advanced is the integrated services model, where users interact with a single entry point for the entire life event. Services are bundled together, leveraging co-ordination and collaboration among providers, while data interoperability means users only have to provide information once. Thirteen countries have begun to integrate some services for at least one of nine significant life events. Countries most frequently offer an integrated service for those having a baby (9 out of the 19 countries using a life event approach and for which information is available; 47%), followed by starting a business (7 out of 19, 37%) and loss of employment (6 out of 19, 32%). Countries are least likely to offer integrated services for those getting married (1 out of 19 , 5%). They are most likely to offer information grouping for death of a loved one (15 out of 19, 79%). Denmark is using integrated services most widely (six of the nine life events assessed) (Figure 4.19). Gathering information about effectiveness and user satisfaction with these approaches will be essential to refining service models and ensuring they meet citizens' evolving needs and expectations.

Methodology and definitions

The Serving Citizens Survey gathers information from senior government officials responsible for public administrative services. In GAAG 2025, data is presented for 30 OECD countries and 4 OECD accession and partner countries. Responses were collected between November 2024 and March 2025.

The OECD Survey on Digital Government 2.0 collected data from 33 OECD countries, 4 accession countries and 1 partner country in 2022. It surveyed senior officials from central and federal governments responsible for leading and/or executing digital government transformations, who collected data from various government sectors.

Service standards are a set of high-level principles that guide public service teams in designing, iterating and improving services to address users' needs.

Further reading

OECD (2024), "2023 OECD Digital Government Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1a89ed5e-en.

OECD (2022), "OECD Good Practice Principles for Public Service Design and Delivery in the Digital Age", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 23, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2ade500b-en.

OECD (2024), "Recommendation of the Council on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services", OECD Legal Instruments, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0503.

Figure notes

Figure 4.17. Data are not available for Germany, Greece, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, and the United States.

Figure 4.18. Refers to the question: "Does your government take a Life Events approach to public administrative services? Please select one?" Data validation pending for KOR, TUR.

Figure 4.19. Refers to the question: "For the Life Events listed below, what best describes the approach that is in place in your country? Data validation pending for PRT.

Figure J.2.3 (Methods used to involve users in testing digital services, 2022) is available online in Annex J.

Figure 4.17. Whole-of-government service standards, 2022



Source: OECD (2023) Survey on Digital Government.

StatLink https://stat.link/fnojy7

Figure 4.18. Countries using a life events approach to service design and delivery, 2024



Source: OECD (2024) Serving Citizens Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/alikfn

Figure 4.19. Services delivered using a life events approach, 2024



Source: OECD (2024) Serving Citizens Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/izsclj

4.8. Measurement, engagement and improvement of public administrative services

A core principle of the OECD Recommendation on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services is that public services aim to meet user expectations effectively. It encourages countries to measure performance, systematically gather feedback from users and engage with diverse stakeholders to drive continuous service improvement. By regularly assessing user experiences and perceptions, public administrations can identify areas for improvement in service design and delivery, enhance transparency, and create meaningful opportunities for participation, ultimately leading to more responsive and inclusive public services.

User experience surveys collect feedback from users about how easy to use and effective they found services were, and how satisfied they were with their interactions with them. They are used by governments to better understand user needs, preferences and expectations. A majority of OECD countries (14 out of 27, 52%) employ national surveys to assess user experience, while 6 out of 27 (22%) do not, but do conduct surveys at the ministry or agency level. A few countries rely on other methods (3 out of 27, 11%) such as qualitative assessments, while 2 out of 27 (7%), run surveys at regional or local levels rather than nationally (Figure 4.20). Chile's Measuring User Satisfaction Survey (*Medición de Satisfacción Usuaria*, MESU) is an example of an annual national survey that evaluates user satisfaction with public services, providing valuable insights for enhancing service quality. Similarly, Australia's Survey of Trust in Australian Public Services regularly measures public satisfaction, trust and experiences with government services, offering a comprehensive view of citizen perceptions and guiding reforms in the Australian Public Service.

Delivery targets are measurable goals that help public administrations improve the efficiency, transparency and responsiveness of service delivery. In 8 out of 28 OECD countries (29%) all central or federal ministries, agencies and departments must establish delivery targets and in a further 10 countries (36%) some are required to do so. In 2 countries (7%) setting delivery targets is voluntary while 8 countries (29%) report having no delivery targets at the central or federal government level (Figure 4.21). The Government of Canada maintains a comprehensive Service Inventory, a consolidated database of its services and related performance information. This inventory supports the establishment and monitoring of delivery targets, enhancing transparency and accountability in public service delivery.

Leveraging user experience and performance data is critical to enhancing public services. A majority of surveyed countries use such data to publish service performance reports and to communicate results (17 out of 30 in both cases, 57%) or incorporate the data into their decision-making process to improve services (16 out of 30, 53%). Other less common applications include reporting results to parliament (11 out of 30, 37%), measuring the impact of reforms (9 out of 30, 30%), and incorporating data into public consultations (8 out of 30, 27%). (Figure 4.22).

Methodology and definitions

The Serving Citizens Survey gathers information from senior government officials responsible for public administrative services. In GAAG 2025, data is presented for 30 OECD countries and 4 OECD accession and partner countries. The survey, implemented for the first time in 2024, aims to measure institutional, legislative and organisational arrangements, practices and reforms that influence the delivery of human-centred public administrative services and will allow progress to be monitored and the impact of different choices assessed over time. Responses were collected between November 2024 and March 2025.

The survey is structured around four key components: *strategic vision*, *core foundations*, *seamless and accessible services*, and *measurement, engagement and improvement*

Further reading

OECD (2024), "Recommendation of the Council on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0503.

Figure notes

Figure 4.20. Refers to the question: "Does your government run any survey which asks service users about their experiences with public administrative services provided by the central/federal government?" Data pending validation for BEL, ISR, TUR.

Figure 4.21. Refers to the question: "Do public service ministries/agencies/departments in central/federal government have delivery targets for administrative services" and "Is setting delivery targets mandatory or voluntary?" Data pending validation for ISL, KOR.

Figure 4.22. Refers to the question: "What are the uses of the user experience survey and performance data by the central/federal government?" Some data points pending validation for TUR.

Figure 4.20. Type of user experience survey, 2024



Source: Serving Citizens Survey, 2024.

StatLink https://stat.link/lmon7p

Figure 4.21. Delivery targets for administrative services, 2024



Source: Serving Citizens Survey, 2024.

StatLink https://stat.link/wkohag

Figure 4.22. Uses of experience and performance data at the central level, 2024



Source: Serving Citizens Survey, 2024.

StatLink https://stat.link/sztnhb

Chapter 5. Governance of cross-cutting agendas

5.1. Policy coherence and co-ordination for sustainable development

The OECD's Recommendation on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD) underlines the critical need to align actions across sectors and levels of government to advance sustainable development. Enhancing policy coherence effectively entails robust whole-of-government co-ordination and a clear, strategic long-term vision. Although OECD countries have taken steps to enhance PCSD, challenges remain in strengthening policy integration and impact assessment.

Whole-of-government co-ordination is needed in order to promote mutually supporting policies across environmental, social and economic sectors for sustainable development. OECD countries have made strides in this direction. For example, 15 out of 24 OECD countries with data available (63%) report having formal governance arrangements for effective communication between ministries and departments. These arrangements include inter-ministerial working groups and networks, focal points, councils, and interdepartmental commissions, many of which are dedicated to sustainable development or Agenda 2030. However, only 3 out of 24 countries (13%) report having established clear mandates to enhance policy coherence and mitigate divergences between sectoral policies (Figure 5.1). Strengthening capacity to resolve policy conflicts helps to minimise trade-offs between sectors and optimise resources in pursuing sustainable development.

As well as whole-of-government co-ordination, achieving sustainable development also requires effective policy integration to ensure that sustainability considerations are embedded into all areas of governance. To this end, OECD countries have made efforts to better incorporate sustainable development into policies and finance. The most common mechanism for policy integration is the use of measures to ensure that planning documents reflect their contribution to sustainable development, reported by 19 out of 24 OECD countries (79%). However, just one-third of the countries (8 out of 24) report using the budgeting process as a tool to integrate sustainable development into policy making (Figure 5.2). Strengthening the strategic use of policy planning mechanisms and tools, such as the budgeting process, can enable governments to make better use of synergies and benefits across economic, social and environmental policy areas as well as across domestic and internationally recognised Sustainable Development Goals.

However, a key factor limiting improvements in policy coherence is the absence of institutional mechanisms for detecting policy conflicts. To address this, the PCSD Recommendation calls on countries to analyse and assess the impacts of policies on sustainable development. This should include the consideration of long-term and transboundary impacts to ensure that domestic efforts do not undermine prospects for sustainable development in other countries or for future generations. Currently, 14 out of 24 OECD countries (58%) report using long-term planning tools, such as strategic foresight and scenario development, to support the development of a long-term strategic vision. However, only 4 out of 24 countries (17%) report using impact assessment tools to assess the transboundary impacts of policies. This low number is partly due to insufficient data and evidence-based information needed for such assessments. Political considerations also play a role. Only 4 out of 24 OECD countries (17%) report including the impacts of policies (or PCSD issues) in information provided to ministers or parliament (Figure 5.3). This suggests that improving PCSD will require greater political ambition to assess and address policy impacts and conflicts (OECD, 2024).

Methodology and definitions

Data are from the 2023 OECD questionnaire on the implementation, dissemination and continued relevance of the OECD Recommendation on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development. This was conducted in collaboration with the OECD Network of National Focal Points for Policy Coherence from November 2023 to January 2024 and informed the Report to Council on the Recommendation Implementation.

Responses were received from 24 OECD countries: Austria, Belgium, Chile, Costa Rica, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain and Switzerland.

Institutional mechanisms refer to structures, systems, processes and working methods applied by the government across all branches and levels of government.

A National Sustainable Development Strategy refers to the integration of economic, social and environmental objectives into one strategically focused blueprint for action at the national level.

The Recommendation recognises that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to promote PCSD. For a number of actions, reported implementation reflects a wide variety of different mechanisms.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *Unleashing Policy Coherence to Achieve the SDGs: An Assessment of Governance Mechanisms*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a1c8dbf8-en.

OECD (2019), "Recommendation of the Council on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0381.

Figure 5.1. Mechanisms for government co-ordination for policy coherence for sustainable development



Source: OECD (2024), *Unleashing Policy Coherence to Achieve the SDGs: An Assessment of Governance Mechanisms*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a1c8dbf8-en.

StatLink https://stat.link/ui25jz

Figure 5.2. Mechanisms for the integration of sustainable development into policy and finance



Source: OECD (2024), *Unleashing Policy Coherence to Achieve the SDGs: An Assessment of Governance Mechanisms*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a1c8dbf8-en

StatLink https://stat.link/fzxlag

Figure 5.3. Mechanisms for the detection of policy conflicts



OECD (2024), *Unleashing Policy Coherence to Achieve the SDGs: An Assessment of Governance Mechanisms*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a1c8dbf8-en.

StatLink https://stat.link/yzsphf

5.2. Public policy evaluation

Integrating policy evaluations as a central element of the policy cycle is essential, as such evaluations can offer valuable insights into effectiveness and guide informed decision making. They also contribute towards demonstrating how public resources are being used to deliver intended outcomes for citizens. Public policy evaluations in turn become a valuable source of evidence for others, shedding light on what works, why, for whom, and under what circumstances. Strengthening the use of evidence and improving communication about how it underlies policy decisions – and clarifying those policies impact on citizens' lives – could improve public perceptions of government and institutional trustworthiness (see Section 2.4 on "Dignity" in Chapter 2).

Although all 31 OECD countries that responded to the 2023 Survey on Public Policy Evaluation had at least some form of evaluation in place, systematically conducting and using policy evaluations remains challenging for many governments. To tackle this, the 2022 OECD Recommendation on Public Policy Evaluation calls on countries to "establish robust institutions and practices that promote the use of public policy evaluations". The recommendation is structured around three pillars that aim to improve the use of public policy evaluations and their institutionalisation, quality and impact (OECD, 2022).

The majority of OECD countries with data available (26 out of 31, 84%) have at least one institution with a formal mandate to centrally co-ordinate public policy evaluations across government. These designated "evaluation champions" co-ordinate evaluations across institutions and advise on best practices to promote their quality and use (Figure 5.4). In parallel, evaluations are also often conducted inside line ministries. A majority of OECD countries (22 out of 31, 71%) have dedicated evaluation units in some or most line ministries but only Canada, Mexico, the Netherlands and Spain report having dedicated units in all line ministries (Figure 5.5).

Mechanisms to ensure the quality and impact of evaluations could be further improved. The most common approach to ensuring the quality and consistency of evaluations is to provide central guidelines. Most surveyed countries have at least one set of guidelines for policy evaluation (24 out of 31 countries, 77%). Most also have evaluation clauses included in laws (24 out of 31 countries, 77%). These aim to ensure that evaluations will take place and will be planned in advance. However, in nearly all of these countries (23 out of 24, 96%), these clauses apply only to some policies. Only a minority of countries have adopted professional competence standards or requirements for those conducting evaluations inside the government (7 out of 31 countries, 23%). Moreover, the quality of evaluations is rarely subject to systematic external scrutiny through peer review. Only New Zealand subjects all evaluations to peer review, while 39% (12 out of 31 countries) only use peer reviews for some evaluations (Table 5.1).

For evaluations to have an impact, their findings must be communicated effectively. Countries could do more to embed and communicate the results of evaluations. Overall, transparency and the publication of evaluations are widely acknowledged as important. In 2023, most OECD countries (19 out of 31, 61%) published evaluation results by default. However, around one-third of countries (9 out of 31, 29%) lack follow-up mechanisms to ensure that evaluation results are implemented and monitored at the level of line ministries. Only a few (7 out of 31, 23%) have follow-up mechanisms in place for all evaluations (Table 5.1).

Methodology and definitions

Data are from the 2023 OECD Survey on Public Policy Evaluation. Responses were collected from 31 OECD countries, referring only to central/federal government practices as of 1 May 2023 and reflecting the country's own assessment of current practices and procedures. Respondents were country delegates with cross governmental co-ordinating functions on policy evaluation.

Public policy evaluation refers to the structured and evidence-based assessment of the design, implementation or results of a planned, ongoing or completed public intervention.

Further reading

OECD (2020), *Improving Governance with Policy Evaluation: Lessons From Country Experiences*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/89b1577d-en.

OECD (2022), "Recommendation of the Council on Public Policy Evaluation", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0478#adherents.

OECD (2025), *Implementation Toolkit for the OECD Recommendation on Public Policy Evaluation*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/77faa4fe-en.

Figure notes

Figure 5.4, Figure 5.5, and Table 5.1. Data for Finland, Germany, Israel, Korea, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Türkiye are not available.

Table 5.1. Data for Hungary on central guidelines for policy evaluation are not available.

Figure 5.4. Existence of institutions with a formal mandate for the central co-ordination of evaluations, 2023



Source: OECD (2023), Survey on Public Policy Evaluation.

StatLink https://stat.link/3fdmin

Figure 5.5. Existence of dedicated evaluation units in line ministries, 2023



Source: OECD (2023), Survey on Public Policy Evaluation.

StatLink https://stat.link/bamsdw

Table 5.1. Elements in place to ensure quality and impact of evaluations, 2023

Country	Measures to ensure quality of evaluations				Measures to ensure impact of evaluations	
	Central guidelines for policy evaluation	Evaluation clauses in laws	Professional standards or requirements for evaluators	Peer review of evaluations	Evaluations are public by default	Follow up mechanisms
Australia	●	◘		◘		◘
Austria	●	●			●	◘
Belgium		◘				◘
Canada	●	◘		◘	●	●
Chile	●	◘	●	◘	●	◘
Colombia	●	◘	●		●	◘
Costa Rica	●	◘	●	◘	●	●
Czechia	●			◘	●	◘
Denmark		◘		◘		◘
Estonia	●	◘			●	◘
France	●	◘		◘	●	
Greece						◘
Hungary	n/a	◘	●			
Iceland						
Ireland	●			◘		
Italy	●	◘				◘
Japan	●	◘		◘	●	●
Latvia	●	◘			●	
Lithuania	●	◘			●	●
Luxembourg		◘				
Mexico	●	◘	●		●	●
Netherlands	●	◘	●		●	●
New Zealand	●	◘		●		◘
Norway	●	◘			●	
Poland	●				●	◘
Portugal	●	◘				◘
Spain	●	◘			●	●
Sweden				◘	●	
Switzerland	●	◘			●	◘
United Kingdom	●		●	◘		◘
United States	●	◘		◘	●	
OECD total						
● Yes / Yes, always	24	1	7	1	19	7
◘ Yes, sometimes		23		12		15

Source: OECD (2023), Survey on Public Policy Evaluation.

StatLink https://stat.link/9qse5p

Chapter 6. Openness, transparency and participation

6.1. Transparency of public information

Transparency is a core element of a functioning democracy. It is underpinned by the right to access information, understood as the ability of an individual to seek, receive, impart and use information (OECD, 2022). The OECD Recommendation on Open Government emphasises the importance of proactive disclosure of "clear, complete, timely, reliable and relevant public sector data and information" (OECD, 2017a). Likewise, the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity encourages transparency and stakeholder engagement at all stages of the political process and policy cycle to promote accountability and the public interest. In particular, this means 1) promoting transparency and an open government, including ensuring access to information and open data, along with timely responses to requests for information; and 2) granting all stakeholders – including the private sector, civil society and individuals – access to the development and implementation of public policies (OECD, 2017b).

The OECD Public Integrity Indicators on the transparency of public information measure both the quality of the regulatory framework on the transparency of public information (*de jure*) and its implementation in practice (*de facto*). On the *de jure* side, the indicator measures criteria including whether regulations establish that all public institutions and public officials are holders of public information, whether the right to request and access public information extends to both citizens and non-citizens, whether data are provided in the requested format and in a timely fashion, and whether everyone has the right to appeal to an independent body when a request is denied. On the *de facto* side, the criteria cover the extent to which public authorities publish a range of information and standard datasets that support social and economic benefits. These include detailed records of public revenues and expenditures, public contracts with private entities, legislation and policy documents, ministerial and government agendas, and asset and/or interest declarations of senior public officials.

Overall, OECD countries perform well across the OECD Public Integrity Indicators on transparency of public information. On average, they fulfil 66% of the predefined criteria on regulatory frameworks, and 62% of those on implementation in practice (Figure 6.1). The regulatory framework establishes that specific information must be accessible and standard datasets should be proactively disclosed. In practice, all OECD countries except Costa Rica proactively disclose the state budget for the current and the last full calendar years, and 31 out of 33 (94%) publish a consolidated repository of primary laws, featuring past amendments for every piece of legislation. However, fewer than half of OECD countries (16 out of 33) publish ministers' agendas. The asset declarations of senior public employees across the three branches of government are accessible in 14 out of 33 (42%) of OECD countries. Only ten proactively disclose full data on the individual salaries of senior civil servants across all ministries (Table 6.1).

Methodology and definitions

Data were collected through a questionnaire based on the OECD Public Integrity Indicators on regulatory framework for access to information and open data. Thirty three OECD countries and six accession countries (Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, Indonesia, Romania and Peru) responded to the questionnaire. Respondents were senior officials responsible for integrity policies in central government. The OECD Public Integrity indicators measure the implementation of the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity.

Public integrity refers to the consistent alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values, principles and norms for upholding and prioritising the public interest over private interests in the public sector.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/968587cd-en.

OECD (2022), *The Protection and Promotion of Civic Space: Strengthening Alignment with International Standards and Guidance*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d234e975-en.

OECD (2017a), "Recommendation of the Council on Open Government", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0438.

OECD (2017b), "Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0435.

Figure notes

Data for Belgium, Colombia, Germany, Hungary and New Zealand are not available

Figure 6.1. Regulation refers to the indicator values for "Regulatory framework for access to information and open data". Practice refers to the indicator values for "Coverage of basic functions to implement access to information and open data", "Openness of government decision-making process" and "Proactive disclosure of datasets". The list of indicators and criteria for the dataset on Accountability of Public Policy Making is available on the OECD Public Integrity Indicators website.

Figure 6.1. Transparency of public information: Regulations and practice, 2024

Percentage of criteria that are fulfilled in regulation and in practice



Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 9 May 2025). https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/indicators

StatLink https://stat.link/xtjq4k

Table 6.1. Proactive disclosure of selected datasets, 2024

Country	Datasets proactively disclosed				
	State budget for the current and the latest full calendar year	Consolidated versions of all primary laws	Government sessions agenda	Asset declarations of senior public employees	Salaries of individual senior civil servants
Australia	✓	✓	×	×	×
Austria	✓	✓	×	×	×
Canada	✓	✓	×	✓	×
Chile	✓	✓	×	✓	✓
Costa Rica	×	✓	×	✓	×
Czechia	✓	✓	✓	×	×
Denmark	✓	×	×	×	✓
Estonia	✓	✓	✓		✓
Finland	✓	✓	✓	×	×
France	✓	✓	✓	✓	×
Greece	✓	✓	×	×	×
Iceland	✓	✓	✓	✓	×
Ireland	✓	✓	×	×	×
Israel	✓	✓	✓	×	×
Italy	✓	✓	×	×	✓
Japan	✓	✓	✓	×	×
Korea	✓	✓	✓	✓	×
Latvia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Lithuania	✓	✓	✓	✓	×
Luxembourg	✓	✓	×	×	×
Mexico	✓	✓		✓	✓
Netherlands	✓	✓	✓	×	×
Norway	✓	✓	×	✓	✓
Poland	✓	✓	✓	✓	×
Portugal	✓	✓	×	×	✓
Slovak Republic	✓	✓	✓	✓	×
Slovenia	✓	✓	✓	✓	×
Spain	✓	✓	✓	×	✓
Sweden	✓	✓	✓	×	×
Switzerland	✓	✓	×	×	×
Türkiye	✓	✓	×	×	×
United Kingdom	✓	✓	×	×	✓
United States	✓	×	×	✓	×
OECD total	97%	94%	48%	42%	30%
Argentina	✓	✓	×	✓	×
Brazil	✓	✓			
Croatia	✓	×	✓	✓	✓
Indonesia	✓		×	×	
Peru	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Romania	✓	✓	×	✓	✓

Source: OECD (2025), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 9 May 2025), https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/.

StatLink https://stat.link/tk1rle

6.2. Political efficacy

The active participation of citizens is the essence of any functioning democracy. People's willingness to participate in political life is linked to their perception of their own ability to understand political matters and how far they can influence change through their actions (usually defined as political efficacy). Individuals with a greater sense of political efficacy are significantly more likely to trust their national government (see Chapter 2), as well as to vote, engage with political representatives and participate in civic initiatives (OECD, 2024).

According to the results from the OECD Trust Survey, not all individuals feel equipped to participate in the political system. Overall across OECD countries, 40% of people are confident in their ability to participate in politics. Confidence levels vary significantly between countries and are the highest in Ireland (64%) and Switzerland (55%) (Figure 6.2). When it comes to government responsiveness to public feedback, only 37% of people in OECD countries believe their government would change a national policy that is opposed by the majority, while 42% believe such change is unlikely. Switzerland (55%) and Finland (51%) are the only countries where a majority of people expect their government to respond to public feedback in this way (Figure 6.3).

Many opportunities for political participation occur at the local level, where citizens can engage more directly with policy makers, attend community meetings and contribute to decision-making processes. At the local level, public perceptions of political efficacy is evenly split: on average, four in ten people believe they would have the opportunity to voice their opinions when local governments make decisions that affect their communities, while an equal share think otherwise (Figure 6.4). This is important because the perception of having a say in local matters is the factor with the strongest positive influence on trust in local government (OECD, 2024).

There is widespread scepticism about how meaningful public consultations are in practice. On average across OECD countries, only 32% believe that the government would adopt opinions expressed in a public consultation. Across countries, there is a strong positive association between people's confidence that they have a say in government decisions and their perceptions of how responsive governments are to public consultations (Online Figure J.3.1). This highlights the importance of meaningful follow-up to the inputs received during public consultations, not just to enhance transparency and accountability but also to build citizens' engagement (OECD, 2022). All in all, promoting and strengthening political efficacy at all levels is vital for fostering an engaged, empowered and active citizenry – one that underpins a resilient democracy.

Methodology and definitions

The 2023 wave of the OECD Trust Survey is a nationally representative population survey collecting data from around 60 000 respondents in 30 OECD countries to explore the drivers of public trust. Most countries were surveyed in October-November 2023. For an in-depth look at the survey method and implementation, please refer to the detailed methodological background paper at https://oe.cd/trust.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

OECD (2023), *Open Government for Stronger Democracies: A Global Assessment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5478db5b-en.

OECD (2022), *OECD Guidelines for Citizen Participation Processes*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f765caf6-en.

Figure notes

Figure 6.2. Refers to the question "How confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics?" Confident corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a 0-10 scale.

Figure 6.3. Refers to the question "If over half of the people in your country clearly expressed a view against a national policy, how likely do you think it is that it would be changed?" Likely corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a 0-10 scale, neutral to 5 and unlikely to 0-4.

Figure 6.4. Refers to the question "If a decision affecting your local community is to be made by the local government, how likely do you think it is that you would have an opportunity to voice your opinion?" Likely corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a 0-10 scale, neutral to 5 and unlikely to 0-4.

Figure J.3.1 (Political efficacy and confidence in impact of public consultation, 2023) is available online in Annex J.

Figure 6.2. Confidence in own ability to participate in politics, 2023



Source: OECD Trust Survey, 2023, http://oe.cd/trust.

StatLink https://stat.link/7m6efs

Figure 6.3. Perceptions of responsiveness of policies to public feedback, 2023

Share of respondents reporting different levels of perceived likelihood that a national policy would be changed if a majority of people expressed a view against it



Source: OECD Trust Survey (http://oe.cd/trust).

StatLink https://stat.link/h509oc

Figure 6.4. Perceptions of opportunities to influence local decisions, 2023

Share of respondents reporting different levels of perceived likelihood that they would have a voice in decisions affecting their community



Source: OECD Trust Survey, 2023 (http://oe.cd/trust).

StatLink https://stat.link/68i04v

6.3. Citizen participation and deliberation

Citizens' involvement in democracy goes beyond voting. Participation in the design and delivery of policies and services promotes more democratic and effective policy making, enhances the transparency and accountability of government processes, and can increase public acceptance of government decisions (OECD, 2024a; OECD, 2022; OECD, 2017). As citizens' trust in government remains consistently low, governments can complement established mechanisms of representative democracy with the judicious use of direct, participatory and deliberative democratic practices (OECD, 2024). The latter can include, for example, citizen assemblies, juries and dialogues.

Between 1979 and 2023, the OECD tracked 716 cases of such deliberative processes across 28 OECD countries, where public authorities involved more than 80 000 randomly selected citizens in total to learn, deliberate and issue policy recommendations. Since the mid-2000s, there has been a clear upward trend in the use of deliberative democracy, peaking in 2021 at 62 cases. In total, 148 new instances were recorded between 2021 and 2023 across OECD countries (Figure 6.5).

Deliberative processes are often used to address complex, value-based or long-term policy issues. For instance, of the 148 recent cases, 60 (41%) have focused on environmental issues (Figure 6.6). Balancing trade-offs between short-term costs and long-term gains involved in the effects of climate change, for example, can be a major dilemma for elected politicians. Deliberative processes, when implemented well and for democratic purposes, can help address polarisation and political deadlock by formulating balanced proposals with long-term perspectives, and generate wider public support for policies (OECD, 2024).

Traditionally, participation at the subnational level offers citizens the greatest "return on investment" due to its proximity and more immediate and tangible impact on their lives, and this remains the case today. So, it is not surprising that citizen participation processes by cities and regions often exhibit more innovation, more sustained participation over time, and generate higher trust levels than for national governments (see Chapter 2). Out of the 148 deliberative processes recorded between 2021 and 2023, 103 (70%) were local or regional, while the remaining 45 (30%) were at the national level (Table 6.1)

Subnational governments are also more likely to permanently embed deliberative processes into decision-making structures (e.g. ministry-specific citizens' assemblies with a legal mandate). Out of the 19 permanent cases collected, 13 (68%) took place at the local level (Table 6.2). Institutionalising deliberative democracy can help ensure the continuity of such mechanisms beyond electoral cycles, enable economies of scale and foster a culture of deliberation for decision making (OECD, 2022).

Methodology and definitions

A representative deliberative process includes group-based dialogue and debate aimed at finding common ground, identifying solutions and informing public decisions. It involves carefully weighing options, considering diverse perspectives and using expert-informed, accurate information to assess trade-offs and reach collective decisions.

Institutionalising deliberation means incorporating deliberative activities into the rules of public decision-making structures and processes of a community, in a legally constituted way. It entails establishing a basic legal or regulatory framework to ensure continuity regardless of political change.

The data are drawn from the OECD Deliberative Democracy Database, which tracks examples of deliberative processes in OECD and non-OECD countries meeting three criteria: 1) at least one full day of face-to-face, online, or hybrid deliberation; 2) randomly selected and representative participants; and 3) process commissioned by a public authority. Data were collected via desk research, interviews and surveys of countries and key stakeholders. The dataset represents OECD best efforts to track deliberative processes across its members using a consistent methodology, but cannot be considered exhaustive.

Further reading

OECD (2024a), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

OECD (2024b), "Exploring new frontiers of policy participation in the policy cycle", discussion paper for the Global Forum on Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy, Milan, 21-22 October 2024, www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/about/programmes/reinforcing-democracy-initiative/Exploring-New-Frontiers-of-Citizen-Participation-Discussion-Paper.pdf.

OECD (2022), *OECD Guidelines for Citizen Participation Processes*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f765caf6-en.

OECD (2017), "Recommendation of the Council on Open Government", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0438.

Figure notes

Figure 6.5. Based on available data as of September 2023 from 28 OECD countries and the European Union.

Figure 6.6 and Table 6.2. Based on the 22 countries with data available between January 2021 and September 2023.

Figure 6.5. Number of representative deliberative processes in OECD countries, 1979-2023



Source: OECD Deliberative Democracy Database, 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/asldtu

Figure 6.6. Policy issues covered in representative deliberative processes, 2021-2023



Source: OECD Deliberative Democracy Database, 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/uicda5

Table 6.2. Deliberative processes by level of government and degree of institutionalisation, 2021-23

Number of processes

Country	Local		Regional		National		Total	
	Ad-hoc	Permanent	Ad-hoc	Permanent	Ad-hoc	Permanent	Ad hoc	Permanent
Australia	6	6	2	0	0	0	8	6
Austria	0	0	0	3	1	0	1	3
Belgium	1	0	1	0	0	1	2	1
Canada	2	0	0	0	1	0	3	0
Denmark	6	1	3	0	3	0	12	1
Estonia	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
EU	0	0	2	0	6	0	8	0
Finland	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0
France	8	3	1	0	11	0	20	3
Germany	6	0	1	0	4	1	11	1
Hungary	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Ireland	1	0	0	0	3	0	4	0
Italy	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Netherlands	5	0	2	0	0	0	7	0
New Zealand	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Poland	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Portugal	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Spain	2	0	4	0	0	0	6	0
Switzerland	5	0	3	0	0	0	8	0
United Kingdom	13	1	0	0	10	1	23	2
United States	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
Total	68	13	19	3	42	3	129	19

Source: OECD Deliberative Democracy Database, 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/zrubv9

6.4. Protection and promotion of civic space

Civic space is defined as the set of legal, policy, institutional and practical conditions that non-governmental actors need to access information, express themselves, associate, organise and participate in public life. When civic space is protected and promoted, it is easier for civil society and governments to collaborate throughout the policy-making cycle, fostering an environment where people can exercise their democratic rights. Countries that commit to strengthening civic space reap many benefits: greater levels of citizen engagement, improved quality of policy decisions, strengthened transparency and accountability, empowered citizens and civil society, and ultimately higher levels of trust in government (OECD, 2024).

Fostering an enabling environment for civil society organisations (CSOs), allowing them to operate freely and effectively, is one of the dimensions included in the OECD conceptual framework for civic space, alongside civic freedoms, the public-interest information ecosystem, and inclusion and non-discrimination.

A national CSO strategy helps governments set clear objectives and define outcomes for collaboration with CSOs, both as governance partners and as independent actors. Having such a strategy in place could streamline policy planning by clarifying roles, responsibilities and priorities; reducing redundancy; addressing support gaps; and improving co-ordination. In 2020, 21 out of 28 OECD countries (75%) with data available have adopted policies or strategies to enhance the enabling environment for CSOs (Figure 6.7).

Transparent, accessible and fair registration procedures for CSOs are a key component of an enabling environment and help protect freedom of association. Online registration procedures, short timelines, low or no costs and clearly defined documentation requests help CSOs to register quickly, efficiently and effectively. International guidance suggests that laws should set a short time limit for the relevant public authorities to accept or deny a CSO's registration request (OECD, 2022). According to the latest data, 10 out of the 24 (42%) OECD countries with available data have relatively short timelines of 15 days or less, while 11 out of 24 (46%) countries on average decide within three months. In the remaining three countries, the timeframe is between three months and one year (Figure 6.8).

Predictable, accessible, transparent and sustainable funding is another key condition of an enabling environment for CSOs. International guidance suggests that CSOs should be free to seek funding resources from various sources, including public support, such as government funding and tax exemptions; as well as international, and private funding. Government funding should follow predictable, transparent and non-discriminatory processes, offering both targeted project support and core funding for the sector's long-term development. In 27 out of 29 OECD countries (93%) CSOs receive some form of central or federal funding (Figure 6.9). However, there is a lack of comprehensive and disaggregated data on government funding. Government funds are often only disbursed for short-term projects, posing challenges for CSO sustainability.

Methodology and definitions

Data are drawn from the OECD 2020 Survey on Open Government. Respondents were high-level officials in charge of open government policies in 33 OECD countries and 5 accession countries (Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Peru and Romania).

A civil society organisation is defined as "an organisational representation of civil society and includes all not-for-profit, non-state, non-partisan, non-violent, and self-governing organisations outside of the family in which people come together to pursue shared needs, ideas, interests, values, faith and beliefs, including formal, legally registered organisations as well as informal associations without legal status but with a structure and activities", according to the DAC Recommendation on Enabling Civil Society in Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

OECD (2024), *Practical Guide for Policymakers on Protecting and Promoting Civic Space*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/6c908b48-en.

OECD (2022), *The Protection and Promotion of Civic Space: Strengthening Alignment with International Standards and Guidance*, OECD Publishing, Paris,https://doi.org/10.1787/d234e975-en.

Figure notes

Figure 6.7. Data on Türkiye is based on OECD desk research and was shared with country officials for validation. No data are available for Costa Rica, Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and the United States

Figure 6.8. Data are not available for Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the United States.

Figure 6.9. Data on Ireland are based on OECD desk research and were sent to country officials for validation. Data are not available for Japan, Korea, New Zealand and the United States.

Figure 6.7. Existence of civil society organisation strategies and policies, 2020



Source: OECD Survey on Open Government, 2020.

StatLink https://stat.link/xd47vn

Figure 6.8. Average length of time between a request for civil society organisation registration and a decision, 2020



Source: OECD Survey on Open Government, 2020.

StatLink https://stat.link/xhreq4

Figure 6.9. Government funding of civil society organisations, 2019



Source: OECD Survey on Open Government, 2020.

StatLink https://stat.link/kqr7gm

Chapter 7. Digital government and innovation

7.1. Digital government index

Governments face significant challenges in an evolving digital environment, shaped by technological advances and rising citizen expectations. By placing digital transformation at the core of their modernisation efforts, governments can streamline processes, enhance agility and create more responsive, transparent and effective government functions, including enhancing policy implementation. Effective digital government policies rely on multifaceted enablers including strong governance, cohesive whole-of-government strategies and resilient digital public infrastructure, such as digital identity and data-sharing systems. These foundations are essential for fostering inclusive, long-term transformation and greater public sector efficiency (OECD, 2024a).

The Digital Government Index (DGI) benchmarks digital government policies and their implementation through a whole-of-government and human-centred approach. It comprises six dimensions based on the OECD Digital Government Policy Framework: *digital by design*, *data-driven public sector*, *government as a platform*, *open by default, user-driven* and *proactiveness*, with scores ranging from 0 (the lowest) to 1 (the highest).

The average composite score for OECD countries is 0.61, with most scoring above 0.5. Korea (0.94), Denmark (0.81) and the United Kingdom (0.78) are the three countries with highest scores. These countries' balanced performance across the six dimensions reflects their comprehensive efforts in the implementation of digital government policies. Conversely, the countries in the bottom tier generally lagged behind the OECD average in all six dimensions (Figure 7.1). This underscores the need for countries to improve their digital policy frameworks and take a strategic whole-of-government approach to using digital technologies and leveraging data to become more human-centred and proactive.

Across the six dimensions of the index, OECD countries on average scored best in *digital by design* (0.68 out of 1.0). This measures the extent to which "digital" has been incorporated as a critical transformative element throughout policy processes, governance frameworks and public service delivery, rather than just as a technical tool. Australia (0.97), Korea (0.97), the United Kingdom (0.91), Denmark (0.85) and Ireland (0.84) perform close to best practice in this dimension thanks to comprehensive governance over digital government and its interplay with digital public infrastructure, investments, digital talent, and service design and delivery (Figure 7.2).

On average, OECD countries do least well on the *open by default* (0.53) and *proactiveness* (0.57) dimensions. *Open by default* measures the policies, tools and transparency mechanisms in place that promote a culture of openness. Korea (0.88), Denmark (0.78), France (0.76), Colombia (0.73) and Canada (0.73) score best on this dimension. Lower scores suggest a need for governments to guarantee access, availability, security and re-use of open government data (Figure 7.3).

Proactiveness evaluates the readiness of governments to anticipate user needs without formal user requests, including the provision of data and services, often using artificial intelligence (AI). It is one of the frontiers of government digital transformation, enabling personalised and seamless public services. Korea (0.93), Estonia (0.87), the United Kingdom (0.85), Denmark (0.79) and Türkiye (0.76) are the most digitally proactive OECD countries. Lower scores in this dimension indicate governments need to improve their capacity to leverage the use of data and AI to promote more responsive and proactive policies and services (Online Figure J.4.1).

Methodology and definitions

The OECD Survey on Digital Government 2.0 collected data from 33 OECD countries and 5 accession countries. It surveyed senior officials from central and federal governments responsible for leading and/or executing digital government transformations, who collected data from various government sectors. Data collection ran from November 2022 to January 2023.

The 2023 DGI measures six equally weighted dimensions of digital government, as defined by the OECD Digital Government Policy Framework. The score for each dimension is based on data points from the survey, and ranges from 0 to 1 based on predefined maturity benchmarks derived from the OECD work on digital government. The composite score is the average of all the dimensions. Country composite and dimension scores allow benchmarking and provide individual profiles. Further details on the index are available in Annex B.

Further reading

OECD (2024a), "2023 OECD Digital Government Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1a89ed5e-en.

OECD (2024b), "Recommendation of the Council on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD/LEGAL/0503, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0503.

OECD (2020), "The OECD Digital Government Policy Framework: Six dimensions of a Digital Government", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 2, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f64fed2a-en.

Figure notes

Data for Germany, Greece, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland and the United States are not available.

Figure J.4.1 (Digital government: Proactiveness, 2022) is available online in Annex J.

Figure 7.1. OECD Digital Government Index, 2022



Source: OECD (2022), Survey on Digital Government 2.0.

StatLink https://stat.link/y2umkn

Figure 7.2. Digital government: Digital by design, 2022



Source: OECD (2022), Survey on Digital Government 2.0.

StatLink https://stat.link/x5qutp

Figure 7.3. Digital government: Open by default, 2022



Source: OECD (2022), Survey on Digital Government 2.0.

StatLink https://stat.link/ga2ofw

7.2. Digital public infrastructure

Digital public infrastructure (DPI) is a key foundation for public service delivery, public sector efficiency and the broader digital economy. There are six key DPI components: digital identity, digital payments, data-sharing systems, digital post, digital notifications and base registries. Governments play a central role in designing, implementing and overseeing this infrastructure, as well as providing the underlying enablers, comprising open-source and interoperability frameworks, and standards for metadata and application programming interfaces (APIs).

The most widely adopted digital public infrastructure components are data-sharing systems, available in 28 out of 33 countries (85%) and digital identities, used by 24 out of 33 countries (73%). Base registry frameworks have been implemented in 21 out of 33 countries (64%), digital post in 19 out of 33 countries (58%), digital payments in 18 out of 33 countries (55%) and digital notifications in 17 out of 33 countries (52%). Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Korea and Latvia have implemented all six DPI components (Figure 7.4). Among the DPI enablers, interoperability frameworks have been adopted by 29 out of 33 OECD countries (88%). API standards have been adopted by 22 out of 33 countries (67%) metadata standards in 20 out of 33 countries (61%). Open-source frameworks are implemented in only 17 out of 33 countries (52%). Australia, Canada, Estonia, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have adopted all four enablers (Figure 7.4).

Digital identities play a key role in enabling secure and trusted digital interactions, including access to public services. Eighteen out of 33 OECD countries (55%) offer widespread access to public services through secure and user-friendly digital identity solutions, with at least 75% of services accessible using such a digital identity. Conversely, in 9 out of 33 countries (27%) less than half of services can be accessed in this way (Figure 7.5).

The spread of public services using digital identity solutions is reflected in the share of eligible populations actively using them. Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), along with Korea and the Netherlands, lead the way with more than 90% of their populations using a digital identity. This success is largely attributed to strong collaboration with the private sector, including banks. However, in about one-fifth of the countries with available information (5 out of 26), less than one-quarter of the population have adopted digital identity solutions, underscoring the challenges these countries face in implementing and scaling digital identities effectively across their populations (Figure 7.6).

Methodology and definitions

The OECD Survey on Digital Government 2.0 collected data from 33 OECD countries and 5 accession countries. It surveyed senior officials from central and federal governments responsible for leading and/or executing digital government transformations, who collected data from various government sectors. Data collection ran from November 2022 to January 2023.

Digital public infrastructure (DPI) refers to a set of shared, secure and interoperable digital systems designed to support broad access to public and private services.

Further reading

OECD (2024), "Digital public infrastructure for digital governments", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 68, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ff525dc8-en.

OECD (2024), "2023 OECD Digital Government Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1a89ed5e-en.

Figure notes

"Digital identity" indicates that at least 50% of public services can be accessed through a two-factor authentication (2FA) digital identity solution.

Figure 7.4. Availability of digital public infrastructure components and enablers, 2023



Source: OECD (2022), Survey on Digital Government 2.0.

StatLink https://stat.link/vk72p8

Figure 7.5. Adoption of digital identities by public services, 2023

Share of services accessible through a secure and user-friendly digital identity solution (SMS, app, email 2FA)



Source: OECD (2022), Survey on Digital Government 2.0.

StatLink https://stat.link/wiq58p

Figure 7.6. Adoption of digital identities by the population, 2023

Share of population using a secure and user-friendly digital identity solution (SMS, app, email 2FA) to access services



Source: OECD (2022), Survey on Digital Government 2.0.

StatLink https://stat.link/ldtywi

7.3. Open government data

Data are essential for modern public governance, playing a key role in improving internal operations, enhancing services and supporting effective policy making, including through Artificial Intelligence. By providing open data, governments enable everyone – businesses, researchers and citizens – to access, use and share these resources freely to drive innovation, improve transparency and solve societal challenges. The Open, Useful and Re-usable Data (OURdata) Index measures how well governments design open data policies, involve stakeholders in defining these policies and publish high-value datasets.

The 2023 OURdata Index highlights varying levels of open data maturity among OECD countries. The average composite score for OECD countries is 0.48 out of 1. Korea is the country with the highest score (0.91), followed by France (0.83) and Poland (0.79). Of the three pillars that comprise the index, *data accessibility* scores the highest on average (0.59), indicating that OECD countries are generally effective in making their data easily accessible and reusable. *Data availability* follows, with an average score of 0.48, suggesting room for improvement in designing open data policies and publishing high-value datasets. *Government support for data re-use* has the lowest average score (0.37), highlighting a need for increased efforts in encouraging data re-use across society (Figure 7.7).

The *data availability* pillar measures how well governments design and steer open data policies and ensure that high-value data is published. France (0.89 out of 1) leads in this category, closely followed by Korea with 0.84. Both countries have strong strategies, including clear governance structures, guidelines and requirements for open data publication. Denmark (0.73), Estonia (0.72), and Lithuania (0.71) are the next highest scorers (Figure 7.8).

The *data accessibility* pillar evaluates how easily accessible and re-usable open government data are, as well as the functions and performance of the national open government data portal. Poland earns the highest score for this measure with 0.96 and Korea (0.90) and Norway (0.89) follow close behind (Figure 7.9).

The pillar on *government support for data re-use* focuses on how governments encourage the re-use of open data across society. Korea stands out with a score of 1.00, reflecting its advanced programmes for fostering data re-use. Spain (0.85), along with Poland, Ireland and France (all scoring 0.75) also show advanced practices in this area (Online Figure J.4.2).

The results from the 2023 OURdata Index demonstrate the need for governments to expand open data efforts, shifting from seeing data as a public right to recognising it as a strategic asset for innovation, transparency and economic growth. This transition requires balancing openness with strong privacy and security protections, especially as some OECD countries face growing security concerns in today's geopolitical context. By aligning data policies with evolving digital needs, governments can unlock the potential of their data while ensuring responsible governance and trust.

Methodology and definitions

The 2023 edition of the OURdata Index provided data for 36 OECD countries and 4 accession countries (Brazil, Croatia, Peru and Romania). Data were collected through the OECD Survey on Open Government Data in 2022 which was designed to monitor the implementation of the OECD Recommendation of the council of Digital Government strategies and Recommendation on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data. It surveyed officials from central and federal government, responsible for leading and/or implementing digital government reform, who collected data from various government sectors.

The OURdata composite score, which represents overall open government data performance, is the unweighted average of the scores of all three pillars, which range from 0 to 1. Each pillar score is calculated as an unweighted average of all corresponding sub-pillars. The score for each sub-pillar is calculated by averaging the corresponding parameter and variable scores. The relative weight of each variable and parameter is determined by the number of variables and parameters within a sub-pillar. A complete account of all sub-pillars, variables and their respective weights can be found in Annex A.

The OECD defines open data as non-discriminatory data access and sharing arrangements where data are machine readable and can be accessed and shared free of charge and used by anyone for any purpose, subject at most to requirements that preserve integrity, provenance, attribution and openness.

Further reading

OECD (2023), "2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and Key Findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 43, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en.

OECD (2024), "Chapter 9. Digital government and open government data" in *Government at a Glance: Latin America and the Caribbean 2024*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/4abdba16-en.

OECD (2021), "Recommendation of the Council on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0463.

Figure notes

Data for Hungary and the United States are not available.

Figure J.4.2 (Open government data: Support for data re-use, 2022) is available online in Annex J.

Figure 7.7. OURdata Index, 2023



Source: OECD (2022), Survey on Open Government Data 5.0.

StatLink https://stat.link/uwyil1

Figure 7.8. Open government data: Accessibility, 2023



Source: OECD (2022), Survey on Open Government Data 5.0.

StatLink https://stat.link/agj8lk

Figure 7.9. Open government data: Availability, 2023



Source: OECD (2022), Survey on Open Government Data 5.0.

StatLink https://stat.link/3b7wlv

7.4. Open access to high-value datasets

High-value datasets (HVDs) are datasets held by governments that are deemed particularly valuable for societal and economic benefit. Open access to these datasets can support innovative solutions from businesses, civil society and the public sector, including AI systems, while improving efficiency in using public resources. It also fosters an open and inclusive information ecosystem, enabling access to reliable data and facts to inform critical issues such as climate change, healthcare and education. The HVDs in this analysis refer to 82 datasets in 10 high-value categories defined by the OECD to enable meaningful international comparison of open data implementation. The non exhaustive list is based on the original G8 Open Data Charter and informed by recent international developments, such the EU Open Data Directive.

Currently, 47% of HVDs are available as open data across OECD countries. Of the ten categories assessed, the most widely provided datasets are in the geospatial information and statistics category (67%), followed by earth observation and environmental data, and mobility data (56% each). In contrast, fewer datasets are available in the meteorology (46%), health and social welfare (42%), crime and justice (39%), and education (37%) categories. The categories of HVD least likely to be available as open data are companies and company ownership (31%) and government finances and accountability (27%). These would include datasets on company registers, beneficial ownership, election results and public procurement. In terms of accessibility, most open access HVD are offered in open formats (88%) and are up to date (79%). Additionally, 66% of these datasets are accessible via central open government data portals. However, less than half are accompanied by high-quality metadata or provided through standard application programming interfaces (APIs) (Figure 7.10).

Among individual countries, only 6 of the 36 OECD countries (17%) have made at least 70% of their HVDs available: France (82%), Korea (81%), Finland (76%), Denmark (74%), Spain (72%) and Colombia (70%). Most surveyed OECD countries (20 out of 36, or 56%) provide less than half of their HVDs, and 7 out of 36 (19%) provide less than 30%. There is, however, significant variation within countries depending on the dataset category. For example, Finland provides 100% of education and mobility HVDs, but only 31% of government finance and accountability ones, only just above the OECD average. These discrepancies point to opportunities for targeted reforms to address weaknesses while leveraging existing strengths (Figure 7.11).

OECD countries generally perform better on accessibility. In 22 out of 36 countries (61%), more than half of openly available HVDs meet all five of the accessibility factors assessed. Top performers include the Netherlands (77% of open HVDs), Canada (73%) and Norway (73%). Notably, Costa Rica, Chile and Mexico exhibit the widest variation in accessibility across HVD categories. For example, while Mexico provides nearly 80% of HVD in open formats and through a central portal, less than 15% are accompanied by good metadata quality or made available via APIs. These results highlight the need for consistent efforts to improve accessibility across all HVD dimensions (Figure 7.12).

Methodology and definitions

The data were collected through the OECD Survey on Open Government Data (5.0) in 2022 from 36 OECD member countries and 4 accession countries.

Application programming interfaces (APIs) are interfaces used by information systems to communicate with each other. APIs allow automated access to and exchange of data within the limits established by the information system operator.

High-value datasets (HVDs) refer to 82 datasets defined by the OECD to enable meaningful international comparison of open data implementation. The list is based on the original G8 Open Data Charter and informed by recent international developments, such the EU Open Data Directive. The list is not exhaustive.

The assessment divides the HVDs into ten categories: companies and company ownership; earth observation and environment; geospatial; meteorological; mobility; statistics; government finances and accountability; crime and justice; education; and health and social welfare. Each dataset is evaluated on whether it is available as open data (machine-readable, free of charge and provided with an open licence). Those which are open are then further assessed based on factors such as being accessible through a central open data portal, having standardised and complete metadata, being provided in open formats, being up-to-date, and having API access.

Further reading

OECD (2023), "2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and Key Findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en.

Figure 7.10. Availability and accessibility of high value datasets, OECD average, 2023



Source: OECD (2022), Survey on Open Government Data (5.0).

StatLink https://stat.link/wn6ec3

Figure 7.11. Availability of high-value datasets by selected category, 2023



Source: OECD (2022), Survey on Open Government Data (5.0).

StatLink https://stat.link/5qvsbg

Figure 7.12. Accessibility of high-value datasets, 2023



Source: OECD (2022), Survey on Open Government Data (5.0).

StatLink https://stat.link/3jp98a

Chapter 8. Regulation

8.1. Stakeholder engagement in regulation

Rules can be significantly improved if those they affect are involved in their development. This allows assumptions to be tested and alternatives found, and helps governments improve the design of regulations by better understanding their impact. Moreover, when businesses, associations and the public can share feedback and feel that their voices are heard in the policy-making process, they are more likely to comply with the rules and view them as fair, transparent and aligned with their needs (OECD, 2025). The OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) measure the quality of communication, consultation and stakeholder engagement when developing regulations.

Primary laws are regulations which must be approved by the legislature. On a scale of 0 to 4, iREG found the average quality of systems and practices for engaging stakeholders on primary laws among OECD countries improved from 2.0 in 2014 to 2.26 in 2024 (Figure 8.1). The scores for 25 countries and the EU increased, most notably in Iceland (+1.77), Israel (+1.76) and Italy (+1.21). Oversight and quality control remains the weakest dimension measured, with an average score of 0.38 out of 1 across OECD countries in 2024. Countries could use existing tools to improve in this area: 33 out of 38 (87%) have set up a stakeholder consultation oversight body, but only 15 (39%) require policy makers to consider comments made by these bodies following reviews.

Subordinate regulations are those that can be approved by the head of government, a minister or the cabinet. The average quality of stakeholder engagement on subordinate regulations increased from 1.95 in 2014 to 2.16 in 2024 across the OECD (Figure 8.2). Again, 25 countries and the EU increased their scores, led by Israel (+1.96) and Italy (+1.12). Engagement on subordinate regulations continues to lag that of primary laws, with the gap increasing very slightly (by 0.05) between 2014 and 2024. This was due to greater improvements in the areas of systematic adoption and transparency for primary laws than for subordinate regulations. Oversight and quality control remains the weakest dimension for subordinate regulations, averaging 0.37 out of 1 across OECD countries.

Countries could do more to harness digital channels to enable stakeholder engagement. The use of virtual meetings in early stage consultations increased from 35% of OECD countries (13 out of 37) in 2017 to 65% (24 out of 37) in 2024 (Figure 8.3). The use of online consultation at this stage rose slightly from 22 out of 37 countries (59%) in 2017 to 23 (62%) in 2024. Online consultation is also used in late stage consultations by 84% of OECD countries (31 out of 37), with 46% (17) always or regularly using it. Regular digital engagement is a trait of more advanced engagement systems: among the OECD countries that systematically use online consultations for draft primary laws, the average score for stakeholder engagement is 0.31 points (7.7%) above the OECD average.

Methodology and definitions

38 OECD countries and the EU responded to the survey. The data cover primary laws and subordinate regulations initiated by the executive. More information on iREG is at https://doi.org/10.1787/5jrnwqm3zp43-en.

The composite indicator for stakeholder engagement contains four equally weighted categories: methodology gathers information on the different forms of consultation used, oversight and quality control records the mechanisms to monitor and ensure the quality of stakeholder engagement, systematic adoption records formal requirements and how often stakeholder engagement is conducted, and transparency records how open processes are. The maximum score for each category is 1. The total score ranges from 0 to 4.

Primary laws are regulations which must be approved by the legislature. Subordinate regulations can be approved by the head of government, a minister or the cabinet.

Early stage consultation is conducted to help policy makers define a policy problem and consider solutions. Late stage consultation is conducted when the decision to regulate has been made and proposed regulation drafted.

Further reading

OECD (2025), *OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/56b60e39-en.

Arndt, C. et al. (2015), "2015 Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance: Design, Methodology and Key Results", *OECD Regulatory Policy Working Papers*, No. 1, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5jrnwqm3zp43-en.

OECD (2012), *Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264209022-en.

Figure notes

Figure 8.1, Figure 8.2. Data for 2014 do not include the four countries that were not in the OECD at the time (Colombia, Costa Rica, Latvia and Lithuania). For these countries, the 2014 total reflects their 2017 score.

Figure 8.1, Figure 8.3. Only cover practices in the executive. Türkiye and the United States, where all primary laws are initiated by the legislature, are excluded.

Figure 8.1. Data are based on the 38 OECD countries and indicators are also calculated for the European Union (EU). Most primary laws are initiated by the executive in the majority of OECD members. Asterisks (*) denote countries where a greater share of primary laws are initiated by the legislature.

Figure 8.3. Data reflects practices for primary laws. Includes data for the EU.

Figure 8.1. Stakeholder engagement in primary laws, 2014 and 2024



Source: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) Surveys 2014and 2024.

StatLink https://stat.link/d47ifo

Figure 8.2. Stakeholder engagement in subordinate regulations, 2014 and 2024



Source: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) Surveys 2014, and 2024.

StatLink https://stat.link/1sxyde

Figure 8.3. Use of digital methods to consult on primary laws, 2017, 2020 and 2023

Number of jurisdictions



Source: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) Surveys 2017, 2020, and 2024.

StatLink https://stat.link/nv3bw6

8.2. Regulatory impact assessment

Regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) are used to assess the potential impact of new regulations, both positive and negative. It provides decision makers with crucial information on whether and how to regulate to achieve public policy goals. In doing so, they help countries make policies that are smarter, simpler and more streamlined and help governments to take clear and transparent decisions, building public confidence in regulatory policy and public institutions. When regulating and implementing policies on complex challenges such as climate change and AI, RIAs can help decision makers by identifying different pathways and highlight the trade-offs of the various approaches. The OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) survey measures the quality of RIA systems for both primary laws and subordinate regulations in OECD countries on a scale of 0 to 4.

On average across OECD countries the quality of RIA systems for primary laws improved from 2.1 in 2014 to 2.3 in 2024 (Figure 8.4). On average, countries perform better in the areas of methodology (scoring 0.65 out of 1 on average across the OECD) and systematic adoption of RIA (average score of 0.76). Countries perform worse on transparency (average score of 0.53) and least well on oversight and quality control (0.40). Over this period, 22 of the 33 countries with data available (67%), and the EU, have improved their RIA practices. The main areas of progress have been in systematic adoption and transparency. For instance, new guidance issued by Finland and the Netherlands added requirements to consider a broader range of impacts. Lithuania increased its emphasis on the need for policy makers to monitor the impact of decisions.

The average score across the OECD on RIA for subordinate regulations has also improved over the past decade, from 1.9 in 2014 to 2.2 in 2024 (Figure 8.5). On average, countries perform better in the areas of methodology (average score of 0.58 out of 1 across the OECD) and systematic adoption of RIA (average score of 0.71). Countries perform worse on transparency (average score of 0.50) and on oversight and quality control (0.43). Since 2014, there have been improvements in RIA for subordinate regulations in 20 of the 35 countries with data available (57%), and also in the EU. The increases are mainly due to improved oversight and quality control, with some progress in systematic adoption. For example, Chile, Greece and Latvia have significantly expanded their RIA frameworks to address a wider range of concerns, including gender equality, social goals and economic impacts.

Impact assessments are required in an increasing number of OECD countries across all areas of impact (Figure 8.6). The most frequently assessed areas are budgets and competition, both of which have to be evaluated for at least some regulations in 35 countries, followed by impacts on the public sector, small businesses and the environment (required in 34 countries each). The least commonly required areas of assessment are into impacts on sustainable development (28 countries) and regional areas (26 countries), although the number of countries considering these impacts has risen since 2014.

Methodology and definitions

The iREG survey is based on the practices described in the 2012 *OECD Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance* and draws on responses from central government officials. In 2024, 38 OECD countries and the EU responded to the survey. The data cover primary laws and subordinate regulations initiated by the executive. More information on iREG is at https://doi.org/10.1787/5jrnwqm3zp43-en.

The RIA composite indicator contains four equally weighted categories: *methodology* gathers information on the different assessments included in RIA, *oversight and quality control* records the mechanisms to monitor and ensure the quality of RIA, *systematic adoption* records formal requirements and how often RIA is conducted, and *transparency* records how open processes are. The maximum score for each category is 1. The total score ranges from 0 to 4.

Primary laws are regulations which must be approved by the legislature. Subordinate regulations can be approved by the head of government, a minister or the cabinet.

Further reading

OECD (2025), *OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/56b60e39-en.

OECD (2020), Regulatory Impact Assessment, *OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7a9638cb-en.

Arndt, C. et al. (2015), "2015 Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance: Design, Methodology and Key Results", *OECD Regulatory Policy Working Papers*, No. 1, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5jrnwqm3zp43-en.

OECD (2012), *Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264209022-en.

Figure notes

Figure 8.4, Figure 8.5, Figure 8.6. Data for 2014 total do not include the four countries that were not OECD countries at the time (Colombia, Costa Rica, Latvia and Lithuania).

Figure 8.4. Only covers practices in the executive. Türkiye and the United States, where all primary laws are initiated by the legislature, are excluded. Most primary laws are initiated by the executive in the majority of OECD countries. Asterisks (*) denote countries where a greater share of primary laws are initiated by the legislature.

Figure 8.4. Regulatory impact assessment for primary laws, 2014 and 2024



Source: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) Survey 2014 and 2024.

StatLink https://stat.link/qhf48y

Figure 8.5. Regulatory impact assessment, subordinate regulations, 2014 and 2024



Source: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) Survey 2014 and 2024.

StatLink https://stat.link/facwh9

Figure 8.6. Areas covered by regulatory impact assessments of subordinate regulations, 2014 and 2024



Source: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) Survey 2014 and 2024.

StatLink https://stat.link/698o07

8.3. *Ex post* evaluation

Laws and regulations can quickly become outdated or can have unintended consequences that undermine policy objectives. Regular evaluation of rules after they have been implemented (*ex post)* helps policy makers to understand how they work in practice and what changes might be needed to improve and adapt them. Evaluation is also vital for removing unnecessary regulatory burdens on businesses and citizens and making rules easier to comply with. Making evaluations and follow-up actions publicly available can increase government accountability and responsiveness.

The OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) survey measures the quality of *ex post* evaluations for both primary laws and subordinate regulations in OECD countries and found significant scope to improve *ex post* evaluation in both areas. On a scale from 0 to 4, the average score across OECD countries for *ex post* evaluation of primary laws in 2024 was only 1.34. Only 9 out of the 38 countries with data available, and the EU, achieved a score of 2 or more. There are significant deficiencies in all four aspects of *ex post* evaluation: methodology (with an OECD average score of 0.36 out of 1 in 2024), systematic adoption (0.36), transparency (0.37), and oversight and quality control (0.25). The average score for *ex post* evaluation of subordinate regulations was similarly low, at only 1.33. Again, only 9 out of the 38 countries, plus the EU, achieved a score of 2 out of 4 or better. The scores for *ex post* evaluation are very similar in most countries for both primary laws and subordinate regulations (Figure 8.7).

Moreover, there has been only limited improvement since 2014, when the OECD average score for *ex post* evaluations of primary laws was 0.89 (Figure 8.7). OECD countries have seen an average increase of around 0.12 points each in the three dimensions of oversight and quality control, methodology, and transparency. Systematic adoption has seen a smaller improvement (+0.06 points), as countries have not expanded their formal requirements for evaluations (OECD, 2025).

Governments could improve their systematic adoption of *ex post* evaluation by ensuring that it systematically covers all regulations, or at least targets those that have the greatest impact to ensure the best use of evaluation resources. Currently *ex post* evaluations remain largely ad hoc. Only 7 of 38 OECD countries (18%) require periodic *ex post* evaluations of all primary laws, and a further 4 countries (11%) for all major laws. 13 countries (34%) require them for only some primary laws, and the remaining 14 (37%) have no requirements at all (Figure 8.8). The lack of a systematic approach creates a risk that evaluations may instead be chosen based on politically driven priorities or in response to regulatory failures.

Governments can also improve their *ex post* evaluation methodologies by providing practical advice on appropriate methodologies. The number of countries making guidance available to officials has increased from 10 in 2014 to 26 in 2024 (68% of OECD countries) (Figure 8.9). Guidance can also be used to set expectations and quality criteria, such as a thorough assessment of policy objectives, to maximise the value of *ex post* evaluations across the administration.

Methodology and definitions

The iREG survey is based on the practices described in the 2012 *OECD Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance* and draws on responses from central government officials. In 2024, 38 OECD countries and the EU responded to the survey. The data cover primary laws and subordinate regulations initiated by the executive. More information on iREG is at https://doi.org/10.1787/5jrnwqm3zp43-en.

The composite indicator for *ex post* evaluation contains four equally weighted categories: *methodology* gathers information on the different assessments included in *ex post* evaluation, *oversight and quality control* records the mechanisms to monitor and ensure the quality of *ex post* evaluation, *systematic adoption* records formal requirements and how often *ex post* evaluation is conducted, and *transparency* records how open processes are. The maximum score for each category is 1. The total score ranges from 0 to 4.

Primary laws are regulations which must be approved by the legislature. Subordinate regulations can be approved by the head of government, a minister or the cabinet.

Further reading

OECD (2025), *OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/56b60e39-en.

OECD (2020), *Reviewing the Stock of Regulation*, OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1a8f33bc-en.

Arndt, C. et al. (2015), "2015 Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance: Design, Methodology and Key Results", *OECD Regulatory Policy Working Papers*, No. 1, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5jrnwqm3zp43-en.

OECD (2012), *Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264209022-en.

Figure notes

Figure 8.7. Data for 2014 do not include the four countries that were not in the OECD at the time (Colombia, Costa Rica, Latvia and Lithuania). For these countries, the 2014 total reflects their 2017 scores.

Figure 8.9. Data for 2014 are based on the 34 countries that were OECD members at the time. Data for subsequent years are based on 38 OECD countries.

Figure 8.7. *Ex post* evaluation of primary laws, 2014 and 2024, and subordinated regulations, 2024



Source: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) Survey 2014, 2017 and 2024.

StatLink https://stat.link/hz2eix

Figure 8.8. Scope of requirements for *ex post* evaluation of primary laws, 2024



Source: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) Survey 2024.

StatLink https://stat.link/7sqfya

Figure 8.9. Provision of written guidance on *ex post* evaluation of primary laws, 2014-2024



Source: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) Survey 2014, 2017, 2020 and 2024.

StatLink https://stat.link/o1qk4v

8.4. Governance of sector regulators

Economic regulators play a key role in the delivery of essential services across sectors including energy, e-communications, rail and air transport, and water. They work to ensure people have access to affordable and high-quality services in these sectors, by promoting competition, setting prices, enforcing standards and protecting consumers. Regulators act as rule-setters as well as market "referees", balancing stakeholders' interests and hold a unique position among government, industry and citizens. Effective governance arrangements are essential to allow regulators to do their work effectively. Regulators must act objectively, impartially and consistently, avoiding conflicts of interest. Moreover, recent changes in the regulatory framework have expanded their mandates. The green and digital transitions, as well as shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic and other crises, have meant regulators have seen their responsibilities widening. This reinforces the need for effective governance arrangements.

Independence acts as a safeguard against undue pressure in regulators' interactions with stakeholders. Between 2018 and 2023, there has been little improvement in the independence of regulators in OECD countries across utility sectors (Figure 8.10). On a scale of 0 to 6, average scores across all sectors rose only slightly from 4.11 to 4.14, or 0.5%. There was a slight increase in the uptake of positive governance arrangements by regulators but overall, legal safeguards to protect independence have improved little. Looking at the average across regulators in OECD countries with data for both 2018 and 2023, scores have remained unchanged in the energy sector (4.36) and water sector (4.39) over this period. The scores for the e-communications, rail and air transport sectors showed a modest improvement, with independence in the e-communication sector increasing from 4.24 to 4.30, rail transport from 4.05 to 4.10 and air transport from 3.67 to 3.70.

Accountability is required to ensure regulators stay within their mandates, and to support their performance. It secures necessary checks and balances, ensuring regulators' decisions are transparent, predictable and inclusive. Average accountability scores increased by 3% from 4.29 to 4.44 across all utility sectors between 2018 and 2023 (Figure 8.10). This is bigger than the improvement for independence. The most significant improvement was in the air sector, with an increase from 3.74 to 4.01 (7%) between 2018 to 2023. The data also confirm a positive correlation between independence and accountability: regulators that are more independent tend to have more measures in place to hold them to account (OECD, 2025)

There is still room to improve regulators' independence and accountability arrangements. For example, when it comes nominations for leadership positions, independent panels are only involved for 46% of regulators on average across sectors, either with or without ministerial nominations (Figure 8.11). As the leadership is ultimately in charge of regulatory decisions, government involvement in nominations without sufficient transparency and accountability can create perceptions of undue closeness between regulator and government. The e-communications sector has the greatest share of regulators with leaders who are nominated by government without an independent selection panel (59%).

Methodology and definitions

The OECD Indicators on the Governance of Sector Regulators (GSR) map the governance of regulators, looking at their independence, accountability and scope of action. The 2023 edition of the GSR survey was distributed to national governments and economic regulators as part of the OECD's Product Market Regulation survey. Findings from the 2023 survey reflect arrangements for 144 regulatory agencies across 40 countries. The latest survey round ran in two stages from 2023 to early 2024. Building on the 2018 survey, the 2023 survey is the first edition that allows arrangements to be compared over time, due to a more stable survey format.

Survey responses were validated by assessing understanding, adherence to question formats, accuracy and completeness, using public sources like legislation, websites and reports where available. Follow-up questions were used to clarify misunderstandings and inconsistencies, or to request additional evidence. The scores for independence and accountability each range from 0 to 6, with a higher score indicating a greater use of good practice governance arrangements.

Further reading

OECD (2025), *The 2023 Indicators on the Governance of Sector Regulators,* OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/dc22e402-en.

OECD (2017), *Creating a Culture of Independence: Practical Guidance against Undue Influence*, The Governance of Regulators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264274198-en.

OECD (2014), *The Governance of Regulators, OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264209015-en.

Figure notes

Figure 8.10. When comparing scores from 2018 and 2023 and calculating the OECD average, the analysis only includes regulators with data available for both years, to ensure comparability.

Figure 8.11. Share of all regulators with a given arrangement for the nomination of leadership candidates.

Figure 8.10. Independence and accountability scores, 2018 and 2023

Independence

	Energy		E-comms		Rail		Air		Water	
	2018	2023	2018	2023	2018	2023	2018	2023	2018	2023
AUS	5.0	5.0	4.2	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
AUT	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.8	5.3	5.3	3.3	3.1		
BEL	4.9	4.8	4.6	4.6	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.2	3.2
CAN	3.6	3.8	3.2	3.3	2.6	2.6	2.8	2.8		
CHL	2.9	2.9	2.7	2.7	1.8	1.8	3.1	3.1	4.1	4.1
COL	4.1	4.1	4.8	5.0			2.6	2.6	4.3	4.1
CRI	5.0	5.0	4.2	4.3	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.9	5.2
CZE	4.3	4.3	4.7	4.7	4.5	4.5	3.9	3.9	3.1	2.8
DNK	4.0	4.0	3.8	3.6	3.5	3.9	3.7	3.7	4.1	4.1
EST	5.0	5.0		4.4	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.1
FIN	4.1	4.1	4.4	4.4	3.6	3.9	3.8	3.8		
FRA	4.9	4.7	5.0	4.9	4.2	4.4	4.5	4.4		
DEU	4.2	4.4	4.1	4.5	4.3	4.3				
GRC	4.8	5.2	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.5	3.2	4.5		2.6
ISL	4.5	4.2	3.9	3.9						3.6
IRL	4.2	4.2	4.6	4.5	3.6	3.7	4.0	4.5	4.4	4.4
ISR	4.3	4.5	3.3	3.3	3.7	4.0	3.6	3.6	4.3	4.3
ITA	5.4	5.6	5.2	5.1	5.6	5.7	5.6	5.7	5.6	5.6
JPN	3.1	3.1	2.6	2.5	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8		
KOR	3.5	3.3						4.3	3.6	3.6
LVA	5.1	5.3	5.1	5.3	4.7	4.8	3.6	3.7	5.1	5.3
LTU	5.0	5.1	4.2	4.3	4.1	4.2	3.3	3.2	4.9	5.1
LUX	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.2	4.2		
MEX	4.9	4.9	5.3	5.3	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.9		
NZL	4.3	4.3	3.8	3.9	3.3	3.3	2.9	2.9		
NOR	3.7	3.6	4.0	4.1	4.4	4.6	3.4	3.4		
POL	4.6	4.3	4.1	4.9	4.4	4.4	3.5	2.9		2.3
PRT	5.1	5.3	5.0	5.0	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.6	5.0	5.0
SVK	4.4	4.1	5.0	5.0	4.3	4.4			4.4	4.1
SVN	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	5.0	5.1				
ESP	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.4	4.4	3.0	3.0		
SWE	3.0	3.1	2.9	3.3	4.0	4.0	3.4	3.4		
CHE	3.3	3.3	3.9	4.0	3.8	3.5	2.5	2.5		
TUR	4.6	4.4	4.1	4.1	2.7	2.6	3.5	3.7		3.0
GBR	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.3	4.2	4.2
OECD	**4.4**	**4.4**	**4.2**	**4.3**	**4.1**	**4.1**	**3.7**	**3.7**	**4.4**	**4.4**
BRA	4.9	5.2	5.3	5.3	4.6	4.6	4.9	5.2	4.3	4.4
BGR	4.8	5.2	4.5	4.5	3.3	3.3	2.7	2.5	4.5	4.6
HRV	4.8	5.1	4.9	5.0	4.8	4.6	4.4	4.2	3.5	3.6
PER	4.3	4.3	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.2		4.2		4.1

Accountability

	Energy		E-comms		Rail		Air		Water	
	2018	2023	2018	2023	2018	2023	2018	2023	2018	2023
AUS	4.9	4.9	5.2	5.3	5.2	5.3	5.2	5.2	5.3	5.3
AUT	4.1	4.2	4.6	4.8	4.5	4.5	2.7	2.7		
BEL	4.8	4.8	5.9	5.9	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.4	1.4	1.4
CAN	4.9	4.9	2.9	2.9	3.6	4.1	3.5	3.5		
CHL	3.4	3.4	3.0	3.0	2.2	2.2	5.1	5.1	4.2	4.4
COL	5.0	5.0	3.8	4.4			2.7	2.7	4.7	4.7
CRI	5.7	5.9	5.2	5.2	5.6	5.8	5.6	5.6	6.0	5.8
CZE	4.6	4.6	5.1	5.1	3.5	4.1	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.2
DNK	3.7	3.7	2.5	3.6	4.3	3.7	2.9	3.2	2.0	2.0
EST	4.1	4.0		4.3	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.9	3.5	3.5
FIN	4.2	4.2	4.0	4.0	0.8	1.9	3.4	3.4		
FRA	4.5	5.0	5.4	5.4	5.0	5.0	2.2	5.0		
DEU	4.6	5.2	5.2	5.1	5.3	5.4				
GRC	5.5	5.5	5.1	5.1	4.3	4.4	1.9	3.6		3.3
ISL	3.9	4.0	4.0	4.0						2.9
IRL	5.3	5.3	5.7	5.7	4.0	4.3	4.3	5.0	5.3	5.3
ISR	4.7	4.4	5.7	5.8	4.0	4.0	4.3	4.9	5.3	5.6
ITA	5.3	5.3	5.9	5.9	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
JPN	3.1	3.1	3.8	3.8	3.5	3.6	3.0	3.3		
KOR	4.4	5.5						4.1	5.5	5.5
LVA	4.9	5.7	4.9	5.7	3.8	4.2	3.1	3.9	4.9	5.7
LTU	6.0	6.0	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.9	3.6	3.7	6.0	6.0
LUX	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.2	3.2	3.0	3.0		
MEX	5.4	5.2	5.9	5.9	3.7	3.1	2.8	2.8		
NZL	4.9	4.9	4.8	4.8	4.6	4.6	4.8	4.8		
NOR	3.8	3.8	3.5	3.8	3.6	3.9	3.1	3.5		
POL	3.2	3.3	4.1	4.2	3.2	3.6	4.2	4.7		2.1
PRT	5.3	5.6	5.8	5.8	5.7	6.0	6.0	6.0	5.1	5.1
SVK	5.5	5.7	4.6	4.6	1.9	2.2			5.7	5.7
SVN	5.2	5.2	5.4	5.5	4.4	4.4				
ESP	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.5	5.7	5.4	5.4		
SWE	2.8	3.0	3.4	4.1	4.1	4.1	3.2	3.2		
CHE	3.2	3.2	4.1	4.1	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.5		
TUR	3.7	3.7	5.7	5.7	4.1	4.4	5.1	5.0		4.0
GBR	5.7	5.7	4.4	4.4	5.6	5.6	3.8	3.8	3.5	3.6
OECD	**4.6**	**4.7**	**4.7**	**4.8**	**4.1**	**4.2**	**3.7**	**4.0**	**4.5**	**4.5**
BRA	4.5	5.9	5.6	5.6	4.6	5.2	5.4	5.6	4.4	4.9
BGR	5.7	5.9	5.8	5.2	2.4	2.3	3.5	3.5	5.3	5.3
HRV	5.4	5.5	5.6	5.6	4.3	4.6	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.7
PER	3.6	3.7	3.9	4.0	4.2	3.7		3.7		4.4

Source: Indicators on the Governance of Sector Regulators, 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/rolf14

Figure 8.11. Nomination process for leadership positions at regulators by sector, 2023

Percentage of regulators



Source: Indicators on the Governance of Sector Regulators, 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/yliekm

8.5. Green objectives and powers of sector regulators

Sector regulators have a significant contribution to make to the green transition and the decarbonisation of sectors including water, energy, transport and e-communications. When appropriately empowered and enabled, regulators can increase how much environmental sustainability is considered in the choices of both operators and consumers. However, not all regulators currently have the tools they need or the governance arrangements in place to contribute effectively to this area.

Sector regulators need to have appropriate mandates and objectives if they are to support carbon mitigation efforts. There is currently no standard approach to defining the role of economic regulators in the green transition. Only 41% of economic regulators have environmental sustainability objectives explicitly defined in legislation while 36% have no such objectives at all (Figure 8.12).

To support emission reductions and the green transition, regulators also need appropriate legal powers to consider environmental sustainability in their regulatory decisions. Regardless of their statutory objectives, 42% of economic regulators lack the legal power to consider environmental sustainability in decision making (Figure 8.13). These powers are most widely held by regulators in the energy (86%), water (77%), and air transport (72%) sector. However, most regulators in rail transport (30%) and e-communications (29%) lack such powers.

Even where powers are provided, these may not extend to the full range of regulators' functions, nor the full range of environmental issues. Only 21% of regulators have powers to consider the full range of environmental issues, including greenhouse gas reduction, decarbonisation, biodiversity, and water and air pollution (Figure 8.14). The most common environmental issues that regulators have the power to consider are greenhouse gas reduction (held by 65% of regulators with such powers) and decarbonisation (65%). However, only a minority can consider waste management (33%) or biodiversity (31%).

A broadened remit that includes sustainability requires regulators to balance multiple objectives. Around 43% of regulators have encountered or anticipate trade-offs between environmental and other policy objectives (Online Figure J.5.1). For 37% of regulators, these trade-offs relate to improving cost effectiveness, and for 27% they relate to protecting consumer welfare or social inclusion. Co-ordination can be enabled by establishing clear roles and responsibilities, and guidance on managing competing priorities. However, 60% of regulators lack formal co-ordination mechanisms to connect them with public authorities for environmental sustainability issues (Online Figure J.5.2).

Methodology and definitions

The 2023 Governance of Sector Regulators (GSR) survey was distributed as part of the OECD's Product Market Regulation (PMR) survey. A questionnaire on green governance was included to gather data on regulators' governance arrangements and contributions to the green transition. Responses were collected for 42 countries, representing 184 sector-country combinations (or 151 unique institutions as some regulators cover multiple sectors). Data displayed is for all 36 OECD countries which completed the survey, representing 158 sector-country combinations (127 unique institutions). Survey responses refer to laws, policies and regulations in force as of 1 January 2023 and do not consider any policy reforms or laws and regulations that came into force after this date. For more information, see OECD (2024).

Further reading

OECD (2024), *The Role of Economic Regulators in the Green Transition: Driving Sustainable Change in Network Sectors*, The Governance of Regulators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7d4704c9-en.

OECD (2023), *Better regulation for the green transition*, OECD Public Governance Policy Papers, No. 40, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c91a04bc-en.

Figure notes

Figure 8.12. Refers to the question "Is there a piece of legislation that includes objective(s) for the regulator relating to the environmental sustainability of the sector?" Based on responses from 158 regulators.

Figure 8.13. and Figure 8.14. Refers to the question "Regardless of the existence of statutory objective(s), does the regulator have the legal power to include any considerations regarding environmental sustainability in its regulatory decision making?" Based on responses from 158 regulators by sector (Figure 8.13) and 91 regulators with such powers by issue area (Figure 8.14).

Figure J.5.1 (Trade-offs between environmental and other policy objectives, 2023) and Figure J.5.2 (Formalised co-ordination mechanisms to address issues of environmental sustainability by sector, 2023) are available online in Annex J.

Figure 8.12. Share of regulators with objectives relating to environmental sustainability in legislation, 2023

Source: Indicators on the Governance of Sector Regulators, 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/5zvmkc

Figure 8.13. Share of regulators with the legal power to consider environmental sustainability in regulatory decision making, by sector, 2023



Source: Indicators on the Governance of Sector Regulators, 2023

StatLink https://stat.link/yctrb9

Figure 8.14. Legal powers to consider environmental sustainability in decision making by issue area, 2023



Source: Indicators on the Governance of Sector Regulators, 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/a5z1gj

8.6. Green capabilities of sector regulators

For regulators to act effectively on climate change, they need powers to collect and manage relevant data for their sector. Unfortunately, this is not the case for 56% of regulators overall (Figure 8.15); even among those with environmental objectives (see Figure 8.12 in previous section), more than one-quarter lack these powers. A majority of regulators in the air transport (69%) and water (64%) sectors collect environmental data, but only half (50%) of energy regulators. This may be due to collection powers being too narrowly defined, or because there is no requirement to assess the impact of decision making on environmental sustainability. Overarching targets can also be useful to guide regulators' actions in support of environmental goals. At present, 56% of regulators have quantitative targets defined for their sector, but only 31% overall use such targets in their decision making (Online Figure J.5.3).

Less than one-quarter of regulators are required to assess the impact of regulation on environmental outcomes. E-communications regulators are the least likely to report such requirements (only 6%) compared to 38% of air transport regulators (Figure 8.16). *Ex ante* regulatory impact assessments (RIA) can help to reveal trade-offs and identify solutions with the greatest net benefits for the environment, whilst *ex post* evaluations help ensure regulations stay fit-for-purpose. Regulators may introduce a proportional and targeted approach to increase impact assessments and look to develop methodologies that encompass social and environmental in addition to economic criteria.

Regulators will require new skills and tools to support a focus on the green transition, including carrying out RIAs and quantifying environmental costs and benefits. Currently, 50% of regulators have not recruited staff with expertise in environmental sustainability and have no plans to, nor bring in external professionals (Figure 8.17). Only 30% of regulators have hired such staff in the last five years and 7% plan to do so, while 13% make use of external expertise. Barriers to hiring include budgets and uncertainty over their mandate. In some cases, regulators are unable to offer wages that can compete with the private sector, hindering their ability to attract staff with appropriate skills and sector knowledge.

Regulators may also need to engage with a wider range of stakeholders over environmental goals, such as civil society organisations (CSOs) or representatives of vulnerable groups affected by environmental threats. Currently, 79% of regulators provide avenues for environmental CSOs to have input into regulatory decision making, either through an open call for comments or a targeted request (Online Figure J.5.4) (OECD, 2024).

Methodology and definitions

The 2023 Governance of Sector Regulators (GSR) survey was distributed as part of the OECD's Product Market Regulation (PMR) survey. A questionnaire on green governance was included to gather data on regulators' governance arrangements and contributions to the green transition. Responses were collected for 42 countries, representing 184 sector-country combinations (or 151 unique institutions as some regulators cover multiple sectors). Data displayed is for all 36 OECD countries which completed the survey, representing 158 sector-country combinations (127 unique institutions). Survey responses refer to laws, policies and regulations in force as of 1 January 2023 and do not consider any policy reforms or laws and regulations that came into force after this date. For more information, see OECD (2024).

Further reading

OECD (2024), *The Role of Economic Regulators in the Green Transition: Driving Sustainable Change in Network Sectors*, The Governance of Regulators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7d4704c9-en.

OECD (2023), "Better regulation for the green transition", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 40, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c91a04bc-en.

Figure notes

Figure 8.15. Refers to the question "Does the regulator have the legal power to collect relevant data on the environmental sustainability of the sector (e.g. greenhouse gas emissions, etc.) to inform its regulatory decision making?" Based on responses from 158 regulators.

Figure 8.16. Refers to the question "Is the regulator required to assess (*ex ante* or *ex post*) the impact of the regulatory framework (or specific regulatory decisions issued by the regulator) on furthering environmental sustainability objectives?" Based on responses from 158 regulators.

Figure 8.17. Refers to the question "Does your organisation recruit any staff with expertise in areas related to the environmental sustainability of the sector, in support of the delivery of its functions?" Based on responses from 158 regulators.

Figure J.5.3 (Consideration of quantitative environmental sustainability targets in decision making, 2023) and Figure J.5.4 (Use of inputs from environmental civil society organisations to inform decision making, 2023) are available online in Annex J.

Figure 8.15. Powers to collect data on environmental sustainability by sector, 2023

Percentage of regulators



Source: Indicators on the Governance of Sector Regulators, 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/rofawu

Figure 8.16. Requirements to assess the impact of regulation on furthering environmental sustainability by sector, 2023

Percentage of regulators



Source: Indicators on the Governance of Sector Regulators, 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/ef8d02

Figure 8.17. Use of internal and external expertise relating to the environmental sustainability of the sector, 2013

Percentage of regulators



Source: Indicators on the Governance of Sector Regulators, 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/mzvl3o

8.7. Better regulation for the green transition

Well-designed and implemented regulation can support climate change mitigation and adaptation, encourage green innovation, and secure sustainable economic growth. To achieve these outcomes, governments should use tools and approaches designed to improve the quality of regulations, ensuring they efficiently achieve climate goals, particularly for high-emission sectors such as energy and transport which are critical for climate change mitigation.

Regulatory impact assessments play a critical role in this process by helping identify the likely impacts, feasible alternatives and trade-offs of different policy options. Among OECD countries with data available, 77% (27 out of 36) assess the environmental impact of all or major primary laws, while 60% (21 out of 38) do so for subordinate regulations (Figure 8.18). However, only around half of OECD countries extend these reviews to cover specific impact areas. Moreover, the impacts of subordinate regulations on specific areas tend to be assessed less systematically than those of primary laws, even though they can be significant. When it comes decarbonisation targets, 40% of OECD countries with data available (14 out of 36) assess the impact of all or major primary laws compared to 37% (13 out of 37) doing so for the subordinate regulations of all or major laws. For natural resources the shares are 37% of countries (13 out of 36) for primary laws and 34% (13 out of 38) for subordinate regulations. For human health the shares are 46% of countries (16 out of 36) for primary laws and 40% (14 out of 37) for subordinate regulations. Assessing these different impact areas is critical for gaining a comprehensive understanding of climate impacts. More systematic and granular evaluations are needed in practice to fully complete environmental impact assessments.

Regular *ex post* review is also essential for ensuring that existing regulations support national and international climate policy goals while promoting green investment and innovation. Identifying effective policy responses to climate change requires governments to adopt an agile approach, regularly evaluating and improving regulations to respond to evolving challenges and opportunities. Despite recent efforts, *ex post* evaluation remains an underdeveloped practice among OECD countries, particularly in the area of environmental impacts. Only 7 out of 38 OECD countries (18%) undertake any *ex post* review of regulations to assess whether they align with national or international environmental sustainability goals (Figure 8.19), and only 3 (8%) do this for regularly for all or major laws. Iterative and flexible *ex post* evaluation cycles enable governments to ensure regulations remain fit-for-purpose amidst rapid climate change and advancing technologies, through continuous review and adjustment through feedback loops. However, only 7 out of 38 OECD countries (18%) have undertaken a principle-based review to assess the impacts of existing regulations on environmental sustainability in recent years (Online Figure J.5.5).

Methodology and definitions

The Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) Survey draws on responses from central government officials. The survey is based on the practices described in the *2012 OECD Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance*. In 2024, 39 OECD Members responded to the survey. The data covers primary laws and subordinate regulations initiated by the executive. Subordinate regulations can be approved by the head of government, a minister or the cabinet. More information on iREG at https://doi.org/10.1787/5jrnwqm3zp43-en.

Principle-based reviews, use a principle (e.g. administrative burdens or effect of regulation on competition) as an initial filter to identify which regulations warrant review or potential reform.

Further reading

OECD (2025), *OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/56b60e39-en.

OECD (2023), *Better Regulation for the Green Transition*, OECD Public Governance Policy Papers, No. 40, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c91a04bc-en.

Arndt, C. et al. (2015), "2015 Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance: Design, Methodology and Key Results", *OECD Regulatory Policy Working Papers*, No. 1, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5jrnwqm3zp43-en.

Figure notes

Data are based on 38 OECD Members. Data reflects the situation as of 2024.

Figure 8.18. Refers to the question "When developing regulation, are regulators required to include assessments of the following: Impact on environment?" Most primary laws are initiated by the executive in the majority of OECD countries, except for Austria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, France, Korea, Lithuania, Mexico and Portugal, where a higher share of primary laws are initiated by the legislature. Türkiye and the United States, where all primary laws are initiated by the legislature, are excluded from measures related to primary laws.

Figure 8.19. Refers to the question "Are *ex post* evaluations required to assess consistency with national or international environmental sustainability goals?"

Figure J.5.5 (Principle-based reviews of regulations related to environmental sustainability, 2024) is available online in Annex J.

Figure 8.18. Extent to which impacts on the environment are assessed systematically, by type of impact



Source: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) Survey 2024.

StatLink https://stat.link/nctlvz

Figure 8.19. Extent of *ex post* evaluation of environmental impacts, 2024



Source: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) Survey 2024.

StatLink https://stat.link/yft0hd

Chapter 9. Budgeting practices

9.1. Medium-term and top-down budgeting

Medium-term and top-down budgeting are two cornerstones of modern budgeting. Medium-term budgeting is designed to bring a multi-annual perspective to the budget process, helping policy makers consider the future fiscal implications of immediate policy decisions and provide greater predictability about the future availability and allocation of resources. The top-down approach aims to maintain fiscal discipline and ensure that budgets align with the government's fiscal strategy and policy priorities.

According to the OECD Spending Better Framework (OECD, 2023), the effective implementation of medium-term and top-down budgeting requires setting multi-annual expenditure ceilings to define future spending levels and prioritise fiscally responsible expenditure. Ideally, the ceilings should be binding for at least the first two years and assigned to each ministry to foster ownership and accountability. Ceilings for later years may be aggregated and become more indicative. Multi-annual expenditure ceilings should either be aligned with the government's term of office or updated annually on a rolling basis.

Most of the OECD countries that responded to the 2023 OECD Senior Budget Officials Survey on Budget Frameworks use such multi-annual top-down expenditure ceilings (26 out of 36 survey respondent countries, 72%). Of the ten countries which do not, seven use expenditure ceilings only for the upcoming budget year and instead rely on forecasts to anticipate fiscal developments and inform planning decisions. The remaining three countries do not use top-down expenditure ceilings at all (Figure 9.1).

OECD countries use a variety of practices to set their expenditure ceilings. Most of those with multi-annual expenditure ceilings set them for a 3-5 year period (25 out of 26 countries, 96%) and have binding ceilings for at least the upcoming budget year (22 out of 26, 85%). Of these, nine use binding ceilings over the full period of the medium-term framework, while three use them only for a two-year period. Slightly more than half the countries (14 out of 26, 54%) use only indicative ceilings beyond the upcoming budget year (Figure 9.2).

Most OECD countries with multi-annual expenditure ceilings use a rolling medium-term framework (20 out of 26 countries, 77%), meaning that each year the ceiling is extended by one year to include the next outer year. Six countries (23%) use a fixed period framework, meaning that new ceilings are set only once the initial set period has been completed. A majority of OECD countries with top-down expenditure ceilings set them at the organisational level, such as line ministries or agencies (19 out of 26, 73%). Only one country solely uses aggregate ceilings for the entire period covered by the expenditure ceilings (Figure 9.2).

Methodology and definitions

Data are derived from the 2023 OECD Senior Budget Officials Survey on Budget Frameworks, encompassing responses from 36 OECD countries, and referring only to central/ federal government practices as of end-February 2023. Respondents were predominantly senior budget officials within central budget authorities. Responses represent the country's own assessment of current practices and procedures.

Medium-term budgeting refers to budgeting for multiple years (usually 3-5 years), as opposed to focusing solely on the upcoming fiscal year. Top-down budgeting refers to defining spending limits based on the economic forecast, estimates of future spending on current policies (baselines) and the government's fiscal objectives, before considering bottom-up budget requests.

Top-down expenditure ceilings refer to setting an upper limit on the level of government expenditure, whether for multiple years or the annual budget. Ceilings can be set for 1) different areas of expenditure such as overall/total, other aggregate (e.g. programme or sector), organisational and/or other level; and 2) different periods.

Further reading

Moretti, D., A. Keller and M. Majercak (2023), "Medium-term and top-down budgeting in OECD countries", *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, Vol. 23/3, https://doi.org/10.1787/39425570-en.

OECD (2023), *OECD Spending Better Framework*, OECD, Paris, updated 1 December 2023, GOV/SBO(2022)6/REV1.

Figure notes

Australia, Belgium and Italy do not use top-down expenditure ceilings as part of their budget systems. Australia and Belgium publish multi-annual expenditure forecasts that are not ceilings in nature. In Italy, legislation authorises the use of expenditure ceilings, but they have not yet been used in practice. Data for Lithuania and Mexico are not available.

Figure 9.1. Chile, Norway and Spain use binding top-down expenditure ceilings for the upcoming budget year, while for Costa Rica, Japan, Korea and Luxembourg they are solely indicative.

Figure 9.2. T1 is the upcoming budget year. Refers only to the 26 OECD countries with multi-annual top-down expenditure ceilings and shows how long binding or indicative ceilings apply and at what level (granularity). Data for Portugal on the granularity level of the multi-annual indicative expenditure ceilings are not available. Further explanations on country-specific details (letters a to q) are available in the via the StatLink.

Figure 9.1. Top-down expenditure ceilings in budgeting, 2023



Source: OECD (2023), SBO Survey on Budget Frameworks.

StatLink https://stat.link/j0ckxr

Figure 9.2. Type, length and level of multi-annual top-down expenditure ceilings, 2023

Country	Time period						Level of ceilings (granularity)				Operationalisation
	Duration	Upcoming budget year	2-years	3-years	4-years	≥ 5-years	Total expenditure level	Organisational level	Programme level	Other	
Austria	4-years						T1+3	T1			Rolling basis
Canada	5-years								T1+4		Rolling basis
Colombia	4-years									T1+3 (a)	Rolling basis
Czechia	3-years						T1+2	T1+2	T1+2		Rolling basis
Denmark	4-years									T1+3 (b)	Rolling basis
Estonia	4-years							T1+3		T1+3 (c)	Rolling basis
Finland	4-years						T1+3	T1+3 (d)			Fixed period
France (e)	3-years						T1+2	T1+2	T1+2		Rolling basis
Germany	4-years						T1+3	T1+3		T1+3 (f)	Rolling basis
Greece	4-years							T1+3			Rolling basis
Hungary	3-years							T1+2			Rolling basis
Iceland	5-years						T1	T1	T1+4 (g)		Rolling basis
Ireland	3-years						T1+2	T1+2	T1		Rolling basis
Israel	4-years						T1+3	T1+3	T1		Rolling basis
Latvia	3-years						T1+2		T1		Rolling basis
Netherlands	4-years						T1+3	T1+3			Fixed period
New Zealand (h)	4-years									T1+3 (i)	Rolling basis
Poland	3-years						T1+2	T1+2	T1+2		Rolling basis
Portugal (j)	4-years						T1	T1	T1		Rolling basis
Slovak Republic	4-years						T1+3	T1+2			Fixed period
Slovenia	4-years						T1+2	T1+1	T1+3	T1+1 (k)	Fixed period
Sweden	3-years						T1+2			(l)	Rolling basis
Switzerland	4-years						T1+3				Rolling basis
Türkiye	3-years						T1+2 (m)	T1+2			Rolling basis
United Kingdom (n)	5-years						T1+4	T1+1	(o)		Fixed period
United States	10-years (p)						T1+9	T1+9	T1+9 (q)		Fixed period
	OECD Total						**OECD Total**				**OECD Total**
3-years	8						19	19	12	7	Rolling basis: 20
4-years	14										Fixed period: 6
5-years	3										
> 5-years	1										

Binding
Indicative

Source: OECD (2023), SBO Survey on Budget Frameworks.

StatLink https://stat.link/pkgm4a

9.2. Performance budgeting

Performance budgeting is an important budgeting tool allowing countries to allocate and prioritise resources more effectively by linking them to measurable outcomes. It enhances accountability and transparency, and cultivates a performance-oriented culture that strengthens public service delivery.

In 2023, 28 out of the 33 OECD countries that responded to the OECD Performance Budgeting Survey (85%) implemented some form of performance budgeting. The most common approach is performance-informed budgeting, used by 14 out of 33 countries (42%), where performance information is included in budget documents alongside financial information to inform budget decisions. Seven out of 33 countries (21%) use a presentational approach, in which performance information is provided as background material, separate from the main budget document. The same number of countries (7) use a managerial approach, using performance data primarily for performance management at the organisational level. This approach often emphasises understanding the underlying reasons for any shortfalls, rather than imposing automatic funding cuts (Figure 9.3).

Performance information is used for a variety of purposes. Just over two-thirds of OECD countries that implement performance budgeting (20 out of 28, 71%) use performance information to inform annual resource allocations, and 16 out of 28 countries (57%) use it to guide managerial decisions. Notably, only about one-third of countries (9 out of 28, 32%) use this information to inform multi-year budget planning (Figure 9.4).

OECD countries use a variety of internal accountability mechanisms to strengthen the impact of performance budgeting by ensuring high-quality data are available for decision making. Almost 80% of countries (22 out of 28) that implement performance budgeting engage in regular discussions between finance ministries and line ministries to improve the quality of performance information. In 13 countries (46%), a senior official must sign off the performance information included in budget documents, adding a layer of supervision and responsibility. In 9 countries (32%), line ministries are subject to specific measures if targets are missed. These might include increased scrutiny, or there might be consequences for future budget allocations (Table 9.1).

External accountability and transparency are supported by the widespread publication of performance reports, with 24 out of 28 OECD countries (86%) making such information publicly available.

One emerging practice is the use of interactive web-based dashboards, used by 12 countries (43%). These allow external users to explore performance information in a visual format, and quickly assess which targets have been met or missed. Parliament also plays a crucial role in reinforcing accountability. In 19 countries (68%), elements related to performance budgeting are regularly reported to parliament, while 9 countries (32%) hold parliamentary committee hearings and 8 countries (29%) conduct parliamentary debates that make use of performance budgeting information. However, structured engagement with civil society remains minimal, with only three countries (11%) reporting such initiatives (Table 9.1).

Methodology and definitions

Data are derived from the 2023 OECD Performance Budgeting Survey, encompassing responses from 33 OECD countries, and referring only to central/ federal government practices as of end-August 2023. Respondents were predominantly senior budget officials. Responses represent the countries' own assessments of current practices and procedures.

Performance budgeting is defined as the systematic use of performance information to inform budget decisions, either as a direct input to budget allocation decisions or as contextual information to inform budget planning. Its purpose is to increase transparency and accountability throughout the budget process by providing information to government officials, legislators and the public on the purposes of spending and the results achieved.

Further reading

Tryggvadottir, Á. and I. Bambalaite (2024), "OECD performance budgeting framework", *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, Vol. 23/3, https://doi.org/10.1787/247e9dcb-en.

OECD (forthcoming), *2023 OECD Performance Budgeting Survey: Highlights*.

Figure notes

Figure 9.3, Figure 9.4, and Table 9.1. Data for Colombia, Ireland, Israel, Italy and Japan are not available.

Figure 9.4 and Table 9.1. Data only cover countries that implement performance budgeting.

Figure 9.3. Use of performance budgeting approaches, 2023



Source: OECD (2023), Performance Budgeting Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/k7ao1p

Figure 9.4. Use of performance information in decision making, 2023



Source: OECD (2023), Performance Budgeting Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/3o142x

Table 9.1. Internal and external accountability tools for performance budgeting, 2023

Country	Internal accountability				External accountability					
	Discussions between line ministries and the finance ministry on the quality of performance information	Monitoring and reporting mechanisms	Sign-off by a high-level official	Specific consequences if targets are not met	Publication of performance reports	Regular reporting to parliament	Use of interactive online dashboards	Parliamentary committee hearings	Parliamentary debate	Structured engagement with civil society
Australia			●		●			●		
Austria	●	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	
Belgium										
Canada	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Chile	●	●		●	●	●				●
Denmark		●	●		●					
Estonia	●	●	●		●	●	●			
Finland	●	●			●	●				
France	●	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	
Germany	●									
Greece	●		●		●				●	
Iceland	●	●			●		●			
Korea	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		●	
Latvia	●	●		●	●		●			
Lithuania		●	●	●	●	●		●		
Mexico	●	●		●	●	●	●			●
Netherlands	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●
New Zealand	●		●		●	●		●	●	
Norway	●	●			●	●				
Poland					●	●				
Slovak Republic		●					●			
Slovenia	●					●				
Spain	●	●			●					
Sweden	●				●	●				
Switzerland	●	●			●	●		●		
Türkiye	●	●	●		●	●			●	
United Kingdom	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
United States	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
OECD Total										
● Yes	22	20	13	9	24	19	12	9	8	3

Source: OECD (2023), Performance Budgeting Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/1qxien

9.3. Spending reviews

Spending reviews support the sustainability of public finances through systematic analyses of existing expenditures. They help governments to manage their overall level of expenditure, identify savings or reallocation measures to fund new priorities, and improve effectiveness within programmes and policies. While there are differences in their design and implementation across countries, key elements that contribute to successful outcomes include clear objectives and scope, strong political leadership and commitment, and a direct link with the budget process (Tryggvadottir, 2022).

The 2023 OECD Survey on Spending Reviews showed that almost all OECD countries (34 out of the 35 OECD countries that responded, 97%) are conducting or have conducted at least one spending review, compared to 31 of the 37 (84%) OECD countries responding in 2020 (OECD, 2021). The six OECD countries that have since introduced spending reviews are Belgium, Costa Rica, Czechia, Hungary, Slovenia and Switzerland. The increase reflects the interest in using spending reviews as a tool to improve fiscal discipline and the sustainability of public finances. By 2023, more than half of OECD countries were conducting spending reviews annually (20 out of 35, 57%), while 9 conducted them periodically (26%) and 5 had only conducted pilot reviews (14%) (Figure 9.5).

Spending reviews have become a core instrument for prioritising and reallocating expenditure, and a permanent feature of the budget process in many OECD countries. Their objectives vary depending on the needs and goals of governments and countries commonly use them to pursue multiple objectives simultaneously. For example, a majority of countries (24 out of 30 OECD countries with available information, 80%) identified improving the effectiveness of programmes and policies as a key objective of spending reviews. Controlling total expenditure was a key objective for 16 (53%), while 12 (40%) reported using them to align expenditure with government priorities. These multiple objectives reflect the flexibility of spending reviews, which can be tailored to meet countries' changing economic conditions and specific circumstances (Figure 9.6).

Aligning the review process with the budget cycle is crucial if spending reviews are to have a meaningful impact. Two-thirds (22 out of 33) of the OECD countries that answered to the survey state that the recommendations from the review are presented before the formulation of the budget begins to inform the budget negotiations. In 13 countries (39%), the recommendations are adopted and integrated into the upcoming budget and 7 countries (21%) included them in their multi-annual budget planning (Figure 9.7).

Political leadership and commitment are crucial to defining the objective and scope of spending reviews, adopting policy options, and making decisions based on the review findings. In 2023, cabinets were involved in setting the objectives and scope in 15 out of 32 OECD countries with information available (47%). In slightly more than half of the countries (17, 53%), the cabinet made the final decision on adopting spending review recommendations (Online Tables J.6.1 and J.6.2).

Methodology and definitions

Data are derived from the 2023 OECD Spending Review Survey, encompassing responses from 35 OECD countries and referring only to central/federal government practices as of end-August 2023. Respondents were predominantly senior budget officials. Responses represent the countries' own assessments of current practices and procedures.

Spending reviews are tools to systematically analyse existing government expenditure. They should be clearly linked to the budget process. The purposes of a spending review include enabling the government to manage the aggregate level of expenditure, identifying savings and reallocation measures, aligning expenditure to the priorities of the government, and improving the effectiveness of programmes and policies.

Further reading

Tryggvadottir, Á. (2022), "OECD best practices for spending reviews", *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, Vol. 22/1, https://doi.org/10.1787/90f9002c-en.

OECD (2021), *Government at a Glance 2021*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1c258f55-en.

OECD (forthcoming), *2023 OECD Spending Review Survey: Highlights*.

Figure notes

Data for Israel, Japan and Türkiye are not available.

Figure 9.6. Data only cover countries that implement spending reviews. Data for Canada, Colombia, Hungary and Luxembourg are not available.

Figure 9.7. Data only cover countries that implement spending reviews. "Other" includes, but is not limited to, using spending review results to inform top-down expenditure ceilings. In Austria, Costa Rica, and Czechia, spending reviews are not formally linked to the budget process. Data for Colombia are not available.

Table J.6.1 (Entities involved in determining the objective and scope of spending reviews, 2023) and Table J.6.2 (Entities involved in the final decision on adopting spending review recommendations, 2023) are available online in Annex J.

Figure 9.5. Use of spending reviews, 2023



Source: OECD (2023), Spending Review Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/mus97t

Figure 9.6. Main objectives of spending reviews over the past three years, 2023



Source: OECD (2023), Spending Review Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/th3vzp

Figure 9.7. Integration of spending reviews into the budget process, 2023



Source: OECD (2023), Spending Review Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/wq1tp0

9.4. Independent fiscal institutions

Governments face difficult choices when managing public finances. They must balance the immediate needs of their citizens with long-term challenges, such as ageing populations and climate change. This balancing act is made more difficult by pressures to prioritise short-term gains over long-term sustainability. Independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) can play a crucial role in empowering public understanding of these issues by communicating complex fiscal issues in a clear and accessible way and helping citizens understand the trade-offs involved in different policy choices. This can, in turn, generate political will for reforms that promote long-term fiscal sustainability.

IFIs are independent, non-partisan bodies that provide objective analysis of fiscal policies. The number of IFIs surged following the global financial crisis, with most OECD countries (29 out of 38, 76%) now having established at least one IFI (Figure 9.8).

The 2024 OECD Fiscal Advocacy Index assesses the extent to which IFIs fulfil the role of fiscal advocates, (i.e. institutions that champion fiscal sustainability). The index evaluates 35 national IFIs across four dimensions: *independence, analytical focus, communications apparatus and communications impact*. A higher score indicates a greater capacity for fiscal advocacy. The average score for IFIs across the OECD is 1.8 out of a maximum possible value of 4 (Figure 9.9).

This indicates that, while some elements are in place, many IFIs still have room to increase their capacity for fiscal advocacy. IFIs score highest in terms of independence and communications apparatus, averaging scores of 0.6 out of a possible value of 1 in both dimensions. Communications impact is still in the early stages of development across most OECD countries, achieving the lowest average score of any dimension (0.14 out of 1).

The Institutions at the top of the index – Canada's Parliamentary Budget Office, the Netherlands' Central Planning Bureau, the United Kingdom's Office for Budget Responsibility and the United States' Congressional Budget Office – stand out for their effective communications impact. They achieve the highest scores in this dimension, ranging from 0.62 to 0.68. Others have a more limited focus or struggle to reach a wide audience. Larger IFIs with an official role in producing economic or fiscal forecasts have a natural advantage, as their work often attracts more interest due to these responsibilities. However, smaller IFIs with narrower remits do still have the potential to produce influential analysis that enhances the public debate. For instance, the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council scores 0.48 in this area (Figure 9.9).

One area where many IFIs could improve their fiscal advocacy score is their analytical focus. On average, IFIs across the OECD score 0.4 out of 1 on this dimension. Most IFIs do at least some of the analytical work core to a fiscal advocacy role. A majority of institutions (25 out of 35, 71%) cover long-term sustainability analysis, and just over two-fifths produce either macro or fiscal forecasts or both (15 out of 35, 43%). However, only a few IFIs produce dedicated fiscal risks reports (6 out of 35, 17%) and even fewer produce election costings (4 out of 35, 11%). This means that there is still substantial scope to broaden the work of IFIs and strengthen their capacity to be fiscal advocates (Figure 9.10).

Methodology and definitions

Data are primarily derived from the 2021 OECD Independent Fiscal Institutions Database and refer only to national institutions in OECD member countries. The database includes 35 national-level institutions in 29 OECD countries. Six countries have two independent fiscal institutions (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland and Portugal). The full dataset includes subnational IFIs, not covered by this analysis.

As a composite index, the 2024 OECD Fiscal Advocacy Index combines several indicators into a single score. Its four dimensions are equally weighted, each with a maximum value of 1, and comprise several variables. Institutional scores are the sum of the scores for each dimension, with a maximum value of 4. In 2024, new data relating to the *communications impact* dimension were developed using Google search and trends analysis (2021 to 2023). The other three dimensions are based on data from the 2021 OECD Independent Fiscal Institutions Database. The *communications apparatus* dimension of the index subsumes the 2021 OECD IFI Communications Index and measures the tools IFIs use to disseminate, promote and track their work. The remaining two dimensions relate to each institutions' *independence and analytical focus*, respectively. Further details on the index are available in Annex C.

Further reading

OECD (forthcoming), *From Fiscal Watchdogs to Fiscal Advocates: Creating Champions of Fiscal Sustainability*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD (2014), "Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0401.

Figure notes

Figure 9.9 and Figure 9.10. Data refer to 35 national IFIs in place in 29 OECD countries.

Figure 9.10. Shows a selection of the activities and functions that form the analytical focus dimension, but not all of the variables covered by the dimension.

Figure 9.8. Existence of independent fiscal institutions, 2021



Source: OECD Independent Fiscal Institutions Database (2021).

StatLink https://stat.link/5vf84n

Figure 9.9. OECD Fiscal Advocacy Index, 2024



Source: OECD Independent Fiscal Institutions Database (2021) and OECD calculations of communications impact (2021-23).

StatLink https://stat.link/pbn0s8

Figure 9.10. IFI analytical activities and functions, 2021



Source: OECD Independent Fiscal Institutions Database (2021).

StatLink https://stat.link/azvydb

Chapter 10. Infrastructure planning and delivery

10.1. Management of asset performance throughout the life cycle

Investing in infrastructure has long-term implications, making careful planning and execution critical. As crises, including those driven by climate change, become more frequent, infrastructure investment faces increasing pressure to perform. The OECD Recommendation on the Governance of Infrastructure emphasises how a life cycle approach can optimise assets and ensure whole-of-life performance. Efficient management of assets during their planning, construction, operation, maintenance and decommissioning is key to achieving value for money and strengthening resilience.

The OECD Infrastructure Governance Indicator (IGI) on asset performance management provides an overview of the key elements needed for a life cycle approach: *policies and tools for asset management, accountability and professionalisation,* and *financial management*. On average, OECD countries score 0.61 (on a scale from 0 to 1), with individual scores ranging from 0.14 to 0.85 (Figure 10.1). Although countries generally demonstrate good practices in financial management, there is still room to improve in the areas of policies and tools, and accountability and professionalisation.

A key element of optimising life cycle performance is accurately assessing the costs and benefits of design features in investment decisions. This requires methodologies that capture an asset's costs and benefits across its whole life cycle. For example, a comprehensive life-cycle costing (LCC) approach takes into consideration the costs of mitigating external environmental impacts in addition to costs over the entire life cycle. Most OECD countries with information available (26 out of 33, 79%) include sustainability savings (e.g. lower energy use, social and environmental impacts) in life cycle cost calculations. However, only 12 out of 33 countries (36%) systematically factor in full life cycle costs (including operation, maintenance, and possible decommissioning costs) when appraising all projects, while 19 (58%) only do this for some (Table 10.1).

There are more tools countries could adopt to help optimise assets' performance across their life cycle. For instance, only about one-quarter of countries with information available (8 out of 33, 24%) require asset management plans under law or regulation. The absence of such long-term plans may risk organisations prioritising short-term gains over long-term sustainability and affect cost optimisation and quality of service. Similarly, only eight countries have fixed asset registers covering all government assets, while ten (30%) have no centralised register at all (Table 10.1). Countries can also leverage on Public-Private Partnership models to ensure assets are maintained throughout their life and performance optimised. Furthermore, innovative funding instruments can support investment in infrastructure maintenance, e.g. user charges and fees, grants and subsidies (29 or 88% each), long-term revenue generation from existing assets, new forms or applications of taxes (14 or 42% each), and land value capture instruments (11 or 33%) (see Online Figure J.7.1).

To fully benefit from these tools, assets' performance needs to be monitored for their whole life cycle. Continuous monitoring enhances infrastructure resilience by increasing accountability and enabling resilience measures to be adopted early. Although most OECD countries (24 out of 33, 73%) continually monitor asset performance, only 17 (52%) use predefined service delivery targets and expected outcomes for this monitoring. Only 11 countries (33%) evaluate the impact of infrastructure on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) after implementation (Table 10.1). For example, France has established transport observatories as tools for *ex post* assessment, which collect data, set benchmarks, and publish audits of transport projects.

Methodology and definitions

Data are drawn from the 2023 OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure, conducted in November 2023, with responses from 33 OECD countries. Israel, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovenia did not respond to the survey and data for Australia and Ireland are missing for some questions. The survey monitors policies and arrangements in place at the national/federal level during the survey implementation (from November 2023 until July 2024) and does not cover practices at subnational levels. However, due to difficulties in data collection at the federal level in Belgium, data is only available for Flanders. Respondents were predominantly senior officials in the central/federal ministries of infrastructure, public works and finance, as well as in infrastructure agencies and other line ministries. The index ranges from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest). For further information about the index see Annex D.

An asset management plan is a comprehensive long-term strategy for managing an organisation's infrastructure asset portfolio to achieve its strategic goals. It serves as a framework for integrating long-term strategic planning with operational and capital budgeting processes. Typically, asset management plans are developed for specific infrastructure services or activities, such as water supply, sewage disposal or road maintenance.

A fixed asset register is a documented list of fixed assets, i.e. produced assets used repeatedly or continuously in production processes for more than one year. Asset registers are often centralised and include a variety of information useful for the purposes of preparing financial statements, national and sectoral planning, and budgeting for maintenance.

Further reading

OECD (2020), "Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Infrastructure", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0460.

OECD (2021), "Building resilience: New strategies for strengthening infrastructure resilience and maintenance", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 5, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/354aa2aa-en.

OECD (2025 forthcoming), "Management of assets throughout their life cycle, evidence from the Infrastructure Governance Indicators", *OECD Public Governance Working Papers*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Figure notes

Figure 10.1. Complete data are not available for Australia and Ireland. Only the sub-pillars with complete data are included (countries with incomplete data are not included in the OECD average).

Figure J.7.1 (Funding instruments available to support investment in infrastructure maintenance, 2023) is available online in Annex J.

Figure 10.1. Index of asset performance management, 2023



Source: OECD (2023), Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure.

StatLink https://stat.link/1q4xm8

Table 10.1. Policies and tools for a life cycle approach to asset performance management, 2023

Country	Inclusion of sustainability savings in the calculation of life cycle costs	Integration of life cycle costs in project appraisal and selection	Requirement for asset management plans	Centralised fixed asset registers	Continual monitoring of asset performance	*Ex post* evaluation of the impact of infrastructure on SDGs
Australia	✓	○	✓	×	▲	×
Austria	✓	○	✓	×	▲	×
Belgium (Flanders)	×	○	×	□	△	×
Canada	✓	○	×	■	▲	×
Chile	×	●	×	×	▲	×
Colombia	✓	●	×	■	▲	✓
Costa Rica	✓	●	×	■	△	✓
Czechia	✓	○	×	■	×	×
Denmark	✓	○	×	□	△	×
Estonia	✓	○	✓	■	▲	×
Finland	✓	●	×	■	▲	×
France	✓	●	×	×	▲	✓
Germany	✓	●	×	□	×	×
Greece	✓	●	×	□	△	×
Hungary	✓	○	×	■	▲	×
Iceland	✓	×	×	■	△	×
Ireland	✓	●	×	×	▲	✓
Italy	✓	○	×	□	▲	✓
Japan	×	○	✓	□	×	✓
Korea	✓	○	✓	□	▲	✓
Lithuania	✓	●	×	□	▲	×
Luxembourg	×	×	×	×	×	×
Mexico	×	○	×	×	×	✓
New Zealand	✓	○	✓	×	×	✓
Norway	✓	○	×	□	▲	×
Poland	✓	○	×	□	×	×
Slovak Republic	✓	○	×	□	▲	×
Spain	×	○	×	□	△	×
Sweden	✓	●	×	×	△	✓
Switzerland	✓	○	×	□	▲	×
Türkiye	×	○	×	□	×	×
United Kingdom	✓	●	✓	×	▲	×
United States	✓	●	✓	□	×	✓
OECD Total						
✓ Yes	26		8			11
× No	7	2	25	10	9	22
● For all projects		12				
○ For certain projects		19				
■ Covering all government fixed assets				8		
□ Covering most government fixed assets				15		
▲ Monitored against predefined service delivery targets and expected outcomes					17	
△ Monitored, but not against predefined delivery targets and expected outcomes					7	

Source: OECD (2023), Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure.

StatLink https://stat.link/85arib

10.2. Ensuring the resilience of critical infrastructure

Critical infrastructure refers to the systems, assets and networks essential for the economy and public well-being. Disruptions to services like telecommunications, water, energy, transportation or finance can have a severe impact on citizens and the economy, often extending beyond the affected sector. A system-based, all-hazards approach to infrastructure resilience is crucial for maintaining service continuity in the face of various threats. The OECD Recommendations on Infrastructure and Critical Risks emphasise the importance of governance that aims to limit service disruptions and enhance the capacity to recover from shocks.

The OECD Infrastructure Governance Indicator (IGI) assesses key governance elements for enhancing critical infrastructure resilience: *multi-sector governance*; *interdependencies and vulnerabilities*; *trust and secure information sharing*; *partnerships for a common resilience vision*; *policy mix, tools and incentives*; *accountability and monitoring*; and *transboundary co-operation*. On average, the 23 OECD countries with data available score 0.59 (on a scale from 0 to 1), with individual scores ranging from 0.32 to 0.83 (Figure 10.2). Although countries have made progress in establishing multi-sector governance and addressing cross-border issues, they could still improve their use of policy tools to prioritise cost-effective measures throughout the infrastructure life cycle.

Building resilience requires a whole-of-government systems approach, prioritising the most critical components and addressing the weak points that create critical vulnerabilities for the entire system. Infrastructure assets are usually just a part of a wider system, which should be considered in its entirety in a comprehensive resilience strategy. Most countries have such an instrument in place in some form: 14 out of 23 (61%) have a national policy, strategy or programme; 6 (26%) have a policy established in legislation; and 2 (9%) have a policy enshrined in a wider set of sectoral policies (Figure 10.3).

The types of hazards faced by critical infrastructure are constantly evolving. Climate risks and other natural hazards, digital threats, and security risks can all disrupt services with far-reaching socio-economic consequences. In this dynamic risk landscape, a comprehensive resilience policy must adopt an all-hazards approach to critical infrastructure resilience to ensure more resilient infrastructure. In 18 out of 23 OECD countries (78%), the policy on critical infrastructure resilience addresses all hazards and threats (Figure 10.3).

Strengthening critical infrastructure resilience relies on partnerships and platforms that enable information sharing between governments and infrastructure operators. These collaborations build trust and support ongoing exchanges of knowledge, joint exercises, situational awareness, co-ordinated actions, mutual assistance, and sharing of equipment and emergency supplies. In the OECD, 70% of countries (19 out of 27 with data available) have laws or policies on the sharing of information on the risks and vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure (see Online Figure J.7.2). Information-sharing mechanisms vary and include dedicated government platforms, broader platforms and regular face-to-face meetings.

Methodology and definitions

Data are drawn from the Survey on Critical Infrastructure Resilience conducted in 2022-23, with responses from 23 OECD countries. Respondents were government officials with responsibility for critical infrastructure resilience or protection at the central government level. Survey responses were co-ordinated by senior government officials with responsibility for disaster risk or crisis management and included experts in critical infrastructure. The IGI on governance of critical infrastructure resilience is composed of seven sub-pillars each with an equal weight (14%). The overall index ranges from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest).

An all-hazards forward-looking approach to critical infrastructure resilience and security complements hazard-specific approaches while enabling policy makers and operators to better prepare for the unexpected.

Further reading

OECD (2020), "Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Infrastructure", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0460.

OECD (2019), *Good Governance for Critical Infrastructure Resilience*, OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/02f0e5a0-en.

OECD (2014), "Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Critical Risks", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0405.

Figure notes

Figure 10.2. The index is only calculated for countries with complete information.

Figure J.7.2 (Existence of legislation, regulations or policies for information-sharing about risks or vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure, 2022) is available online in Annex J.

Figure 10.2. Index of governance of critical infrastructure resilience, 2022



Source: OECD (2022), Survey on Critical Infrastructure Resilience.

StatLink https://stat.link/txbpqg

Figure 10.3. Policy instrument dedicated to critical infrastructure resilience, 2022



Source: OECD (2022), Survey on Critical Infrastructure Resilience.

StatLink https://stat.link/ietk0b

Figure 10.4. Hazards and threats addressed by the policy on critical infrastructure resilience, 2022



Source: OECD (2022), Survey on Critical Infrastructure Resilience.

StatLink https://stat.link/uzg42w

10.3. Delivering climate-resilient infrastructure

Infrastructure is increasingly vulnerable to climate change, leading to widespread failures and damages. Economic losses from climate-related extreme events rose sevenfold from USD 198 billion in the 1970s to USD 1.6 trillion in the 2010s, with infrastructure suffering much of the damage (OECD, 2024). As climate risks intensify, the sort of risks infrastructure assets will face will change over the course of their lifespans. To mitigate these risks, infrastructure providers must plan for improved performance as climate threats increase. Countries need to take a holistic approach to designing, building, operating and maintaining infrastructure that accounts for evolving risks. The OECD Recommendation on Infrastructure Governance urges governments to strengthen their strategies for delivering climate-resilient infrastructure.

An outcome-focused approach to planning and delivering climate-resilient infrastructure ensures that decisions made throughout the infrastructure life cycle align with long-term resilience goals. Regular monitoring and reporting on progress are essential for evidence-based decision making and accountability. While 21 of the 32 OECD countries with available information (66%) have set climate resilience outcomes for infrastructure assets, only 7 of the 31 with data for this measure (23%) report on progress annually or biennially (Figure 10.5). This highlights a gap in tracking and communicating results, which is crucial for achieving resilience goals. A good example is Canada's National Adaptation Strategy which includes a 2050 goal to achieve climate-resilient infrastructure systems that undergo continuous adaptation to adjust for future impacts to deliver reliable, equitable, and sustainable services to all of society. The Strategy also establishes targets to measure and track progress and includes a commitment to develop progress reports midway through the Strategy's implementation cycles.

While there is a growing recognition of the importance of climate resilience outcomes, the use of these outcomes in the appraisal of projects is still in its infancy. For example, only 9 of the 32 OECD countries with available data (28%) conduct comparative assessments of alternative infrastructure solutions based on climate resilience (Figure 10.6). The Swedish Transport Administration uses a methodology to compare the levels of climate resilience of different transport solutions within the available economic resources and as part of sustainable development of the whole transport system.

Similarly, less than half of OECD countries with available data (14 out of 31, 45%) evaluate and monetise the costs and benefits of climate disaster resilience in infrastructure projects and only 10 (32%) use the results to inform project selection and prioritisation (Figure 10.7). The New Zealand Transport Agency has developed a methodology to assess and monetise the resilience of transport infrastructure, focusing on benefits, which are more complex to evaluate than costs. It values resilience in terms of avoided disruption costs, including user-related costs (e.g. diversions and delays), direct costs (e.g. injuries and repairs) and indirect impacts (e.g. effects on non-users, disaster preparedness and economic benefits).

Methodology and definitions

Data are drawn from the 2023 OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure, conducted in November 2023, with responses from 33 OECD countries. Israel, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovenia did not respond to the survey and data for Australia and Japan are missing for some questions. The survey monitors policies and arrangements in place at the national/federal level during the survey implementation (from November 2023 until July 2024) and does not cover practices at subnational levels. However, due to difficulties in data collection at the federal level in Belgium, data is only available for Flanders. Respondents were predominantly senior officials in the central/federal ministries of infrastructure, public works and finance, as well as in infrastructure agencies and other line ministries.

Resilience is defined as the capacity of systems to absorb a disturbance, recover from disruptions and adapt to changing conditions while retaining essentially the same function as before the disruptive shock. This definition includes the ability to withstand shocks, sustain required operations, limit the duration of service interruption, minimise recovery time, adapt to new conditions and improve systems' functionality.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *Infrastructure for a Climate-Resilient Future*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a74a45b0-en.

OECD (2020), "Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Infrastructure", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0460.

Figure notes

Figure 10.5. Inner ring: establishment of climate resilience outcomes for infrastructure assets and networks; Outer ring: annual/biennial reporting on the progress made and results achieved on the climate resilience outcomes. .Data for Australia are not available. Data for Japan on reporting on the progress made and results achieved on climate resilience outcomes are not available.

Figure 10.6. Data for Australia are not available.

Figure 10.7. Data for Australia and Japan are not available. Since the completion of data collection, Canada has reported developing a methodology to quantify the costs associated with climate risks and the associated benefits of adaptation and resilience.

Figure 10.5. Climate resilience: Outcome setting and monitoring, 2023



Source: OECD (2023), Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure.

StatLink https://stat.link/iqc6mp

Figure 10.6. Assessment of alternative infrastructure solutions based on climate resilience, 2023



Source: OECD (2023), Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure.

StatLink https://stat.link/dblu0n

Figure 10.7. Valuation of the costs and benefits of climate disaster resilience in infrastructure, 2023



Source: OECD (2023), Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure.

StatLink https://stat.link/r8jibs

10.4. Evidence-informed infrastructure decision making

The OECD Recommendation on the Governance of Infrastructure emphasises the importance of systematic collection, storage and management of relevant data on the whole infrastructure life cycle at appropriate government levels (central or subnational). Evidence-informed decision making is crucial for delivering quality infrastructure and effectively and efficiently managing assets that are resilient to risks, such as climate-related risks. A strategic approach to evidence enhances the understanding of infrastructure trends and needs, improving long-term planning for investments and development. An evidence-based approach also increases the resilience of assets and enhances accountability and transparency in decision making across the life cycle of infrastructure projects.

Such evidence-informed decision making uses existing evidence and past analyses to generate new insights into the costs, benefits and effects of infrastructure projects, guiding future decisions. Most OECD countries with available data (28 out of 31, 90%) use cost-benefit analysis to appraise and select public-private partnerships (PPPs) or other infrastructure projects. These offer a simple logic, and generate clear quantitative values (i.e. net present values, benefit/cost ratios) that can be used to compare and rank projects. Methodologies such as multi-criteria analysis which can accommodate longer-term goals – such as environmental sustainability – are less widely used (18 out of 31, 58%) (Figure 10.8).

The OECD Infrastructure Governance Indicator (IGI) index on evidence-informed decision making gives an overview of the use of evidence in the transport sector during the strategic planning, project appraisal and impact analysis, procurement, and infrastructure management stages of projects. The average score across OECD countries is 0.65 out of a maximum of 1, with country scores ranging widely from 0.14 to 1 (Figure 10.9). Evidence is most widely used during project appraisal and impact analysis, while the most room for improvement is in its use during the procurement process.

Almost all OECD countries (29 out of 30 with available data, 97%) use *ex ante* analysis of past trends in infrastructure use in order to project needs. Most countries (26 out of 30, 87%) also assess the risks of systematic service disruptions, such as local or national disasters, to inform contingency planning. However, systematic and comprehensive *ex post* analysis is less common. Such analysis can be used to assess plans, project selection and delivery, and performance during operation. Many countries require *ex post* evaluation of transport projects, however, few actually enforce this requirement (ITF, 2017). This failure is often related to a lack of dedicated funding for *ex post* evaluation and limited availability of relevant data. For example, just over half of OECD countries (15 out of 29 with available data, 52%) use *ex post* analysis of previous transport master plans to inform current plans (Figure 10.10). The same number conduct systematic *ex post* analyses of contract performance, such as cost overruns and delays. However, only 13 (45%) use these analyses to inform future procurements (see Online Figure J.7.3). For successful *ex post* evaluation, it is recommended to, among other things, plan for data collection for evaluation needs from the outset and audit projects throughout the life cycle (ITF, 2017).

Methodology and definitions

Data are drawn from the 2020 and 2022 OECD Surveys on the Governance of Infrastructure. The 2020 survey was conducted in January 2021, with responses from 32 OECD countries. Denmark, France, Israel, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden did not respond to the survey and data for Czechia are missing for some questions. The 2022 Survey was conducted in May 2022, with responses from 31 OECD countries. Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United States did not respond to the survey and data for the Slovak Republic and Canada are missing for some questions. The surveys monitor policies and arrangements in place at the national/federal level during the survey implementation and do not cover practices at subnational levels. However, due to difficulties in data collection at the federal level in Belgium, data is only available for Flanders. Respondents were predominantly senior officials in the central/federal ministries of infrastructure, public works and finance, as well as in infrastructure agencies and other line ministries. The IGI on evidence-informed decision making is composed of four sub-pillars each with an equal weight (25%). The overall index ranges from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest). For further information about the index see Annex D.

Further reading

OECD (2020), "Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Infrastructure", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0460.

ITF (2017), *Ex-Post Assessment of Transport Investments and Policy Interventions*, ITF Roundtable Reports, No. 162, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789282108154-en.

Figure notes

Figure 10.8. Inner ring: use of cost-benefit analysis to assess PPPs or other infrastructure projects; Outer ring: use of multi-criteria analysis to assess PPPs or other infrastructure projects. Data for Czechia are not available.

Figure 10.9. The Slovak Republic does not have complete data for this indicator. For Canada, only the sub-pillars applicable at the federal level are shown. Only sub-pillars with complete data are included (countries with incomplete data are not included in the OECD average).

Figure 10.10. Inner ring: *ex ante* analysis of past trends on infrastructure use and projected needs; Middle ring: *ex ante* assessment of the risk of systematic service disruptions; Outer ring: *ex post* analysis of the transport master plan. *Ex post* analysis of the transport master plan is not applicable in Canada at the federal level.

Online Figure J.7.3 (Use of systematic *ex post* analysis of contract performance in the transport sector, 2022) is available online in Annex J.

Figure 10.8. Use of cost-benefit analysis and multi-criteria analysis to assess infrastructure projects, 2020



Source: OECD (2020), Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure.

StatLink https://stat.link/ifs073

Figure 10.9. Index of evidence-informed infrastructure decision making in the transport sector, 2022



Source: OECD (2022), Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure - Part IV: Promote evidence-informed decision making.

StatLink https://stat.link/3mv9sb

Figure 10.10. Analysis of past use and future projections to inform transport plans, 2022



Source: OECD (2022), Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure - Part IV: Promote evidence-informed decision making.

StatLink https://stat.link/428lsc

Chapter 11. Procurement

11.1. Size of public procurement

As a key activity for governments, public procurement of goods and services can play a major role in delivering public services, fostering public sector efficiency, and contributing to key governmental agendas like the digital transformation and the environmental agenda. Public procurement accounts for a large share of the taxpayers' money. All levels of government are expected to carry it out efficiently and with high standards of integrity to ensure the quality of service delivery and safeguard the public interest.

In 2023, public procurement expenditure as a share of GDP across the OECD stood at 12.7%, an increase from 12.2% in 2019, and a slight decrease from 13% in 2021. The same trend was seen across the OECD-EU countries, where public procurement expenditure as a share of GDP stood at 14.8% in 2023, 13.9% in 2019, and 15% in 2021 (Figure 11.1). The modest decline in the ratio to GDP from 2021 to 2023 was largely attributable to a more rapid increase in GDP relative to the growth in procurement spending.

On the other hand, public procurement relative to total government expenditures in 2023 remained at a similar level to that in 2019 (29.9%) but increased by 1.6 percentage points compared to 2021 (28.3%) across the OECD. Across the OECD-EU countries, public procurement expenditure as a share of total government expenditures in 2023 represented 30%, increasing by 0.2 percentage points compared to 2019 (29.8%) and 0.8 percentage points compared to 2021 (29.2%). The distribution of public procurement expenditure between the central government and sub-national governments has only slightly changed over the past five years, with 62.5% of OECD countries' procurement spending at sub-national levels in 2023, compared to 61.3% in 2021 (Online Figure J.8.1).

As public procurement is key to delivering public services, it is used across all spending functions of governments, from health to environmental protection, public order, and economic affairs (comprising infrastructure, transport, communication, energy, and R&D). As in previous years, health accounted for the largest share of public procurement spending, at 29.7% on average across OECD countries in 2023. This was followed by economic affairs (16.7%), education (11.4%), social protection (10.1%), and defence (9.9%). Belgium, Costa Rica, and Japan spent more than 43% of their public procurement expenditure in the health sector. Economic affairs represented more than 25% of public procurement spending in Latvia and Poland, as did social protection in the Netherlands (Table 11.1). Compared to 2019, public procurement spending increased only for public services (0.7 percentage points), health (0.5 percentage points), and public order and safety (0.2 percentage points) (Online Table J.8.1). However, compared to 2021, most spending functions saw slight increases in public procurement spending, except for health and economic affairs which fell by 2.1 and 0.2 percentage points respectively. This shows a dwindling influence of the COVID-19 pandemic and the measures to mitigate its effects, while efforts to rebuild are still underway. With an increasingly unstable geopolitical landscape and intensifying security challenges, notably in the EU, defence is starting to record an increase in public procurement spending by 0.4 percentage points since 2021.

Methodology and definitions

The size of general government procurement spending is estimated using data from the OECD National Accounts Statistics (database), based on the System of National Accounts (SNA). General government procurement is defined as the sum of intermediate consumption (goods and services purchased by governments for their use, such as accounting or information technology services), gross fixed capital formation (acquisition of capital excluding sales of fixed assets, such as building new roads) and social transfers in kind via market producers (purchases by general government of goods and services produced by market producers and supplied to households). Public corporations were excluded from the estimation of procurement spending. Data on general government procurement spending are disaggregated according to the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) in Table 11.1. Further information about the type of expenditures included in each category is available in Annex I.

Further reading

OECD (forthcoming), *Report on the Implementation of the 2015 OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement,* https://doi.org/10.1787/1de41738-en.

OECD (2019), *Reforming Public Procurement: Progress in Implementing the 2015 OECD Recommendation*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1de41738-en.

OECD (2015), "Recommendation of the Council on Public Procurement", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0411.

Figure notes

Figure 11.1. Data for Chile are not available. Data for Türkiye is not included in the OECD average. A large share of general government procurement in the Netherlands is spent on social transfers in kind via market producers, scholastic grants, and mandatory health insurance systems. Data for Türkiye are for 2020 rather than 2021. Data for Brazil refers to 2021 rather than 2023. Data for Indonesia refers to 2022 rather than 2023.

Table 11.1. Data for Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, New Zealand, and Türkiye is not available. Data for Colombia and Costa Rica are not included in the OECD average. The negative amount for the Slovak Republic in defence reflects disposals of fixed assets donated as foreign military aid. Data for Costa Rica refers to 2021 rather than 2023. Data for Korea refers to 2022 rather than 2023.

Table J.8.1 (Change in the structure of general government procurement spending by function, 2019 to 2023) and Figure J.8.1 (General government procurement spending by level of government, 2019 and 2023) are available online in Annex J.

Figure 11.1. General government procurement spending, 2019, 2021, and 2023



Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database). Data for Australia are based on a combination of Government finance statistics and National Accounts data provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.

StatLink https://stat.link/c85b9k

Table 11.1. General government procurement spending by function as percentage of total procurement spending, 2023

Country	General public services	Defence	Public order and safety	Economic affairs	Environmental protection	Housing and community amenities	Health	Recreation, culture and religion	Education	Social protection
Austria	11.8	1.6	2.8	22.5	1.2	0.7	35.8	3.8	8.8	11.1
Belgium	11.6	2.3	2.2	13.7	2.8	1.1	45	3	7.1	11.2
Colombia	12.8	2.9	6.1	16.8	4.8	3.9	13	5.3	14.1	20.4
Costa Rica	4.5	0	7.1	11	3.3	3.4	43.9	1.2	17	8.5
Czechia	6.8	4.9	4	20.4	4.5	4.3	35.8	4.8	8.9	5.5
Denmark	14.4	6.8	2.9	10.5	1.4	0.7	32	5	10.5	15.7
Estonia	9.1	12.7	3.6	18.4	3.5	1.7	26.5	6.5	14	4
Finland	14.6	3.6	2.4	13.8	0.6	1	22.9	4.7	13.3	23.1
France	7.7	6.4	2.8	13.5	4	4.2	37.7	4.5	6.3	13
Germany	12	3.3	3.1	13.3	2	1.1	37.6	3	7	17.8
Greece	14.7	7.3	1.8	16.8	5.5	2	33.6	3.8	6.8	7.8
Hungary	18.6	8.4	2.8	24.1	2.2	5.4	15.6	7.6	11.9	3.4
Iceland	10.5	0.1	4.1	18	2.9	2.4	26.4	9.3	17.6	8.5
Ireland	5.1	1.3	3.4	13	3	5.1	35.6	3.5	8.1	22.1
Israel	6	20.1	3.3	10.2	2.8	2.5	25.3	4.7	13	12.1
Italy	12.3	4	3.9	15	6.6	2.9	37.9	4.2	5.9	7.3
Japan	6.9	4.3	1.8	14.2	5.5	1.8	43.6	1.4	6.9	13.5
Korea	5.9	11	2.6	14.8	3.7	5.3	34.3	2.8	12.8	6.8
Latvia	6.2	6.9	7.8	27.1	1.8	5	19.7	4.2	15.3	6.2
Lithuania	7.1	12.8	3.1	17.4	3.2	4.1	28.1	5	11.8	7.6
Luxembourg	14.7	1.1	2.6	22.7	4.2	2.2	20.8	5.8	8.1	17.8
Netherlands	5.3	2.9	3.7	12.1	5.1	1.6	32.7	3.2	8.4	25.1
Norway	10.1	8	2.5	22.2	3.9	4.3	26.2	4.5	9.2	9.1
Poland	5.3	7.1	5.3	26.5	2.7	3.9	29.1	5.8	10.8	3.6
Portugal	13.1	3.1	2.7	20.5	3.9	3.8	34.3	4.6	9.7	4.3
Slovak Republic	10.6	-6.3	6	25	5.6	3.7	36.7	4.1	11.5	3.2
Slovenia	8.6	4.1	3.5	24.1	4.2	3.2	30.6	5.1	11.6	5.1
Spain	10.2	4	2.8	16.1	6.4	3.2	31.3	6.2	10.5	9.4
Sweden	10.8	6.9	3.1	16.6	2.1	2.8	22.3	4.2	16.9	14.3
Switzerland	22.1	6.6	5.8	15	3.9	1.5	1.7	2.8	19.2	21.5
United Kingdom	2.8	11.4	7.5	13.6	3.8	2.9	33.1	2.4	8.8	13.7
United States	12.4	18.9	6.4	20.4	0	2.2	16.9	1.5	17.7	3.7
OECD	9.8	9.9	4.3	16.7	2.7	2.5	29.7	2.8	11.4	10.1
OECD-EU	10.2	4.4	3.3	15.5	3.6	2.5	34.8	4.1	8.2	13.3
Bulgaria	5.4	5.6	3.8	23.1	4.8	8.1	34.8	3.2	9	2.2
Croatia	7.7	4.6	4.6	23.6	3.1	4.8	31.2	5.2	11.1	4.1
Romania	7.9	3.7	4.2	31.2	3.9	10.3	23.2	4.4	6.8	4.3

Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database); Eurostat Government finance statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/zhgwfp

11.2. Professionalisation of public procurement

The OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement calls upon countries to develop a procurement workforce with the capacity to deliver value for money efficiently and effectively. No longer just an administrative function, public procurement represents a key strategic element of public service, requiring technical expertise in law, market research and analysis, tender evaluation, and contract management, as well as soft skills including project management and negotiation. Accordingly, professionalising the procurement workforce should be a central priority in procurement reforms (OECD, 2023).

OECD countries are investing in professionalisation initiatives, such as the development of competency models and certification frameworks, recognising the procurement profession as a standalone function within the civil service, capacity-building activities, incentives, and collaboration with knowledge centres. In 2024, 19 out of 35 surveyed OECD countries (54%) reported having competency models for public procurement officials. The figure increased from 40% in 2020 to 50% in 2024 for 30 OECD countries with comparable data (Table 11.2). For instance, Latvia and Slovenia developed competency models by adapting the European Competency Framework (ProcurComp^{EU}) launched by the European Commission at the end of 2020 to support the professionalisation of public procurement.

Certification frameworks are also gaining traction, although they are not yet a common practice. Less than a third of OECD countries (11 out of 35, 31%) have such frameworks. This share has increased from 25% in 2020 to 31% in 2024 among 32 OECD countries for which data are available for both years (Table 11.2). In July 2022, for instance, Lithuania introduced its first-ever certification framework for the public procurement workforce, covering essential knowledge and skills such as legislation, market research, needs analysis, green public procurement, and socially responsible purchasing. Similarly, Norway launched a certification on sustainable public procurement in 2021, complementing its existing basic-level certificate. OECD countries are also implementing capacity-building initiatives, including training courses and methodological support through guidelines and manuals (in both cases, 97% of countries), help desks (86%), standard templates (80%), and lists of frequently asked questions (71%). More hands-on approaches like on-the-job training and mentoring remain less common, however (Figure 11.2).

Despite progress, gaps remain. In 2024, only 17 out of 35 OECD countries (49%) recognised public procurement as a standalone profession within the civil service job family (Figure 11.3), limiting opportunities for career growth, retention, and performance-based rewards. Moreover, just 5 out of 35 OECD countries (14%) report offering competitive salaries compared to other civil service workstreams (Online Figure J.8.2), highlighting the need for further efforts to make public procurement a more attractive and competitive career choice given its complexity and the risks faced by the profession.

Methodology and definitions

Data were collected through the 2024 survey developed to assess the state of implementation of the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement. Responses were received from 35 OECD countries and 5 accession countries between June and July 2024. Earlier data were collected through the 2018 OECD Survey on the Implementation of the 2015 OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement and the 2020 OECD Survey on Professionalisation. Survey respondents were country delegates responsible for procurement policies at the central government level and senior officials in central purchasing bodies.

Public procurement workforce refers to professionals responsible for planning, managing and overseeing procurement processes within public sector entities.

Competency models map critical skills and the capability levels which are required for the overall strategic direction of an organisation.

Certification frameworks certify the level of skills and competencies acquired by public procurement officials.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *Public Procurement in Lithuania: Increasing Efficiency through Centralisation and Professionalisation*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/aa1b196c-en.

OECD (2023), "Professionalising the public procurement workforce: A review of current initiatives and challenges", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 26, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e2eda150-en.

OECD (2015), "Recommendation of the Council on Public Procurement", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0411.

Figure notes

Table 11.2. Data for Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechia, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States is not available for 2018. Data for Canada, Costa Rica, Iceland, Luxembourg, and the United States are not available for 2020. Data for Denmark, Japan, and Switzerland is not available for 2024.

Figure 11.2 and Figure 11.3. Data for Denmark, Japan, and Switzerland are not available.

Figure J.8.2 (Competitive salaries for public procurement compared to other civil service workstreams, 2024) is available online in Annex J.

Table 11.2. Measures to support public procurement capacity, 2018, 2020, and 2024

Country	Competency model			Certification framework		
	2018	2020	2024	2018	2020	2024
Australia	○	○	●	○	○	○
Austria	○	●	●	○	●	●
Belgium	○	○	○	○	○	○
Canada	●	..	●	●	..	○
Chile	●	●	●	●	●	●
Colombia	..	●	○	..	○	○
Costa Rica	..	..	●	○	○	○
Czechia	..	○	●	..	●	○
Denmark	○	○	..	○	○	..
Estonia	○	○	●	○	○	○
Finland	○	○	●	○	○	○
France	●	●	●	●	●	●
Germany	○	○	●	○	○	○
Greece	○	○	○	○	○	●
Hungary	○	○	○	○	○	●
Iceland	●	..	●	○	○	○
Ireland	..	○	○	..	○	○
Israel	○	●	●	●	●	●
Italy	..	○	○	..	○	○
Japan	●	●	..	○	○	..
Korea	○	○	○	○	○	○
Latvia	○	○	●	○	○	○
Lithuania	○	○	○	○	○	●
Luxembourg	..	..	○	..	..	○
Mexico	○	○	○	○	○	○
Netherlands	●	●	●	○	○	○
New Zealand	●	●	●	○	○	○
Norway	○	○	●	●	●	●
Poland	○	○	○	○	○	○
Portugal	●	●	○	○	○	○
Slovak Republic	●	●	○	○	●	●
Slovenia	○	●	●	○	○	○
Spain	○	○	○	○	○	○
Sweden	○	○	○	○	○	○
Switzerland	..	●	..	..	●	..
Türkiye	○	●	○	○	○	○
United Kingdom	..	●	●	..	●	●
United States	..	..	●	..	..	●
OECD Total						
● Yes	9	14	19	5	9	11
○ No	20	19	16	25	26	24
.. No information	9	5	3	8	3	3
Brazil	..	..	●	..	..	●
Bulgaria	..	..	○	..	..	○
Croatia	..	..	●	●	●	●
Peru	..	..	○	..	..	●
Romania	..	..	●	..	..	●

Source: OECD (2018), *Survey on the Implementation of the 2015 OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement*; OECD (2020), *Survey on the Professionalisation of Public Procurement*; OECD (2024), *Survey on the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement 2024*.

StatLink https://stat.link/6xqkeb

Figure 11.2. Capacity-building initiatives to support public procurement officials, 2024



Source: OECD (2024), *Survey on the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement 2024*.

StatLink https://stat.link/s8zndr

Figure 11.3. Recognition of public procurement as a profession, 2024



Source: OECD (2024), *Survey on the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement 2024*.

StatLink https://stat.link/txbz8c

11.3. Integration of public procurement with public financial management

The widespread adoption of digital tools, with increasing amounts of data being generated, is driving an ongoing digital transformation of the public sector. This transformation has the potential to support the creation of seamless e-procurement systems that enhance transparency, foster competition, and generate cost and time savings. Integrating public procurement with other digital systems and databases, such as finance, budgeting, human resources (HR), social security, tax, auditing, and enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems, could reduce administrative burdens, improve efficiency, enhance accountability, and minimise errors.

OECD countries are using integration to enhance their procurement systems. Nearly two-thirds of surveyed OECD countries (25 out of 35, 71%) report that they have integrated their e-procurement systems with other digital government systems to allow the real-time exchange of information. For example, Slovenia upgraded its public procurement system in 2022 by connecting it directly with the payments portal to increase transparency and accountability. At the same time, there is significant potential to further enhance system integration. Only 2 out of 35 countries (6%) have integrated their e-procurement systems with asset registries, 3 with beneficial ownership databases (9%), and 5 with ERP systems (14%) (Table 11.3.).

Integrating public procurement with public financial management ensures alignment with budgetary goals while also contributing directly to broader financial governance objectives. Such alignment enables better insights into procurement expenditures, helps detect cost overruns, identifies spending trends, and flags potential risks or improprieties. Currently, 31 out of 35 OECD countries (89%) report having public procurement plans in line with budget planning and formulation processes, but only 19 OECD countries (54%) include detailed and realistic descriptions of financial and human resource requirements in these plans. Similarly, although public entities in 28 out of 35 OECD countries (80%) are required to certify budget availability before issuing tenders to ensure there are sufficient resources and prevent procurement commitments from exceeding allocated budgets, only 18 countries (51%) state that they have mechanisms to align procurement reporting with budget execution (Figure 11.4).

Mechanisms to align procurement decisions with medium- and long-term budgetary plans help ensure that procurement commitments are financially viable over time and resources are allocated efficiently. Just under half of OECD countries (17 out of 35, 49%) report doing so fully, while 10 (29%) report partial alignment with some policies and monitoring mechanisms, and 5 (14%) report no alignment (Figure 11.5). This highlights the need for stronger integration between public procurement and financial management processes in this area.

Methodology and definitions

Data were collected through the 2024 survey developed to assess the state of implementation of the Recommendation on Public Procurement. The data were collected between June and July 2024 and responses were received from 35 OECD countries and 5 accession countries between June and July 2024. Survey respondents were country delegates responsible for procurement policies at the central government level and senior officials in central purchasing bodies.

The public procurement cycle refers to the sequence of procurement activities from needs assessment, competition, and award to payment and contract management, as well as any subsequent monitoring or auditing.

Enterprise resource planning (ERP) refers to software used by private companies and public entities to manage daily core business functions in an integrated manner, including accounting, human resources, orders, and contract management.

Asset registries are centralised, comprehensive records that include key information about an organisation's fixed assets, such as their location, condition, and value.

Beneficial ownership databases provide details on the individuals who directly or indirectly control or own a company or entity.

Further reading

OECD (2015), "Recommendation of the Council on Public Procurement", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0411.

Figure notes

Table 11.3. Data for Denmark, Japan, and Switzerland is not available.

Figure 11.4. Data is shown for 35 OECD countries.

Table 11.3. Integration of e-procurement systems with other digital government systems, 2024

Countries	Budgeting systems	Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)	e-invoicing systems	Business registries	Tax registries	Social security databases	Beneficial ownership databases	Debarment or sanctioned supplier databases	Asset registries and cadastres	Other
Australia	○	○	○	●	○	○	○	○	○	○
Austria	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	●
Belgium	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Canada	●	●	○	●	●	○	●	●	○	○
Chile	●	○	●	●	○	○	○	●	○	○
Colombia	○	○	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Costa Rica	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	●
Czechia	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Estonia	○	○	○	●	●	●	○	○	○	●
Finland	○	○	○	●	●	●	○	○	○	○
France	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Germany	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	●
Greece	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Hungary	○	○	○	○	●	○	○	●	○	●
Iceland	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Ireland	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Israel	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Italy	●	○	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	○
Korea	●	○	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	○
Latvia	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	●	○
Lithuania	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Luxembourg	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Mexico	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Netherlands	○	○	○	●	○	○	○	○	○	○
New Zealand	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Norway	○	○	○	●	●	●	○	○	○	○
Poland	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	●
Portugal	○	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	●
Slovak Republic	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	●
Slovenia	○	○	○	●	●	○	○	●	○	●
Spain	○	●	○	●	○	○	○	○	○	●
Sweden	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Türkiye	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	○	○
United Kingdom	○	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
United States	●	○	●	○	○	○	○	●	○	○
OECD Total										
● Yes	7	5	8	13	10	7	3	9	2	10
○ No	28	30	27	22	25	28	32	26	33	25
Brazil	○	○	○	○	●	●	○	●	●	○
Bulgaria	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	●
Croatia	○	○	○	●	●	●	○	○	○	●
Peru	●	○	○	●	●	○	○	●	○	●
Romania	○	○	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	●

Source: OECD (2024), *Survey on the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement 2024.*

StatLink https://stat.link/wp4zb1

Figure 11.4. Integration of public procurement with public financial management, 2024



Source: OECD (2024), *Survey on the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement 2024.*

StatLink https://stat.link/

Figure 11.5. Alignment of public procurement decisions with medium and long-term budgetary plans, 2024



Source: OECD (2024), *Survey on the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement 2024.*

StatLink https://stat.link/8hn9ax

11.4. Green public procurement

Green public procurement (GPP) has been high on governments' agendas for more than a decade, with an increasing number of countries leveraging their purchasing power to procure goods, services and works in ways that reduce their environmental impact. All the OECD countries responding to the 2024 survey on the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement report incorporating environmental objectives into their procurement-specific policy documents.

Translating green objectives into concrete obligations, such as predefined targets, helps guide implementation and facilitate effective monitoring, reporting and evaluation. Monitoring can also reveal challenges and bottlenecks, creating a positive feedback loop to continuously improve GPP-related policies, action plans and operational tools.

Slightly more than two-thirds of OECD countries (24 out of 35, 69%) report setting quantitative targets for GPP (Figure 11.6). These might include overall procurement targets (e.g. requiring 80% of procurement by value or number of tenders, to include GPP criteria by a certain year) or only for certain groups of products or services. For example, in France, the National Plan for Sustainable Procurement 2022-2025 sets a target for 100% of public contracts to include at least one environmental consideration by 2025, while in Mexico, office paper purchases must contain at least 50% recycled or sustainably sourced fibres. Targets may also differ across national, regional and local levels of government. Countries can also include operational targets related to public procurement (e.g. mandating GPP training for all public procurement staff by a specific year).

However, despite the widespread recognition of the potential of public procurement to contribute to sustainability goals, there is only limited measurement of whether this is having an impact on the environment, such as saving CO_2 emissions. This highlights a missed opportunity to assess and promote the concrete impact of public procurement, a key economic activity, on environmental factors. As of 2024, of the 29 OECD countries that have key performance indicators for their public procurement system, only 3 – Finland, New Zealand and Norway (10%) – report measuring its impact on the environment (Figure 11.7). For instance, Norway publishes detailed reports on the public sector's climate footprint from procurement and has developed a tool to estimate climate footprints at both government-wide and organisational levels.

Although 11 out of 29 OECD countries (38%) are developing methodologies for measuring environmental impact (Figure 11.7), they may face practical challenges. Data constraints often hinder accurate assessments, as procurement data may not be granular enough to distinguish between specific products, relying instead on broad product categories for which the environmental footprint can only be averaged. In addition, assessing lifecycle emissions is difficult due to data scarcity and a lack of consensus on key assessment elements, such as system boundaries and the allocation of impacts to processes.

Methodology and definitions

Data were collected through the 2024 survey developed to assess the state of implementation of the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement. Responses were received from 35 OECD countries and 5 accession countries between June and July 2024. Survey respondents were country delegates responsible for procurement policies at the central government level and senior officials in central purchasing bodies.

Additional data were collected through the 2022 Survey on Green Public Procurement, aimed at gathering data on the implementation of green public procurement initiatives. The survey was conducted in 2022 and received responses from 34 OECD countries and 4 accession countries. Respondents included country delegates responsible for procurement policies at the central government level and senior officials in central purchasing bodies.

Green public procurement (GPP) is the public purchasing of products and services that are less environmentally damaging, when taking their whole life cycle into account. GPP is part of a broader sustainable public procurement agenda that addresses economic, social and environmental concerns.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *Harnessing Public Procurement for the Green Transition: Good Practices in OECD Countries*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e551f448-en.

OECD (2023), "Public procurement performance: A framework for measuring efficiency, compliance and strategic goals", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 36, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0dde73f4-en.

OECD (2015), "Recommendation of the Council on Public Procurement", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0411.

Figure notes

Figure 11.6. Data for Denmark, Japan and Switzerland are not available.

Figure 11.7. Only includes respondent countries that report having set any KPIs for their public procurement system.

Figure 11.6. Quantitative targets in relation to green objectives in public procurement, 2024



Source: OECD (2024), *Survey on the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement 2024*.

StatLink https://stat.link/eglavu

Figure 11.7. Measurement of the impact of public procurement on the environment, 2024



Source: OECD (2024), *Survey on the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement 2024*.

StatLink https://stat.link/vmcb9d

11.5. Efficient public procurement

All the countries that responded to the 2024 survey on the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement recognise the need to foster efficiency in their public procurement systems. They fulfil this by using various tools, including framework agreements, joint procurements, e-catalogues, and centralised purchasing, while improving procurement practices by reducing duplication and achieving greater value for money.

Of the tools that can contribute to increasing efficiency, centralising purchasing offers numerous benefits, including better value for money through economies of scale, lower transaction costs, faster implementation of policy objectives, and improved capacity and expertise. A large majority of OECD countries (32 out of 35, 91%) have established national or federal central purchasing bodies (CPBs) for general commodities. Given the relevance of some specific procurement categories for the delivery of public services, sector-specific CPBs are also emerging, with 17 out of 35 OECD countries (49%) using them for health sector procurement and 12 out of 35 (34%) for ICT-related procurement (Figure 11.8).

Efficiency in public procurement can also be enhanced by implementing processes such as planning, risk management, and inventory control. Digital technologies – like data analytics, AI, machine learning, robotic process automation (RPA), cloud storage for procurement data, and mobile technologies – can further drive efficiency by streamlining workflows, automating repetitive tasks, increasing productivity, and lowering costs. These technologies also improve the exchange of information between suppliers and contracting authorities, and when combined with well-established processes, can lead to even greater efficiency gains. In 2024, OECD countries mainly used such technologies to promote transparency, control, and oversight (23 out of 35 countries for both categories, 66%). A further 60% of OECD countries (21 out of 35) reported using innovative technologies to improve administrative efficiency. However, these technologies are still underused in inventory management and logistics, with only 14% of OECD countries (5 out of 35) applying them in this context (Figure 11.9).

Measuring the efficiency of public procurement processes requires developing the necessary evidence and indicators. Indicators can include monetary and time savings, market participation levels, and the duration of procurement processes (including vetting). These are increasingly recognised as a key element in public procurement performance measurement frameworks, alongside compliance and whether procurement is contributing to strategic government objectives. Overall, in 2024, 24 out of 35 OECD countries (69%) reported using efficiency indicators (Figure 11.10).

Methodology and definitions

Data were collected through the 2024 survey developed to assess the state of implementation of the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement. Responses were received from 35 OECD countries and 5 accession countries between June and July 2024. Survey respondents were country delegates responsible for procurement policies at the central government level and senior officials in central purchasing bodies.

A central purchasing body (CPB) is a contracting authority that acquires supplies or services intended for one or more contracting authority; or that awards public contracts or concludes framework agreements for works, supplies or services intended for one or more contracting authority.

Further reading

OECD (2015), "Recommendation of the Council on Public Procurement", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0411.

OECD (2023), "Public procurement performance: A framework for measuring efficiency, compliance and strategic goals", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 36, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0dde73f4-en.

OECD (2024), *The Digital Transformation of Public Procurement in Ireland: A Report on the Current State*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/87912457-en.

Figure notes

Figure 11.8. and Figure 11.10. Data for Denmark, Japan, and Switzerland is not available.

Figure 11.9. Data for Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland, and Türkiye is unavailable.

Figure 11.8. Adoption of central purchasing bodies in OECD countries, 2024



Source: OECD (2024), *Survey on the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement 2024*.

StatLink https://stat.link/8u9ja4

Figure 11.9. Public procurement functions supported by innovative technologies, 2024



Source: OECD (2024), *Survey on the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement 2024*.

StatLink https://stat.link/bn8a2g

Figure 11.10. Categories of indicators used to measure public procurement performance, 2024



Source: OECD (2024), *Survey on the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement 2024*.

StatLink https://stat.link/0vag3h

Chapter 12. Integrity

12.1. Perceptions of public sector integrity

Unethical behaviour by elected officials and civil servants can manifest in various forms, such as undue influence, petty corruption, bribery, embezzlement and favouritism. All of them weaken democratic governance and result in ineffective policies, diverted or wasted resources, and poorer outcomes for the public. Perceptions about integrity are important as they can shape how people relate to institutions and influence their behaviour, thereby affecting their confidence in institutions and individuals' actions in society (OECD, 2024a).

Across OECD countries, there is widespread scepticism about the integrity of elected officials, accompanied by concerns about undue influence. On average, nearly half of respondents (49%) believe it is likely that a high-level political official would grant a political favour in exchange for a lucrative private sector job, while only 31% consider it unlikely (Figure 12.1). Notably, the share of people who think this likely rose by 3 percentage points between 2021 and 2023 on average in the countries that participated in both rounds of the OECD Trust Survey (Figure 12.2).

In the case of non-elected officials, 36% of respondents across OECD countries believe civil servants would reject a bribe intended to expedite access to a service. People in Norway (56%), Finland (54%) and Denmark (52%) report the highest levels of confidence in public servants' behaviour (Figure 12.3). Among countries that participated in both waves of the Trust Survey, this figure has fallen by 4 p.p. since 2021, when the OECD average was 40% (Online Figure J.9.1). This suggests that, although civil servants are still generally viewed as more ethical than politicians, this weakening could signal growing concerns about integrity in everyday administrative interactions in some countries. Nevertheless, perceptions of ethical behaviour have improved in some countries. Mexico and Finland saw the largest gains, with confidence rising by 9 p.p. in Mexico (from 18% in 2021 to 27% in 2023) and 8 p.p. in Finland (from 46% in 2021 to 54% in 2023).

Overall, the findings highlight persistent concerns about integrity in both the political and administrative spheres across OECD countries. Strengthening institutional safeguards, increasing transparency and enforcing ethical standards remain essential to rebuilding public trust and ensuring that both elected officials and civil servants are perceived as acting in the public interest.

Methodology and definitions

The 2023 wave of the OECD Trust Survey is a nationally representative population survey collecting data from around 60 000 respondents in 30 OECD countries to explore the drivers of public trust. Most countries were surveyed in October-November 2023. For an in-depth look at the survey method and implementation, please refer to the detailed methodological background paper at https://oe.cd/trust.

Further reading

OECD (2024a), *Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/968587cd-en.

OECD (2024b), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

Brezzi, M., et al. (2021), "An updated OECD framework on drivers of trust in public institutions to meet current and future challenges", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 48, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b6c5478c-en.

Figure notes

Data for 2021 for Chile, Costa Rica, Czechia, Germany, Spain, Greece, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Switzerland are not available, Data for 2023 for Austria and Japan are not available. Likely corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a 0-10 scale, neutral to 5 and unlikely to 0-4. Don't know was a separate answer choice.

Figure 12.1. Refers to the question "If a politician was offered a well-paid job in the private sector in exchange for a political favour, how likely do you think it is that they would refuse it?".

Figure 12.2. "OECD" presents the unweighted average of responses across countries, for the listed countries where the variable is available in both 2021 and 2023. The 2021 question was worded slightly differently in Norway ("If a member of the Storting were to be offered a bribe or other benefit in return for exercising their influence on a parliamentary matter, how likely are they to accept it?") and in Finland: ("If a parliamentarian were offered a bribe to influence the awarding of a public procurement contract, do you think that he/she would refuse the bribe?").

Figure 12.3. Refers to the question "If a public employee was offered money by a citizen or a firm for speeding up access to a public service, how likely do you think it is that they would refuse it?".

Figure J.9.1 (Changes in perceptions of corruption among public employees, 2021 and 2023) is available in Annex J.

Figure 12.1. Perceptions of undue influence on elected officials, 2023

Share of population who find it likely or unlikely that a high-level political official would refuse a well-paid job in exchange for a political favour



Source: OECD Trust Survey, 2023, http://oe.cd/trust.

StatLink https://stat.link/g8cfbn

Figure 12.2. Changes in perceptions of undue influence on elected officials, 2021 and 2023

Share of population who find it likely or unlikely that a high-level political official would refuse a well-paid job in exchange for a political favour



Source: OECD Trust Survey, 2021 and 2023, http://oe.cd/trust.

StatLink https://stat.link/n9hls7

Figure 12.3. Perceptions of corruption among public employees, 2023

Share of population who find it likely or unlikely that a public employee would refuse a bribe to speed up access to a public service



Source: OECD Trust Survey, 2023 http://oe.cd/trust.

StatLink https://stat.link/x8gwld

12.2. Integrity and anti-corruption strategies

A strategic approach to anti-corruption enables governments to identify key challenges, set clear priorities and objectives, and define actionable steps to achieve desired outcomes. It also establishes clear responsibilities, fosters consensus around goals and activities, and supports effective implementation through robust monitoring and evaluation, using specific indicators to measure success. The 2017 OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity states that adherents should develop a strategic approach to mitigating public integrity risks in the public sector, most notably corruption. A strategic approach, involving both the whole of government and the whole of society, can shift the focus from ad hoc policies to a coherent and comprehensive integrity system, to curb the worst forms of corruption such as undue influence, political and grand corruption.

An anti-corruption and integrity strategy can be an expression of political will, but only those adopted by a council of ministers or equivalent can be considered a whole-of-government approach likely to foster wide political support. OECD countries have intensified their recent efforts to develop such a strategic approach; 20 out of 32 OECD countries (63%) have in place a whole-of-government strategic framework containing strategic primary objectives to strengthen anti-corruption and public integrity (Table 12.1).

Strong anti-corruption and integrity strategies aim to cultivate a culture of integrity across society and include elements to mitigate corruption risks in private as well as public entities. However, only 14 out of 32 OECD countries (44%) have strategic objectives for mitigating corruption risks in the private sector, public corporations, state-owned enterprises or public-private partnerships. National anti-corruption and integrity strategies continue to focus on traditional areas, such as fraud and other types of corruption (19 out of 20 strategic frameworks in place in 2024, 95%), internal control and risk management (17 out of 20, 85%), public procurement (16 out of 20, 80%), and human resource management (14 out of 20, 70%) (Table 12.1).

The OECD Public Integrity Indicators measure the overall quality of strategic frameworks by assessing 45 standard criteria related to coverage (primary strategic objectives), evidence-based problem analysis and diagnostic tools, consultation practices, action plans for implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. On average, the OECD countries with a strategic framework in place in 2024 fulfil 22 of these criteria (50%). Latvia and Chile have the strongest frameworks, fulfilling over 36 criteria (80%) (Figure 12.4).

The adequacy of implementation indicator uses 15 criteria to assess the quality of action plans and monitoring reports. On average, OECD countries fulfilled 48% of these criteria. The countries fulfilling the largest share, Chile, Czechia, Greece, Latvia and Lithuania, tend to have stronger frameworks overall. The quality of action plans and monitoring reports therefore have a strong impact on the overall quality of the strategic framework (Figure 12.4).

Tracking the implementation rate of planned activities contributes to effective monitoring, but only six OECD countries fully monitor these data, with implementation rates of 28% in Chile, 36% in Greece, 48% in Finland, 49% in Hungary, 56% in Estonia and 98% in Czechia (Figure 12.4). The reasons for a lack of implementation vary but are usually driven by resource constraints, shifting political commitment or inadequate implementation structures.

Methodology and definitions

Data were collected through a questionnaire based on the OECD Quality of Strategic Framework indicators to which 32 OECD countries and 5 accession countries (Argentina, Croatia, Indonesia, Peru and Romania) responded. Respondents were senior officials responsible for integrity policies in central government. The OECD Public Integrity Indicators measure the implementation of the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity.

Primary strategic objectives are understood as formal objectives set and adopted by the government (council of ministers or equivalent) in official strategy documents or regulations that are not subordinate to any other objectives.

The indicator on *adequacy of implementation structures and reporting* comprises 15 criteria covering essential components, such as a central co-ordination function responsible for implementation; monitoring, evaluation and reporting; and an action plan specifying activities, indicators, targets, costs, etc.

The implementation rate of activities related to strategic objectives for public integrity is based on monitoring reports provided by national authorities. Activities that are ongoing, continuous or only partly implemented are excluded. The rate presents the average rate for all strategic objectives across all strategies.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/968587cd-en.

OECD (2017), "Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0435.

Figure notes

Data for Belgium, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand and Slovenia are not available. Canada does not have a unified central anti-corruption strategy, instead relying on specialised bodies and legislation and a variety of tools to address the risks of corruption.

Figure 12.4. Quality of strategic framework represents the share of 45 standard criteria fulfilled across the *quality of strategic framework* indicator. Adequacy of implementation represents the share of 15 standard criteria fulfilled under the *adequacy of implementation structures and reporting* indicator. The list of indicators and criteria for the dataset on the Quality of the strategic framework is available on the OECD Public Integrity Indicators website.

Table 12.1. Coverage of strategic framework on anti-corruption and public integrity, 2024

Country	Annual coverage of strategic framework	A strategic framework was in place in 2024	The strategic framework contains primary strategic objectives on:						
			Fraud and corruption	Internal control and risk management	Public procurement	Human resource management	Private sector, SOEs, PPPs	Public financial management	Other areas
Australia	2013- (regulation)	YES	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
Austria	2023-2025	YES	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓
Canada	No strategic framework	NO	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Chile	2023-2033	YES	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	O
Colombia	2011 & 2019 (regulations)	YES	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Costa Rica	2021-2030	YES	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗
Czechia	2023-2026	YES	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
Denmark	2018- (regulation)	YES	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
Estonia	2021-2025	YES	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	P
Finland	2021-2024	YES	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗
France	2020-2022	NO	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Germany	2004- (regulation)	YES	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Greece	2022-2025	YES	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
Hungary	2024-2025	YES	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗
Iceland	No strategic framework	NO	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Ireland	No strategic framework	NO	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Japan	2006- (regulation)	NO	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗
Korea	2018-2022	NO	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Latvia	2023-2025	YES	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Lithuania	2022-2033	YES	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mexico	2019-2024	YES	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Netherlands	2023- (regulation)	YES	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗
Norway	No strategic framework	NO	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Poland	2017-2022	NO	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Portugal	2020-2024	YES	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗
Slovak Republic	2019-2023	NO	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Spain	No strategic framework	NO	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Sweden	2024-2027	YES	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗
Switzerland	2021-2024	YES	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗
Türkiye	2019-2023	NO	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
United Kingdom	2017-2022	NO	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
United States	2021-2025	YES	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓
OECD		YES: 20	YES: 19	YES: 17	YES: 16	YES: 14	YES: 14	YES: 11	YES: 9
		NO: 12	NO: 1	NO: 3	NO: 4	NO: 6	NO: 6	NO: 9	NO: 11
Argentina	2023- (regulation)	YES	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓
Brazil	2017-2020	NO	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Peru	2017-2040	YES	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓
Croatia	2021-2030	YES	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗
Indonesia	2018 – (regulation)	YES	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Romania	2021-2025 & 2023-2027	YES	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Other areas: infrastructure, housing, health, education, taxation and/or customs. N/P: data not provided: data missing from questionnaire responses.

Source: OECD (2025), Public Integrity Indicators Database (Data extracted on 9 May 2025), https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/.

StatLink https://stat.link/gko43u

Figure 12.4. Quality of strategic framework and implementation, 2024



Source: OECD (2024), Public Integrity Indicators (database), https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/.

StatLink https://stat.link/3p2iun

12.3. Corruption risk management and internal audit

Internal control and risk management are the policies, processes and actions used to manage integrity risks such as fraud, corruption and abuse. A strong internal control system should also include internal auditing to evaluate the strength of the internal control system, and a robust risk management framework to help organisations identify and respond to corruption risks. Internal control, internal audit and risk management support public sector organisations in their efforts to be less vulnerable to fraud and corruption and to achieve their policy goals and objectives, comply with regulations, manage risks, and use resources responsibly. They play a crucial role in preventing misuse of public funds and maintaining the efficiency and integrity of public services, and in turn may increase trust in public institutions (OECD, 2024a).

OECD countries have strong regulations on internal control, internal audit and risk management to counter corruption risks. According to the OECD Public Integrity Indicators, OECD countries on average fulfil 76% of the standard criteria for regulations on internal control and risk management, and 55% of those for internal audit. Eight countries fulfil all the criteria for internal control and risk management regulations: Costa Rica, Estonia, Lithuania, Mexico, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United States. Lithuania is the only country that fulfils all the criteria for internal audit regulations.

Despite their strong regulations, the effectiveness of OECD countries' internal control, risk management and internal audit processes could be improved in practice. Standard criteria for strong practices include ensuring internal control and internal audit systems are developed by a central function, and the inclusion of integrity risks in public organisations' risk assessments. OECD countries on average fulfil 33% of these criteria on practices for internal control and risk management, and 27% for internal audit. Lithuania performs most strongly on practice, fulfilling 77% of criteria for internal control and risk management, and 67% for internal audit (Table 12.2).

Integrity risk management policies and processes provide reasonable assurance to management that a public body is achieving its integrity objectives and managing its risks effectively. Integrity risk management regulations and policies adopted at the central level of government are not consistently applied across line ministries and agencies. Although 21 OECD countries have regulations requiring risk assessment frameworks to address public integrity risks, only 6 have carried out recent risk assessments across all ministries and agencies. These are Australia, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Portugal (Figure 12.5).

Internal audit is most effective when it has sufficient coverage of key risk areas within the public budget. It offers assurance on the effectiveness of internal control systems and can contribute to fraud prevention by identifying vulnerabilities and strengthening controls. Regulation and practice vary significantly across OECD countries. On average, while internal audits cover 82% of OECD countries' national budget organisations, only 62% of them have been internally audited in the last five years (Figure 12.6). Four countries have full coverage both in legislation and in practice: Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands and Türkiye. Six countries have full coverage in legislation but have not internally audited all entities in practice: Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia (Figure 12.6).

Methodology and definitions

Data were collected through a questionnaire based on the OECD Public Integrity Indicators on Internal Control and Risk Management to which 29 OECD countries and 3 accession countries (Argentina, Brazil and Peru) responded. Respondents were senior officials responsible for integrity policies in central government. The OECD Public Integrity indicators measure the implementation of the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity.

Internal control is defined as "a process effected by an entity's management designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories: (i) Effectiveness and efficiency of operations; (ii) Reliability of financial reporting; and (iii) Compliance with applicable laws and regulations." (www.coso.org).

Risk management refers to a systematic process for assessing and integrating professional judgements about probable adverse conditions and/or events.

Internal audit is an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and improve an organisation's operations. Internal audit helps an organisation accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes.

Further reading

OECD (2024a), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

OECD (2024b), *Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/968587cd-en.

OECD (2024c), "Enhancing co-operation between internal and external auditors: Towards a well-co-ordinated and strengthened public sector audit to ensure public accountability", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 67, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0d4976ed-en.

Figure notes

Data not available for Belgium, Colombia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, New Zealand and United Kingdom.

Table 12.2. Percentages represent the share of OECD standard criteria fulfilled under each category. For example, as measured against OECD standards on internal control and risk management, Australia fulfils 80% of criteria for regulations and 10% for practice. The list of indicators and criteria for the dataset on the Effectiveness of internal control and risk management is available on the OECD Public Integrity Indicators website. N/P: data not provided: data missing from questionnaire responses.

Figure 12.6. Not collected: data not fully collected and/or fully centralised by national authorities. Data for Spain is under assessment.

Table 12.2. Internal control and risk management: Regulations and practice, 2023

Country	Internal control and risk management		Internal audit	
	Regulation	Practice	Regulation	Practice
Australia	80%	10%	0%	42%
Austria	27%	13%	0%	0%
Canada	87%	27%	67%	8%
Chile	80%	57%	78%	33%
Costa Rica	100%	7%	67%	8%
Czechia	67%	43%	67%	25%
Denmark	33%	3%	0%	0%
Estonia	100%	30%	78%	50%
Finland	93%	3%	11%	8%
France	87%	N/P	N/P	N/P
Greece	93%	40%	89%	25%
Ireland	93%	33%	78%	33%
Japan	20%	0%	0%	0%
Korea	53%	17%	67%	0%
Latvia	73%	50%	100%	50%
Lithuania	100%	77%	100%	67%
Luxembourg	27%	0%	11%	8%
Mexico	100%	43%	33%	0%
Netherlands	80%	40%	89%	83%
Norway	93%	27%	22%	8%
Poland	80%	53%	78%	50%
Portugal	80%	53%	44%	0%
Slovak Republic	87%	50%	78%	42%
Slovenia	100%	57%	89%	58%
Spain	100%	37%	78%	33%
Sweden	100%	53%	22%	50%
Switzerland	33%	47%	44%	58%
Türkiye	47%	30%	78%	17%
United States	100%	20%	67%	8%
OECD	**76%**	**33%**	**55%**	**27%**
Argentina	87%	50%	89%	50%
Brazil	87%	67%	89%	42%
Peru	27%	0%	0%	0%

Source: OECD (2025), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 9 May 2025), https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/

StatLink https://stat.link/g8crsw

Figure 12.5. Public integrity risk management across line ministries or agencies: Regulation and practice, 2023



Note: Asterisks (*) denote no data available on practice.
Source: OECD (2025), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database, data extracted on 9 December 2025), https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/

StatLink https://stat.link/czhkgv

Figure 12.6. Internal audit of budget organisations: Regulation and practice, 2023



Source: OECD (2025), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 9 May 2025), https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/.

StatLink https://stat.link/w5bqlf

12.4. Accountable law making

Institutional checks and balances in a democracy limit concentration of power and ensure that decisions are made without undue influence. As part of these, legislative procedures encompass the formal steps through which laws or bills are proposed, debated, amended and voted on within legislative bodies. Legislative scrutiny plays a crucial role in enhancing transparency and accountability.

In 2023, 38% of people in OECD countries thought it likely that their parliament could effectively hold the government accountable, for instance by questioning a minister or reviewing the budget, while a slightly larger share (40%) thought it unlikely (Figure 12.7). Only in Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Switzerland are around half of the population confident in the oversight function of parliament.

Oversight mechanisms also include public consultations, transparency in lobbying and influence, and conflict of interest regulations. The OECD Recommendations on Public Integrity call on adherents to ensure that relevant stakeholders are granted access during the development of draft legislation, promoting effective policy making while preventing capture by narrow interest groups (OECD, 2017).

Legislation may sometimes need to be enacted quickly or through extraordinary procedures, such as during emergencies (e.g. COVID-19) or when transposing international treaties. However, these procedures should be used only in specific situations and be time bound. Fourteen OECD countries have adopted rules that allow parliament to expedite, modify or bypass standard procedures in such cases. In 2021, on average, OECD countries passed 16% of primary legislation (excluding budget laws and international treaties) using expedited processes that prevented external oversight (counted as extraordinary procedures or adoption within 10 days of introduction) (Figure 12.8).

Stability and predictability of law making is important for legal certainty and to allow interested parties to understand and possibly influence legislation (Benoît, Brenner and Fazekas, 2024). Frequent changes to legislation can cut economic growth by creating an unpredictable and volatile regulatory environment, making it difficult for businesses to operate and plan future investments (see Chapter 3). In 2021, 11% of primary legislation was amended within a year on average across OECD countries. The most stable law making was in Canada, Estonia, Spain and the United States, as none of the primary legislation they enacted in 2020 was amended within a year (Figure 12.9).

Methodology and definitions

The 2023 wave of the OECD Trust Survey is a nationally representative population survey collecting data from around 60 000 respondents in 30 OECD countries to explore the drivers of public trust. Most countries were surveyed in October-November 2023. For an in-depth look at the survey method and implementation, please refer to the detailed methodological background paper at https://oe.cd/trust.The OECD Public Integrity Indicators were collected through a questionnaire based on the OECD's guidelines on Internal Control and Risk Management. Thirty-three OECD countries, and five accession countries (Argentina, Croatia, Indonesia, Romania, and Peru), participated. Respondents were senior officials responsible for integrity policies in central government. The OECD Public Integrity Indicators measure the implementation of the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity.

Legislative procedural scrutiny is calculated by dividing the number of primary laws enacted through an extraordinary procedure (or within 10 days of introduction, if no extraordinary procedure is in place) in 2021 by the total number of primary laws enacted that year, subtracted from 100% to standardise the values, with 100% representing the most positive outcome. This excludes amendments, budget laws, international treaties and EU transposition.Legislative stability is calculated by dividing the number of new primary laws enacted in 2020 that were amended within 365 days by the total number of new laws enacted that year, subtracted from 100% to standardise the values. This calculation also excludes amendments, budget laws, international treaties and EU transposition.

Further reading

Benoit, Brenner and Fazekas (2024), *The LEGDAT Dataset: A Global Dataset on Legislative Processes, Outputs and Outcomes*.

OECD (2017), "Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0435.

Figure notes

Figure 12.7. Refers to the question "How likely do you think it is that the national parliament would effectively hold the national government accountable for their policies and behaviour, for instance by questioning a minister or reviewing the budget?" Likely corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a 0-10 scale, neutral to 5 and unlikely to 0-4. Don't know was a separate answer choice.

Figure 12.8. Data for Belgium, Colombia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland are not available.

Figure 12.9. Data for Belgium, Colombia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia and Türkiye are not available.

Figure 12.7. Confidence in the national parliament holding the national government to account, 2023



Source: OECD Trust Survey 2023.

StatLink https://stat.link/fw6v4c

Figure 12.8. Legislative procedural scrutiny, 2021

Share of laws not adopted through extraordinary procedures or within ten days of their introduction



Source: OECD (2025), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 9 May 2025), https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/.

StatLink https://stat.link/0euvzp

Figure 12.9. Legislative stability, 2020

Share of laws not amended within 365 days of enactment



Source: OECD (2025), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (Data extracted on 9 May 2025), https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/.

StatLink https://stat.link/4qued9

Chapter 13. Public employment and representation

13.1. Employment in general government

Governments across the OECD rely on a dedicated and skilled public sector workforce to deliver a wide range of policies and services for their citizens and to generate the conditions needed to achieve prosperity. While some services are provided directly by public organisations, others are delivered through partnerships with private or non-profit organisations. As a result, the composition and size of public employment vary across OECD countries, reflecting different policy choices and institutional frameworks. For instance, in some countries the majority of healthcare professionals, teachers and emergency responders are public employees, whereas in others these roles are primarily filled by workers in private or non-profit organisations operating within publicly funded systems. Over time, changes in the size and structure of public employment have also been influenced by broader economic and social developments affecting the labour market.

The share of general government employment varies significantly across OECD countries. It is highest in the Nordic countries, where government employment makes up close to one-third of total employment: Norway (30.1%), Sweden (28.2%), Denmark (27.3%) and Finland (25.2%). In contrast, Chile, Japan and Korea recorded the lowest shares among OECD countries, with general government employment below 10% of total employment (Figure 13.1).

Overall, the share of general government employment has remained relatively stable over time. In 2023 general government employment averaged 18.4% of total employment across OECD countries, a slight increase of 0.3 percentage points since 2019. The greatest increases between 2019 and 2023 were in Latvia (+4.5 p.p.), Estonia (+1.4 p.p.) and the United Kingdom (+1.1 p.p.). Conversely, the greatest decreases over that period were in Lithuania (-1.1. p.p.), France (-0.9 p.p.) and Hungary (-0.9 p.p.) (Figure 13.1).

The overall increase in the share of general government employment was largely due to general government employment growing faster rate than total employment. Between 2019 and 2023, general government employment grew by an average of 1.6% per year between 2019 and 2023, while total employment grew by 1.1% (Figure 13.2). General government employment grew in all but two OECD countries (Costa Rica and Hungary), and total employment grew in all but four (Costa Rica, Japan, Latvia and Mexico). Around two-thirds of OECD countries saw general government employment outpace total employment growth or not fall as fast. Among these countries, the widest gaps in growth rates between the two employment categories were in Latvia (5.4 p.p. difference), Costa Rica (2.9 p.p. difference) and Portugal (2.0 p.p. difference). Among the remaining one-third of countries, the greatest differences between the two growth rates, resulting in a declining share of government employment, were in Lithuania (1.3 p.p. difference), France and Hungary (both 1.1. p.p. difference).

Methodology and definitions

Data are derived from the OECD National Accounts Statistics (database), which are based on the System of National Accounts (SNA), a set of internationally agreed concepts, definitions, classifications and rules for national accounting. General government employment covers employment in all levels of government (central, state, local and social security funds) and includes core ministries, agencies, departments and non-profit institutions that are controlled by public authorities. The data represent the total number of persons directly employed by those institutions. Total employment covers all persons engaged in productive activity that falls within the production boundary of the national accounts. The employed comprise all individuals who, during a specified brief period, were in either paid employment or self-employment.

Further reading

OECD (2023), *Public Employment and Management 2023: Towards a More Flexible Public Service*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5b378e11-en.

OECD (2021), *Public Employment and Management 2021: The Future of the Public Service*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/938f0d65-en.

Figure notes

Total employment refers to domestic employment. Data for Colombia and New Zealand are not available. Data for Australia, Chile, Costa Rica, Iceland, Japan and Korea are not included in the OECD average. Data for Japan do not include social security funds. Data for Australia for total employment are based on OECD estimates.

Figure 13.1. Data for Israel, Norway, Portugal and Switzerland are for 2022 rather than 2023. Data for Costa Rica are for 2021 rather than 2023.

Figure 13.2. Data for Australia, Chile and Iceland are not available. Data for Israel, Norway, Portugal and Switzerland are for 2019-22. Data for Costa Rica are for 2019-21.

Figure 13.1. Employment in general government as a percentage of total employment, 2019 and 2023



Sources: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database). Data for Australia, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Türkiye and the United States are from the International Labour Organization (ILO), ILOSTAT (database), Public employment by sectors and sub-sectors of national accounts. Data for Chile for general government were provided by national authorities (based on Budget Directorate data).

StatLink https://stat.link/8htodn

Figure 13.2. Annual average growth rate of general government employment and total employment, 2019-23

Sources: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database). Data for Japan, Korea, Türkiye and the United States are from the International Labour Organization (ILO), ILOSTAT (database), Public employment by sectors and sub-sectors of national accounts.

StatLink https://stat.link/sihyzb

13.2. Age profile of the central administration workforce

Age diversity can strengthen public administrations by improving innovation, representation and service delivery while fostering a more inclusive and sustainable workforce. Understanding the age profile of the central administration workforce helps determine current and future workforce management challenges, including planning for recruitment, engagement and retention. Governments with a predominantly older workforce may be well placed to draw on a wealth of experience, but may face challenges with workforce renewal and building the next generation of public servants. Those with a predominantly younger workforce may be seen as attractive to younger applicants, but have to prioritise career development and the retention of more experienced staff. A balanced workforce can help bridge the gap between younger and older generations, maintaining a steady pipeline of candidates for middle and senior management roles as the central administration evolves.

In 2023, on average across the OECD, 27.1% of central administration public servants were aged 55 and older, while 19.1% were 18-34 years old, a difference of 8 percentage points. In 12 out of 32 countries with data available (63%), there are more employees in the oldest age group than the youngest, with the largest gaps in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, where over 40% of the workforce are 55 years or older. In contrast, Denmark (32.3%), Japan (30.9%), New Zealand and Israel (both 30.1%) have the highest shares of young workers, indicating the attractiveness of their central administration (Figure 13.3).

On average, the share of older workers in central administration workforces in OECD countries was about 5 percentage points higher than their share in the overall economy (22.5%). Countries with the largest share of older workers in the central administration also showed the greatest difference compared to the overall economy. The top three were Italy, with a difference of 30.9 p.p., Spain (27.1 p.p.) and Greece (21.1 p.p.).

Age is also relevant to experience and tenure. Unsurprisingly, managerial positions were mostly held by the middle (35-54 year-olds) and oldest age groups. On average across OECD countries, those aged 55 years and over occupied 42% of the senior manager positions and 30.3% of the middle manager positions; for the youngest age group these shares were 1% and 6% (Figure 13.4). France (15.6%) and the United Kingdom (19.2%) had the largest shares of young employees in middle manager positions. This may reflect their use of talent management programmes to identify and accelerate the careers of high-potential individuals, such as France's National Public Service Institute (INSP, 2024) and the United Kingdom's ''fast stream programme" (GOV.UK, 2024).

Non-managerial positions were dominated by employees in the middle age group, but unlike for managerial positions there was a more equal distribution between the youngest and oldest age groups (Figure 13.5).

Methodology and definitions

Data on the central administration by age group were collected through the 2024 Composition of the Workforce in Central/Federal Governments Survey, which was conducted during 2024. The data were provided by senior officials in central government HRM departments, The survey encompasses responses from all OECD countries except Colombia, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway and the United States. Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania, OECD accession countries, also participated to the survey. Office assistants in Figure 13.5 refer to 'General Office Clerks' as of ILO ISCO-08 411 and 4110 definitions. For definitions of the occupational levels please refer to Annex E.

Data on the overall economy (measured as total employment) by age groups are from the ILOSTAT (database) which are based on the Labour Force Survey. Total employment comprises all persons of working age who, during a specified brief period, such as one week or one day, were in the following categories: paid employment or self-employment. Both datasets represent the total number of people employed in headcount unless otherwise indicated.

Further reading

GOV.UK (2024), Civil Service Accelerated Development Schemes, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-service-talent-management/civil-service-talent-management.

INSP (2024), Institute National du service public, https://insp.gouv.fr/.

OECD (2023), *Retaining Talent at All Ages, Ageing and Employment Policies*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/00dbdd06-en.

Figure notes

Age groups for Poland refer to under 30 year-olds, 30-49 year-olds, and 50 year-olds and over. Age groups for Bulgaria refer to under 30 year-olds, 30-59 year-olds, and 60 year-olds and over. Data for Japan, Lithuania and Spain refer to civil servants (permanent for Japan and Spain). Data for Denmark, Estonia, Italy and Latvia are reported in full-time equivalents (FTEs). Data for Korea and the Netherlands represent 23% of the administration. Data for France refer to 2021. Data for Italy and Korea refer to 2022.

Figure 13.3. Data for Türkiye for total central administration by age are not available.

Figure 13.4 and Figure 13.5. Data for Croatia refer to ministries. Middle managers for Germany include professionals. Countries are ranked by share of senior managers/professionals aged 55 years and older.

Figure 13.4. Austria is not included in the OECD average.

Figure 13.5. Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Latvia and Spain are not included in the OECD average.

Figure 13.3. Distribution of employees in the central administration by age, 2023



Sources: OECD (2024), Survey on the Composition of the Workforce in Central/Federal Governments; ILOSTAT (database) Employment by sex and age, Annual Labour Force Statistics (LFS).

StatLink https://stat.link/jd09e6

Figure 13.4. Distribution of senior and middle managerial positions in central administration by age, 2023



Source: OECD (2024), Survey on the Composition of the Workforce in Central/Federal Governments.

StatLink https://stat.link/gts961

Figure 13.5. Distribution of non-managerial professional and assistant positions in central administration by age, 2023



Source: OECD (2024), Survey on the Composition of the Workforce in Central/Federal Governments.

StatLink https://stat.link/p7lt0c

13.3. Educational profile of the central administration workforce

A highly educated workforce can contribute to public sector transformation through greater capacity to address complex challenges and take decisions based on evidence. Although public servants in central administrations are, on average, highly educated, levels vary significantly across OECD countries. This may be explained by differences in recruitment policies, salary levels, returns for graduate-level degrees and wider societal factors. In some countries, having an advanced education degree is an entry requirement for most central administration positions, while other countries place greater emphasis on technical qualifications or work experience.

In 2023, on average, around 75% of the central administration employees in OECD countries held an undergraduate (bachelor's) or graduate (master's or doctoral) degree, fairly evenly distributed between the two higher levels. However, countries vary greatly in the distribution of undergraduate and graduate degree holders. In Israel, Lithuania, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic more than 60% hold a graduate degree (Figure 13.6).

On average, central administration employees are more likely to hold a graduate-level degree (39.8%) than those in the overall economy (17.3%). The only exception is in Portugal (where 9.3% of employees in the central administration hold graduate degrees, compared to 21.6% of those in employment) (Figure 13.6).

Managerial positions are predominantly filled by those with graduate degrees. On average, 74.8% of senior managers in central administrations, and 60.2% of middle managers, hold a graduate degree. In contrast, only 5% of senior managers and 10.2% of middle managers lack a university education (Figure 13.7).

The educational levels among those in professional non-managerial roles are more evenly distributed. While most of these public servants hold graduate (42.6%) or undergraduate degrees (37.6%), a larger share of employees have a non-university education (19.8%) than those in managerial roles (Figure 13.8).

Levels of education are linked to career entry points, progression and access to managerial roles. However, the high share of graduate degrees among managers could indicate the existence of a "paper ceiling", where those without such degrees may face barriers to advancement, regardless of their skills, experience or performance. Such barriers can reduce diversity in leadership and discourage capable public servants from pursuing managerial positions. To address this, and create a more inclusive, skilled and adaptable public administration, governments should promote learning and development opportunities and create a culture of career-long learning among public servants (OECD, 2023). Internal workforce development strategies, enabling skills and qualifications to be earned during their careers, can help the most capable employees to advance into more senior roles.

Methodology and definitions

Data on the central administration workforce were collected through the Composition of the Workforce in Central/Federal Governments Survey, conducted in 2024. Data were provided predominately by senior officials in central government human resource management (HRM) departments. The survey was completed by all OECD countries except Colombia, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway and the United States, and four accession countries (Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania). Educational levels are based on the UNESCO ISCED classification: graduate degrees correspond to master's and doctoral level (ISCED 7/8), undergraduate degrees to bachelor's level (ISCED 6), non-university education to all other levels. Office assistants in Figure 13.8 refer to General Office Clerks as of ILO ISCO-08 411 and 4110 definitions. For definitions of occupational levels and the educational classification please refer to Annex E.

Data on the overall economy (measured as total employment) are from the ILOSTAT database, based on the Labour Force Survey. Total employment comprises all persons of working age who, during a specified brief period, were in paid employment or self-employed. Both datasets represent the total number of people employed as headcounts unless otherwise indicated.

Further reading

OECD (2024), *Education at a Glance 2024: OECD Indicators*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c00cad36-en.

OECD (2023), *Public Employment and Management 2023: Towards a More Flexible Public Service*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5b378e11-en.

OECD (2019), "Recommendation of the Council on Public Service Leadership and Capability", OECD Legal Instruments, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0445.

Figure notes

Data for Latvia and Lithuania refer to civil servants. Data for Estonia, Italy and Latvia are reported in full-time-equivalents (FTEs). Data for Korea represent 23% of the administration. Data for Italy, Korea and Sweden refer to 2022.

Figure 13.6. Data for Türkiye for total central administration by education are not available.

Figure 13.7 and Figure 13.8. Data for Croatia refer to ministries. Data are ordered by graduate level for senior managers and professionals respectively.

Figure 13.8. Greece, Israel and Latvia are not included in the OECD average.

Figure 13.6. Distribution of employees in the central administration by education level, 2023



Sources: OECD (2024), Survey on the Composition of the Workforce in Central/Federal Governments; ILOSTAT (database) Employment by sex and education, Annual Labour Force Statistics (LFS).

StatLink https://stat.link/ha5zqb

Figure 13.7. Distribution of senior and middle managerial positions in central administration by education level, 2023



Source: OECD (2024), Survey on the Composition of the Workforce in Central/Federal Governments.

StatLink https://stat.link/bv6lxy

Figure 13.8. Distribution of non-managerial professional and assistant positions in central administration by education level, 2023



Source: OECD (2024), Survey on the Composition of the Workforce in Central/Federal Governments.

StatLink https://stat.link/bxu2ih

13.4. Gender parity in central administrations

Greater diversity in public workforces can result in more responsive and equitable public policies, improved public services and service delivery, more innovation, and increased employee engagement. Many governments in OECD countries have embraced diversity strategies. An important component of these has been to promote balance in the number of men and women in the senior positions where key decisions are made. Policies that could contribute to achieving gender balance include setting and monitoring of diversity objectives and targets, removing barriers for women in recruitment and promotion, ensuring equal access to flexible work practices across the administration, and generally cultivating a culture of inclusion and parity in the workplace.

In 2023, on average across the OECD, 58% of public servants were women. Only six OECD countries have fewer women than men in their central administrations: Belgium (47.9%), Japan (32.7%), Korea (48.5%), Spain (48.4%), Switzerland (37.6%) and Türkiye (33.7%). In contrast, women account for 46% of total employment across the overall economy; in almost all OECD countries, the share of women in the central administration is higher than the share in total employment (Figure 13.9). This difference may be attributed to differences in salaries and the enhanced job security typically offered by central administration roles, among other reasons.

Although women make up a greater share of public servants overall, this is not the case at all levels of the hierarchy. Women account for 41.1% of senior managerial positions on average across the OECD, 16.6 percentage points lower than their overall share in central administrations. Women account for the majority of senior positions in nine countries, with Latvia (58%), Greece (57.8%) and Sweden (57.1%) reporting the highest shares of women in managerial roles. At the middle management level, women hold an average of 50.3% of positions, reflecting progresses towards gender parity in many OECD countries (Figure 13.10). The 9.2 p.p. difference between the share of women in senior and middle managerial positions highlights persistent challenges for women's advancement, including factors such as gender stereotypes, work-life balance pressures and workplace harassment (OECD, 2023a).

The representation of women is greatest in non-managerial positions (Figure 13.11). Women occupied 57.6% of professional positions and 62.2% of office assistant positions in OECD countries on average. In four OECD countries, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, women accounted for more than 70% of both non-managerial positions. This highlights the challenges of attracting men to such positions, potentially due to lower pay or gender norms (OECD, 2019).

Methodology and definitions

Data on the central administration workforce were collected through the Composition of the Workforce in Central/Federal Governments Survey, conducted in 2024. Data were provided predominately by senior officials in central government human resource management (HRM) departments. The survey was completed by all OECD countries except Colombia, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway and the United States and four accession countries (Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania). Office assistants refer to General Office Clerks as of ILO ISCO-08 411 and 4110 definitions. For definitions of occupational levels please refer to Annex E.

Data on the overall economy (measured as total employment) are from the ILOSTAT (database) which are based on the Labour Force Survey. Total employment comprises all persons of working age who, during a specified brief period, such as one week or one day, were in the following categories: paid employment or self-employment. Both datasets represent the total number of people employed as headcounts unless otherwise indicated.

Further reading

OECD (2023a), *Joining Forces for Gender Equality: What is Holding us Back?,* OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/67d48024-en.

OECD (2023b), *Public Employment and Management 2023: Towards a More Flexible Public Service*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5b378e11-en.

OECD (2019), *Fast Forward to Gender Equality: Mainstreaming, Implementation and Leadership*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g9faa5-en.

Figure notes

Data for Lithuania and Spain refer to civil servants (permanent for Spain). Data for Denmark, Estonia, Italy and Latvia are reported in full-time-equivalents (FTEs). Data for France refer to 2021. Data for Italy and Korea refer to 2022.

Figure 13.10 and Figure 13.11. Data for Croatia refer to ministries. Middle managers for Germany include Professionals. Data for Korea represent 23% of the administration. Countries are ranked by the share of senior managers/professionals who are women.

Figure 13.10. Data for Japan refer to permanent civil servants. Austria is not included in the OECD average.

Figure 13.11. Germany, Greece, Israel and Latvia are not included in the OECD average.

Figure 13.9. Gender parity employment in the central administration and the overall economy, 2023



Sources: OECD (2024), Survey on the Composition of the Workforce in Central/Federal Governments; ILOSTAT (database) Employment by sex and age, Annual Labour Force Statistics (LFS).

StatLink https://stat.link/kvmoq0

Figure 13.10. Gender parity employment in senior and middle managerial positions in central administration, 2023



Source: OECD (2024), Survey on the Composition of the Workforce in Central/Federal Governments.

StatLink https://stat.link/reacs5

Figure 13.11. Gender parity employment in non-managerial professional and assistant positions in central administration, 2023



Source: OECD (2024), Survey on the Composition of the Workforce in Central/Federal Governments.

StatLink https://stat.link/d8bkxo

13.5. Gender parity in politics

Gender parity in politics goes beyond merely counting the number of women in parliament or ministerial roles. Women from diverse backgrounds must be able to participate in politics without discrimination, have the opportunity to meaningfully influence policy making, and ensure that public services reflect the distinct needs of both women and men. While gender-balanced representation involves more than numbers, collecting and publishing gender-disaggregated data is necessary for identifying disparities and creating policies that promote inclusiveness.

The representation of women in parliament has improved in nearly all OECD countries over the last decade, although inequalities persist. In 2025, women held an average of 34% of seats in the lower or single houses of parliament in OECD countries, up from 26% in 2012. While this is a notable improvement, it highlights the need to maintain and strengthen efforts towards parity (Figure 13.12).

Progress varies widely among countries. Mexico has achieved full gender parity, with women holding 50% of seats, while Costa Rica is close, with 49.1%. Four other OECD countries have more than 45% female representation in parliament: Iceland (46.0%), Finland (45.5%), New Zealand (45.5%), and Sweden (45.0%). The largest gains since 2012 were in Chile (+20.9 percentage points), the United Kingdom (+18.2 p.p.), and Colombia (+17.3 p.p.). Despite these advances, in 17 out of 38 OECD countries (45%), women still hold less than one-third of parliamentary seats (Figure 13.12).

OECD countries have implemented a range of strategies to enhance women's representation in parliaments, including mandatory quotas, voluntary targets, mentorship programmes and other initiatives to make parliamentary workplaces more inclusive (OECD, 2023a). Electoral quotas, adopted by most OECD countries, remain a key tool in promoting gender parity in politics (Figure 13.12). However, for lasting impact, these quotas should be complemented by broader measures that support gender equality beyond electoral processes (OECD, 2023b).

A gender-balanced cabinet signals a government's dedication to gender parity and the integration of a gender perspective in key policy decisions. As of 2025, women held an average of 35% of cabinet positions across OECD countries, though representation varies significantly (Figure 13.13). Finland (61%), Iceland (60%), Estonia (58%), Chile (50%), Spain (50%), and the United Kingdom (50%) were the six OECD countries where women comprised at least half of the political executive. Conversely, in 15 out of 38 countries (39%), women held one third or less of cabinet minister positions. Moreover, achieving true gender parity requires not only increasing women's overall representation but also ensuring a more balanced distribution of ministerial responsibilities: gender disparities are often reflected in portfolio allocation, with women more likely assigned to social and cultural portfolios, such as gender parity, family affairs, social protection, and minority rights (IPU/UN Women 2025).

Methodology and definitions

Data for women parliamentarians refer to the lower or single house of parliament and were obtained from the Inter-Parliamentary Union's Parline database. Data refer to the share of women parliamentarians recorded as of 1 January 2025 and 31 October 2012. There are three key types of gender quotas: legislated candidate quotas (which regulate the gender composition of the candidate lists and are legally binding on all political parties in the election); legislated "reserved seats" (which regulate by law the gender composition of elected bodies by reserving a certain number of seats for women members, implemented through special electoral procedures); and party quotas (also called voluntary party quotas, that are adopted by individual parties for their own candidate lists, and are usually enshrined in party statutes and rules). Data on quotas were obtained from the Inter-Parliamentary Union's PARLINE database.

Data on women cabinet ministers in national government were obtained from the Inter-Parliamentary Union's Women in Politics database. Data show women as a share of cabinet members who head ministries as of 1 January 2025 (excluding ministers without portfolios). Heads of government were also included where they held ministerial portfolios.

Further reading

IPU/UN Women (2025), Women in Politics: 2025. Inter-Parliamentary Union, https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/infographics/2025-03/women-in-politics-2025.

OECD (2023a), *Toolkit for Mainstreaming and Implementing Gender Equality 2023*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3ddef555-en.

OECD (2023b), *Joining Forces for Gender Equality: What is Holding us Back?*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/67d48024-en.

Figure notes

Figure 13.12. Light red bars represent countries without electoral quotas in their lower or single house parliaments as of January 2025.

Figure 13.13. Data for Japan refer to cabinet members who are ministers, including heads of ministries and ministry-equivalent entities leading the development and implementation of key policy areas. Data for Bulgaria refer to the new cabinet appointed after 1 January 2025 following elections held in 2024.

Figure 13.12. Gender parity in parliament and electoral gender quotas, 2012 and 2025



Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), PARLINE (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/yckp2f

Figure 13.13. Gender parity in cabinet ministerial positions, 2025



Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), Women in Politics (2025).

StatLink https://stat.link/9lu3vs

13.6. Youth representation in politics

Youth representation in politics is vital to ensure decision making reflects the experiences, priorities and needs of all generations. Age diverse governments can foster more inclusive policies, bridge intergenerational divides and strengthen trust in government by demonstrating that all age groups have a voice (OECD, 2024a). Governments must promote youth representation in politics while strengthening their technical and administrative capacity to enhance participation, using digital tools to improve accessibility and align with young people's communication preferences (OECD, 2022).

Although 20-39 year-olds represent 34% of the voting-age population on average across OECD countries, only 22% of members of parliament (MPs) were aged 40 and under in 2024, a representation gap of 12 percentage points. There is significant variation across countries, from a high of 42% of young MPs in Colombia to less than 15% in seven countries. In Denmark, Finland, Germany and Norway, the shares of young MPs are within 2 p.p. of the share of under 40s in the voting-age population (Figure 13.14).

In December 2024, only 60 out of a total of 770 cabinet across OECD countries were under 40 (8%) and only 22 were aged 35 or under (3%). The average age of cabinet members across OECD countries is 53 years, unchanged since 2022. The five youngest cabinets are in Denmark (average age of 46), Lithuania (46), Estonia (47), Norway (48) and Finland (48). The countries which have seen the average age of cabinet members fall the most since 2022 were Colombia (with a fall of 5 years), Luxembourg (-5), Mexico (-3) (Figure 13.15).

Young people (18-29 year-olds) reported being less engaged than other age groups in formal political activities, such as voting, contacting politicians/governments or participating in public consultations in 2023 The widest gap was in voting in national elections, where, according to self reports, young people were 21 p.p. less likely to vote than those aged 50 and over. In contrast, young people were more likely than their older peers to engage in more informal forms of political activity such as taking part in public demonstrations (by 5 p.p.) and posting political content on social media (by 5 p.p.) (Figure 13.16).

Methodology and definitions

The terms youth and young people typically refer to those aged 15-29 as per the OECD Recommendation on Creating Better Opportunities for Young People, although the age range employed varies depending on the topics, indicators and data availability.

Data on indicators related to participation in political activities were sourced from the 2024 OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions which classifies young people as those aged 18-29. The survey provides the original data to explore people's experience with, and expectations from, public governance. The 2023 wave collected public opinion survey data from nearly 60 000 respondents across 30 OECD countries. Most countries were surveyed in October-November 2023. For an in-depth look at the survey method and implementation, please refer to the detailed methodological background paper at https://oe.cd/trust.

The share of young MPs refers to the share of parliamentary representatives aged 40 and under obtained from the Inter-Parliamentary Union's (IPU) 2024 Parline database.

Data on the voting-age population (aged over 20) were obtained from the OECD Demography and Population database.

Data on the average age of cabinet members was collected via desk research as of 10 December 2024 of OECD countries' cabinet membership using official government websites and members' biographies.

Further reading

OECD (forthcoming), *The OECD Citizen Participation Barometer - Conceptual Framework and Way Forward*.

OECD (2024a), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

OECD (2024b), *OECD Youth Policy Toolkit*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/74b6f8f3-en.

OECD (2022), "Recommendation of the Council on Creating Better Opportunities for Young People", *OECD Legal Instruments,* OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0474

Figure notes

Figure 13.14. Data on the share of young people as a share of the voting-age population are from 2022. National parliament age data are from 2024, except Ireland and the United Kingdom, which date from 2023.

Figure 13.15. Data could not be found for 1 cabinet member in Argentina, 12 in Costa Rica, 2 in Peru and 1 in Romania. Cabinet lists were based on official government websites.

Figure 13.16. Refers to the questions "Did you vote in the last national election on [Date]?" and "Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities: voted in a local election, created or signed a petition, posted or forwarded political content on social media, boycotted certain products for political reasons, volunteered for social or environmental causes, contacted a politician or government, taken part in a street protest or demonstration, participated in a public consultation, attended a meeting of a trade union or political party, ran for or held an elected office".

Figure 13.14. Share of parliamentarians aged 40 and under, and population aged 20-39, 2024



Source: OECD calculations based on OECD Demography and Population database (2022) and Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Parline database on national parliaments (2023 and 2024).

StatLink https://stat.link/s6fn3y

Figure 13.15. Average age of cabinet members by country, 2022 and 2024



Source: OECD desk research (data as of 10 December 2024).

StatLink https://stat.link/apz23u

Figure 13.16. Participation in political activities by age group, 2023

OECD average



Source: OECD Trust Survey, 2023, http://oe.cd/trust.

StatLink https://stat.link/lupyjn

Chapter 14. Managing human resources

14.1. Delegation of public employment policies in central administrations

To be effective enablers of development and transformation, public employment policies – including those around recruitment, remuneration, learning and development, and succession planning – must be tailored to the specific needs of each central government ministry. Each organisation and its leadership will face different workforce and talent development needs, and challenges unique to their mission, mandate and transformation strategies. At the same time, some degree of central oversight and co-ordination is needed to enable government-wide workforce transformations, address common challenges, ensure minimum standards across government, uphold common principles and statutory obligations (where applicable) of merit and fairness, and avoid uneven pay scales or inter-ministerial competition for employees (see also Section on "Civil service oversight institutions").

The index on the delegation of public employment in central administrations summarises how far human resources management (HRM) practices have been delegated to line ministries in central government. It assesses the delegation of financial decisions (budget for compensation, pay and benefits); attraction, recruitment and onboarding responsibilities; and workforce planning activities. Although the average delegation index score across OECD countries is 0.55 (on a scale from 0 to 1), the individual results reveal no single model or common standard for delegation in public employment. Countries show significant variation, with individual scores ranging from 0.36 to 0.76 (Figure 14.1), reflecting diverse approaches to balancing ministerial flexibility with common and co-ordinated HR practices.

All countries have dedicated HRM units in individual line ministries (Table 14.1). However, the mandates and roles of these units vary significantly across countries. Activities related to attraction, recruitment and onboarding are the most frequently delegated with an average score of 0.22 out of 0.33. Delegating these functions to line ministries allows for greater flexibility and responsiveness to changes in operational contexts (Figure 14.1).

At the lower end of the scale, financial decisions – such as setting budget envelopes for staffing, compensation and benefits – have an average score of 0.13 out of 0.33 (Figure 14.1). These responsibilities are typically centralised under finance ministries or centres of government. This centralisation helps ensure consistent pay and benefits across ministries, reducing inter-ministerial competition for critical skills.

Denmark and Norway have the highest levels of autonomy over HRM decisions. In both countries, all key decisions are entirely decentralised (Table 14.1). While highly decentralised, HR policies are still regulated by collective agreements and other legislative tools to ensure co-ordination within individual ministries. At the other end of the scale, in countries such as Chile, Greece, Israel and Korea, central institutions have power over a greater number of activities including recruitment of public servants, external branding and communications, and producing workforce plans. Achieving a good balance between delegation and central authority lies in ensuring organisations and their leadership have strong HRM capabilities, effective monitoring and evaluation of HRM policies across government, and ensuring there are co-ordination and communication mechanisms between all levels and institutions.

Methodology and definitions

Data are drawn from the 2024 OECD Survey on Public Service Leadership and Capability module on HRM Institutions, with responses from 35 OECD countries as well as the OECD accession countries Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. Respondents were predominately senior officials in central government HRM departments, and data refer to HRM practices in central government in 2024. Countries use different definitions for the civil service and the organisations governed at the central level of government, which should be considered when making comparisons. The terms public and civil service/servants are used interchangeably throughout this chapter.

The index on delegation is composed of three variables examining the extent of delegation around *financial and budgetary decisions*; *attraction, recruitment and onboarding*; and *workforce planning decisions*. The index ranges from 0 (no delegation) to 1 (high level of delegation). The variables comprising the index and their relative importance are based on expert judgements and weighted equally. The current index varies from previously published indices on performance assessment presented in *Government at a Glance 2011* and *2017* and should not be compared to previous results.

See the Annex F for further country-specific information as well as details on the methodology and factors used in constructing the index.

Further reading

OECD (2025 forthcoming), *Public Employment and Management 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD (2023), *Public Employment and Management 2023: Towards a More Flexible Public Service*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5b378e11-en.

OECD (2021), *Public Employment and Management 2021: The Future of the Public Service*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/938f0d65-en.

Figure notes

Data for Colombia, Iceland and the United States are not available.

Figure 14.1. Index of delegation of human resources management activities in central administrations, 2024



Source: OECD (2024), Public Service Leadership and Capability Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/m9c01l

Table 14.1. Body responsible for human resource management practices in central administrations 2024

Country	Responsible for people management and HRM policies	Setting annual budget envelope for non-senior staff compensation/ remuneration	Determining and updating pay scales	Determining and updating benefits	Running the recruitment of public servants	Onboarding new staff	External branding and communications	Deciding on the number and type of positions/roles to open	Producing workforce plans
Australia	◆■	◆■	◆■	◆■	■	■▲	◆■	■	■▲
Austria	◆■	◆	◆	■	◆■	■	◆■	◆	◆
Belgium	◆■	◆	◆	◆	◆■	■	◆■	■	■
Canada	◆■	■	❖	❖	■	■	◆■	■	■
Chile	◆■	◆	◆	◆	◆	■	❖	◆■	◆
Costa Rica	◆■	◆	◆	◆❖	◆■	■	■	◆	■
Czechia	◆■	■	◆	◆■	■	◆■	■	■	■
Denmark	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Estonia	◆■	■	◆■	■	■	■	◆■	■	◆■
Finland	◆■	■	■	◆	■	◆■	◆■	■	■
France	◆■	◆■	◆■	◆	◆■	■▲	◆■	■	◆■
Germany	◆■	◆	◆	◆	■	■	◆■	■	■
Greece	◆■	◆	◆	◆	◆❖	◆■	◆	◆■▲❖	◆■
Hungary	◆■	◆■	◆■	◆■	☒	■	☒	■	◆
Ireland	◆■	◆	◆	◆	■❖	■	■❖	■	■
Israel	◆■	◆	◆	◆	◆■	◆■	◆■	◆	◆■
Italy	◆■	◆	◆	◆	◆■	☒	☒	■	■
Japan	◆■	◆	◆	◆	■	■	☒	■	◆
Korea	◆■	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆■	◆■	■	◆
Latvia	◆■	■	◆	◆	■	■▲	◆■	■❖	◆■
Lithuania	◆■	◆	■	■	◆■	✧	■	■	◆■
Luxembourg	◆■	◆	◆	◆	◆■	■	◆❖	■❖	■
Mexico	◆■	◆■	◆	◆❖	■	◆■	■	◆■	◆■
Netherlands	◆■	◆	◆	◆	◆▲	▲	❖	■▲	◆▲
New Zealand	◆■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	◆■
Norway	◆■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Poland	◆■	◆■	◆	■	■	■	◆	■	◆
Portugal	■	❖	❖	❖	▲❖	▲	▲	■▲	▲
Slovak Republic	◆■	◆■	◆	◆■	■	■	■	■	◆■
Slovenia	◆■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Spain	◆■	◆	◆	■	◆■	✧	◆■	◆	◆
Sweden	■	☒	☒	❖	■▲	■▲	■	■▲	■
Switzerland	◆■	■	◆	◆	■	■	◆	■	■
Türkiye	◆■	◆	◆	◆	■	■	◆■	◆	◆■
United Kingdom	◆■	◆■	◆■	◆■	◆■	◆■	◆■	◆■	◆■
OECD Total									
◆ Central HRM body	33	23	26	23	14	7	17	10	19
■ Ministry	35	17	11	14	29	29	24	30	26
▲ Team or work unit		0	0	0	3	9	1	4	3
❖ other		1	2	5	3	0	4	3	0
☒ Not applicable		1	1	0	1	1	4	0	0
Bulgaria	◆■	■	◆■	◆■	■	■	■	■	■
Brazil	◆■	◆	◆	◆	■	■	◆■	◆	◆■
Croatia	◆■	◆	◆	❖	■	■	■	■	■
Romania	◆■	◆■	◆	◆	◆■	■	◆■	■	◆

Source: OECD (2024), Public Service Leadership and Capability Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/p4f5vj

14.2. Civil service oversight institutions

The civil service is expected to uphold core values such as legality, integrity, fairness and merit, and operate without undue influence or interference in their management of people. The bodies that oversee the effective functioning of the civil service system and ensure adherence to these values are therefore essential. These institutions carry out key policy-setting, advisory, investigative and enforcement roles. Central human resource management (HRM) bodies typically fulfil the policy-setting and advisory functions, helping to co-ordinate public employment practices and transformations across ministries. Investigative functions – typically performed by merit or disciplinary boards – create accountability by obliging ministries to provide information, clarify, explain or justify conduct or employment decisions (OECD, 2020). Finally, enforcement functions – typically performed by administrative tribunals and some disciplinary boards encourage compliance and deter misconduct through the threat of disciplinary action or penalties. There is no one single approach to overseeing civil services and countries vary both in the number of oversight institutions (Figure 14.3) and their functions (Figure 14.2).

Most OECD countries (30 out of 35, 86%) have a central HRM body, the majority of which (28 out of 30, 93%) operate in an advisory capacity. The next most common are non-judicial entities (25 out of 35, 71%) and special judicial or administrative tribunals (22 out of 35, 63%). Standalone merit protection boards or other merit-related oversight institutions are not common (9 out of 35, 26%) even though widespread delegation of recruitment activities to ministries could enable different interpretations of rules and processes to emerge. In some countries which lack such a body, responsibility for merit protection lies with other relevant authorities. In Chile, for example, the Comptroller General of the Republic carries out merit protection functions while in Sweden the National Board of Appeals, a judicial or administrative tribunal, also reviews appeals against employment decisions. Similarly, few OECD countries (8 out of 35, 23%) have an independent civil service commission although these are more common in countries with parliamentary systems based on the UK model. Such commissions typically operate beyond an advisory capacity, but also have investigative and, in some cases, enforcement powers. Regardless of approach, upholding shared values and protecting against undue influence requires institutions to have the power to investigate and, at times, to intervene (OECD, 2020). Across OECD countries, oversight powers are generally quite strong with 31 out of 35 countries (89%) having at least one institution with investigative functions and 28 (80%) with enforcement functions (Figure 14.2).

The leadership arrangements of oversight institutions are crucial to their effectiveness, as they can significantly influence both their independence and their functionality. Political appointments of heads – by parliament, ministers or the prime minister – are common across OECD countries, occurring in 30 out of 35 countries (86%). However, the extent of political appointments varies within countries (Figure 14.3).

The length of appointments is one way to balance political alignment with the long-term independence of such institutions In OECD countries where political appointments are prevalent, it is rare for the heads of oversight institutions to hold permanent positions (Figure 14.3). Heads of civil service commissions, which often perform a wide range of functions, and non-judicial entities rarely have permanent appointments. In contrast, such appointments are more common in special judicial or administrative tribunals.

Methodology and definitions

Data are drawn from the 2024 OECD Survey on Public Service Leadership and Capability module on HRM Institutions, with response from 35 OECD countries as well as the OECD accession countries Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. Respondents were predominately senior officials in central government HRM departments, and data refer to HRM practices in central government in 2024. Countries use different definitions for the civil service and the organisations governed at the central level of government, which should be considered when making comparisons. The terms public and civil service/servants are used interchangeably throughout this chapter.

Responses identified the functions performed by the country's relevant oversight institutions over public employment laws and policies from a choice of advisory (issuing guidance and advice) investigative/adjudicative (investigating and making decisions) and enforcement (issuing and implementing sanctions). Multiple functions could be selected for each.

Further reading

OECD (2025 forthcoming), *Public Employment and Management 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD (2020), *OECD Public Integrity Handbook*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac8ed8e8-en.

Figure notes

Data for Colombia, Iceland and the United States are not available.

Figure 14.2. "Other" reflects results for institutions where only the only function type selected was "other". Where other functions were included, only these are displayed

Figure 14.3. Fixed appointments of over five years are omitted.

Figure 14.2. Functions of civil service oversight institutions, 2024

OECD countries



Source: OECD (2024), Public Service Leadership and Capability Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/sp209q

Figure 14.3. Oversight institutions, politically appointed heads and selected appointment lengths, 2024



Source: OECD (2024), Public Service Leadership and Capability Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/bucwp2

14.3. Performance assessments in central administrations

Effective performance management systems help civil service managers achieve their objectives by aligning their employees' actions with the goals of their teams, organisations and the whole civil service. These processes support talent management and employee development by identifying leadership potential and/or skill gaps across the civil service. When implemented effectively, performance management incentivises employees by linking their efforts to organisational goals and outcomes for the public. Aligning reward and recognition mechanisms to performance in this way helps managers to uphold principles of fairness and merit in promotions and pay decisions. Finally, by supporting transparent communication of performance information, performance systems can also create accountability to the public and elected officials.

The index on standardised performance assessments in central administrations captures how widely performance assessments are used, including whether standard tools are in place, and how frequently they are applied. The average score across OECD countries is 0.52 (on a scale of 0 to 1), suggesting that regular, mandatory performance assessments are common. However, countries vary considerably, with individual scores ranging from 0.03 to 0.9 (Figure 14.4). Most OECD countries with information available (28 out of 35, 80%) have mandatory formal performance assessment of all or most central government staff, regardless of their grade. In Finland, performance assessment is mandatory for senior managers but not for all staff. In those OECD countries where performance assessments are not mandatory (5 out of 35, 14%), they may be carried out at the discretion of the organisation, as for example in Denmark, Hungary or Sweden (Table 14.2).

The use of standard tools to measure performance across all ministries and agencies improves the comparability of information, supports mobility and enables system-wide initiatives to develop performance management capabilities, particularly among managers. Most OECD countries (29 of 35, 83%) have at least one standard method for assessing performance across all ministries, although the number of common tools varies. While using multiple tools can help build robust performance data, their effectiveness depends on the capabilities of the managers who use them, both in assessing performance and in acting on the outcomes of these assessments. Timely feedback is important for recognising, motivating and developing staff, and supports the efficacy of performance assessment regardless of the tools used. Across OECD countries, the most widespread performance assessment tools in regular use (i.e. at least once a year) involve a manager and typically occur on an annual basis. These include individual meetings or check-ins (used in 26 out of 35 countries, 74%) and written feedback (21 out of 35, 60%). Conversely, 360-degree feedback is least likely to be in regular use (4 out of 35 countries, 11%) (Table 14.2).

Methodology and definitions

Data are drawn from the 2024 OECD Survey on Public Service Leadership and Capability module on Performance Management. With responses from 35 OECD countries as well as the OECD accession countries Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. Respondents were predominately senior officials in central government HRM departments, and data refer to HRM practices in central government in 2024. Countries use different definitions for the civil service and the organisations governed at the central level of government, which should be considered when making comparisons. The terms public and civil service/servants are used interchangeably throughout this chapter.

The index on performance assessment is composed of three variables: *existence of a mandatory formalised performance assessment*; *count of tools used in all central government ministries*; and *frequency with which these tools are used*. The overall index ranges from 0 (no use) to 1 (high use). The variables composing the index and their relative importance are based on expert judgements and weighted equally. The current index differs from previously published indices on performance assessment presented in *Government at a Glance 2011* and *2017* and should not be compared to previous results. See the Annex F online for further country-specific information as well as details on the methodology and factors used in constructing the index.

Further reading

OECD (2025 forthcoming), *Public Employment and Management 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD (2023), *Public Employment and Management 2023: Towards a More Flexible Public Service*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5b378e11-en.

OECD (2021), *Public Employment and Management 2021: The Future of the Public Service*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/938f0d65-en.

Figure notes

Data for Colombia, Iceland and the United States are not available. In Denmark, Sweden, and Türkiye, performance assessments are not mandatory for any category of public servants. In Denmark and Sweden, the types and frequency of tools used is at the discretion of ministries while in Türkiye, a legal framework is currently underway.

Figure 14.4. Index on the use of standardised performance assessments in central administrations, 2024



Source: OECD (2024), Public Service Leadership and Capability Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/1fk270

Table 14.2. Performance assessment tools and their use, 2024

Country	Mandatory performance appraisal	At least 1 standardised tool used in all ministries	Individual meetings or check-ins with immediate superior or up to two levels above	Employees set performance objectives and goals with manager approval/validation	Employee self-evaluation of performance	Written feedback from a superior	Individual learning plans	360-degree feedback
Australia	●	✓	▲	▲	☐	■	☐	☐
Austria	●	✓	▲	▲	☒	☒	▲	☒
Belgium	●	✓	▲	▲	☐	▲	☐	☐
Canada	●	✓	◆	☒	▲	■	▲	☒
Chile	●	✓	■	▲	☐	▲	☐	☒
Costa Rica	●	✓	▲	☒	■	▲	☒	☒
Czechia	●	✓	☐	▲	☐	☐	▲	☒
Denmark	⌘	☒	▲	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒
Estonia	●	✓	▲	▲	☐	☐	☐	☐
Finland	❍	✓	▲	▲	▲	☐	☐	☐
France	●	☒	▲	☐	☐	▲	☐	☐
Germany	●	✓	▲	☒	☒	❖	▲	☐
Greece	●	✓	◆	■	▲	▲	◆	▲
Hungary	⌘	✓	☐	☒	☐	☐	▲	☒
Ireland	●	✓	◆	■	■	■	■	❖
Israel	●	✓	▲	▲	☒	▲	☒	☒
Italy	●	✓	☐	▲	☒	▲	☐	☒
Japan	●	✓	■	■	■	☒	☒	▲
Korea	●	✓	■	▲	☒	■	▲	▲
Latvia	●	✓	▲	▲	▲	▲	☐	☐
Lithuania	●	✓	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	❖
Luxembourg	●	✓	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	☐
Mexico	●	☒	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲
Netherlands	●	✓	◆	▲	▲	▲	☐	☐
New Zealand	⌘	✓	■	▲	▲	☐	☐	☐
Norway	●	✓	☐	❖	❖	❖	☐	☐
Poland	●	✓	❖	☒	☒	❖	❖	☒
Portugal	●	✓	❖	☒	❖	❖	☐	☒
Slovak Republic	●	✓	▲	☒	☒	▲	▲	☒
Slovenia	●	✓	☒	☒	☒	▲	☒	☒
Spain	●	☒	▲	☒	☒	▲	☒	☒
Sweden	⌘	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Switzerland	●	✓	▲	☒	☒	▲	☒	☒
Türkiye	⌘	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
United Kingdom	●	✓	◆	▲	◆	◆	▲	▲
OECD Total								
● Mandatory for all or most	28							
❍ Mandatory for some	1							
⌘ Not mandatory	5							
✓ Used in all ministries		29						
◆ Three or more times a year			5	0	1	1	1	0
■ Twice a year			4	3	2	4	1	0
▲ Annually			17	17	9	16	11	4
❖ Every two years			2	1	2	4	1	3
☐ Ad hoc/Other			6	3	9	7	14	13
☒ Not used		6	1	11	11	3	7	15
Brazil	●	☒	☐	▲	▲	☐	☐	☒
Bulgaria	●	✓	■	■	■	■	▲	☒
Croatia	●	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒
Romania	●	✓	▲	☒	☒	▲	☒	☒

Source: OECD (2024), Public Service Leadership and Capability Survey.

StatLink https://stat.link/78i1d4

14.4. Employee engagement in central administrations

Engaged public employees report higher levels of well-being and perceive that their teams and organisations perform better. They are therefore likely to be more productive, which is important as they play a key role in designing and delivering policies and services for citizens (OECD, 2016). On the other hand, disengaged employees are more likely to leave their organisations, which means that organisations with low employee engagement can face challenges with higher turnover rates (OECD, 2025 forthcoming). Measuring employee engagement provides valuable insights into the effectiveness of the leadership and people management in public administrations.

The OECD Employee Engagement Index is a composite indicator used to measure employees' overall job satisfaction, motivation and commitment in eight OECD countries and two accession countries. It captures the levels of enthusiasm, sense of accomplishment, willingness to go beyond expectations and alignment with their organisations' mission among the employees of central administrations. The average index score ranges from 74.9 in Norway to 63.5 in Latvia, on a 0-100 scale (Figure 14.5). Employee engagement differs between managers and non-managers, with managers consistently displaying higher scores across all countries than those in non-managerial roles. The smallest difference in engagement levels between managers and non-managers was found in Latvia (3.4. p.p.) (Figure 14.6). These differences in could point to differences in the underlying drivers of engagement, as managers report greater satisfaction with both their leadership or management and their working conditions which in turn could influence their level of engagement (OECD, 2025 forthcoming).

One dimension of the OECD Employee Engagement Index is employees' sense of satisfaction and accomplishment. Figure 14.7 illustrates the share of public employees who report being satisfied with their job and having a sense of accomplishment. Job satisfaction was more widespread than a sense of accomplishment in all countries except the United Kingdom. The Netherlands had the largest share of employees who were satisfied with their jobs (85.5%), while Norway had the highest share reporting a sense of accomplishment (82.4%).

Latvia, Norway and the United Kingdom included the same two questions on job satisfaction and sense of accomplishment in their national employee surveys in 2022. Based on these results, all three countries showed an increase in the share of positive responses to both questions. The largest improvement was observed in job satisfaction in Latvia which increased by 28.9 p.p. over the two years (Figure 14.7). However, it is important to note that although the wording of the questions remained identical, they were asked as part of national surveys. As such, variations in the survey context and accompanying questions may influence the comparability of the results.

Methodology and definitions

Data are drawn from the 2024 EU/OECD standard EU Survey of Central Government Public Servants. In 2024, the survey was run in nine OECD countries – Belgium, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, the Netherlands, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic and the United Kingdom as well as the accession countries of Bulgaria and Croatia. These countries participated in a project funded by the European Commission's Technical Support Instrument, except for Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom where the relevant items were run in separate employee surveys. All surveys were conducted in the national languages of each country. State-owned enterprises, public corporations, and government-owned non-profit institutions were not included. The survey also excluded a range of front-line government workers such as government-employed doctors, nurses, teachers, police officers, judges, firefighters, and military personnel. Definitions of the civil service as well as the organisations governed at the central level of government differ across countries and should be considered when making comparisons. The terms public and civil service/servants are used interchangeably throughout this chapter.

The Employee Engagement Index refers to employees' perceptions of their engagement and is based on nine items relating to job satisfaction, organisational commitment, and a sense of pride and accomplishment. All items used a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree", The final index was rescaled from 0 (strongly disagree to all items) to 100 (strongly agree to all items). The number and type of employees who answered varies by country. For further details see StatLink.

Further reading

OECD (2025, forthcoming), W*orkforce Insights from Central Governments: Findings* of the 2024 EU/OECD Survey of Central Government Public Servants, OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD (2016), *Engaging Public Employees for a High-Performing Civil Service*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264267190-en.

Figure 14.5. Employee Engagement Index, 2024



Source: OECD (2024), Standard EU/OECD Survey of Central Government Public Servants.

StatLink https://stat.link/dnr1i0

Figure 14.6. Employee Engagement Index by managerial status, 2024



Source: OECD (2024), Standard EU/OECD Survey of Central Government Public Servants.

StatLink https://stat.link/vxtquk

Figure 14.7. Job satisfaction and sense of accomplishment among public servants, 2022 and 2024

Share of respondents who agree or strongly agree



Source: OECD (2024), Standard EU/OECD Survey of Central Government Public Servants.

StatLink https://stat.link/wrclxq

14.5. Perceptions of management and leadership quality in central administrations

Senior leaders in the public service are at the forefront of building effective and efficient public sector organisations that can deliver the government's priorities. They communicate the mission, priorities and direction of the organisation, and motivate employees to find innovative solutions to address citizens' needs. Managers play a pivotal role in bridging the divide between senior leaders and employees by helping to translate the strategic direction and priorities of the organisation into team and individual objectives. In doing so, managers help employees to feel connected and see how their work contributes to the organisation's wider purpose. They are also vital in communicating and reinforcing expected and valued behaviour and attitudes through feedback, rewards and recognition, and daily interactions, thereby upholding the culture of the organisation.

A survey of central administration employees in seven OECD countries and two accession countries found they had more positive perceptions of their immediate managers than of their organisation's senior leadership. The OECD Manager Index captures the extent to which employees agree that their immediate supervisor is supportive, acts with fairness and integrity, and provides feedback and delegates appropriately. The Senior Manager Index captures perceptions of how well senior leaders provide clear direction, communicate and manage well, promote co-operation, and act with integrity. Average scores for the Manager Index range from 66.6 in Denmark to 75.5 in Lithuania, on a 0-100 scale. In contrast, average scores in OECD countries for the Senior Leadership Index are about 10 percentage points lower, ranging from 56.1 in Slovenia to 64.9 in Latvia (Figure 14.8). This difference is probably due to the more frequent informal communication, greater visibility and closer relationships employees have with their line managers.

In addition to formal performance management (see Figure 14.4 in Section on "Performance assessments in central administrations"), managers can use informal performance management practices, including regular check-ins and feedback. Regular feedback from immediate supervisors is important for staff development while rewards and recognition are important for motivating employees and reinforcing desired behaviour. Figure 14.9 shows perceptions among central administration employees of their immediate supervisors' informal performance management practices by country. On average across the seven OECD countries surveyed, the share of employees who feel their supervisor provides helpful feedback (62%) and recognises and rewards good performance (63%) are comparable. In four out of seven countries (57%) respondents are more positive about their immediate supervisors' use of feedback than about their use of rewards and recognition. In contrast, in Denmark and Latvia, the shares are the other way around.

Methodology and definitions

Data are drawn from the 2024 EU/OECD standard EU Survey of Central Government Public Servants. Respondents were staff in central government organisations. In 2024, the survey was run in seven OECD countries – Belgium, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic as well as the accession countries of Bulgaria and Croatia. These countries participated in a project funded by the European Commission's Technical Support Instrument, except for Denmark where the relevant items were run in a separate employee survey. All surveys were conducted in the national languages of each country. State-owned enterprises, public corporations, and government-owned non-profit institutions were not included in the survey. The survey also excluded a range of front-line government workers such as government-employed doctors, nurses, teachers, police officers, judges, firefighters, and military personnel. Definitions of the civil service as well as the organisations governed at the central level of government differ across countries and should be considered when making comparisons. The terms public and civil service/servants are used interchangeably throughout this chapter.

The Senior Leadership Index captures employees' perceptions of the senior leaders of their organisation and is based on 11 items relating to integrity, direction, recognition, co-operation and change management. The Manager Index captures employees' perceptions of their immediate supervisor and is based on 13 items relating to integrity, performance management, support, interpersonal skills and delegation. All items used a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree". The final indexes were rescaled from 0 (strongly disagree to all items) to 100 (strongly agree to all items). The number and type of employees who answered varies by country. For further details see StatLink.

Further reading

OECD (2025 forthcoming), W*orkforce Insights from Central Governments: Findings of the 2024 EU/OECD Survey of Central Government Public Servants*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Figure notes

Figure 14.9. Data refer to the results of items from the Manager Index that relate to performance management.

Figure 14.8. Senior leadership and immediate manager indices, 2024



Source: OECD (2024), Standard EU/OECD Survey of Central Government Public Servants.

StatLink https://stat.link/ylxfi8

Figure 14.9. Perceptions of performance management efforts from managers, 2024



Source: OECD (2024), Standard EU/OECD Survey of Central Government Public Servants.

StatLink https://stat.link/mb89g5

Chapter 15. Public spending

15.1. General government expenditures

Governments allocate public resources across a wide range of activities—from administering justice and maintaining infrastructure to delivering healthcare, education, and social protection. While the level of public provision of goods and services varies significantly between countries depending on policy choices, priorities and political systems and traditions, the general government expenditures capture the totality of financial commitments across all levels of government. These expenditures not only indicate current policy priorities and the structure of service provision, but also provide a basis for assessing the effectiveness and sustainability of public action. For policy makers, understanding the composition and evolution of public spending is key to designing responsive, equitable, and efficient public policies that meet citizens' needs.

General government expenditures across the OECD averaged 42.6% of GDP in 2023 (Figure 15.1), confirming a declining trend after the 2020 peak at 48.3% of GDP due to the large-scale fiscal stimuluses deployed by governments to counteract the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on their economies (Figure 15.2). However, levels remain above 2019 ones for most OECD countries, except for Norway (-4.3 p.p.), Denmark (-3p.p.), Australia (-3.0 p.p.), Ireland (-1.1 p.p), Sweden (-0.3 p.p.) and Portugal (-0.2 p.p.) and Switzerland (-0.1 p.p.). Overall, between 2019 and 2023, public spending as a percentage of GDP decreased in 7 of 38 OECD countries, with Italy (-3.4 p.p.) and Hungary (-2.3 p.p.) reporting the largest decreases. Between 2023 and 2024, public spending decreased as a share of GDP in 9 out of 28 OECD countries for which 2024 data are available.

On average public spending in OECD countries that are also EU members was at 49.3% of GDP in 2024, above the OECD average, with Finland (57.5%), France (57.2%) and Austria (56.3%) displaying the highest levels. If these numbers still indicate a reduction compared to 2020 and 2021 figures, the level of public spending in EU countries has been influenced by the fiscal measures taken to mitigate the impact of increasing energy prices in 2023 and 2024 (Eurostat, 2025).

In 2023, general government spending per capita averaged USD 22 800 at purchasing power parity (PPP) across OECD countries (Figure 15.3), ranging from USD 5 687 PPP in Mexico to USD 65 697 PPP in Luxembourg. Between 2019 and 2023, spending per capita increased on average by USD 4 382 PPP with the largest increases in Norway (USD 22 654 PPP) and Luxembourg (USD 10 305 PPP). Across OECD countries also part of the EU, it increased from USD 22 954 PPP in 2019 to USD 27 305 PPP in 2023, also partly due to the energy prices support in 2023.

Methodology and definitions

General government expenditures data are from the *OECD National Accounts Statistics* (database), which are based on the *System of National Accounts* (SNA), a set of internationally agreed concepts, definitions, classifications and rules for national accounting. The 2008 SNA framework has been implemented by all OECD countries (see Annex G for details on reporting systems and sources). In SNA terminology, general government consists of central, state and local governments and social security funds. Expenditures encompass intermediate consumption, compensation of employees, subsidies, property income (including interest spending), social benefits, other current expenditures (mainly current transfers) and capital expenditures (capital transfers and investments). Gross domestic product (GDP) is the standard measure of the value of the goods and services produced by a country during a period. Government expenditures per capita were calculated by converting total government expenditures to USD using the OECD/Eurostat purchasing power parities (PPP) for GDP and dividing by population of the country. PPP is the number of units of country B's currency needed to buy the same quantity of goods and services in country A.

Further reading

OECD (2025), *OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report March 2025: Steering through Uncertainty*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/89af4857-en.

Eurostat (2025), Government expenditure function by COFOG, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Government_expenditure_by_function_%E2%80%93_COFOG.

Minarik, J. (2023), "Targeting public spending: Means-testing and user charging" in OECD (2023), *OECD Journal on Budgeting, Volume 2023 Issue 3*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ec1d2b4e-en.

Figure notes

Data for Chile and Türkiye are not included in the OECD average.

Figure 15.1 and Figure 15.3. Data for Brazil are for 2021 rather than 2023.

Figure 15.1 and Figure 15.3. Data for Indonesia are for 2022 rather than 2023.

Figure J.10.1 (Annual growth rate of real government expenditures per capita, 2019-20, 2020-22, 2022-23 and 2023-24) is available online in Annex J.

Figure 15.1. General government expenditures as a percentage of GDP, 2019, 2023 and 2024



Source: *OECD National Accounts Statistics* (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/hogy3j

Figure 15.2. General government expenditures as a percentage of GDP, 2007 to 2024



Source: *OECD National Accounts Statistics* (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/stp0k7

Figure 15.3. General government expenditures per capita, 2019, 2023 and 2024



Source: *OECD National Accounts Statistics* (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/h2p4xf

15.2. Government expenditure by function (COFOG)

Analysing government expenditure by function provides a detailed picture of how public funds are distributed across key areas such as health, education, defence, or social protection, therefore revealing the relative weight governments assign to different aspects of public service provision. It also sheds light on preferred delivery modes, indicating whether services are primarily provided through public institutions or in partnership with private actors. For policy makers, functional expenditure data is a vital tool for evaluating the alignment between resource allocation and strategic objectives, tracking changes in priorities over time, and comparing practices across countries. Ultimately, it offers a window into how governments translate their responsibilities into tangible public action and allocate resources to respond to societal needs and policy priorities.

Social protection, covering pensions and sickness, disability and unemployment benefits, accounted on average for the largest share of public spending across OECD countries in 2023 (13.4% of GDP), even higher (19.3% of GDP) in countries also part of the EU (Table 15.1). This level remained stable since 2019, with an average increase of 0.1 p.p. for both groups. However, within OECD countries, this share varies from 7.9% of GDP in 2023 in the United States to 25.7% in Finland, reflecting different institutional models. Between 2019 and 2023, the largest decrease in social protection spending occurred in Norway (-2.1 p.p.) explained by the GDP growth outpacing the growth of while the largest increase was observed in Korea (+1.8 p.p.) (Online Table J.10.1).

In 2023, healthcare, mainly covering hospital and patient services and medical products and equipment, accounted for the second largest share of public expenditure across the OECD (8.4% of GDP) with a 0.5 p.p. increase since 2019, partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021. The lowest share is to be found in Switzerland (2.2% of GDP) and Hungary (4.0%), the highest in Colombia (10.3%) and the United States (10.1%), with differences in the level of spending across countries partially reflecting preferences for public or private health schemes.

At the opposite, spending on environmental protection represents the lowest share of public spending across all functions in 2023, accounting on average for 0.5% of GDP in OECD countries and 0.8% in OECD-EU member countries, a share that has remained stable since 2019. Greece (1.5% of GDP representing a 0.2 p.p. increase since 2019) has spent the most in this category in 2023. In 2023, OECD and EU member countries have allocated most of spending on environmental protection to waste management (0.36% of GDP), wastewater management (0.15%) and pollution abatement (0.14%), while protection of biodiversity only gathered 0.08% of GDP in public financing (Table 15.2).

Overall, while the allocation of public spending across functions has remained relatively stable between 2019 and 2023, spending on education, representing on average 4.9% of GDP in OECD countries in 2023, has seen the largest decrease (-0.2 p.p.). On the contrary, spending on general public services including the service of public debt has experienced the largest increase (+0.7 p.p.) and reached 6.0% of GDP in 2023.

Methodology and definitions

Expenditures data are derived from the *OECD National Accounts Statistics* (database) and *Eurostat Government Finance Statistics* (database), which are based on the *System of National Accounts* (SNA), a set of internationally agreed concepts, definitions, classifications and rules for national accounting. The 2008 SNA framework has been implemented by all OECD countries (see Annex G). Data on expenditures are disaggregated according to the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG), which divides expenditures into ten functions (I level): general public services; defence; public order and safety; economic affairs; environmental protection; housing and community amenities; health; recreation, culture and religion; education; and social protection. Within these functions, environmental protection expenditures are further divided into six sub-functions: waste management, waste water management, pollution abatement, protection of biodiversity and landscape, R&D environmental protection; and environmental protection n.e.c. (not elsewhere classified). See Annex I for more information about the types of expenditures included.

Further reading

OECD (2025), *OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report March 2025: Steering through Uncertainty*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/89af4857-en.

OECD (2024), "Green budgeting in the Government of Canada", *OECD Papers on Budgeting*, No. 2024/03, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1a110ac3-en.

Barnes, S., B. Cournède and J. Pascal (2023), "Do governments re-prioritise spending?: First insights from COFOG data on public spending reallocation in OECD countries", *OECD Economics Department Working Papers*, No. 1785, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/56dda017-en.

Figure notes

Table 15.1. Data for Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica are not included in the OECD average.

Table 15.1. Data for Canada, Mexico, New Zealand and Türkiye are not available.

Data for Costa Rica refer to 2021 rather than 2023.

Table 15.1. Data for Korea refer to 2022 rather than 2023.

Table 15.2. Data for several OECD non-European countries are not available.

Table J.10.1 (Change in general government expenditures by function as a percentage of GDP, 2019 to 2023), Table J.10.2 (Structure of general government expenditure by function, 2023 and change 2019 to 2023), and Table J.10.3 (Structure of general government expenditures by function of environmental protection, 2023 and change 2019 to 2023) are available online in Annex J.

Table 15.1. General government expenditures by function as a percentage of GDP, 2023

Country	General public services	Defence	Public order and safety	Economic affairs	Environmental protection	Housing and community amenities	Health	Recreation, culture and religion	Education	Social protection
Australia	4.3	2.3	2.0	5.3	0.9	0.6	7.6	0.9	5.7	10.6
Austria	5.7	0.6	1.4	7.4	0.6	0.4	9.1	1.2	4.9	21.4
Belgium	6.8	0.9	1.7	6.8	1.2	0.4	7.9	1.2	6.3	20.1
Chile	2.8	0.8	1.7	2.8	0.2	0.9	5.5	0.5	4.5	8.6
Colombia	11.7	1.0	2.2	4.1	0.6	0.7	11.3	0.7	3.8	12.1
Costa Rica	4.1	0.0	2.4	2.4	0.3	0.6	6.5	0.2	6.6	8.1
Czechia	4.6	1.2	1.8	6.4	0.8	0.9	8.9	1.3	4.5	13.5
Denmark	5.8	1.8	0.9	2.9	0.4	0.2	8.2	1.5	5.5	19.5
Estonia	4.2	2.7	1.9	4.9	0.7	0.5	6.5	2.0	6.3	13.5
Finland	6.6	1.4	1.2	4.6	0.2	0.5	7.6	1.7	6.3	25.7
France	6.2	1.8	1.7	6.3	1.0	1.3	8.9	1.5	5.0	23.4
Germany	6.1	1.1	1.6	5.8	0.6	0.5	7.5	1.0	4.5	19.7
Greece	8.2	2.2	1.9	5.9	1.5	0.4	5.8	1.1	4.0	18.5
Hungary	10.2	1.9	1.7	9.2	0.6	1.6	4.0	2.6	5.2	12.2
Iceland	8.8	0.1	1.6	4.9	0.7	0.6	8.2	3.0	6.7	10.8
Ireland	2.2	0.2	0.8	2.0	0.4	0.6	5.2	0.5	2.8	8.1
Israel	4.7	6.1	1.5	2.9	0.6	-0.2	5.2	1.4	6.5	11.3
Italy	7.4	1.2	1.7	5.8	0.9	4.3	6.5	0.8	3.9	21.1
Japan	3.6	1.1	1.2	4.9	1.1	0.6	8.1	0.4	3.2	16.1
Korea	4.9	2.6	1.2	5.7	1.1	1.2	5.6	1.0	4.8	9.0
Latvia	3.9	3.1	2.6	6.4	0.5	0.9	5.3	1.3	6.1	13.5
Lithuania	3.4	2.5	1.2	3.3	0.5	0.7	5.3	1.2	5.1	14.0
Luxembourg	5.5	0.5	1.3	6.2	1.1	0.6	5.5	1.3	5.0	19.8
Netherlands	3.6	1.3	1.8	5.1	1.5	0.6	7.0	1.1	4.9	16.2
Norway	5.0	1.8	1.0	5.6	1.0	0.8	8.0	1.5	4.6	17.5
Poland	4.9	2.0	2.3	7.5	0.7	0.7	5.7	1.3	4.9	16.8
Portugal	5.8	0.8	1.6	4.4	0.8	0.5	6.7	0.9	4.3	16.6
Slovak	5.5	1.2	2.4	7.4	0.9	0.5	6.6	1.1	5.0	17.5
Slovenia	4.6	1.2	1.6	6.3	0.9	0.5	7.4	1.5	5.4	17.0
Spain	5.7	0.9	1.8	5.0	1.0	0.5	6.6	1.2	4.2	18.5
Sweden	5.2	1.8	1.4	5.0	0.6	0.8	7.3	1.4	7.2	18.7
Switzerland	4.2	0.9	1.6	3.9	0.5	0.2	2.2	1.0	5.6	13.1
United	6.4	2.2	2.2	4.9	0.7	0.9	8.7	0.6	4.8	15.4
United States	6.9	3.0	1.9	3.2	0.0	0.5	10.1	0.2	5.4	7.9
OECD	6.0	2.2	1.7	4.6	0.5	0.8	8.4	0.7	4.9	13.4
OECD-EU	5.9	1.3	1.7	5.8	0.8	1.2	7.2	1.2	4.7	19.3
Bulgaria	3.2	1.5	2.6	5.7	0.7	1.0	5.5	0.8	4.1	13.8
Croatia	4.8	1.3	2.2	7.8	0.8	1.6	7.8	2.0	5.3	13.0
Romania	5.4	1.7	2.7	6.5	0.7	1.5	4.7	1.0	3.3	12.8

Source: *OECD National Accounts Statistics* (database) and *Eurostat Government Finance Statistics* (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/c4j0lv

Table 15.2. General government expenditures by function of environmental protection as a percentage of GDP, 2023

Country	Waste management	Waste water management	Pollution abatement	Protection of biodiversity and landscape	R&D environmental protection	Environmental protection n.e.c.
Australia	0.11	0.05	0.22	0.14	0.00	0.39
Austria	0.08	0.08	0.32	0.02	0.02	0.05
Belgium	0.39	0.14	0.38	0.07	0.02	0.22
Colombia	0.03	0.11	0.06	0.12	0.01	0.24
Costa Rica	0.20	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.05
Czechia	0.33	0.21	0.03	0.20	0.03	0.04
Denmark	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.18	0.02	0.12
Estonia	0.32	0.06	0.05	0.09	0.06	0.15
Finland	0.02	0.00	0.07	0.05	0.04	0.04
France	0.53	0.18	0.14	0.07	0.05	0.05
Germany	0.17	0.13	0.14	0.06	0.04	0.05
Greece	0.86	0.10	0.56	0.00	0.00	0.01
Hungary	0.22	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.00	0.22
Iceland	0.46	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.01	0.09
Ireland	0.02	0.18	0.11	0.02	0.01	0.02
Israel	0.45	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.03
Italy	0.54	0.04	0.09	0.14	0.08	0.02
Japan	0.45	0.53	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.06
Latvia	0.24	0.03	0.11	0.03	0.00	0.09
Lithuania	0.21	0.02	0.14	0.06	0.00	0.12
Luxembourg	0.19	0.41	0.31	0.13	0.00	0.06
Netherlands	0.63	0.38	0.28	0.14	0.03	0.03
Norway	0.21	0.37	0.23	0.04	0.03	0.06
Poland	0.12	0.23	0.15	0.03	0.02	0.12
Portugal	0.22	0.12	0.19	0.09	0.09	0.05
Slovak Republic	0.45	0.07	0.13	0.09	0.00	0.18
Slovenia	0.06	0.40	0.28	0.06	0.05	0.09
Spain	0.57	0.15	0.04	0.13	0.04	0.05
Sweden	0.13	0.22	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.21
Switzerland	0.14	0.24	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.04
United Kingdom	0.55	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.08
OECD-EU	0.36	0.15	0.14	0.08	0.04	0.06
Bulgaria	0.58	0.02	..	0.01	0.00	0.07
Croatia	0.32	0.23	0.04	0.13	0.02	0.08
Romania	0.37	0.10	0.19	0.00	0.00	0.05

Source: *OECD National Accounts Statistics* (database) and *Eurostat Government Finance Statistics* (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/0myift

15.3. Structure of government expenditures by economic transaction

Analysing government expenditures by economic transaction breaks down public spending according to the nature of the economic activity it supports (e.g. employee compensation, intermediate consumption, subsidies, or social transfers). Unlike functional classifications, which organise expenditures by policy area, this approach focuses on the type of transaction, offering insight into how governments deploy resources to produce goods and services or redistribute income. This distinction helps policy makers analyse the operational mechanics of public spending—such as the balance between in-house service delivery and outsourcing, or the extent of direct income support. As such, this classification is instrumental in evaluating fiscal sustainability, public sector efficiency, and the broader macroeconomic implications of government activity.

In 2023, social benefits remained the largest share of government expenditure across the OECD (39.0% of total expenditures on average), with OECD countries also part of the EU accounting for an even larger share (43.4%) (Table 15.3). Japan, the Netherlands and Belgium largely exceed the OECD average, with their share of expenditure on social benefits amounting respectively to 51.6%, 47.3% and 47.0% of total expenditure, while in Iceland (19.4%) and Mexico (14.5%) this share was the lowest among OECD countries. Between 2019 and 2023, the share of expenditures on social benefits increased in 7 out of 37 countries for which data is available, with the highest increase observed in Mexico (+2 p.p.) and the largest decreases in Italy (-5 p.p.), Poland (-3.9 p.p.) and Greece (-3.7 p.p.).

The second largest category of government expenditures in 2023 remained employee compensation, representing on average 20.6% of total expenditures in OECD countries and 20.3% in countries also part of the EU. Chile (34.3% of total expenditures), Iceland (30.7%) and Mexico (28.9%) spent most on this category, while Japan (12.5%) and Colombia (13.9%), displayed the lowest shares. This disparity can be accounted for differences in the size of public service across countries, with Japan for instance having the smallest public employment share across OECD countries, significantly below OECD average (see Section on "Employment in general government" in Chapter 13). While the share of employee compensation in total government expenditure has decreased in all countries between 2019 and 2023, except Australia (+0.3 p.p.), the largest decrease has been observed in Costa Rica (-14.4 p.p.), bringing compensation of government employees in the country closer to OECD average, and reflecting the introduction of limits to public wages as part of the 2018 fiscal reform, with first effects observed in 2021, as well as the introduction of a single and unified salary framework as part of the 2022 public employment framework law (OECD, 2023).

Overall, the share of public spending on both social benefits and employee compensation has decreased on average since 2019 in both OECD (respectively by -1.2 p.p. and -1.8 p.p.) and OECD-EU member countries (respectively by -2.3 p.p. and -1.5 p.p.), while spending on other transactions, especially capital expenditures (+1.4 p.p. in OECD and +2.5 p.p. in OECD-EU countries), has increased.

Methodology and definitions

Expenditures data are derived from the *OECD National Accounts Statistics* (database), which are based on the *System of National Accounts* (SNA), a set of internationally agreed concepts, definitions, classifications and rules for national accounting. The 2008 SNA framework has been implemented by all OECD countries (see Annex G). Expenditures encompass the following economic transactions: intermediate consumption (i.e. goods and services that are consumed in a production process within the economic territory and during the accounting period); compensation of employees; subsidies; property income (mainly including interest spending); social benefits (consisting of social benefits other than social transfers in kind and of social transfers in kind provided to households via market producers); other current expenditures (mainly current transfers but also other minor expenditures as other taxes on production, current taxes on income and wealth etc. and the adjustment for the change in pension entitlements); and capital expenditures (i.e. capital transfers and investments). All these transactions at the level of general government are recorded on a consolidated basis (i.e. transactions between levels of government are netted out).

Further reading

Immervoll, H. (2024), "Financing social protection in OECD countries: Role and uses of revenue earmarking", *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers*, No. 312, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0d53155c-en.

OECD/KIPF (2024), *Addressing Inequality in Budgeting: Lessons from Recent Country Experience*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ea80d61d-en.

OECD (2023), *OECD Economic Surveys: Costa Rica 2023*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8e8171b0-en.

Figure notes

Data for Chile and Türkiye are not included in the OECD average.

Data for Brazil are for 2021 rather than 2023.

Data for Indonesia are for 2022 rather than 2023.

Table 15.3. Structure of government expenditures by economic transaction, 2023, 2024 and their change since 2019

% of total expenditures	Intermediate consumption			Compensation of employees			Subsidies			Property income (incl. interest)			Social benefits			Other current expenditures			Capital expenditures		
	2023	2024	Change 2019-23	2023	2024	Change 2019-23	2023	2024	Change 2019-23	2023	2024	Change 2019-23	2023	2024	Change 2019-23	2023	2024	Change 2019-23	2023	2024	Change 2019-23
Australia	20.5	..	0.6	22.7	..	0.3	3.1	..	-5.9	6.1	..	3.4	31.4	..	0.8	4.5	..	0.2	11.7	..	0.5
Austria	13.2	12.7	0.4	20.2	20.4	-1.4	4.3	3.5	1.0	2.3	2.7	-0.6	43.4	44.2	-1.4	7.2	7.2	0.4	9.3	9.3	1.6
Belgium	7.9	7.9	0.0	23.2	23.1	-0.5	7.0	6.6	-0.3	3.8	4.1	-0.1	47.0	47.4	0.0	3.9	3.6	0.2	7.2	7.4	0.7
Canada	18.0	17.1	0.6	28.4	28.0	-1.7	3.4	3.2	0.7	7.6	7.8	0.4	28.7	28.0	-0.9	4.0	3.7	0.5	10.1	12.1	0.3
Chile	..	..	..	34.3	..	-1.4	2.0	..	0.1	3.7	..	0.4	..	..	..	8.3	..	..	7.8	..	-0.9
Colombia	11.3	11.7	-1.2	13.9	14.5	-2.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	8.6	3.6	26.0	26.3	-1.4	30.9	32.3	2.6	7.9	6.6	-1.1
Costa Rica	7.6	..	-4.0	27.8	..	-14.4	0.0	..	0.0	14.5	..	5.2	13.2	..	-2.6	30.5	..	18.8	6.5	..	-2.9
Czechia	12.9	13.6	-1.4	22.1	22.5	-2.1	6.2	4.5	0.8	3.0	3.1	1.3	38.7	39.8	1.4	4.8	4.5	0.0	12.4	11.9	0.0
Denmark	17.3	17.5	0.1	30.3	30.3	-0.1	2.7	2.7	-0.6	1.4	1.6	-0.1	33.2	33.1	-1.4	6.3	5.9	0.0	8.8	8.9	2.1
Estonia	14.7	14.5	-1.8	26.8	28.0	-0.7	2.2	1.5	0.2	0.8	1.3	0.7	33.6	34.3	-1.9	5.4	4.1	0.9	16.5	16.3	2.6
Finland	20.7	20.2	2.0	23.6	23.3	-0.3	1.9	2.0	-0.2	2.1	2.7	0.5	38.6	38.9	-1.8	4.8	4.3	0.0	8.3	8.5	-0.2
France	9.8	9.6	0.4	21.5	21.7	-0.8	4.4	3.5	1.3	3.3	3.6	0.5	44.1	44.8	-2.0	6.7	6.4	0.2	10.2	10.4	0.3
Germany	13.0	13.3	0.7	16.7	16.7	-1.0	4.2	2.6	1.2	1.8	2.1	0.1	50.3	51.3	-2.1	4.6	4.2	-0.2	9.4	9.8	1.4
Greece	11.1	10.8	1.2	21.1	21.5	-3.7	3.8	2.9	1.0	6.8	7.2	0.6	41.2	40.4	-3.7	2.9	3.1	-0.3	13.1	14.0	5.1
Hungary	17.8	17.5	-1.2	19.8	22.1	-3.0	5.6	4.5	3.1	9.5	10.6	4.7	24.3	25.6	-1.9	8.9	7.2	1.8	14.2	12.5	-3.6
Iceland	20.7	20.7	0.3	30.7	30.4	-2.1	3.0	3.0	0.4	11.8	8.7	1.9	19.4	19.9	-2.0	4.0	4.3	0.1	10.5	12.9	1.4
Ireland	16.6	16.1	2.3	27.1	27.2	-0.4	2.2	2.2	-0.1	3.0	2.6	-2.3	34.2	34.0	-1.3	4.6	4.3	0.8	12.3	13.6	1.0
Israel	16.6	..	-0.7	25.3	..	-0.7	2.7	..	0.4	7.3	..	2.0	24.3	..	0.7	11.0	..	-1.0	12.7	..	-0.6
Italy	10.4	11.6	-1.1	16.4	17.7	-3.5	3.4	3.3	0.0	6.8	7.7	-0.1	41.6	44.8	-5.0	4.4	4.3	-0.2	17.1	10.6	10.0
Japan	11.0	..	1.3	12.5	..	-1.3	3.4	..	2.0	3.4	..	-0.6	51.6	..	-3.1	6.2	..	2.4	12.0	..	-0.6
Korea	10.9	..	0.3	18.6	..	-1.9	1.7	..	-0.3	3.6	..	0.2	34.9	..	2.0	12.6	..	1.8	17.7	..	-2.1
Latvia	14.2	13.9	-2.3	27.9	28.9	-0.4	4.7	1.6	2.5	1.7	2.4	-0.2	31.0	33.0	-0.3	5.6	5.8	-1.0	15.0	14.5	1.8
Lithuania	10.7	11.1	-1.6	28.0	29.3	-1.3	1.7	0.9	0.6	1.6	2.1	-1.1	39.6	39.0	-0.2	5.3	5.2	0.7	13.1	12.5	2.9
Luxembourg	9.6	9.8	-0.3	23.2	23.8	-0.4	3.3	2.9	0.8	0.6	0.7	-0.1	41.2	41.5	-1.6	8.8	8.3	0.5	13.2	13.1	1.1
Mexico	11.3	..	0.2	28.9	..	-0.7	1.2	..	-0.2	12.2	..	2.2	14.5	..	2.2	18.5	..	-4.1	13.3	..	0.4
Netherlands	14.6	15.1	0.6	19.3	19.7	-0.4	3.9	3.1	1.2	1.6	1.6	-0.3	47.3	47.4	-2.2	4.7	3.8	0.6	8.7	9.4	0.6
New Zealand	15.9	..	0.3	21.8	..	-0.7	1.3	..	-2.5	4.6	..	1.3	35.7	..	0.5	5.5	..	-0.1	15.3	..	1.2
Norway	15.4	15.1	0.6	27.7	27.4	-2.0	4.3	4.1	0.7	2.0	2.8	1.0	32.4	32.7	-0.4	6.5	6.2	0.5	11.7	11.7	-0.5
Poland	14.1	13.6	0.5	21.8	23.3	-2.8	4.4	2.5	3.1	4.4	4.5	1.1	37.4	39.2	-3.8	3.8	4.4	-1.0	14.1	12.5	2.8
Portugal	12.3	12.2	0.3	24.6	24.8	-0.8	1.9	1.8	0.9	4.9	4.8	-2.0	41.4	42.5	-1.4	5.7	5.9	0.4	9.3	8.0	2.6
Slovak Republic	11.2	12.1	-2.0	22.8	24.0	-2.6	7.0	3.6	4.6	2.4	3.0	-0.6	41.1	44.2	0.0	4.2	4.4	-0.6	11.2	8.7	1.3
Slovenia	14.1	14.3	0.2	24.1	24.3	-1.8	4.0	2.4	1.8	2.7	2.8	-1.1	37.7	39.7	-2.5	4.5	4.2	0.3	13.0	12.4	3.1
Spain	12.6	12.3	0.4	24.0	23.8	-1.6	3.0	2.6	0.6	5.2	5.4	-0.1	43.0	43.1	-0.6	3.7	3.4	0.0	8.4	9.4	1.3
Sweden	17.1	16.7	0.7	25.0	25.2	-0.4	3.1	2.4	0.0	1.8	1.7	0.6	30.2	30.0	-1.7	11.3	11.2	0.0	11.5	12.7	0.8
Switzerland	14.7	..	0.2	22.0	..	-0.1	9.4	..	0.0	0.8	..	-0.1	32.6	..	-0.7	7.4	..	0.1	13.1	..	0.7
United Kingdom	18.5	18.8	-0.7	20.9	21.5	-1.3	4.4	2.7	1.9	6.8	6.2	1.4	33.3	34.5	-3.2	3.5	2.7	-1.1	12.6	13.5	2.9
United States	16.9	..	0.1	21.2	..	-2.8	0.9	..	0.1	11.1	..	0.5	38.5	..	0.7	0.8	..	0.2	10.5	..	1.2
OECD	14.4	..	0.3	20.6	..	-1.8	2.7	..	0.5	6.8	..	0.6	39.3	..	-1.2	4.8	..	0.2	11.3	..	1.4
OECD-EU	12.3	12.5	0.2	20.3	20.8	-1.5	4.0	3.1	1.0	3.7	4.0	0.3	43.4	44.4	-2.3	5.2	4.9	-0.1	11.2	10.3	2.5
Brazil	8.3	..	0.4	19.6	..	-0.7	0.3	..	-0.1	10.9	..	-0.6	40.5	..	-0.2	17.2	..	1.0	3.1	..	0.3
Bulgaria	12.5	11.4	0.0	27.2	28.7	-0.3	6.2	5.4	-0.4	1.3	1.4	-0.3	38.7	39.5	3.6	3.5	3.3	-0.7	10.6	10.4	-1.9
Croatia	16.7	15.8	-1.4	24.1	27.0	-1.1	4.3	3.4	1.8	3.5	3.2	-1.2	29.9	31.3	-2.6	5.0	4.2	0.9	16.3	15.1	3.6
Indonesia	17.3	..	-2.0	19.9	..	-5.3	4.8	..	10.6	8.7	..	0.2	3.3	..	1.9	25.3	..	0.1	20.8	..	-5.5
Romania	15.1	14.3	-0.7	24.8	25.7	-6.6	2.6	1.9	1.6	4.7	5.4	1.8	30.8	31.4	-1.8	4.6	5.0	0.7	17.4	16.4	5.0

Source: *OECD National Accounts Statistics* (database). Data for Australia are based on a combination of National Accounts and Government finance statistics data provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.

StatLink https://stat.link/xwvmru

15.4. Government investment spending

Public investment can enhance productivity and promote economic growth, foster societal wellbeing, and support long-term policies. Government expenditures can be considered investments if they are directed towards durable assets like transport or energy infrastructure, healthcare or education facilities, IT systems, defence systems, and intangible assets such as research. Government investment often includes purchases needed to implement long-term policies, such as promoting sustainable development by investing in green energy infrastructure. Government investment may be important during economic downturns because it can stimulate demand, create jobs, and help stabilise the economy, particularly when there are high levels of uncertainty that may weigh on households and private sector investment decisions (OECD, 2025).

Across OECD countries, public investment spending averaged 3.5% of GDP in 2023, ranging from 6.8% of GDP in Estonia to 1.4% in Costa Rica. Investment rose in 24 of 37 countries between 2019 and 2023, with an average increase across OECD countries of 0.2 p.p of GDP. The largest increases were in Estonia (1.7 p.p.), Greece (1.5 p.p.) and Slovenia (1.4 p.p.). In 2024, government investment spending was 3.6% of GDP across the OECD-EU countries. It rose between 2023 and 2024 in 17 of the 27 OECD-EU countries for which data is available. The largest increase was in Sweden (0.4 p.p.) (Figure 15.4). Government investment averaged 15.5% of total national investment across OECD countries in 2023 (Online Figure J.10.2).

Investment spending averaged 8.2% of total government spending in 2023, a slight fall from 8.4% in 2019. Despite this, government investment as a share of total investment increased in only 22 of 37 countries. The largest increase was in Greece (2.7 p.p.) and the largest fall in Costa Rica (-4.2 p.p.). Between 2023 and 2024, government investment as a proportion of total investment rose in 14 of 28 countries for which data is available and fell in 14. The largest increase was in Italy (1.1 p.p.), and the largest decrease was in Hungary (-1.7 p.p.) (Figure 15.5).

The distribution of investment expenditure across levels of government varies, especially between federal and unitary countries. In 2023, on average across OECD countries, 43% of government investment was carried out by central government, 28% by state governments and 28% by local governments. Central government accounted for over half of government investment in 22 out of 37 OECD countries. Government investment in many non-federal countries is carried out predominantly by central government, such as in Chile (88%) and Hungary (76%). In highly decentralised or federal countries, it is often primarily carried out by state and, to a lesser extent, local governments. For example, in Canada the shares are 11% central, 51% state and 38% local government; and in Belgium 19%, 52% and 29% (Figure 15.6). The most common area for government investment expenditure is economic affairs, which averages 33.1% of government investment (Online Table J.10.4).

Methodology and definitions

Data are from the OECD National Accounts Statistics (database) based on the System of National Accounts (SNA), a set of internationally agreed concepts, definitions, classifications and rules for national accounting. The 2008 SNA framework has been implemented by all OECD countries (see Annex G). General government investment includes gross capital formation and acquisitions, less disposals of non-produced nonfinancial assets. Gross fixed capital formation (also called fixed investment) is the main component of investment. For government, it mainly consists of transport infrastructure but also includes infrastructure such as office buildings, housing, schools and hospitals. In the SNA 2008 framework, expenditures in research and development have also been included in fixed investment. Government investments together with capital transfers constitute the category of government capital expenditures. Government consists of central, state and local governments and social security funds. State government is only applicable to the nine OECD countries that are federal states: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Mexico, Spain (considered a quasi-federal country), Switzerland and the United States.

Further reading

OECD (2025), *OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report March 2025: Steering through Uncertainty*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/89af4857-en.

OECD (2019), *Effective Multi-level Public Investment: OECD Principles in Action*, OECD Multi-level Governance Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c3bc625b-en.

Figure notes

Figure 15.4 and Figure 15.5. Data for Chile and Türkiye are not included in the OECD average. Data for Brazil are for 2021 rather than 2023. Data for Indonesia are for 2022 rather than 2023.

Figure 15.6. Data for Türkiye are not available. Data for Chile are not included in the OECD average. Local government is included in state government for Australia and the United States. Australia does not operate government social insurance schemes. Social security funds are included in central government in New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Figure J.10.2 (Government investment as a share of total investment, 2019 and 2023) and Table J.10.4 (Structure of general government investment by function, 2023) are available online in Annex J.

Figure 15.4. Government investment as percentage of GDP, 2019, 2023 and 2024



Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/rbc73n

Figure 15.5. Government investment as a share of total government expenditures, 2019, 2023 and 2024



Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/v28qkx

Figure 15.6. Distribution of investment spending across levels of government, 2023 and 2024



Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/ygzkeo

15.5. General government fiscal balance

The fiscal balance is the difference between a government's revenues and expenditures. It signals whether public accounts are in surplus or deficit. Recurrent deficits imply the accumulation of public debt and may send negative signals to consumers and investors about the sustainability of public accounts, deterring consumption or investment decisions. Nonetheless, if debt is kept at a sustainable level, deficits can help to finance necessary public investment and can contribute to maintaining living conditions in difficult or unexpected circumstances (such as recessions, pandemics or natural disasters).

In 2023, the average general government fiscal balance across OECD countries was -4.6% of GDP, indicating a widespread fiscal deficit. Only six OECD countries recorded a fiscal surplus, with Norway posting the highest at 16.5% of GDP. In contrast, 31 member countries ran fiscal deficits, highlighting the overall trend of government spending exceeding revenue. Similarly, among the 27 OECD-EU countries for which data is available for 2024, 6 recorded a surplus and 21 a deficit (Figure 15.7). Governments' fiscal balances were subject to major shocks during the global financial crisis in 2009 (when the OECD average deficit reached -8.5% of GDP) and during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 (when it reached -10.2% of GDP). As of 2023, the average fiscal deficit across the OECD had improved to -4.6% of GDP, though it had not yet returned to its pre-pandemic average of -2.9% between 2015 and 2019 (Figure 15.8).

Net interest payments measure the amount governments spend on interest and capital repayments on public debt. Across OECD countries, net interest payments averaged 2.3% of GDP in 2023. The general government primary balance is the difference between government revenues and expenditures, excluding these interest payments. This sheds light on government's ability to honour its debt repayment commitments without incurring additional debt to pay for other expenses. The average primary balance across OECD countries in 2023 was -2.4% of GDP. Only 10 of 36 OECD countries recorded a primary surplus in 2023, of which the largest was Norway (13.9% of GDP) (Online Figure J.10.3).

The structural primary fiscal balance aims to correct the primary balance for effects of the economic cycle or one-off events. During economic downturns, government revenues tend to fall and spending to increase as more people claim benefits. The opposite occurs during economic upturns. By removing these effects, the structural primary balance can help to assess the long-run sustainability of public finances. During the COVID pandemic, the average structural primary deficit across OECD countries fell from -1.7% of potential GDP in 2019 to -5.7% in 2020 (Online Figure J.10.4). By 2023 it recovered to -2.5% of potential GDP. However, 21 of 33 OECD countries had not yet regained the balance they had prior to COVID. By the end of 2026, the average structural primary balance across the OECD is projected to improve to -2.2% of GDP, with 16 of 33 OECD countries forecast to improve since 2024 (Figure 15.9).

Methodology and definitions

Fiscal balance data are derived from the OECD National Accounts Statistics (database), based on the System of National Accounts (SNA), a set of internationally agreed concepts, definitions, classifications and rules for national accounting. The 2008 SNA framework has been implemented by all OECD countries (see Annex G for details on reporting systems and sources). Using SNA terminology, general government consists of central government, state government, local government and social security funds.

Fiscal balance, also referred to as net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) of general government, is calculated as total government revenues minus total government expenditures. Revenues encompass taxes, net social contributions, and grants and other revenues. Expenditures comprise intermediate consumption, compensation of employees, subsidies, property income (including interest spending), social benefits, other current expenditures (mainly current transfers) and capital expenditures (i.e. capital transfers and investments). The primary balance is the fiscal balance excluding net interest payments on general government liabilities (i.e. interest payments minus interest receipts).

Structural balance data are derived from the OECD Economic Outlook, No.117 (database). The structural fiscal balance, or underlying balance, represents the fiscal balance as reported in the System of National Accounts (SNA) framework adjusted for two factors: the state of the economic cycle (as measured by the output gap) and one-off fiscal operations. Potential GDP is not directly observable, and estimates are subject to substantial margins of error. One-off factors include both exceptional and irregular fiscal transactions as well as deviations from trend in net capital transfers. For more details, see the OECD Economic Outlook (https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/economic-outlook.html#stat).

Further reading

OECD (2025), *OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2025 Issue 1: Tackling Uncertainty, Reviving Growth*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/83363382-en.

Figure notes

Figure 15.7 and Figure 15.8. Data for Chile and Türkiye and are not included in the OECD average.

Figure 15.7. Data for Brazil are for 2021 rather than 2023. Data for Indonesia are for 2022 rather than 2023.

Figure 15.9. Data for Chile are not applicable. Data for Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Türkiye are not available.

Figure J.10.3 (General government primary balance and net interest spending as a percentage of GDP, 2023 and 2024) and Figure J.10.4 (General government structural primary balance as a percentage of potential GDP, 2007 to 2026) are available online in Annex J.

Figure 15.7. General government fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP, 2019, 2023 and 2024



Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/hspr7f

Figure 15.8. General government fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP, 2007 to 2024



Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database)

StatLink https://stat.link/dweumj

Figure 15.9. General government structural primary balance as a percentage of potential GDP, 2019, 2023 and 2024 and projected change until 2026



Source: OECD (2025), OECD Economic Outlook, No 117, June 2025.

StatLink https://stat.link/d81t6o

Chapter 16. Public revenues and production costs

16.1. General government revenues

Government revenues refer to the income collected by governments from taxes and other revenue sources. In most OECD countries, the primary sources of government revenue are taxes and social contributions, supplemented to a lesser extent by fees for public services. A significant portion of revenue may also come from non-tax sources, such as profits from state-owned enterprises or royalties from natural resources. Public policy for government revenue serves multiple purposes. At its core, it aims to collect the funds needed to finance public goods and services. In addition, many revenue systems are structured to promote equity, for example by taxing higher levels of income or wealth at higher rates. Governments may also use revenue to encourage socially beneficial activities (such as tax breaks on research and development) and discourage harmful ones (such as taxes on carbon emissions or tobacco). However, these various goals may conflict with each other, requiring careful balancing in policy design.

General government revenues across the OECD were on average 37.9% of GDP in 2023 recording a slight increase of 0.4 percentage points (p.p.) from 37.5% in 2019. Norway (63.2%), Finland (53.0%), and France (51.6%) were the countries with the highest revenue-to-GDP ratios in 2023. There is however a wide range in spending levels between OECD countries, with OECD-EU countries tending to have higher share of expenditure, 46.0% on average, compared to the OECD average of 37.5% (Figure 16.1).

Government revenues have on average remained stable between 2007 and 2024 across OECD countries, with only minor fluctuations, from a low of 35.6% of GDP in 2009 following the global financial crisis, to a peak of 39.4% in 2022 in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2023, OECD countries have largely returned to pre-pandemic levels of revenue. However, general government revenues have increased since 2019 in Japan (+2.3 p.p.) and the United Kingdom (+2.6 p.p.).

The differences in revenues are more pronounced when measured per capita, due to variations in income levels per capita between countries. For instance, Luxembourg had the highest revenue levels per capita in 2023 (6 5697 USD PPP), despite its revenue-to-GDP ratio being close to the OECD-EU average. Similarly, Ireland had revenue per capita levels above the OECD average in 2023, while being the country with the third lowest revenue-to-GDP ratio the same year. Norway stands out with having both significantly higher revenues per capita and as a share of GDP (Figure 16.3). In 20 out of 37 countries, annual growth of real government revenues per capita was negative between 2022 and 2023, on average -2.6 across OECD countries and -0.8 across OECD-EU countries. (Online Figure J.11.1).

Methodology and definitions

Revenues data are derived from the OECD National Account Statistics (database), which is based on the System of National Accounts (SNA). The SNA provides a set of internationally agreed concepts, classifications, definitions and rules for national accounting. The 2008 SNA framework has been implemented by all OECD countries (see Annex G for details on reporting systems and sources). In SNA terminology, general government is composed of central government, state government, local government, and social security funds. Revenues include taxes, net social contributions and grants and other revenues. Gross domestic product (GDP) is the standard measure of the value of goods and services produced by a country during a period. Government revenues per capita were calculated by converting total revenues to USD using the OECD/Eurostat purchasing power parity (PPP) for GDP and dividing them by the population of the country. PPP is the number of units of country B's currency needed to purchase the same quantity of goods and services in country A.

Further reading

OECD (2024b), *Revenue Statistics 2024: Health Taxes in OECD Countries*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c87a3da5-en.

Figure notes

Figure 16.1. Data for Indonesia are for 2022 rather than 2023.

Figure 16.3. Data for Brazil are for 2021 rather than 2023.

Figure J.11.1 (Annual growth rate of real government revenues per capita, 2019-20, 2020-22, 2022-23 and 2023-24) is available online in Annex J.

Figure 16.1. General government revenues as a percentage of GDP, 2019, 2023 and 2024



Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/2zqxpg

Figure 16.2. General government revenues as a percentage of GDP, 2007 to 2024



Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/4c6bd3

Figure 16.3. General government revenues per capita, 2019, 2023 and 2024



Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/7t3yce

16.2. Structure of government revenues

The structure of government revenues shows the sources from which governments collect their revenues and how these sources evolve over time. Taxes are the single most important source of government revenue in all OECD countries, albeit their relative weight varies across countries. In 2023, taxes accounted for an average of 60.5% of government revenues, with the highest share in Denmark (86.8%) and Australia (82.4%). By contrast, countries such as Costa Rica (42.5%), Slovak Republic (46.2%) and Czechia (46.3%) recorded lower tax shares and relied more heavily on revenues from social contributions, which made up an average of 24.5% of revenues across OECD countries in 2023. OECD countries also collect a small proportion of their revenues from sales of goods and services, 8.2% on average. Grants and other sources are the smallest revenue category, representing 6.8% on average. However, for some Latin American countries, such as Mexico (25.2%%), Colombia (35.5%) and Costa Rica (32%), as well as Norway (27.9%), it is a significant revenue source (Figure 16.4).

The share of revenues coming from taxes in 2023 has increased by an average of 1 percentage point (p.p.) compared to 2019, whereas revenue from social contributions has decreased by 0.7 p.p. compared to the pre-pandemic levels. For sales (-0.4 p.p.) and grants and other revenues (+0.1 p.p.), the changes are relatively small on average. However, in some countries the differences are more pronounced. Costa Rica stands out with a decrease of 16.0 p.p. share of revenues from taxes and a 9.3 p.p. decrease from social contributions, in favour of grants and other revenues, which grew in comparative share by 26.9 p.p. (Figure 16.5). Costa Rica has been undertaking an ambitious, multi-year multi-dimensional reform programme supported through international funds (IMF 2024).

The largest share of government tax revenue in 2022 came from income and profits, accounting for 36.5% on average across OECD countries, compared to 33.9% in 2019 (Figure 16.6). It represented the largest share of tax revenues in 18 out of 38 OECD countries in 2022, with Denmark (64.6%), Australia (62.2%), and Norway (60.9%) being the countries with the highest share coming from these sources in 2022. Taxes on goods and services was the second largest revenue source (31.6%), followed by social security contributions (24.8%). Chile had the highest share of revenues coming from goods and services, 47.8%, which is mainly attributed to a high reliance on value added taxes (VAT) and a low share of the population eligible to pay income tax (OECD, 2025). In contrast, Czechia was the country with the highest share of revenues coming from social security contributions, 45.9%, due to relatively higher taxes on labour compared to income (OECD, 2023).

Methodology and definitions

Data on revenues are computed from the OECD *National Accounts Statistics* (database), which are based on the System of National Accounts (SNA). The 2008 SNA framework has been implemented by all OECD countries (see Annex G). Revenues include taxes (e.g. on consumption, income, wealth, property and capital), net social contributions (i.e. contributions for pensions, health and social security after deduction of social insurance scheme service charges, where applicable), sales of goods and services (e.g. market output of government establishments, entrance fees), and grants and other sources (e.g. current and capital grants, property income, and subsidies). These aggregates were constructed using sub-account items (see Annex H). The data in Figure 16.6 come from OECD Revenue Statistics. The definitions of tax revenues differ between SNA and OECD Revenue Statistics, especially regarding compulsory social security contributions. In SNA, taxes are mandatory unrequited payments, in cash or in kind, made by institutional units to the government. Net social contributions are actual or imputed payments to social insurance schemes to make provision for social benefits to be paid. These may be compulsory or voluntary and funded or unfunded. OECD Revenue Statistics treat compulsory social security contributions as taxes, whereas the SNA considers them net social contributions because the receipt of social security benefits depends, in most countries, upon appropriate contributions having been made, even though the size of the benefit is not necessarily related to the amount of the contributions.

Further reading

OECD (2025), *OECD Economic Surveys: Chile 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/efad96ce-en.

IMF (2024), *Costa Rica, sixth review under the extended arrangement under the extended fund facility, third review under the resilience and sustainability facility arrangement, and monetary policy consultation clause,* https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2024/06/14/Costa-Rica-Sixth-Review-Under-the-Extended-Arrangement-Under-the-Extended-Fund-Facility-550543.

OECD (2023), *OECD Economic Surveys: Czech Republic 2023*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e392e937-en.

Figure notes

Figure 16.4 and Figure 16.5. Data for Chile and Türkiye are not available. Australia does not collect revenues via social contributions because it does not operate government social insurance schemes. Data for Brazil are for 2021 rather than 2023.

Figure 16.6. For the OECD-EU countries total taxation includes custom duties collected on behalf of the EU. 2022 is the latest available year for which data are available for all OECD countries. OECD average is unweighted.

Figure 16.4. Structure of general government revenues, 2023 and 2024



Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/xoz8a7

Figure 16.5. Change in the structure of general government revenues, 2019-23



Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/xg7hiw

Figure 16.6. Breakdown of tax revenues as a percentage of total taxation, 2019 and 2022



Source: OECD Revenue Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/ey1xp4

16.3. Revenues and spending by level of government

Administrative systems are generally organised into central and subnational levels. The subnational level typically includes at a minimum a local level and, in many cases including federal countries, a state level (or regional level). The degree of autonomy granted to subnational authorities in raising and spending resources varies across countries. In 2023, central governments collected an average of 53.2% of general government revenues across OECD countries. In some countries, such as the United Kingdom (91.8%), New Zealand (88.1%), and Norway (86.9%), tax collection in highly centralised. By contrast, 9 out of 36 countries also allocate significant taxing power to the state level. For example, in Canada, the Provinces collected 43% of general government revenues in 2023, more than the central government (37.4%). (Figure 16.7).

Local governments typically raise a smaller share of revenues compared to central and state governments. In 2023, they accounted for an average of 9.7% of general government revenues across OECD countries. However, in some countries, the local share was substantially higher: Korea (35.2%), Sweden (31.4%), and Denmark (27.8%) recorded the highest share of local tax collection (Figure 16.7).

Spending responsibilities for important public services are often associated with a higher share of local revenue collection in countries where local governments manage and deliver these services. This is reflected in Sweden and Denmark, where both local revenue collection and expenditure were relatively high in 2023, with local governments accounting for 64.3% of total public spending in Denmark and 50.7% in Sweden. Conversely, countries such as the United Kingdom (80.4%), New Zealand (87.8%) allocated most public expenditure to the central government, mirroring their similarly high levels of revenue collection shares at the central level (Figure 16.8).

Compared to 2019, a larger share of resources was collected at the central level of government in 2023 (Online Figure J.11.2). The share increased in 24 out of 36 countries and with 1.2 percentage points (p.p.) on average across all countries. Finland recorded an 8.2 p.p. increase in the share of revenue collected at the central level of government over the period that could be partially explained by the centralisation of the healthcare system. In contrast, the share of revenue collected at the local level of government decreased on average by 0.7 p.p. across OECD countries, while the relative share collected at the state level remained largely unchanged (+0.1 p.p.). Over the same period, central government expenditure shares increased by 2.6 p.p., with large increases in Poland (9.5 p.p.), Costa Rica (8.4 p.p.) and Italy (5.9 p.p.) (Online Figure J.11.3). In Poland, the increase of expenditure mainly come from raised health and defense spending (OECD, 2025).

Methodology and definitions

Data are from the OECD *National Accounts Statistics* (database) based on the System of National Accounts (SNA), a set of internationally agreed concepts, definitions, classifications and rules for national accounting. The 2008 SNA framework has been implemented by all OECD countries (see Annex G). In SNA terminology, general government consists of central, state and local governments, and social security funds. State government only applies to the nine OECD countries that are federal states: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Mexico, Spain (deemed a quasi-federal country), Switzerland and the United States. Data exclude transfers between levels of government except in Australia, Chile, Costa Rica, Korea, and Türkiye. This is in order to see each sub-sector's contribution to general government total revenues, which are consolidated at this level. Revenues include taxes (e.g. on consumption, income, wealth, property and capital), net social contributions (i.e. contributions for pensions, health and social security), sales of goods and services (e.g. market output of government establishments), and grants and other sources (e.g. current and capital grants, property income, and subsidies). Expenditures include intermediate consumption, compensation of employees, subsidies, property income (including interest spending), social benefits, other current expenditures (mainly current transfers) and capital expenditures (capital transfers and investments).

Further reading

OECD (2025), *OECD Economic Surveys: Poland 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/483d3bb9-en.

Figure notes

Data for Colombia and Türkiye are not available. Data for Chile are not included in the OECD average. Flows between levels of government are excluded (apart from Australia, Chile, Costa Rica and Korea). For Japan data for sub-sectors of general government refer to fiscal year. Local government is included in state government for Australia and the United States. Australia does not operate government social insurance schemes. Social security funds are included in central government in New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Figure J.11.2 and J.11.3 (Change in the distribution of general government revenues and expenditures across levels of government, 2019 to 2023) are available online in Annex J.

Figure 16.7. Distribution of general government revenues across levels of government, 2023 and 2024



Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/4ocv8u

Figure 16.8. Distribution of general government expenditures across levels of government, 2023 and 2024



Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/q4jp85

16.4. General government gross debt

Governments take on debt when their spending exceeds their revenue, using borrowed funds to cover operational costs or to carry out investment, for example in infrastructure projects. However, borrowing carries the burden of interest payments and should be guided by careful evaluation of economic needs, infrastructure demands, social and sectoral priorities, and a balanced analysis of the potential costs and benefits. During the COVID-19 pandemic, most OECD nations expanded public spending through stimulus measures aimed at supporting individuals and businesses, leading to increased public debt levels.

In 2023, government debt across OECD countries averaged 110.5% of GDP (Figure 16.9). Between 2019 and 2023, the average debt-to-GDP ratio rose by 1.7 percentage points. Despite this overall increase, 19 out of the 36 countries with available data recorded declines in their debt levels. The most significant reductions occurred in Portugal (30.3 percentage points), Ireland (22.6 p.p.), and Greece (18.7 p.p.), all of which have experienced strong economic growth in recent years. On average, OECD-EU countries saw a seven-percentage point decrease in debt between 2019 and 2024. However, this reduction should be carefully considered, as debt spiked during the COVID-19 pandemic—reaching an average of 128.9% of GDP across OECD countries in 2020—and has since decreased by 18.5 percentage points, moving closer to pre-pandemic levels (Figure 16.10). Overall debt levels remain elevated and without sustained action are projected to grow further. Decisive fiscal actions are needed to ensure debt sustainability, preserve room for governments to react to future shocks and generate resources to help meet large current and impending spending pressures from ageing populations, climate change mitigation and adaptation measures, and plans to significantly enhance defence spending (OECD 2025).

General government gross debt also rose significantly on a per capita basis. In 2019, the average per capita gross debt across OECD countries stood at USD 58 090 (PPP). By 2023, this figure had increased by an average of USD 14347 (PPP) across all OECD countries, and by USD 5 760 (PPP) in OECD-EU countries. Debt per capita rose in 32 of the 36 countries with available data. However, between 2019 and 2024, four OECD countries recorded a decline in per capita debt: Ireland (down USD 11241 PPP), Denmark (USD 4 994), the United Kingdom (USD 2 830), and Portugal (USD 1 280). The majority of public debt in OECD countries—79.3%—is held in the form of debt securities, such as government bonds. In 31 out of 36 countries with available data, more than half of public debt is issued as debt securities. Only in Estonia, Greece, and Norway the majority of public debt takes the form of loans (Online Figure J.11.4).

Methodology and definitions

Data are derived from the OECD National Accounts Statistics (database) and the Eurostat Government Finance Statistics (database), which are based on the System of National Accounts (SNA). The 2008 SNA framework has been implemented by all OECD countries (see Annex G). Debt, under the SNA definition, is a commonly used concept, defined as a specific subset of liabilities identified according to the types of financial instruments included or excluded. Generally, it is defined as all liabilities that require payment or payments of interest or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future. All debt instruments are liabilities, but some liabilities such as shares, equity and financial derivatives are not debt. Debt is thus obtained as the sum of these liability categories, whenever available/applicable in the financial balance sheet of the general government sector: currency and deposits; debt securities; loans; and other liabilities (i.e. insurance, pension and standardised guarantee schemes, other accounts payable as well as, in some cases special drawing rights -SDRs). According to the SNA, most debt instruments are valued at market prices, when appropriate (although some countries might not apply this valuation, in particular for debt securities). The treatment of government liabilities in respect of their employee pension plans varies across countries, making international comparability difficult. In the 1993 SNA, only the funded component of the government employee pension plans was reflected in its liabilities. However, the 2008 SNA recognises the importance of the liabilities of employers' pension schemes, regardless of whether they are funded or unfunded. For pensions provided by government to their employees, countries have some flexibility in recording unfunded liabilities in the core tables; this has also been followed by the ESA 2010, its European equivalent (although a new supplementary table is added showing liabilities and associated flows of all pension schemes, whether funded or unfunded). Some OECD countries, e.g. Australia, Canada, Colombia, Iceland, New Zealand, Sweden and the United States, record employment-related pension liabilities, funded or unfunded, in government debt data. For those countries, an adjusted government debt ratio is calculated by excluding from the debt these unfunded pension liabilities. Government debt here is recorded on a gross basis, not adjusted by the value of government-held assets. The SNA debt definition differs from the definition applied under the Maastricht Treaty, which is used to assess EU fiscal positions (Online Figure J.11.6 in Annex J).

Further reading

OECD (2025), *OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report March 2025: Steering through Uncertainty*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/89af4857-en.

OECD (2025), *OECD Economic Surveys: Ireland 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a368560-en.

OECD (2024), *OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 2024*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a35a56b6-en.

Figure notes

Data for Colombia, Mexico and Türkiye are not included in the OECD average.

Figure 16.9. Data for Costa Rica are not available.

Figure 16.9 and Figure 16.11. Data for Costa Rica are not available. Data for Brazil and Indonesia are for 2021 rather than 2023.

Figure J.11.4 (Structure of government debt by financial instruments, 2023 and 2024) and Figure J.11.5 (Annual growth rate of real government debt per capita, 2019-20, 2020-22, 2022-23 and 2023-24) are available online in Annex J.

Figure 16.9. General government gross debt as a percentage of GDP, 2019, 2023 and 2024



Sources: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database); Eurostat Government finance statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/z069cl

Figure 16.10. General government gross debt as a percentage of GDP, 2007 to 2024



Sources: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database); Eurostat Government finance statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/h4yk73

Figure 16.11. General government gross debt per capita, 2019, 2023 and 2024



Sources: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database); Eurostat Government finance statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/b8v241

16.5. Production costs and outsourcing

The production costs of government are public expenditures on the goods and services which government uses. These costs include compensation for government employees (i.e. wages) and purchases of goods and services (e.g. supplies for schools and hospitals, or public funding of private hospitals or health costs reimbursed to citizens). They do not include government spending that are direct transfers to the economy (e.g. spending on social welfare, unemployment benefits and other transfers). Outsourcing is the portion of government production costs which is used by governments to directly buy goods and services from entities outside of government, i.e. government purchases from private companies and other agencies.

Government production costs averaged 20.8% of GDP across OECD members in 2023 (Figure 16.12). In that year, Finland (31.1%), Sweden (30.3%) and France (28.4%) spent the largest proportion of GDP on production costs among OECD countries. This reflects their widespread provision of publicly funded services. Between 2023 and 2024, government production costs in OECD-EU countries increased by an average of 0.5% of GDP, with decreases observed only in Greece (1%), Spain (0.3%), and Denmark (0.2%). In the case of Greece, it could be explained by growth rates that outpaced other EU countries as well as ongoing efforts to achieve spending efficiencies (OECD, 2024a).

The structure of production costs varies somewhat across OECD countries (Figure 16.13). Average spending on compensation of government employees was 42.1% of total production costs. Most OECD countries (30 out of 36) spent more than 40% their total production costs in this area. Costa Rica (71.6%) and Mexico (71%) stand out as the countries with the highest shares of compensation in their government production costs. In the cases of Mexico and Costa Rica, this reflects a high reliance on the direct provision of public services, as well as the additional costs associated with serving widespread, low-density urban areas (OECD 2024b). Moreover, wage expenditures are not necessarily related to the structure of government; for example, Belgium (46.3%) and Switzerland (45.4%), both federal countries, spent very similar shares to Ireland (46.1%), which has a unitary and centralised government. Average spending on purchases of goods and services was 44.5% of total production costs. Most OECD countries (22 out of 36) spent between 30% and 45% of their total production costs in this area.

On average, governments spent 9.2% of GDP on outsourced expenditures in 2023 (Figure 16.14). Of this, 6.2% of GDP was allocated to paying non-government stakeholders for goods and services directly used by the government, while 3.1% of GDP was spent on goods and services provided to the public by non-government contractors but financed by the government. These may include sectors such as health care, housing, transport, and education. In 17 of the 27 countries where data are available, outsourcing costs increased by an average of 0.1% of GDP between 2023 and 2024. The highest increases were recorded in Slovenia (0.6%) and Germany (0.4%).

Methodology and definitions

The concept and methodology of production costs builds on the classification of government expenditures in the *System of National Accounts* (SNA). The 2008 SNA framework has been implemented by all OECD countries (see Annex G for details). Government production costs include: Compensation costs of government employees including cash and in-kind remuneration plus all mandatory employer (and imputed) contributions to social insurance and voluntary contributions paid on behalf of employees. Goods and services used by government, which are the first component of government outsourcing. In SNA terms, this includes intermediate consumption (procurement of intermediate products required for government production). Goods and services financed by government, which are the second component of government outsourcing. In SNA terms, this includes social transfers in kind via market producers paid for by government. Other production costs, which include the remaining components of consumption of fixed capital (depreciation of capital) and other taxes on production fewer other subsidies on production. The data include government employment and intermediate consumption for output produced by the government for its own use. The production costs presented here are not equal to the value of output in the SNA.

Further reading

OECD (2024a), *OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 2024*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a35a56b6-en.

OECD (2024b), *OECD Economic Surveys: Mexico 2024*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b8d974db-en.

Figure notes

Figure 16.12. Data for Australia are based on a combination of National Accounts and Government finance statistics data provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Data for Türkiye are not available. Data for Brazil are for 2021 rather than 2023. Data for Indonesia are for 2022 rather than 2023.

Figure 16.13. Data for Australia are based on a combination of National Accounts and Government finance statistics data provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Data for Chile and Türkiye are not available. Data for Indonesia are for 2022 rather than 2023.

Figure 16.14. Data for Chile and Türkiye are not available. Countries of Mexico, the United States and Indonesia do not account separately for goods and services financed by general government in their National Accounts. Data for Brazil are for 2021 rather than 2023. Data for Indonesia are for 2022 rather than 2023.

Figure J.11.7 (Structure of general government outsourcing expenditures, 2023) is available online in Annex J.

Figure 16.12. Production costs as a percentage of GDP, 2023 and 2024



Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/mepiad

Figure 16.13. Structure of production costs, 2023



Source : OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/96caxm

Figure 16.14. Expenditures on general government outsourcing as a share of GDP, 2023 and 2024



Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/0d8ova

Structure and indicators

In order to accurately interpret the data included in *Government at a Glance 2025*, readers need to be familiar with the following methodological considerations that cut across a number of indicators. Starting with Chapter 2, individual indicators are presented in a standard format on two pages. The first page contains text that explains the relevance of the topic and highlights some of the major differences observed across OECD countries. This is followed by a "Methodology and definitions" section, which describes the data sources and provides important information necessary to interpret the data. Closing the first page is a "Further reading" section, which lists useful background literature providing context to the data displayed. The second page showcases the data. Figures show current levels and, where possible, trends over time.

Definition of government

Data on public finances are based on the definition of the sector "general government" found in the System of National Accounts (SNA). Accordingly, general government comprises ministries/departments, agencies, offices and some non-profit institutions at the central, state and local level, as well as social security funds. Data on revenues and expenditures are presented both for central and sub-central (state and local) levels of government and (where applicable) for social security funds. Data on employment also refer to general government, although data on employment by gender refer to the public sector, which covers both general government as well as publicly owned resident enterprises and companies. Finally, data on public management practices and processes refer to those practices and processes in the central level of government only unless specified differently.

Calendar year/fiscal year in National Accounts data

Unless specified, data from the OECD National Accounts are based on calendar years.

Data for Australia and New Zealand refer to fiscal years: 1 July of the year indicated to 30 June for Australia and 1 April of the year indicated to 31 March for New Zealand. For Japan, data regarding sub-sectors of general government and expenditures by classification of the functions of government (COFOG) refer to fiscal year.

The data on public finances and economics, based on the *System of National Accounts* (SNA), were extracted from the *OECD National Accounts Statistics* (database) and the *Eurostat Government Finance Statistics* (database) on 8 May 2025. The data on public employment were extracted from the *OECD National Accounts Statistics* (database) and the *ILOSTAT* (database) on 18 April 2025.

Country coverage

Government at a Glance 2025 includes data for all 38 OECD countries based on available information. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

Some additional OECD accession countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Indonesia, Romania and Peru also supplied data for some indicators. Data for these non-member countries are presented separately at the end of tables and figures. Data for Thailand were not included as accession was formalized in the course of the report preparation.

Country abbreviations

OECD countries			
Australia	AUS	**Japan**	JPN
Austria	AUT	**Korea**	KOR
Belgium	BEL	**Latvia**	LVA
Canada	CAN	**Lithuania**	LTU
Chile	CHL	**Luxembourg**	LUX
Colombia	COL	**Mexico**	MEX
Costa Rica	CRI	**Netherlands**	NLD
Czechia	CZE	**New Zealand**	NZL
Denmark	DNK	**Norway**	NOR
Estonia	EST	**Poland**	POL
Finland	FIN	**Portugal**	PRT
France	FRA	**Slovak Republic**	SVK
Germany	DEU	**Slovenia**	SVN
Greece	GRC	**Spain**	ESP
Hungary	HUN	**Sweden**	SWE
Iceland	ISL	**Switzerland**	CHE
Ireland	IRL	**Türkiye**	TUR
Israel	ISR	**United Kingdom**	GBR
Italy	ITA	**United States**	USA
OECD accession countries			
Argentina	ARG	**Indonesia**	IDN
Brazil	BRA	**Peru**	PER
Bulgaria	BGR	**Romania**	ROU
Croatia	HRV		

Survey coverage

The majority of the indicators included in *Government at a Glance* are collected through expert based questionnaires that are sent to, and validated by, OECD working parties and networks. The OECD Survey on the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions is a population-based survey managed by the OECD but administered through a third-party provider. While the Secretariat invites all member and accession countries to participate in data collection exercises, participation is voluntary and thus coverage may vary by topic. In the Methodology and Definitions section within each two-pager the coverage of the corresponding questionnaires is specified. The table below summarizes the coverage for the different questionnaires and surveys included in the report that provides the total to calculate percentages for each of the topics.

Chapter	Survey	OECD countries included	Accession countries included
4. Public services	OECD Serving Citizens Survey, 2025	30	4
	OECD Survey on Digital Government, 2023	33	5
5. Governance of cross-cutting agendas	OECD questionnaire on the implementation, dissemination and continued relevance of the OECD Recommendation on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development.	24	No
	OECD Survey on Public Policy Evaluation, 2023	31	No
6. Openness, transparency and participation	OECD Public Integrity Indicators, 2024	33	6
	OECD Deliberative Democracy Database	28	No
	OECD Survey on Open Government, 2020	33	5

Chapter	Survey	OECD countries included	Accession countries included
7. Digital government and innovation	OECD Survey on Digital Government, 2023	33	5
	OECD Survey on Open Government Data 5.0, 2022	36	4
8. Regulation	OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) Surveys, 2024	38	No
	OECD Indicators on the Governance of Sector Regulators (GSR), 2023	35	4
9. Budgeting practices	OECD Senior Budget Officials Survey on Budget Frameworks, 2023	36	No
	OECD Performance Budgeting Survey, 2023	33	No
	OECD Spending Review Survey, 2023	35	No
	OECD Independent Fiscal Institutions Database, 2021	29	No
10. Infrastructure planning and delivery	OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure, 2023	33	No
	OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure, 2021	32	No
	OECD Survey on Critical Infrastructure Resilience, 2023	23	No
11. Procurement	OECD Survey on the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement, 2024	35	5
	OECD Survey on the Professionalisation of Public Procurement, 2020	34	3
	OECD Survey on the Implementation of the 2015 Recommendation on Public Procurement, 2018	31	2
12. Integrity	OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions, 2023	30	No
	OECD Public Integrity Indicators, 2024	32	5
13. Public employment and representation	OECD Composition of the Workforce in Central/Federal Governments Survey, 2024	33	4
14. Managing human resources	OECD Survey on Public Service Leadership and Capability	35	4

OECD averages and totals

Averages

In figures, the OECD average is presented as unweighted, arithmetic mean or weighted average of the OECD countries for which data are available. It does not include data for non-member countries. In the notes, OECD countries for whom data are not available are listed.

If a figure depicts information for one or more years, the OECD average includes all OECD countries with available data. For instance, an OECD average for 2007 published in this edition includes all current OECD countries with available information for that year, even if at that time they were not members of the OECD. If an OECD country is not included in the OECD average for a particular indicator this is generally due to a lack of backwards series and/or incompleteness and consistency of information in a certain domain.

In the case of *National Accounts* data, averages refer to the weighted average, unless otherwise indicated. The OECD average is calculated for 2023 as not all OECD countries have data available for 2024. However, together with the OECD average, the OECD-EU average is also included in this framework. The OECD-EU group comprises countries which are both members of the OECD and European Union (namely: Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden; the United Kingdom is not part of this composition as is not an EU member country). For these OECD and OECD-EU averages, the method of aggregation for the calculation of the indicators expressed as ratios (e.g. government expenditures in terms of GDP) use the denominator as weight (in this case the GDP, market prices, which is expressed in PPP).

Totals

OECD totals are most commonly found in tables and represent the sum of data in the corresponding column for the OECD countries for which data are available. Totals do not include data for non-member countries. In the notes, OECD countries for whom data are not available are listed.

Online supplements

For several indicators, additional tables and figures presenting country-specific data or annexes with complementary information on the indicator methodology can be found online. When available, these are noted in the "Methodology and definitions" section of the indicator. *Government at a Glance 2025* also offers access to StatLinks, a service that allows readers to download the featured data's corresponding Excel files. StatLinks are found at the bottom right-hand corner of the tables or figures and can be typed into a web browser or, in an electronic version of the publication, clicked on directly.

In addition, the following supplementary materials are available online at: www.oecd.org/gov/govataglance.htm:

- The Government at a Glance data portal includes a selection of indicators in interactive format.
- Country fact sheets that present key data by country compared with the OECD average.
- The Government at a Glance statistical database, which includes regularly updated data for a selection of quantitative indicators and the publication of qualitative data for the surveys collected by the Public Governance Directorate of the OECD; both data are supported by the OECD.Explorer dedicated platform.

Per capita indicators

Some indicators (e.g. expenditures, revenues and government debt) are shown on a per capita (i.e. per person) basis. The underlying population estimates are based on the System of National Accounts notion of residency. They include persons who are resident in a country for one year or more, regardless of their citizenship, and also include foreign diplomatic personnel and defence personnel together with their families, students studying and patients seeking treatment abroad, even if they stay abroad for more than one year. The one-year rule means that usual residents who live abroad for less than one year are included in the population, while foreign visitors (for example, tourists) who are in the country for less than one year are excluded. An important point to note in this context is that individuals may feature as employees of one country (contributing to the gross domestic product [GDP] of that country via production), but residents of another (with their wages and salaries reflected in the gross national income of their resident country).

Purchasing power parities

Purchasing power parities (PPPs) are the rates of currency conversion that equalise the purchasing power of different countries by eliminating differences in price levels between countries. When converted by means of PPPs, expenditures across countries are in effect expressed at the same set of prices, meaning that an equivalent bundle of goods and services will have the same cost in both countries, enabling comparisons across countries that reflect only the differences in the volume of goods and services purchased.

PPPs for current and historical series are produced and updated by the OECD with a specific procedure. PPPs for a given year T are published into the following steps:

1. At T+3 months (March): first PPP estimates, for GDP only
2. At T+6 months (June): second PPP estimates, based on detailed extrapolations, for GDP, households' Actual Individual Consumption (AIC) and Household Final Consumption Expenditure (HFCE)
3. At T+12 (December) and T+14 months (February): third PPP estimates, incorporating all price and expenditure data for year T
4. At T+24 (December) and T+26 months (February): fourth PPP estimates, incorporating updated expenditure estimates
5. At T+36 (December) and T+38 months (February): Fifth PPP estimates for year T

Historical PPP data until 2023 might be revised at the end of March of each year in order to incorporate revisions in National Accounts' deflators. In addition, first estimates for 2024 (GDP only) will be produced in this month. In December 2016, historical PPP data until 2012 were exceptionally revised for all European countries.

Additional information is also available at www.oecd.org/sdd/prices-ppp/.

Composite indicators

This publication includes descriptive composite indices in narrowly defined areas related to budgeting practices and infrastructure planning and delivery. These composite indexes are a practical way of summarising discrete, qualitative information. The composites presented in this publication were created in accordance with the steps identified in the *Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators* (Nardo et al., 2008[109]).

Details about the methodology used to construct the composite indicators on digital government, open government data, independent fiscal institutions, infrastructure governance and human resource management are available in Annexes A, B, C and E. While the composite indicators were developed in co-operation with OECD countries and are based on theory and/or best practices, the variables included in the indexes and their relative weights are based on expert judgments and, as a result, may change over time. Details about the composites on sectoral regulators is found in (Casullo, Durand and Cavassini, 2019[110]).

Signs and acronyms

Sign/acronym	Meaning
..	Missing values
-	Not applicable (unless otherwise stated)
ADR	Alternative dispute resolutions
CBA	Central budget authority
COFOG	Classification of the functions of government
GDP	Gross domestic product
GFS	Government Financial Statistics
GFSM	Government Finance Statistics Manual
HR	Human resources
HRM	Human resources management
ICT	Information and communication technology
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISO	International Organisation for Standardisation
IT	Information technology
OCSC	Office of the Civil Service Commission
OGD	Open government data
PBO	Parliamentary budget offices
PISA	Programme for International Student Assessment
p.p.	Percentage points
PPPs	Purchasing power parities / private-public partnerships
R&D	Research and development
SCS	Senior civil servants
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SDRs	Special drawing rights
SHRM	Strategic human resources management
SMEs	Small and medium-sized enterprises
SNA	System of National Accounts
VAT	Value-added tax
WEO	World Economic Outlook
WJP	World Justice Project

Framework of the publication

The 2025 edition of Government at a Glance presents a structure around three broad categories: 1) Trust, security and dignity; prosperity and satisfaction with public services; 2) Achieving results with good governance practices 3) What resources public institutions use and how are they managed. The next figure presents the conceptual framework for Government at a Glance.

Conceptual framework Government at a Glance



Trust, prosperity and satisfaction with public services

This section includes evidence on public governance outcomes (i.e. trust, security and dignity; prosperity and satisfaction with public services) as perceived by people as well as some of the drivers leading to high or low levels for each of these indicators. The chapter on trust, security and dignity is based on the second round of the OECD survey on the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions to which 30 OECD countries participated and that was carried out in October and November 2023 (Chapter 2).

The chapter on prosperity is featured for the first time in *Government at a Glance* as an outcome measure of public administrations' work. It relies on self-reported data regarding perceptions of economic insecurity, expert-based indicators of governmental measures that can stimulate economic growth, and assessments of the government's role in improving socioeconomic outcomes and reducing poverty and inequality (Chapter 3).

The chapter on satisfaction with public services primarily draws on a new questionnaire that collects information on the administrative processes and standards governments have in place to support the delivery of public administrative services. The implementation of this questionnaire enables the chapter to place a stronger emphasis on public administrative services, while still maintaining key indicators related to health, education, and justice (Chapter 4).

Achieving results with good governance practices

In order to design and implement public policies and deliver public services, public institutions work through public governance processes and practices undertaken by governments to deliver to people. These address the means used by public administrations to fulfil their duties and obtain their goals. In consequence, they are often essential for ensuring the rule of law, accountability, fairness, advance in the green transition and ensure openness of government actions. Public sector reforms often target these processes; as such, they capture the public's attention. The data included in this section are generated by the different Public Governance communities and are to a large extent the specificity of Government at a Glance. This edition includes chapters on the governance of cross-cutting agendas (Chapter 5), openness, transparency and participation (Chapter 6), digital government and innovation (Chapter 7), regulation (Chapter 8), budgeting practices (Chapter 9), infrastructure planning and delivery (Chapter 10), procurement (Chapter 11) and integrity (Chapter 12).

What resources public institutions use and how are they managed

This section of the publication refers to the resources used by governments to deliver as well as how they are mixed; these resources correspond to labour and capital. The chapters that describe inputs and public management practices include public employment and representation (Chapter 13), managing human resources (Chapter 14), public spending (Chapter 15) as well as public revenues and production costs (Chapter 16).

References

Casullo, L., A. Durand and F. Cavassini (2019), "The 2018 Indicators on the Governance of Sector Regulators - Part of the Product Market Regulation (PMR) Survey", *OECD Economics Department Working Papers*, No. 1564, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a0a28908-en. [2]

Nardo, M. et al. (2008), *Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide*, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/sdd/42495745.pdf. [1]

Annex A. OURdata Index

Launched in 2015, the Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index benchmarks governments' efforts to design and implement national open government data policies. With subsequent editions released in 2017, 2019 and 2023, the Index has remained a valuable resource for policymakers and serves as a key public governance indicator, assessing the progress governments have made in ensuring open data to support policy reform.

The OECD definition of open data is "non-discriminatory data access and sharing arrangements where data is machine-readable and can be accessed and shared free of charge and used by anyone for any purpose, subject at most to requirements that preserve integrity, provenance, attribution and openness" (OECD, 2021[1]). The OURdata Index assesses policies for open government data, i.e. government data made available as open data. Government data refers to any data produced and held by public bodies at the central/federal level of government, and in some cases, depending on national context, data aggregated by and collected from local and regional levels, for example mobility data. The OURdata index does not measure the impact of open government data, but rather focuses on assessing governments' efforts to create the conditions necessary for making open data available and enable and encourage its reuse.

The composite OURdata Index consists of three pillars and nine sub-pillars. The three main pillars of the OURdata Index are:

- **Pillar 1:** Data availability: Measures the extent to which governments have adopted and implemented formal requirements to publish open government data. It also assesses stakeholder engagement for identifying data demand and the availability of high-value datasets as open data. For example, this pillar assesses if a country has an open data strategy.
- **Pillar 2:** Data accessibility: Measures the availability of requirements to provide open data in reusable formats, and the extent to which high-value government datasets are provided in open, timely and reusable formats, with good metadata quality, and through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). It also assesses stakeholder engagement on the central open data portal and to improve data quality. For example, the pillar measures the percentage of high-value open datasets that are accessible through a central open data portal.
- **Pillar 3:** Government support to data reuse: Measures the extent to which governments play a proactive role in promoting the re-use of open government data inside and outside government. For example, it looks at events and partnerships with civil society and business actors to raise awareness about open government data and encourage re-use.

Variable and weights

The OURdata composite score, which represents the overall open government data performance, is the unweighted average of the scores of all three pillars, which ranges from 0 to 1. Each pillar score is calculated as an unweighted average of all corresponding sub-pillars. The score for each sub-pillar is calculated by averaging the corresponding parameter and variable scores. The relative weight of each variable and parameter is determined by the number of variables and parameters within a sub-pillar. A complete account of all sub-pillars, variables and their respective weights can be found in (OECD, 2023[2]).

Table A.1. OURdata Index

3 pillars	1. Data availability	2. Data Accessibility	3. Government support to data-reuse
9 sub-pillars	1.1 Content of the open by default policy	2.1 Content of the free and open access to data policy	3.1 Data promotion initiatives and partnerships
	1.2 Stakeholder engagement for data release	2.2 Stakeholder engagement for data quality and completeness	3.2 Data literacy programmes in government
	1.3. Implementation (availability of high-value datasets)	2.3 Implementation (accessibility of high value datasets)	3.3 Monitoring impact

Statistical validation

Several statistical tests have been executed to test the robustness and validity of the updated OURdata Index methodology (2023). Similar to previous Index methodology versions, these tests aim to demonstrate how reliable the OURdata Index is in measuring one underlying, unobservable concept (open government data maturity), as well as the validity of the choice of individual parameters and variables. Details on the statistical validation can be found in (OECD, 2023[2]).

References

OECD (2023), "2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 43, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en. [2]

OECD (2021), "Recommendation of the Council on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD/LEGAL/0463, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0463. [1]

Annex B. Methodology for the OECD Digital Government Index

The OECD Digital Government Index (DGI) assesses the efforts made by governments to establish the foundations necessary for a coherent and human-centred digital transformation of the public sector. It monitors the implementation of the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies (OECD, 2014[1]) and draws upon the long-standing work of the OECD advising governments to strategise with digital technologies and data for improved and joined-up public services and operations, as well as increased trust in public institutions, as outlined in the OECD Digital Government Policy Framework (DGPF) (OECD, 2020[2]). The framework frames the methodology and survey for the DGI across the six dimensions for digital maturity in the public sector:

- *Digital by design:* when a government establishes clear organisational leadership, paired with effective co-ordination and enforcement mechanisms where "digital" is considered not only as a technical topic, but as a mandatory transformative element to be embedded throughout policy processes.
- *Data-driven public sector:* when a government recognises and takes steps to govern data as a key strategic asset in generating public value through their application in the planning, delivering and monitoring of public policies, and adopts rules and ethical principles for their trustworthy and safe reuse.
- *Government as a platform:* when a government provides clear and transparent sources of guidelines, tools, data and software that equip teams to deliver user-driven, consistent, seamless, integrated, proactive and cross-sectoral service delivery.
- *Open by default:* when a government makes government data and policy-making processes (including algorithms) available for the public to engage with, within the limits of existing legislation and in balance with the national and public interest.
- *User-driven:* when a government becomes more user-driven by awarding a central role to people' needs and convenience in the shaping of processes, services and policies; and by adopting inclusive mechanisms for this to happen.
- *Proactiveness:* when a government anticipates people's needs and respond to them rapidly, avoiding the need for cumbersome data and service delivery processes.

Data collection and validation

The *OECD Survey on Digital Government 2.0* serves as the data collection instrument of the 2023 DGI. It is composed of 94 questions covering each of the six dimensions of the DGPF together with four transversal facets that reflect the different stages of the policy cycle (*Strategic approach, Policy levers, Implementation,* and *Monitoring*). It includes questions designed to capture the evolving landscape of digital government, aligning this instrument with the priorities of the OECD Working Party of Senior Digital Government Officials (E-Leaders) and the conceptual policy work advanced by the Secretariat. These developments encompass governance of digital government (OECD, 2021[3]), digital talent and skills in the public sector (OECD, 2021[4]), service design and delivery in the digital age (OECD, 2022[5]), data-driven public sector (OECD, 2019[6]), digital public infrastructure and digital identity (OECD, 2024[7]), digital government investments (OECD, forthcoming[8]), impact measurement, GovTech (OECD, 2024[9]), AI in the public sector (OECD, 2024[10]), and open government data, based on the data collected through the *OECD Survey on Open Government Data 5.0* (OECD, 2023[11]).

The Survey collected evidence from the central/federal level of government, covering all ministries and agencies, spanning the period from January 2020 to October 2022. Survey respondents comprised high-level digital government officials of 33 OECD member countries and 4 accession countries. The Survey was launched in November 2022 and closed in January 2023. A glossary of terms was sent to respondents to provide guidance on specific terminology.

Once the period of data collection was completed, country responses underwent a detailed data validation process designed to ensure the highest standards in data quality and accuracy. Country responses were reviewed to ensure internal consistency and to verify systematically that responses and supporting evidence corresponded to the respective question. A second round of data validation was conducted to ensure transversal consistency across survey sections and themes. For non-validated answers, countries were asked to provide clarification and further evidence, if applicable. The OECD Secretariat assessed the updated responses and evidence, validating or amending the responses with the underlying rationale and explanation. After this final round, each country officially approved their final responses for calculation.

Weighting and aggregation

The DGI is a composite index consisting of six equally weighted dimensions, corresponding to the six dimensions of the DGPF. Data points from the Survey (i.e., response options to specific questions) are used to populate these dimensions based on their thematic alignment with each dimension's definition. The distribution of data points also ensures coverage across four transversal facets that reflect the stages of the policy cycle.

Each data point contributes a maximum number of points according to predefined maturity benchmarks, which are grounded in the OECD's thematic conceptual frameworks. Dimension scores are calculated as the weighted average of all relevant data points within each dimension. The DGI composite score, representing overall digital government performance, is calculated by averaging the scores of all six dimensions. Figure B.1 shows the weights of each dimension and their associated transversal facets.

Figure B.1. OECD Digital Government Index: Dimensions, transversal facets and their corresponding weights



Source: Authors, based on (OECD, 2024[12]).

Statistical validation

The OECD DGI methodology has been calibrated based on a comprehensive statistical validation, encompassing correlation analysis, principal component analysis (PCA), Cronbach's Alpha coefficient, and sensitivity analysis (OECD, 2024[12]). The results of this validation have demonstrated the robustness and validity of the Index.

More information

Refer to OECD (2024[12]) for a more detailed analysis and methodology of the 2023 edition of the OECD Digital Government Index.

References

OECD (2024), "2023 OECD Digital Government Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1a89ed5e-en. [12]

OECD (2024), "Digital public infrastructure for digital governments", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 68, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ff525dc8-en. [7]

OECD (2024), *Enabling Digital Innovation in Government: The OECD GovTech Policy Framework*, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a51eb9b2-en. [9]

OECD (2024), "Governing with Artificial Intelligence: Are governments ready?", *OECD Artificial Intelligence Papers*, No. 20, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/26324bc2-en. [10]

OECD (2023), "2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 43, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en. [11]

OECD (2022), "OECD Good Practice Principles for Public Service Design and Delivery in the Digital Age", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 23, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2ade500b-en. [5]

OECD (2021), *The E-Leaders Handbook on the Governance of Digital Government*, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac7f2531-en. [3]

OECD (2021), "The OECD Framework for digital talent and skills in the public sector", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 45, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/4e7c3f58-en. [4]

OECD (2020), "The OECD Digital Government Policy Framework: Six dimensions of a Digital Government", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 02, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f64fed2a-en. [2]

OECD (2019), *The Path to Becoming a Data-Driven Public Sector*, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/059814a7-en. [6]

OECD (2014), "Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies", *Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate*, Vol. July. [1]

OECD (forthcoming), *Effectively Managing Investments in Digital Government: OECD Digital Government Investments Framework*. [8]

Annex C. Methodology for the fiscal advocacy index

The 2024 OECD Fiscal Advocacy Index is a tool for assessing the extent to which independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) fulfil the role of fiscal advocates — institutions that champion fiscal sustainability.

The Index evaluates IFIs across four dimensions:

1. *Independence* - the extent to which IFIs effectively provide impartial advice to policymakers and the public. Leadership and operations should be free from outside interference and funding should be multiannual in nature, preferably with direct approval of funding from the legislature. This dimension is based on an update of earlier OECD work measuring IFI independence (Nicol and Von Trapp, 2018[1]).
2. *Analysis* - as fiscal advocates, IFIs should be able to focus their work on major aspects of fiscal policy. IFIs should be able to explore long-term sustainability challenges and major fiscal risks facing the public finances. Those that focus on costings should be able to promote citizens' interests by bringing greater transparency to government or legislative proposals as well as election platforms. At the same time, they should have the capacity to generate and deliver macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts to support their analysis, with an adequate number of analytical staff.
3. *Communications Apparatus* - the ability of an IFI to communicate directly with the public and engage with the media separates it from other non-partisan research services. To do this effectively, IFIs should have robust tools in place to disseminate, promote and track the impact of their work. This dimension incorporates previous OECD work, the OECD IFI Communications Index (OECD, 2023[2]).
4. *Communications Impact* - having a robust communications function can help generate an impact on the national debate and promote the IFIs analysis. However, it does not guarantee it. The impact of an IFI's work often relies on more than just the methods it uses to promote that work. It relies on clear and cogent analysis in key areas. This dimension gauges the final impact an IFI has by considering its prevalence in media discussions and the public's interest in the institution.

The four dimensions have been informed by the OECD Council Recommendation on Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions (OECD, 2014[3]). The Recommendation contains 22 principles across nine areas related to local ownership, independence and on partisanship, scope of the mandate, resources, relation with the legislature, access to information, transparency, communication and evaluation.

The methodology used for building the 2024 OECD Fiscal Advocacy Index is based on the Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators (OECD/European Union/EC-JRC, 2008[4]). The index has also been shared and discussed with delegates from the OECD's Working Party of Parliamentary Budget Officials and Independent Fiscal Institutions.

Data collection and validation

For the first three dimensions, data used for the construction of the 2024 OECD Fiscal Advocacy Index comes primarily from the OECD Independent Fiscal Institutions Database (OECD, 2021[5]). The data was collected via desk research and then verified and validated by relevant senior officials in the OECD's Working Party of Parliamentary Budget Officials and Independent Fiscal Institutions.

In addition to that, the fourth dimension (communications impact) draws on new indicators, created using a combination of data on national media coverage plus Google Trends data for 2021 to 2023. These are intended to assess the extent to which IFIs have entered the national debate, as recorded in mentions of their work in the media.

Dimensions and weights

Each of the four dimensions is equally weighted, has a maximum value of 1, and comprises several variables. The overall index has a maximum value of 4, with institutional scores being the sum of the scores for each dimension. A higher score indicates a greater capacity for fiscal advocacy.

The variables and weights comprised in the index were selected based on their relevance to the concept by a group of experts within the OECD and in consultation with delegates to the Working Party of Parliamentary Budget Officials and Independent Fiscal Institutions. Variables within a dimension are weighted based on 1) the number of indicators making up each variable, and 2) and the relative importance of each variable.

A linear aggregation method is applied to first aggregate the indicators into variables, the variables into sub-dimensions and then the sub-dimensions into an overall dimension or composite indicator. To obtain overall index scores, the weighted scores for each indicator are totaled.

The components used in the construction of this index, and the weights given to each, are indicated in the figure below.

Figure C.1. 2024 OECD Fiscal Advocacy Index: Dimensions, sub-dimensions and their weights



A detailed explanation on the components of the 2024 OECD Fiscal Advocacy Index will be available in a forthcoming publication (OECD, forthcoming[6]), including the variables, answer options, scores and weights used to construct the composite index, as well as the statistical analysis carried out.

Statistical analyses

Several statistical tests were used to show how reliable the index is in terms of measuring a coherent underlying concept – fiscal advocacy. They also assess how valid the choices of individual parameters and variables are.

Sensitivity analysis was carried out to establish the robustness of the index scores to different weighting options through Monte Carlo simulations. The results from the sensitivity analysis at dimension level for the 2024 OECD Fiscal Advocacy Index show that, for the majority of the institutions analysed, the overall scores are not very sensitive to the choice of weights given to the categories. In terms of the overall Index, the Cronbach's alpha coefficient is equal to 0.89, indicating that the dimensions are measuring the same underlying construct.

References

Debrun, R. (ed.) (2018), *Measuring IFI independence: A first pass using the OECD IFI*, CEPR Press. [1]

OECD (2023), *Government at a Glance 2023*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3d5c5d31-en. [2]

OECD (2021), *Independent Fiscal Institutions Database (Version 2.0)*, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/OECD-Independent-Fiscal-Institutions-Database.xlsx. [5]

OECD (2014), "Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0401. [3]

OECD (forthcoming), *From fiscal watchdogs to fiscal advocates: Creating champions of fiscal sustainability*, OECD Publishing, Paris. [6]

OECD/European Union/EC-JRC (2008), *Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264043466-en. [4]

Annex D. Methodology for the infrastructure governance indicators

The OECD Infrastructure Governance Indicators (IGIs) are intended to support and monitor the implementation of the OECD Recommendation on the Governance of Infrastructure (hereafter "the Recommendation"), adopted by the OECD Council on 17 July 2020 (OECD, 2020[1]). The Recommendation is based on 10 pillars that relate to how governments plan, prioritise, fund, budget, deliver, operate and monitor infrastructure assets. It presents a whole-of-government approach, covering the entire life cycle of infrastructure projects and placing special emphasis on regional, social, resilience, environmental perspectives and the gender perspective. The overarching nature of the Recommendation's pillars allows for exhaustive analysis of the multiple governance dimensions that are at play in infrastructure planning, decision making and delivery. They therefore provide a robust conceptual framework for the development of the IGIs. The pillars represent both conceptual categories and functional areas of work. As such, the pillars are not standalone entities and interact with one another to support a comprehensive overview of infrastructure governance.

The IGIs serve as a diagnostic tool to help countries assess their current stage of development and identify the dimensions that may require more attention. In particular, the IGIs aim to achieve the following goals:

- map OECD countries' state of play regarding infrastructure governance, identifying strengths and weaknesses
- provide tools for countries to self-assess their performance in each of the infrastructure governance pillars highlighted in the Recommendation
- provide a comprehensive view and deeper understanding of the different pillars that compose the infrastructure governance framework
- allow countries to identify changes in their performance on infrastructure governance through time
- draw attention to how much data are available and needed to measure infrastructure governance, as well as the benefits of building a comprehensive database in the field
- contribute to the discussion on the relationship between infrastructure governance and infrastructure outcomes.

In addition to a general assessment, the IGIs also serve to pinpoint specific areas within each pillar that may require further development from each country. Results at a more granular level (i.e. performance on the sub-components of each dimension) allow for a more in-depth assessment.

The methodology used for building the IGIs is based on the Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators (OECD/European Union/EC-JRC, 2008[2]). It has also been shared and discussed with experts and public officials from the Network of Senior Infrastructure and PPP Officials (SIP) and the Working Party of the Leading Practitioners on Public Procurement (LPP).

Structure of the IGIs

The IGIs are measured and presented in composite indicators, one for each of the pillars arising from the Recommendation, plus the cross-cutting pillar on environmentally sustainable and climate-resilient infrastructure. Each pillar can be disaggregated into groups of variables, called sub-pillars. These sub-pillars reflect countries' performance at a more granular level. The nested structure helps countries understand the driving forces behind each of the composite indicators.

Implementation of the IGIs by phase

The implementation of the IGIs has been carried out in three phases. Three composite indicators were built in the first phase and five, in the second phase. In the third and final phase, two composite indicators have been developed, measuring the following pillars: 1) management of asset performance throughout its life; and 2) governance of critical infrastructure resilience. The development of a composite indicator to measure the pillar on coordination across levels of government is currently being discussed with the OECD

Regional Development Policy Committee (RDPC). The results for the full set of indicators will provide an overarching analysis of countries' performance across all dimensions of the Recommendation and on the cross-cutting pillar on environmentally sustainable and climate-resilient infrastructure. This edition of Government at a Glance presents and discusses the results for one pillar from the second phase – evidence-informed decision making – and two pillars from the third phase – management of asset performance throughout its life and governance of critical infrastructure resilience (see Figure D.1 below). It also presents data on climate resilience from the 2023 Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure. Results of the IGIs are available in the OECD Infrastructure Toolkit (OECD, n.d.[3]).

Figure D.1. Implementation of data collection by phase

Data collection and validation

The IGIs were built using data collected via OECD survey instruments, namely the Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure and other relevant data collected from OECD policy communities. Data presented in this publication is drawn from the 2022-2023 OECD Surveys on the Governance of Infrastructure and the 2022 OECD Survey on Critical Infrastructure Resilience. The former were designed based on inputs from relevant divisions/directorates of the OECD and in consultation with the SIP and the LPP. Invitations to participate in the survey were sent to all OECD countries, including delegates from the SIP and main contact points in country delegations. SIP officials co-ordinated responses across government, which in some cases came from specific sectors (transport being the most common) or other competent ministries. Respondents were predominantly senior officials in the central/federal ministries of infrastructure, public works and finance, as well as in infrastructure agencies and other line ministries. For the Survey on Critical Infrastructure Resilience, respondents were government officials with responsibility for critical infrastructure resilience or protection at the central government level. Survey responses were co-ordinated by government officials with responsibility for disaster risk or crisis management and included experts in critical infrastructure.

Various steps were undertaken to ensure the highest standards in data quality and accuracy. Before the Surveys on the Governance of Infrastructure were launched, the questionnaires and the glossaries of key terms were discussed with relevant divisions/directorates of the OECD and circulated among the delegates of the SIP for comments. A data validation process was used to check for internal and external consistency in the survey responses, comparing the answers to previous answers provided in related questionnaires, and verifying that supporting evidence was systematically provided before validating the responses.

Selection of variables and re-coding

The sub-pillars were constructed from a set of variables that aim to measure the adoption and adequacy of governance practices in line with the Recommendation. The variables were selected in order to measure countries' performance in infrastructure governance in terms of inputs and processes (e.g. policy tools, norms of interaction, decision-making methodologies and monitoring strategies). The proposed composite indicators did not include variables related to outputs or outcomes (e.g. levels of investment, quality of infrastructure services, or amounts of capital stock and achievement of policy objectives). It is important to note that the selection of variables and re-coding, and thus the structure of the composite indicators, could be subject to change in future editions of the IGIs to

account for changes in institutional, political and economic settings across OECD countries. An overview of the sub-pillars under each of the three pillars presented in this edition of the Government at a Glance is shown below in Figure D.2.

The OECD Surveys on the Governance of Infrastructure were designed to collect qualitative data. Therefore, the responses to the survey questions were re-coded using numerical values between 0 and 1, where 1 is the maximum value and indicates complete alignment with the best practices highlighted in the Recommendation, and 0 is the minimum value indicating the absence of such practices in the country.

Figure D.2. Infrastructure Governance Indicators: Pillars, sub-pillars and their corresponding weights used in this publication



Missing data

Due to the cross-cutting nature of the concept of infrastructure governance, the OECD surveys on the governance of infrastructure require respondents from different institutions to provide information on the infrastructure governance frameworks and practices in a country. The composite indicator for each pillar was not calculated for countries that reported not having the information to answer two or more survey questions for any one of its sub-pillars. Consequently, those countries were not included in the OECD average indicator value for that pillar. As the data used to build the composite indicators are qualitative, data imputation was not used to deal with missing data. However, it should be noted that where country responses were only based on practices applicable in a certain sector or sectors, these were retained and important caveats provided in relation to those.

Weighting and aggregation

To build the composite indicators, all the sub-pillars within each pillar were given equal weight. However, the variables within a sub-pillar were weighted differently depending on: 1) the number of variables that make up each sub-pillar, as the larger the number of variables within a sub-pillar the lower the weight each variable will have; and 2) the relevance of each variable, where greater weight was given to variables that are more relevant in measuring a specific sub-pillar. The weights assigned to the variables in each sub-pillar add up to 1. The weighted scores of all the variables are totalled to arrive at a sub-pillar score that ranges from 0 to 1.

The linear aggregation method was used to first aggregate the variables into a sub-pillar (i.e. weighted arithmetic mean), and then the sub-pillars into a composite indicator (i.e. arithmetic mean). Experts and public officials from the SIP and the LPP were consulted over the assignment of weights and the aggregation type before the final set of weights was confirmed.

Multivariate analysis

Multivariate analysis was employed to study the overall structure of the data collected. The analysis was used to further help guide methodological choices with respect to variable grouping and aggregation. The techniques used in the multivariate analysis are detailed below.

Factor analysis

Factor analysis was used to check the structure of the data along the variable dimension, to help identify groups of variables that are statistically similar and that could be regrouped under a sub-pillar where such grouping is conceptually relevant. The analysis was run separately for each pillar. Principal component factor analysis was used to extract the principal components and consider them as factors (groups of variables). The groups of variables offered by the factor analysis were interpreted together with the conceptual framework underpinning the composite indicators exercise.

The results were carefully reviewed to look for any set of variables that measure the same underlying dimension and that could be regrouped to avoid double-counting. The results offered several cases where the factors matched well the conceptual groupings (sub-pillars). In the case of variables with high levels of covariance but belonging to different initial conceptual groupings, the results were discussed with experts to determine if the variables needed to be regrouped. Following this consultation with experts, the sub-pillars were either maintained or restructured to align with the conceptual framework.

Cronbach coefficient alpha

The Cronbach coefficient alpha (c-alpha) was used as a measure of internal consistency and scale reliability. The coefficient shows how related the variables are as a group and to what extent they measure the same underlying concept. A c-alpha of 0.7 is usually recommended as an acceptable reliability threshold (Lafortune and Ubaldi, 2018[4]). The c-alpha test was used to measure internal consistency for each pillar. The coefficients for all the pillars presented in this publication were over the threshold of 0.7.

Sensitivity analysis

To assess the robustness of the composite indicators, Monte Carlo simulations were used to study how uncertainty in the weighting schemes affects the composite indicator values. This technique uses 1 000 sets of randomly generated simulated weights to calculate possible composite indicator scores for each country under different weighting schemes.

Measuring balance in sub-pillar scores

Good infrastructure governance requires improvements across multiple dimensions. Ideally, countries should make progress in all sub-pillars, and low scores in some should not be compensated with high scores in others (i.e. sub-pillars for a country should not show a wide range of values). For each pillar, a rating scale based on the coefficient of variation was used to rate country profiles from balanced (low variability in country sub-pillar scores under a pillar) to unbalanced (high variability in country sub-pillar scores under a pillar). For each pillar, this analysis shows how balanced country profiles are with respect to sub-pillar scores and help identify countries with relatively high indicator values but with great variability in their sub-pillar scores. The analysis for each country is presented in the OECD Infrastructure Toolkit. (OECD, n.d.[3])

References

Lafortune, G. and B. Ubaldi (2018), "OECD 2017 OURdata Index: Methodology and results", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 30, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2807d3c8-en. [4]

OECD (2020), "Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Infrastructure", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0460. [1]

OECD (n.d.), *Infrastructure Toolkit*, OECD, Paris, https://infrastructure-toolkit.oecd.org/. [3]

OECD/European Union/EC-JRC (2008), *Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264043466-en. [2]

Annex E. Classification and definitions of occupations and educational levels

The following classifications resulted from the 2024 OECD Survey on Public Service Leadership and Capability, which also used the same definitions as in the 2024 OECD Survey on the Composition of the Workforce in Central/Federal Governments. It has also been used for the OECD standard survey module on Employee Engagement in civil services.

The classification and the definition of the occupations shown in Table E.1 defines the four main hierarchical levels on occupations. These definitions follow an adapted version of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) developed by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The reason for the adaptation is that not all countries follow the ISCO model to classify their occupations in government, as the occupations included at the national level may differ due to specific legal and administrative frameworks. Full definitions are available via the following link: https://ilostat.ilo.org/methods/concepts-and-definitions/classification-occupation.

The classification and the definition of the educational levels shown in Table E.2 defines the three aggregate educational levels. These definitions follow an adapted version of the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) designed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Full definitions are available via the following link: https://ilostat.ilo.org/methods/concepts-and-definitions/classification-education.

Table E.1. Classification and definition of occupations

Top Managers
D1 Managers (part of ISCO-08 1112) are top public servants just below the minister or Secretary of State/ junior minister. They can be a member of the senior civil service and/or appointed by the government or head of government. They advise government on policy matters, oversee the interpretation and implementation of government policies and, in some countries, have executive powers. D1 managers may be entitled to attend some cabinet/council of ministers meetings, but they are not part of the Cabinet/council of ministers. They provide overall direction and management to the ministry/secretary of state or a particular administrative area. In countries with a system of autonomous agencies, decentralised powers, flatter organisations and empowered managers, D1 managers will correspond to Director Generals.
D2 Managers (part of ISCO-08 11 and 112) are just below D1 managers. They formulate and review the policies and plan, direct, co-ordinate and evaluate the overall activities of the ministry or special directorate/unit with the support of other managers. They may be part of the senior civil service. They provide guidance in the co-ordination and management of the programme of work and leadership to professional teams in different policy areas. They determine the objectives, strategies, and programmes for the particular administrative unit / department under their supervision.
Middle managers
D3 Managers (part of ISCO-08 12) are just below D2 managers. They plan, direct and co-ordinate the general functioning of a specific directorate/administrative unit within the ministry with the support of other managers usually within the guidelines established by a board of directors or a governing body. They provide leadership and management to teams of professionals within their particular area. These officials develop and manage the work programme and staff of units, divisions or policy areas. They establish and manage budgets, control expenditures and ensure the efficient use of resources. They monitor and evaluate performance of the different professional teams.
D4 Managers (part of ISCO-08 121) are just below D3. They formulate and administer policy advice, and strategic and financial planning. They establish and direct operational and administrative procedures, and provide advice to senior managers. They control selection, training and performance of staff; prepare budgets and oversee financial operations, control expenditures and ensure the efficient use of resources. They provide leadership to specific professional teams within a unit.
Professionals
Senior Economists / Policy Analysts (part of ISCO-08 242 and 2422) do not have managerial responsibilities (beyond managing 3 staff maximum), and are above the ranks of junior analysts and administrative/secretarial staff. They are usually required to have a university degree. They have some leadership responsibilities over a field of work or various projects, develop and analyse policies guiding the design, implementation and modification of government operations and programmes. These professionals review existing policies and legislation in order to identify anomalies and out-of-day provisions. They analyse and formulate policy options, prepare briefing papers and recommendations for policy changes. Moreover, they assess the impact, financial implications and political and administrative feasibility of public policies. Staffs in this group have the possibility of becoming a manager through career progression. Their areas of expertise may vary from law, economics, politics, public administration, international relations, to engineering, environment, pedagogy, health economics etc. Senior policy analysts/economists have at least 5 years of professional experience.
Junior economists/policy analysts (part of ISCO-08 242 and 2422) are above the ranks of administrative/secretarial staff. They are usually required to have a university degree. They have no leadership responsibilities. They develop and analyse policies guiding the design, implementation and modification of government operations and programmes. These professionals review existing policies and legislation in order to identify anomalies and out-of-day provisions. They analyse and formulate policy options, prepare briefing papers and recommendations for policy changes. Moreover, they assess the impact, financial implications and political and administrative feasibility of public policies. Their areas of expertise may vary from law, economics, politics, public administration, international relations, to engineering, environment, pedagogy, health economics etc. Junior policy analysts/economists have less than 5 years of professional experience.
Secretarial positions
General office clerks (part of ISCO-08 411 and 4110) are generally not required to have a university degree although many do. They perform a range of clerical and administrative tasks according to established procedures. Tasks performed usually include: recording, preparing, sorting, classifying and filing information; sorting, opening and sending mail; photocopying and faxing documents; preparing reports and correspondence of a routine nature; recording issue of equipment to staff; responding to telephone or electronic inquiries or forwarding to appropriate persons; checking figures, preparing invoices and recording details of financial transactions made; transcribing information onto computers, and proofreading and correcting copy. The most senior that supervise the work of clerical support workers are excluded from this category.

Table E.2. Classification and definition of educational levels

Graduate level (ISCED 7/8) Designed to lead to an advanced research qualification (PhD); Designed to provide participants with advanced academic and/or professional knowledge (Masters Degree).
Undergraduate level (ISCED 6) Designed to provide participants with intermediate academic and/or professional knowledge, skills and competencies, leading to a first degree or equivalent qualification, example: baccalaureates.
Non-university education (ISCED 1-5) Other non-university education, for example Post-secondary Non-tertiary Education; Secondary Education and Primary Education.

Annex F. Methodology for indexes on Strategic Human Resources Management

Data used in the construction of the indexes for Human Resources Management (HRM) are derived from the 2024 OECD (GOV) Survey on Public Service Leadership and Capability. Survey respondents were predominately senior officials in central government HRM departments, and the data refer only to HRM practices at the central government level.

Each index is based on a theoretical framework representing an agreed upon concept in the area it covers. The theoretical framework for these indicators refers to specific principles of the OECD Recommendation on Public Service Leadership and Capability (PSLC) (OECD, 2019[1]), which represents an international consensus on standards for a fit-for-purpose public service. Each index has been reviewed and validated by the delegates of the Working Party on Public Employment and Management.

The two composite indexes presented here have been developed to measure contemporary public sector HRM practices. The variables comprising the indexes were selected based on their relevance to the concept and widespread use across countries.

When making cross-country comparisons, it is important to consider that the definition of the public service, as well as the organisations governed at the central level of government, may differ across countries.

Various statistical analyses were conducted to ensure the validity and reliability of the composite indices. The survey questions used to create the indexes are the same across countries, ensuring that scores are comparable. In order to eliminate the scale effects, all the sub-indicators and variables were normalised between "0" and "1" prior to the final computation of the index. Sub-indicators are equally weighted.

Delegation of public employment policies

To effectively drive workforce development and transformation, public employment policies must find an appropriate balance between the individual needs of ministries' and maintaining central oversight to ensure coherence, fairness, and alignment across government. This is why the PSLC Recommendation calls on governments to clarify institutional responsibilities for people management in particularly by 1) establishing institutional authority to set and oversee common minimum standards and 2) delegating an appropriate level of autonomy to individual agencies, ministries, leaders and/or managers to allow the alignment of people management with their strategic objectives. The composite indicator summarises the extent to which responsibility of determining conditions related to employee compensation (Budget, pay and benefits), sourcing and onboarding talent (Attraction, recruitment and onboarding) and workforce planning (workforce planning) is delegated. The index is organised around these three pillars, each weighted equally (33%).

If a country marked an item as 'not applicable', the - value was replaced with the mean of the other items within the same sub-indicator.

Variables and weights

The following items were used in the construction of this index and the weights are indicated in Figure F.1. Data are from module 6 *I. Human Resource Management Institutions* of the 2024 edition of the Public Service Leadership and Capability survey.

Figure F.1. Variables and weights used in the Delegation of public employment policies in central administrations index



Standardised performance assessments in central administration

Effective performance management aligns employee actions with public service goals, supports talent development, and motivates staff by linking their efforts to organisational outcomes. This is why the PSLC Recommendation calls on governments to assess, reward and recognise good performance, talent and initiative. Aligning reward and recognition mechanisms to performance helps managers to uphold principles of fairness and merit in promotions and pay decisions. The index on standardised performance assessments in central administrations captures how widely performance assessments are used, including for whom performance appraisals are mandatory, which tools are used across all of government, and how frequently they are applied. The index is organised around these three pillars, each weighted equally (33%).

Variables and weights

The following items were used in the construction of this index and the weights are indicated in Figure F.2. Data are from module 7 *II. Performance Management* of the 2024 edition of the Public Service Leadership and Capability survey.

Figure F.2. Variables and weights used in the standardised performance assessments in central administrations index



A detailed HRM annex on the components for each of the two composite indicators is available online at www.oecd.org/gov/govataglance.htm, including the variables, answer options, scores and weights used to construct the composite indicators, as well as the statistical analysis carried out.

References

OECD (2019), "Recommendation of the Council on Public Service Leadership and Capability", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0445. [1]

Annex G. Reporting systems and sources of countries for government in the National Accounts statistics

Table G.1. Reporting systems and sources of countries

Country	Non-financial government accounts	Financial government accounts
OECD member countries		
Australia	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Austria	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Belgium	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Canada	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Chile	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, non consolidated
Colombia	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Costa Rica	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	-
Czechia	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	ESA2010; Eurostat Government financial statistics, Annual financial accounts for general government, consolidated*
Denmark	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	ESA2010; Eurostat Government financial statistics, Annual financial accounts for general government, consolidated*
Estonia	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	ESA2010; Eurostat Government financial statistics, Annual financial accounts for general government, consolidated*
Finland	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
France	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	ESA2010; Eurostat Government financial statistics, Annual financial accounts for general government, consolidated*
Germany	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	ESA2010; Eurostat Government financial statistics, Annual financial accounts for general government, consolidated*
Greece	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Hungary	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	ESA2010; Eurostat Government financial statistics, Annual financial accounts for general government, consolidated*
Iceland	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Ireland	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	ESA2010; Eurostat Government financial statistics, Annual financial accounts for general government, consolidated*
Israel	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Italy	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance

Country	Non-financial government accounts	Financial government accounts
	government accounts	sheets, consolidated
Japan	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Korea	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Latvia	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Lithuania	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Luxembourg	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	ESA2010; Eurostat Government financial statistics, Annual financial accounts for general government, consolidated*
Mexico	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, non consolidated
Netherlands	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	ESA2010; Eurostat Government financial statistics, Annual financial accounts for general government, consolidated*
New Zealand	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Norway	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Poland	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	ESA2010; Eurostat Government financial statistics, Annual financial accounts for general government, consolidated*
Portugal	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Slovak Republic	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Slovenia	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	ESA2010; Eurostat Government financial statistics, Annual financial accounts for general government, consolidated*
Spain	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	ESA2010; Eurostat Government financial statistics, Annual financial accounts for general government, consolidated*
Sweden	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Switzerland	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Türkiye	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
United Kingdom	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
United States	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
OECD accession countries		
Brazil	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, non consolidated
Bulgaria	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	ESA2010; Eurostat Government financial statistics, Annual financial accounts for general government, consolidated*
Croatia	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Indonesia	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	SNA2008; OECD Annual National accounts, Financial balance sheets, consolidated
Romania	ESA2010; OECD Annual National accounts, General government accounts	ESA2010; Eurostat Government financial statistics, Annual financial accounts for general government, consolidated*

Note: * The source for the financial government accounts for these countries refers to Eurostat as it reflects the latest (validated) data updates (which are transmitted twice a year). For the other countries of the same domain the latest (validated) data updates have been transmitted to and drawn from the OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

Annex H. Methodology for revenue aggregates

The following table provides detailed information about how the aggregates of taxes, net social contributions, sales, and grants and other revenues presented in Chapter 16 "Public revenues and production costs" were constructed from the OECD *National Accounts* data.

Table H.1. Revenue aggregates

Label in Government at a Glance	Label in the System of National Accounts	Code in OECD National Accounts Data (Main aggregates of general government)
Taxes		
Indirect taxes	Taxes on production and imports, receivable	GD2R
Direct taxes	Current taxes on income and wealth, receivable	GD5R
Capital taxes	Capital taxes	GD91R
Net social contributions	Net social contributions	GD61R
Sales	Market output and output for own final use Payments for other non-market output	GP11_P12R GP131R
Grants and other revenues		
Current and capital grants	Other current transfers, receivable	GD7R
	Other capital transfers and investment grants, receivable	GD92R_D99R
Subsidies	Other subsidies on production, receivable	GD39R
Property income	Property income, receivable	GD4R
Total revenues	Total revenues	GTR

Annex I. Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG)

Developed by the OECD, the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) classifies government expenditure data from the *System of National Accounts* by the purpose for which the funds are used. As Table I.1 illustrates, first-level COFOG splits expenditure data into ten "functional" groups or sub-sectors of expenditures (such as economic affairs, education and social protection), and second-level COFOG further splits each first-level group into up to nine sub-groups. First-level COFOG data are available for 34 out of the 38 OECD countries (according to time series availability), while second-level COFOG data are usually available for OECD European countries plus Australia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Israel and Japan.[1]

Table I.1. First- and second-level COFOG

First-level	Second-level
General public services	• Executive and legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, external affairs • Foreign economic aid • General services • Basic research • R&D general public services • General public services n.e.c. • Public debt transactions • Transfers of a general character between different levels of government
Defence	• Military defence • Civil defence • Foreign military aid • R&D defence • Defence n.e.c.
Public order and safety	• Police services • Fire-protection services • Law courts • Prisons • R&D public order and safety • Public order and safety n.e.c.
Economic affairs	• General economic, commercial and labour affairs • Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting • Fuel and energy • Mining, manufacturing and construction • Transport • Communication • Other industries • R&D economic affairs • Economic affairs n.e.c.
Environmental protection	• Waste management • Waste water management • Pollution abatement • Protection of biodiversity and landscape • R&D environmental protection • Environmental protection n.e.c.

Housing and community amenities	• Housing development • Community development • Water supply • Street lighting • R&D housing and community amenities • Housing and community amenities n.e.c.
Health	• Medical products, appliances and equipment • Outpatient services • Hospital services • Public health services • R&D health • Health n.e.c.
Recreation, culture and religion	• Recreational and sporting services • Cultural services • Broadcasting and publishing services • Religious and other community services • R&D recreation, culture and religion • Recreation, culture and religion n.e.c.
Education	• Pre-primary and primary education • Secondary education • Post-secondary non-tertiary education • Tertiary education • Education not definable by level • Subsidiary services to education • R&D education • Education n.e.c.
Social protection	• Sickness and disability • Old age • Survivors • Family and children • Unemployment • Housing • Social exclusion n.e.c. • R&D social protection • Social protection n.e.c

Note: n.e.c.: "not elsewhere classified"

Note

[1] First-level COFOG expenditures data are not available for Canada, Mexico, New Zealand and Türkiye. Until recently, second level COFOG data were available in some national statistical offices, but were not collected by international organisations. Moreover, the second-level COFOG data were not always fully comparable among countries because the SNA/UN guide and the International Monetary Fund Manual on Government Finance Statistics did not provide much practical information on the application of COFOG concepts. However, in 2005, Eurostat established a task force on guidance on the application of COFOG to national account expenditure data and to discuss the collection of second-level COFOG data for European countries. Second-level COFOG data are not available for several OECD non-European countries, except Australia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Israel and Japan. In addition, these data are available only for selected COFOG divisions in some countries. Efforts are underway to reach agreement with these countries about the submission of these data to the OECD.

Annex J. Additional figures accessible online

J.1. Chapter 3. Prosperity

Figure J.1.1	Concerns about not being able to pay expenses or make ends meet, 2020 and 2022
Figure J.1.2	Trust in administrative fairness by gender, 2023
Table J.1.1	Legal basis for fiscal objectives and rules in place at national level, 2023

StatLink https://stat.link/iwcz59

J.2. Chapter 4. Public services

Figure J.2.1	Aspects included in government-wide strategy for improving public administrative services, 2024
Figure J.2.2	Rights of public services users, 2024
Figure J.2.3	Methods used to involve users in testing digital services, 2022

StatLink https://stat.link/kza361

J.3. Chapter 6. Openness, transparency and participation

Figure J.3.1	Political efficacy and confidence in impact of public consultation, 2023

StatLink https://stat.link/yka50h

J.4. Chapter 7. Digital government and innovation

Figure J.4.1	Digital government: Proactiveness, 2022
Figure J.4.2	Open government data: Support for data re-use, 2022

StatLink https://stat.link/w02g5z

J.5. Chapter 8. Regulation

Figure J.5.1	Trade-offs between environmental and other policy objectives, 2023
Figure J.5.2	Formalised co-ordination mechanisms to address issues of environmental sustainability by sector, 2023
Figure J.5.3	Consideration of quantitative environmental sustainability targets in decision making, 2023
Figure J.5.4	Use of inputs from environmental civil society organisations to inform decision making, 2023
Figure J.5.5	Principle-based reviews of regulations related to environmental sustainability, 2024

StatLink https://stat.link/1hkxe0

J.6. Chapter 9. Budgeting practices

Table J.6.1	Entities involved in determining the objective and scope of spending reviews, 2023
Table J.6.2	Entities involved in the final decision on adopting spending review recommendations, 2023

StatLink https://stat.link/zn47ht

J.7. Chapter 10. Infrastructure planning and delivery

Figure J.7.1	Funding instruments available to support investment in infrastructure maintenance, 2023
Figure J.7.2	Existence of legislation, regulations or policies for information-sharing about risks or vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure, 2022
Figure J.7.3	Use of systematic ex post analysis of contract performance in the transport sector, 2022

StatLink https://stat.link/xi3tq9

J.8. Chapter 11. Managing public procurement

Table J.8.1	Change in the structure of general government procurement spending by function, 2019 to 2023
Figure J.8.1	General government procurement spending by level of government, 2019 and 2023
Figure J.8.2	Competitive salaries for public procurement compared to other civil service workstreams, 2024

StatLink https://stat.link/s50yez

J.9. Chapter 12. Integrity

Figure J.9.1	Changes in perceptions of corruption among public employees, 2021 and 2023

StatLink https://stat.link/3vrfx9

J.10. Chapter 15. Public spending

Figure J.10.1	Annual growth rate of real government expenditures per capita, 2019-20, 2020-22, 2022-23 and 2023-24
Table J.10.1	Change in general government expenditures by function as a percentage of GDP, 2019 to 2023
Table J.10.2	Structure of general government expenditures by function, 2023 and change 2019 to 2023
Table J.10.3	Structure of general government expenditures by function of environmental protection, 2023 and change 2019 to 2023
Figure J.10.2	Government investment as a share of total investment, 2019 and 2023
Table J.10.4	Structure of general government investment by function, 2023
Figure J.10.3	General government primary balance and net interest spending as a percentage of GDP, 2023 and 2024
Figure J.10.4	General government structural primary balance as a percentage of potential GDP, 2007 to 2026

StatLink https://stat.link/ocz3gw

J.11. Chapter 16. Public revenues and production costs

Figure J.11.1	Annual growth rate of real government revenues per capita, 2019-20, 2020-22, 2022-23 and 2023-24
Figure J.11.2	Change in the distribution of general government revenues across levels of government, 2019 to 2023
Figure J.11.3	Change in the distribution of general government expenditures across levels of government, 2019 to 2023
Figure J.11.4	Structure of government debt by financial instruments, 2023 and 2024
Figure J.11.5	Annual growth rate of real government debt per capita, 2019-20, 2020-22, 2022-23 and 2023-24
Figure J.11.6	General government gross debt, Maastricht definition, as a percentage of GDP, 2019, 2023 and 2024
Figure J.11.7	Structure of general government outsourcing expenditures, 2023

StatLink https://stat.link/csg9d4

Government at a Glance 2025

The 2025 edition of *Government at a Glance* offers a comprehensive overview of public governance and public administration practices in OECD Member and accession candidate countries. It features indicators on trust in public institutions, prosperity, and satisfaction with public services, as well as evidence of good governance practices in the following areas: the governance of cross-cutting agendas; openness, transparency, and participation; digital government; regulation; budgeting; infrastructure planning and delivery; procurement; and integrity.

Finally, it provides indicators on the resources public institutions use and how they are managed, including public finances, public employment, and human resources management. *Government at a Glance* enables cross-country comparisons and supports the identification of trends, best practices, and areas for improvement in the public sector.

PRINT ISBN 978-92-64-36321-2
PDF ISBN 978-92-64-59508-8